Readings in Money and Banking Part 82

[280] Conway and Patterson, _The Operation of the New Bank Act_, pp.

184-192. J. B. Lippincott Company. Philadelphia, 1914.

[281] Victor Morawetz, _The Banking and Currency Problem in the United States_, pp. 47-50. North American Review Publis.h.i.+ng Company. 1909.

[282] From an address by Mr. James B. Forgan to the Texas Bankers'

a.s.sociation.

[283] Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1914, pp. 20, 21.

[284] _Ibid._, pp. 16, 17.

[285] John Skelton Williams, Address before the Kentucky Bankers'

a.s.sociation, October 6, 1915. _The Commercial and Financial Chronicle_, Vol. 101, No. 2624, October 9, 1915, pp. 1137, 1138.

[286] _Journal of the American Bankers' a.s.sociation_, Vol. VIII, No. 9, March, 1916, pp. 755-6.

CHAPTER x.x.xI

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT[287]

THE SPIRIT AND OBJECTS OF THE ACT

The primary purpose of the Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, is to make certain that there will always be an available supply of money and credit in this country with which to meet unusual banking requirements. Banks of a new cla.s.s, to be known as Federal Reserve Banks, are to be established, and upon these banks is to rest the heavy responsibility of supporting the structure of credit in periods of financial strain. The new banks are expected to keep themselves in a condition of such strength in ordinary times that the other banks may safely rely upon them for all needed cash and credit in emergencies. In the past, the banks in this country, when subjected to financial pressure, have relied mainly upon loan contraction and the selling of securities. In future it is expected that they will resort to the Federal Reserve Banks, securing additional funds from these by rediscounting commercial loans. If the new arrangements work well, loans in future will not be reduced merely for the purpose of strengthening the banks. Loan contraction will take place only when there is evidence of an over-extended condition of business; and even then contraction will be carried through gradually, so as to conserve all interests so far as may be possible. Under the new system a most important influence, if not the most important single influence determining the character of banking operations, will be just the reverse of what it has been in the past.

To meet the heavy responsibilities placed upon the Federal Reserve Banks, two things are absolutely essential--good management, and ample powers and resources. Good management cannot be secured with certainty by means of legislative provisions, however carefully designed with that end in view. In the particular instance of the Federal Reserve Act, an ingenious combination of government and banking influence in selecting the management is provided. Purely banking operations are very largely to be handled by boards of directors, a majority of the members.h.i.+p of which is to be chosen by banks. General supervision, and for some purposes control, is placed with the Federal Reserve Board, which is to be appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Experience alone can determine the wisdom of these arrangements for securing effective management.

The Federal Reserve Banks are to exercise wide powers, and would seem likely to have ample resources. The country is to be divided into not less than eight, nor more than twelve districts, in each of which a federal reserve bank is to be established.[288] All national banks are required, and qualified state banking inst.i.tutions are invited, to subscribe to the capital of the reserve bank in their district.

Subscribing banks, to be known as member banks, are required to keep a part of their reserve with their Federal Reserve Bank. These banks will presumably receive most if not all of the general funds of the United States Government. They will provide an elastic currency, issuing notes secured by their commercial a.s.sets. They are also empowered to undertake the business of collecting, and clearing checks throughout the entire country, thus providing an organization for making settlements between banks in different places, the lack of which has been one of the most serious defects in our banking system.

Each Federal Reserve Bank will be a central bank for the section of the country which it is to serve. It will have all the responsibilities and most of the powers of central banks in the various European countries; but largely because the system is to be superimposed upon a fully developed banking system, some important provisions of the Federal Reserve Act are unlike anything to be found in European legislation. The Federal Reserve Banks are to receive deposits from the Government and from member banks only. Ordinarily they will lend to member banks only.

All European central banks, though the bulk of their business is with banks and bankers, may deal with the general public and do so. The most striking divergence from European example, however, is the really novel plan of a system of regional banks in place of a single central bank.

