Readings in Money and Banking Part 85

We have discussed the adequacy of the new note issue in respect to seasonal or ordinary elasticity. We pa.s.s on now to consider its adequacy in respect to emergency elasticity--the elasticity which enables a currency to adjust itself to those extraordinary fluctuations in need which mark a banking panic and the depression that follows. Broadly speaking, it is pretty certain that at this point the new law will get a more favorable verdict than in the previous case. As pointed out in an earlier connection, the banking panic, when fully developed, gives rise to three difficulties and so to three needs: (1) funds to relieve the antecedent stringency which threatens a complete collapse of the credit structure; (2) a circulating medium for ordinary trade when a general suspension of payment by the banks has brought on a money famine; and (3) a prompt and thoroughgoing contraction of the circulation in the depression which follows the panic. Now, there surely can be no doubt that, under the new law, the availability of an issue sufficient in volume instantly to relieve the antecedent stringency, and so to put a stop to a panic before it had developed serious dimensions, is a.s.sured.

In fact, it is not at all improbable that, under the new system, the reserve banks will be able to check the development of such a panic at the very outset without increasing at all their note issues. But, if this does not prove true--if it turns out that more currency is needed for this purpose--there would seem to be no shadow of doubt that the new system will insure the forthcoming of such currency both of a quality and in a quant.i.ty which will be fully adequate to the task put upon it.

(1) The notes to be issued, being obligations of the Federal Treasury, will be as acceptable as gold even on the eve of a panic. (2) There is no limit to the absolute amount of these notes. (3) The practical limit set by the requirement that discounted paper shall be furnished as a basis for their issue is of no real significance, since such paper will undoubtedly be vastly greater in volume than any need which could arise.

Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the new system provides all the expansibility needed to abort, or reduce to comparative harmlessness, any panic which might arise.

A word now with respect to the second need which an emergency circulation is supposed to meet, that is, an ordinary circulating medium for trade when banks have by common consent suspended payment. In the first place, if we are right in supposing that the new law will surely prevent any panic from reaching such a degree of intensity, it is obvious that we shall not have occasion to meet the particular difficulty here under consideration--that our note issue will not be called on to display this particular sort of elasticity. If, however, it be supposed that the foregoing prediction does not turn out to be correct--if experience proves that panics can still go so far as to cause banks generally to suspend payments, to hold on to every form of reasonably solid money, and to try to satisfy the public with subst.i.tutes--our verdict for the new currency would necessarily be less favorable. We should have to admit that the new law does little or nothing to relieve such a situation. Broadly speaking, the new money will be altogether too good to meet this particular need. Banks that had reached a stage of panic sufficiently intense to cause them to suspend payment--to h.o.a.rd the ordinary forms of money--would be sure to h.o.a.rd money as good as those notes are bound to be. That is, the new issue would immediately pa.s.s into h.o.a.rds, as did the greenbacks which the Secretary of the Treasury reissued during the panic of 1873, and, therefore, would bring little if any relief to the currency famine which had developed. In fact, it is almost impossible to conceive any form of note fitted for this particular task except one which was so bad that there was no danger of its being h.o.a.rded. That is, the only proper way to meet this particular need of a severe panic is to make sure that it does not arise at all; and, in this respect, the new law promises well.

We come, finally, to the third need which emergency elasticity is supposed to meet, that is, a prompt and great contraction of the circulation when the panic has pa.s.sed and the inevitable business depression consequent upon such a panic has set in. Here, again, though not in the same degree as in the last case, if the new law proves as successful as many conservative students expect, the need in question will be little, if at all, experienced. We shall usually escape the extreme business inflation of the antepanic period; the panic itself will be much abated, if not completely eliminated; and, in consequence, the trade reaction which naturally follows a panic will be much diminished in intensity. If this turns out to be true, the circulation will never again show such an extraordinary glut as characterized the winter of 1893-94. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, after even an incipient panic, there will be some reaction, and consequently a more or less plethoric condition of the currency will follow. Will the new issue have sufficient contractility to meet this need? Earlier in this paper we have seen that the conditions attached to the new issue are in general not favorable to contractility, in that they do not provide for either the prompt driving home or the prompt drawing home of the notes when the necessity for their issue is past. Outsiders lack adequate motives for sending the notes home; issuers lack adequate motives for calling them home. The case for emergency contractility, however, is somewhat better than the case for ordinary contractility.

First, it is probable that the homing power of the note will prove greater at such a time than in an ordinary year, for, at such a time, outside banks will not be able to find investments for their funds, since speculative trading will disappear altogether and business generally will be at a very low ebb. Again, it seems certain that the issuing bank will, in this case, have more than the usual motive for bringing about a contraction of the circulation. The chief reason why such a bank may not be eager in ordinary times to hasten the retirement of its notes is the fact that, provided the notes do not acc.u.mulate in its own vaults, such a bank will gain more by using the funds in its possession to make loans than it would by using them to retire notes, a.s.suming that the interest charge made by the Federal Reserve Board is not placed excessively high. But it is practically certain that, in the depression which follows a panic, no reserve bank will have opportunities for keeping all of its funds busy; and since, in that case, the interest charge, however small, will be a dead loss, the bank will have adequate motive for effecting, as promptly as possible, an adequate contraction of its note liabilities. This motive would be still further strengthened should the glut prove sufficient to cause a decided drain of gold, since, in that case, the reserve banks will find difficulty in maintaining the required 40 per cent. reserve. On the whole, then, we seem warranted in affirming that, as respects emergency elasticity, the new notes will give no serious disappointment.

Finally, as respects elasticity in general, though the note issue, viewed by itself, does not seem quite fitted to satisfy the tests which an old-fas.h.i.+oned advocate of elasticity is inclined to impose upon it, yet, when we take the new law as a whole, it seems not unreasonable to affirm that it promises to accomplish, directly or indirectly, most of the ends which we had hoped to attain through elasticity and hence promises to give us a system which in essentials is truly and adequately elastic.

NOTES PRINTED AND ISSUED

[300]During the year 1915 the circulation of Federal Reserve notes has increased to $188,817,000 as of December 31, 1915. Believing that the country should be prepared against any contingency, the Board had authorized the printing of about $700,000,000 of these notes. Almost one-quarter of the total supply printed has been placed in circulation.

On December 31, 1915, however, only $16,675,000 of notes secured by commercial paper pledged with the Federal Reserve Agents was outstanding as an obligation of the Federal Reserve Banks. The liability of the Federal Reserve Banks as to the remainder has been discharged by the deposit with the Federal Reserve Agents of a like amount of gold and lawful money. This result has been achieved by the Federal Reserve Banks in responding to requirements, for currency by issuing Federal Reserve notes rather than by parting with gold. While the gold pledged with the Federal Reserve Agents represents a very valuable protection in case of a substantial demand for gold, it must be observed that the process is expensive without, at the same time, giving to the Federal Reserve Banks that additional strength and lending power which they would secure in case the law were amended so that the Federal Reserve Banks would remain liable for the outstanding notes, but, on the other hand, would retain property t.i.tle to the gold delivered to the federal reserve agents, which, in that case, would not be paid in to extinguish the liability upon the notes but would be deposited as collateral security against them.