But the extent of this divergence is generally exaggerated. Political boundaries are indeed in large measure economic and financial boundaries as well; but central banks in the European countries do act and react upon each other, often working in harmony, and yet at times very much at cross purposes. If all Europe were brought under a single government, very likely the various existing central banks would be merged into a single inst.i.tution. In some respects this would be advantageous, but it would not be absolutely necessary. Certainly European arrangements are not so fundamentally unlike those of a system of regional banks in a single country of great size, as to afford ground for the opinion that in setting up this system foreign experience has been altogether disregarded.

The various considerations which led to the adoption of the plan for regional banks, rather than a single central inst.i.tution, deserve careful attention, since they indicate the spirit and purpose of the Federal Reserve Act. A single central bank was the solution of the banking problem reached without a dissenting voice by the members of the National Monetary Commission. The bill which the commission prepared was a notable achievement. Pioneer work though much of it necessarily was, very few defects on the technical banking side were disclosed in the discussion which followed the statement of the proposed measure. Its provisions regarding banking operations, including relations with other banks, are embodied with few changes of an essential character in the Federal Reserve Act. Most of the important differences between the bill and the Federal Reserve Act reflect differences in spirit and purpose rather than in methods. A central bank and also the system of regional banks necessarily involve placing somewhere very extensive power to influence and control credit. In the present temper of public opinion, the possession of great economic power is not tolerated in the absence of a large measure of government supervision and control. But unfortunately, in framing its measure the monetary commission failed to realize the fundamental importance of this consideration as a factor in securing general public approval. In devising a form of organization, competent management and approval in banking circles were evidently the controlling factors. An organization was proposed under which out of forty-five directors, but three were to represent the Government, the remainder being selected in various ways by bankers. Support from some who were the most bitter opponents of the measure might have been secured if the bill had provided for a larger measure of government control; but an equal or even greater number of adherents would probably have been lost. Under the plan of the commission and indeed under any central bank plan, government supervision and control cannot be made effective without at the same time placing the details of operation in charge of government officials. Few of the most ardent advocates of a central bank were prepared to take this extreme step.

Under the plan of organization of regional banks, the difficulty of combining government control and private management vanished. Purely banking matters, such as the granting of loans, could be placed with boards entirely or mainly composed of persons selected by the bankers whose funds were to provide most of the necessary resources. On the other hand, supervision and whatever measure of control might be deemed advisable, could be placed with a board mainly or entirely appointed by the President of the United States. Differences of opinion may be entertained regarding the particular arrangements in the Federal Reserve Act for selecting the various administrative bodies, and regarding the division of power between the directorates of the federal reserve banks and the Federal Reserve Board. If experience should disclose defects in this form of organization, it is flexible enough to permit at any time an extension of government or of banking influence.

Another important advantage of the regional system is to be noted. The operation of a central bank would be far more likely to give rise to sectional antagonism. This danger was apparently fully realized by the members of the National Monetary Commission, and elaborate arrangements for selecting the management were devised in order to make certain that each section of the country should be properly represented. But obviously regional banks, managed by local people, are very much more certain to meet this requirement. Apparently it was an endeavor to remove still further the danger of sectional dissatisfaction that led the Monetary Commission to make its one serious departure from sound banking principle in framing its bill. A provision was inserted requiring rediscounts to be made at a uniform rate throughout the entire country, regardless of the wide differences in the demand and supply of capital, which occasion the existing wide differences in lending rates.

Under the regional plan no such indefensible provision was found necessary. This important feature of the Federal Reserve Act outweighs such advantages in economy of resources and effectiveness in management as were sacrificed in subst.i.tuting for a central bank the regional banks.

The Monetary Commission in framing its bill seems to have been guided by two principles generally wise in legislation--the scope of the measure was limited to the single purpose of removing purely banking defects in our banking system, and no greater departure from existing arrangements was proposed than was essential for the purpose in hand. The Federal Reserve Act certainly runs counter to the first of these principles. Its primary purpose is similar to that of the bill of the monetary commission; but a secondary purpose evidently exercised a potent influence. This purpose was to decentralize credits by lessening the concentration of banking funds in a few large banks in the chief financial centers, and especially in New York. The regional system itself gained much support because it was believed by many that it would lessen the financial predominance of New York City. No comprehensive scheme of legislation with this object in view was inserted in the bill; but wherever two or more means of accomplis.h.i.+ng the primary purpose of the bill were open, that one was evidently selected which it was believed might tend toward decentralization. In general the desire to decentralize credits explains why the act makes very much greater changes in existing arrangements than were proposed in the bill of the Monetary Commission. In the latter, the practice of depositing a part of the required reserves of the banks with reserve agents was left undisturbed. Under the terms of the Federal Reserve Act, such deposits are to be reduced by successive installments, and discontinued entirely three years after the pa.s.sage of the act. From a purely banking point of view, much can be said for this great change; but it was certainly not absolutely necessary in order to secure the desired improvements in the working of our banking system.

The new banking inst.i.tutions for which the Federal Reserve Act makes provision cannot be put in successful operation (and in this it resembles the bill of the Monetary Commission) unless a considerable number of the existing banks enter into relations with them. An inst.i.tution might have been established with large capital, and a monopoly of the right of note issue, authorized to act as government fiscal agent, and to deal with the general public. Such an inst.i.tution would presumably in the course of time have become a central bank, the main reliance of other banks in emergencies. In order to avoid compet.i.tion with existing banks, the act provides that the receipt of deposits by the Federal Reserve Banks, and their normal lending operations shall be confined to those banks which subscribe to the capital and maintain balances with them. Obviously, then, if banks in large numbers do not accept the arrangement, subscribing to the capital and relying upon the new banks for accommodation, the system cannot be put into effective operation. Moreover, it is necessary that many banks shall enter the system at the outset. An att.i.tude of hesitation would change to one of positive distrust, if the initial response were inadequate.

In the case of the bill of the Monetary Commission, reliance was placed simply upon the attractiveness of the measure. No bank would have suffered positive loss from failure to enter the system, though certain slight inducements were held out to those banks which accepted the arrangement at the outset. Whether a sufficient number of banks would have entered that system, if it had been established, may be thought probable but is not certain. Bankers are naturally and properly a conservative cla.s.s and the inclination of many would have been to wait until the system was in successful operation. The att.i.tude of bankers toward the Federal Reserve Act while it was pa.s.sing through Congress was distinctly unfavorable. Most of its provisions already referred to, as well as others in which it differed from the Monetary Commission bill, were disliked. It was evident that in the absence of positive pressure, the number of banks which would accept its terms would be too small to make successful operation possible. No attempt was made, however, to insert provisions which would bring pressure upon state banking inst.i.tutions. Perhaps it would be possible, either under the inter-state commerce or the postal clause in the Const.i.tution; but it would have been contrary to the const.i.tutional traditions of the party in power, and it was not necessary. If the national banks very generally enter the system, the resources of the Federal Reserve Banks will be sufficient to test the effectiveness of the measure. Accordingly the Federal Reserve Act contains a number of provisions designed to bring pressure to bear upon these to enter the system immediately. Failure to accept the terms of the act within one year after its pa.s.sage involves forfeiture of the national charter. This alone would be no great business sacrifice, since banking in most States is quite as profitable under a state as under a national charter. Loss of the national charter, however, involves a loss of the right to issue bank notes and calls for the deposit of lawful money in Was.h.i.+ngton equivalent to the amount of outstanding circulation.

Most national bank notes are secured by 2 per cent. government bonds, the price of which, in the absence of the circulation privilege, would be perhaps about two-thirds of the price (somewhat above par) at which they were purchased by the banks. No considerable number of national banks could refuse to enter the system without involving themselves in a heavy immediate loss. A further provision in the act puts more immediate pressure upon the national banks in reserve cities. If within sixty days after the pa.s.sage of the act, a reserve agent bank fails to signify acceptance of its terms, it must cease to exercise the reserve-holding right upon thirty days' notice from the Federal Reserve Board.