IMPOUNDING GOLD

[301]On November 16, 1914, the first s.h.i.+pment of Federal Reserve notes was received by the Federal Reserve Agent [of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York] from the Comptroller of the Currency. On November 19 the bank pledged with the Federal Reserve Agent $500,000 of commercial paper rediscounted by member banks and received from him a similar amount of Federal Reserve Notes. These notes were not required by the banks which made the rediscounts, as they had already withdrawn by checks the credits so established. They were taken by this bank for its general use. The issue of Federal Reserve notes gave the reserve bank the opportunity of affording to its member banks complete interchangeability between book and note credits. The bank therefore established the policy of issuing Federal Reserve notes freely to any member bank desiring them whether the credit thus withdrawn was established by it through rediscounting, or the deposit of checks, or the deposit of gold or lawful money. In practice, however, most credits withdrawn by notes have been established by the deposit of checks which have been collected by this bank in gold or lawful money through the clearing house. Accordingly, the acc.u.mulation of cover in the hands of the Federal Reserve Agent has been mainly gold, with but a small amount of rediscounts. The processes provided by the act for the issue of Federal Reserve notes to the reserve bank permit complete interchangeability between gold and rediscounts held by the agent. Gold may be subst.i.tuted for rediscounts and rediscounts for gold, in accordance with the requirements of the reserve bank. During the entire period its requirements have been for notes with which it might exercise its statutory right to "exchange federal reserve notes for gold, gold coin, or gold certificates."

The policy of the Federal Reserve Bank has resulted in greatly strengthening its gold position and its ability to a.s.sist its member banks or other Federal Reserve Banks should they at any future time seek credit in order to withdraw gold for domestic or foreign uses. Through this policy also it has been able potentially, at least, to r.e.t.a.r.d the expansion of credit by impounding in the hands of the agent a large volume of gold which might otherwise have found its way into bank reserves already superabundant.

Furthermore, through this policy it has been able to take the first step toward accomplis.h.i.+ng one of the purposes of the act set forth in its t.i.tle, _e. g._, "to furnish an elastic currency." There are two forms of elasticity, one of _quant.i.ty_ and the other of _quality_, both provided for in the act.

From the point of view of cover, the gold certificate is completely inelastic. It stands at one extreme of our currency, with a dollar of gold set aside behind each dollar of paper. At the other extreme stands the national-bank note, with only 5 cents of gold set aside behind each dollar of paper. The a.s.sets of the issuing bank make it good, but its elasticity is nullified by the requirement that it must be secured dollar for dollar by government bonds.

Between these two extremes the Federal Reserve note, a new form of currency, has been introduced. For each dollar of this paper there is set aside from 40 cents to $1 of gold. As in the case of the national-bank note, the obligation of the United States and the a.s.sets of the issuing bank secure it.

The process in which this and other Federal Reserve Banks have been engaged is the subst.i.tution, as a circulating medium, of a note which is elastic in quality for the inelastic gold certificate. Gold is the most uneconomical medium of hand-to-hand circulation since, when held in bank reserves, it will support a volume of credit equal to four or five times its own volume. What the reserve bank does in acc.u.mulating gold behind its Federal Reserve notes is to establish with the holder of each note a credit which may be availed of whenever the occasion requires. With this credit established it can convert at will its gold-covered notes into notes covered partly by gold and partly by commercial paper. In times when credit is becoming strained and bank reserves need strengthening or when gold must be exported, this conversion will take place, and after the strain is over the gold cover will be restored through the repayment of the rediscounts subst.i.tuted for it. In this way elasticity of quality in our currency is obtainable. But it should not be construed as in any way a deterioration of the currency contemplated by the act. Quite the reverse is true. The act provides for the issue of Federal Reserve notes in unlimited amounts, with 40 cents of gold behind each dollar of paper.

This is elasticity of quant.i.ty and it becomes operative with the minimum of gold cover. Elasticity of quality, on the other hand, operates with a gold cover always above the 40 per cent. minimum and ranging as high as 100 per cent.

In order to be prepared for any currency demands which might be made upon it, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the spring of 1915 adopted the policy of having printed and keeping constantly on hand a supply of Federal Reserve notes substantially in excess of the amount of emergency currency which, experience shows, this district might be called upon to supply. The maintenance of this policy and of the policy of issuing Federal Reserve notes freely has entailed a heavy cost upon this bank. Unissued Federal Reserve notes are carried at cost on the books of the bank, and at the end of each month the amount of notes issued to the bank during the month is charged off at cost. The s.h.i.+pment of notes unfit for circulation to the Comptroller of the Currency at Was.h.i.+ngton for cancellation and destruction is a further item of expense in connection with the maintenance of these policies. The directors and officers of the bank, however, feel that the results accomplished amply justify the expense incurred, and consider that the added strength furnished the bank by the gold thus acc.u.mulated is perhaps the most important result of the operations of the period.