Many bankers bitterly condemned the compulsory features in the act while it was on its pa.s.sage through Congress. This feeling was perfectly natural, but it was not very generally shared outside banking circles.

Impartially considered, the act imposes no unreasonable burden upon those who have invested capital in national banks. No one fears the loss of the funds which may be subscribed to the capital stock of the federal reserve banks or placed on deposit with them. If loss should be incurred, it would be primarily due to unsound banking on the part of the boards of directors of the Reserve Banks, a majority of the members.h.i.+p of which is to be chosen by the banks themselves. Some bankers have doubted whether the act would prove an effective measure of banking reform; but few if any have felt that results under its operation could possibly be more unsatisfactory than those under the present system; and all agree that it is a long step toward a perfected system.

ORGANIZATION

The new system is to be organized under the supervision and direction of the "Reserve Bank Organization Committee," consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Comptroller of the Currency. The most important function of this committee is to determine, "with due regard to the convenience and the customary course of business," the number and area of the Federal Reserve districts into which the country is to be divided, and to designate the city in each district in which a Federal Reserve Bank is to be established. Not less than eight, nor more than twelve districts are to be created. This is a most difficult task. However carefully the initial lines of demarcation may be drawn, more or less modification is to be expected after there has been some experience with the working of the system. Changes in area of districts, and additional districts if the organization committee designates less than twelve, may be made at any time in the future by the Federal Reserve Board. While the rivalry of cities may tempt the committee to start the system with a larger number, it is to be hoped that it will be found feasible to begin with no more than eight or nine districts. The problems which will confront the management of the Federal Reserve Banks are in many respects unlike those with which our bankers have had experience. A somewhat higher average of capacity in the management may more confidently be looked for if the smaller number of banks is established. Moreover, especially at the outset, mere size will contribute not a little to the prestige of the banks, and so inspire public confidence in the new system. A greater variety of occupations in large areas will lessen, though not much, extremes of seasonal variation in demands for accommodation upon the federal reserve banks. Then, too, the task of the Federal Reserve Board in supervising and co-ordinating the system will be materially simplified, if the minimum rather than the maximum number of federal districts is decided upon.

Within sixty days after the pa.s.sage of the act, in other words before February 22, 1914, national banks are required, and properly qualified state banks are invited, to signify their acceptance of the terms of the act. Within thirty days after the reserve districts have been designated, each national bank must subscribe to the capital of the reserve bank of its district an amount equal to 6 per cent. of its capital and surplus. One-sixth of this subscription is to be paid at the call of the organization committee, another sixth within three months, and still another within six months thereafter. The remaining half of the subscription may be called at any time by the Federal Reserve Board.

All these payments are to be made in gold or in gold certificates. It will be observed that the exact time when the system will be established is uncertain. The organization committee is only required to designate the reserve districts as soon as is practicable; thirty days is then allowed for the banks to subscribe; and payments will begin sometime thereafter at the call of the committee....

After the minimum capital (four million dollars for any federal reserve bank) has been subscribed, the certificate of organization is to be executed by any five member banks designated for the purpose by the organization committee. The final duty of the committee will be to supervise all arrangements for the election of the six of the nine directors of each Federal Reserve Bank, who are to be chosen by the member banks. For electoral purposes the banks of each district are to be divided into three groups--each group to "contain as nearly as may be one-third of the aggregate number of the member banks ... and as nearly as may be banks of similar capitalization." While the number of banks in each group will be the same, the capitalization will be very different.

All the banks with a capitalization above the average in a district will certainly be in one group; those of somewhat less than average capital, in the second group; while the third group will be composed of banks having a very small capitalization. Under this ingenious arrangement, it is evident that the direct influence of the banks of the large cities in selecting the directorates of the Federal Reserve Banks is limited.

Local alignments are also avoided. On the other hand, this is not a grouping to which the banks have been accustomed in the past, and therefore there is some uncertainty as to whether at the outset it will be conducive to the selection of capable directorates.

Each group of banks is to choose two directors: a Cla.s.s A director, who is to be an active banker representing the stock-holding banks, and a Cla.s.s B director, who must be actively engaged in commerce, agriculture, or some other industrial pursuit in his district. The board of directors of each member bank is to elect a district reserve elector. Candidates for the position of director of a Federal Reserve Bank may be nominated by any member bank; but nomination is not necessary. Electors are to signify their first, second, and other choices for one director in each cla.s.s on a preferential ballot.

In addition to the six directors chosen by the banks, three directors (Cla.s.s C) are to be appointed by the Federal Reserve Board. Two of these must be persons of "tested banking experience," one to serve as chairman of the board of directors and district reserve agent, the other as deputy chairman and deputy reserve agent. These reserve agents are the official representatives of the Reserve Board, through whom it will exercise its powers of supervision and control over the reserve banks.

The act contains no provision regarding the officers to whom the operation of the banks will be entrusted. Presumably each board of directors will appoint one of its members (probably one of the Cla.s.s A directors) as president and manager. The term of office of all directors is three years, but at the outset they are to be cla.s.sified so that the term of one director of each of the three cla.s.ses shall expire annually.

The appointment of Cla.s.s C directors will be the first duty of the Federal Reserve Board; inasmuch as the organization of the system can hardly be completed before the beginning of the summer, the appointment of this board could be deferred until that time. The selection of these directors for each of the eight or more Federal Reserve Banks is, however, no small task in itself; and since public confidence in the new system will largely be based at the outset upon the character of the Federal Reserve Board, its early selection is much to be desired.

The Federal Reserve Board itself is to consist of seven members: the Secretary of the Treasury and Comptroller of the Currency _ex officio_, and five members appointed by the President of the United States by and with the [advice and] consent of the Senate. Of the five appointed members, at least two must be persons experienced in banking or finance.

Not more than one shall be appointed from any federal reserve district, and due regard is to be given to the different commercial, industrial, and geographical divisions of the country. The term of office of the appointed members is ten years; but those first selected are to serve one for two, one for four years, and so on, so that the term of office of one member may expire every two years.

Under this arrangement a majority of the board, in the absence of death and resignation, will never be reconst.i.tuted at any one time. Each President will select two of the appointed members: one in the second year of his term of office, and one in the fourth. The Secretary of the Treasury will, of course, be a new member appointed at the beginning of each presidential term. The term of office of the Comptroller of the Currency is for five years, so that here a variable element is introduced. It may happen that some Presidents will never appoint more than three members during their term of office. Generally, however, each President will appoint four members; but the last appointment, giving a majority on the board, will not be made until his final year of office.

Lack of continuity and the possibility of a political board were much greater under the provisions for selecting the Federal Reserve Board which were in the measure at various stages while it was pa.s.sing through Congress. The arrangements finally adopted would seem to make it reasonably certain that the Federal Reserve Board will be free from both these defects.

Organization of the system will be complete[289] with the selection of the members of the Federal Advisory Council. This Council is to consist of as many members as there are Federal Reserve districts, the board of directors of each Federal Reserve Bank selecting one member. The function and powers of the council are purely consultative. It is to meet regularly four times each year at Was.h.i.+ngton, and at other times there or elsewhere if deemed necessary by the Council itself. It is authorized to confer directly with the Federal Reserve Board, to call for information, and make oral or written representations concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board. It may prove to be an important part of the organization, but this does not seem probable. With a scattered members.h.i.+p and holding regular meetings only at long intervals, it is not to be expected that the Council will be in close touch with the Federal Reserve Board, or in a position to formulate policies and urge them effectively. From individual members of the Council, the Federal Reserve Board should secure valuable information regarding conditions in different parts of the country; but the work of the council itself as an organized body seems likely to be of a formal and perfunctory nature. The importance of the Council would doubtless have been measurably increased if the proposal had been adopted that its chairman should sit, even though without a vote, on the Federal Reserve Board.