Some reduction has already been made in the cost of printing Federal Reserve notes, and it is to be hoped that further experience and study will enable other substantial reductions to be made in the cost of preparing for issue what has already become an important element of the circulating medium of the country. The act provides that all expenses in connection with the issue and redemption of Federal Reserve notes shall be borne by the Federal Reserve Banks, and in view of the service the banks are performing in acc.u.mulating gold through the medium of these notes, the feeling is quite general among their officers that the notes should be furnished to them at the lowest possible cost consistent with the high quality of workmans.h.i.+p required.

The design of the notes is not altogether satisfactory for efficient handling. In sorting notes it is necessary to be able readily to distinguish between notes of this bank and notes of other reserve banks.

This would be greatly facilitated if the printing of the distinctive number and letter of each bank were made more general on the face of the note.

THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS[302]

It seems clear that the cardinal principle in the management of the Federal Reserve Banks will be to disregard the course which will lead to maximum profits, following instead the path which will lead to the greatest safety and which will permit these banks to be of the greatest service to the nation. Large reserves should be maintained, and these should consist chiefly of gold. The payment of interest upon bankers'

deposits and government deposits should be avoided, if possible, for the reason that the payment of interest will force the keeping of smaller reserves, if the c.u.mulative dividend is to be earned. The banks should be managed, not from the standpoint of profit, but from the standpoint of safety.

Yet this is but one side of the policy of the Federal Reserve Banks.

Their power and influence can be made to extend much farther than would result solely from the wise management of their own affairs. These banks are the financial trustees of the nation. The country will look to them to see that they exercise over the member banks a closer supervision and discipline than has been possible in the past. Supplementing a negative control by the bank examiners, who are powerless so long as the letter of the law is observed, the federal reserve banks will be a great positive force. The Federal Reserve Banks, with the approval of the Federal Reserve Agent or the Federal Reserve Board, may conduct examinations of a member bank, both for the purpose of ascertaining its condition, and, what will be of equal importance, for the purpose of determining the lines of credit which are being extended by it.

In the long run, the greatest work which the Federal Reserve Banks can do for the business men of this country is to improve and standardize the methods of commercial borrowing. I believe it is possible for these banks, with the approval of the Federal Reserve Board, under the power just quoted, to establish a comprehensive credit information clearing service through which the aggregate loans of all large borrowers can be known by any bank official and through which excessive borrowing or the lending of money to concerns pursuing unwise financial policies can be checked before disaster overtakes them. This is one of the greatest needs of our banking system....

RELATIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS WITH MEMBER BANKS[303]

The aim of this bank [Federal Reserve Bank of New York] at all times has been to maintain frank and friendly relations with its member banks. At every meeting of the New York or New Jersey Bankers' a.s.sociations, or of their groups, to which invitations have been received, one or more of the directors or officers have been present and discussed the development of the various functions of the system.

When the establishment of an intradistrict collection system was under consideration, the directors and officers invited representative member bankers from all parts of the district to confer with them at the office of the bank. The plan finally adopted was thoroughly discussed in all its aspects and a consensus of opinion seemed to prevail that it was a fair and reasonable plan.

When the conditions under which State banks should be admitted to the reserve system were under consideration three conferences were held by the directors and officers of the bank, one with national bankers, one with State bankers, and one with trust company officers, from various parts of the district, to ascertain their views upon the question at issue. In every case the policy has been pursued of dealing frankly with those present, in order that they might understand fully how the action under consideration would affect them.