CAPITAL, EARNINGS, DEPOSITS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS

Since the capital stock of each of the Federal Reserve Banks is to be exactly 6 per cent. of the capital and surplus of the member banks in its district, it will always be subject to slight variations. If all national banks enter the system at the outset, the total subscribed capital of the Federal Reserve Banks will be a little more than one hundred million dollars. Subscriptions may perhaps fall somewhat below this amount, since with the exception of the reserve agent banks, no penalty attaches to failure to subscribe until twelve months after the pa.s.sage of the act. Few state banking inst.i.tutions will enter the system at the beginning. In many states legislation is necessary to permit them to invest in the stock of the Federal Reserve Banks, and to enable them to count balances with the Federal Reserve Banks as a part of their required reserves. It is to be presumed also, that such inst.i.tutions, since they can enter at any time, will wait to see whether the system is working to the satisfaction of neighboring national banks.[290]

There will always be wide differences between the capital and other resources of the various Federal Reserve Banks. Neither the capital nor the resources of existing banks can be made the basis for dividing the country into Federal Reserve districts. Geographical consideration will necessarily require the creation of a number of districts in spa.r.s.ely settled parts of the country, in which banking resources are comparatively small. No Federal Reserve Bank may, however, be established until it has a subscribed capital stock of at least four million dollars. It would, therefore, seem to follow that the organization committee is precluded from forming any district in which 6 per cent. of the capital and surplus of the national and state banks is less than this minimum amount. There are indeed provisions in the act designed to meet the contingency of failure by banks to subscribe in sufficient numbers to provide a minimum capital; but they would not seem to authorize the organization committee to create districts in which resort to these provisions would be inevitable.[291]

Whether the capital of the Federal Reserve Banks is large or small is a matter of no great importance. Subscriptions to capital provide a comparatively small part of the resources of banks. The capital is an indication that those conducting a bank have something at stake, and is also a margin of safety against loss to depositors. These Federal Reserve Banks are, however, to accept deposits from banks only, and are ordinarily to confine their dealings to the banks. In these circ.u.mstances, there is practically no difference between the funds which the federal reserve banks will secure from member banks in payment of subscriptions to capital stock, and the funds which will be deposited with them by member banks. The depositors are the stockholders and, therefore, there is no separate interest to be protected by a margin of safety.

Shareholders in the reserve banks are ent.i.tled to a c.u.mulative dividend of 6 per cent. A limited dividend is obviously wise, since it tends to eliminate the profit-making motive in the management. Whether all the Federal Reserve Banks will regularly earn the 6 per cent. dividend is, of course, not certain; but it seems highly probable, since the danger of serious losses is remote, and interest will presumably not be paid to the member banks on their balances. All earnings in excess of the dividend are to be paid to the Government of the United States as a franchise tax; but half of these surplus earnings are to be paid into a surplus fund until it has become 40 per cent. of the capital stock.

Whatever is received by the Government from the Federal Reserve Banks is to be used at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, either to increase the gold reserve against United States notes or for the reduction of the interest-bearing debt.

The federal reserve banks will doubtless secure very large resources through the deposit with them of the moneys held in the general fund of the Treasury of the United States, although no power over the disposition which shall be made of these funds is granted either to the Federal Reserve Banks or to the Federal Reserve Board. Entire discretion remains with the Secretary of the Treasury. He may continue the independent treasury system without change; he may continue to deposit funds with member banks, just as. .h.i.therto he has placed deposits with national banks; and finally he may deposit with any or all of the Federal Reserve Banks, using them as government fiscal agencies. The responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury is in no way changed.

Almost certainly in practice, however, the bulk of the free funds of the Government will be placed with the Federal Reserve Banks, and doubtless the opinion of the Federal Reserve Board will determine the distribution of these funds between the various banks.