The officers have expressed themselves at all times as desirous of establis.h.i.+ng personal relations with officers of member banks and have invited them to call at the bank when in New York City. Yet a year has gone by and officers of probably not over 15 per cent. of the member banks have done so. Many of them still have the feeling that the bank is a branch of the Government. Their experience with the Government consists princ.i.p.ally of the statutory and supervisory relations.h.i.+p which exists between them and the Comptroller's office. The conception of the relation of this inst.i.tution with them as co-operative makes headway slowly. The fact that the national banks were practically compelled to join the system naturally r.e.t.a.r.ds the development of the co-operative idea. The change of att.i.tude, upon which the success of the system will ultimately depend, will probably come slowly, but there are already signs, as we enter upon the second year of the system, that the banks are getting more accustomed to it and appreciate the results it has already accomplished. It is hoped that during the coming year, with organization pressure somewhat lessened, more time can be devoted by the officers to developing personal relations with the officers of member banks.

The present att.i.tude of the member banks toward the reserve bank may be summarized as follows:

The New York City banks, upon which the strain of all crises first and chiefly falls, fully understand the value and benefits of the system.

While regretting the loss of bank deposits which will probably be drawn from them (estimated to be as high as $250,000,000), they are nevertheless hearty supporters of the system, at all times co-operative in their att.i.tude.

Many of the banks in other large cities are unable to take full advantage of the lowered reserve requirements, but in spite of the loss of interest on their reserve balance, most of them understand what the system in its larger aspects means for American banking and generally give it their support.

While the same may be said of many of the country banks, yet it is among the country banks as a cla.s.s that most of the apathy and hostility to the federal reserve system which still persists is found. Their opportunities and earnings are relatively small, and in order to live they must figure closely. They feel the loss of interest on reserve deposits; the absence, as yet, of dividends on their capital contribution; and the prospective loss or decrease of the exchange they generally charge on remitting for checks drawn upon them. Many banks in industrial centres are precluded by the activity of their business from taking advantage of the reduction in the required reserve. They believe that they will, in fact, be required to carry an even larger reserve than heretofore in order to obtain collection service for notes, drafts, and non-member bank checks and the various other services now rendered by their reserve agents, but not yet undertaken, by the reserve banks.

It is very natural that they should view with reluctance the termination or diminution of long-standing business a.s.sociations with their reserve agents. Few of them, as yet, conceive of the reserve bank as their active reserve agent, performing all the services which go with the relations.h.i.+p. The dormant accounts most of the banks maintain with the reserve bank are, perhaps, indicative of their att.i.tude toward it.

Relatively few banks of this district are borrowers; in good times and bad they have been able when necessary to borrow from their city correspondents on bonds or on the indors.e.m.e.nt of their directors, two avenues which are now to be closed to them. The rediscounting privilege has been little availed of and the larger functions of the Federal Reserve System, such as influencing domestic rates and international gold movements through the development of a discount market and by dealing in foreign bills, appear remote from their spheres of activity.

They feel that the system has few advantages to offer in return for the cost it entails upon them.

All of these points will be felt with increasing acuteness by the country banker as his reserve transfers approach completion and as reduced balances result in reduced service from his city correspondent.

His point of view is outlined thus frankly in order that the difficulties he sees may be clearly recognized and steps taken gradually to remove them. The development of a more satisfied relations.h.i.+p requires progress on the part of the reserve bank and a willingness to co-operate on the part of the country banker.

The reserve bank should organize a complete collection system embracing the handling of notes, drafts, and items on non-member banks, which eventually will bring all the members into daily active relations with the bank. It must be ready to act for member banks in the purchase, sale, and custody of securities; to supply credit information on names whose paper is offered by brokers; to give its members information concerning methods of developing the new functions which the act authorizes them to exercise; to perform the services now rendered by their reserve agents; and generally to a.s.sist them in every reasonable way.

The member banks should look upon the reserve bank not as an alien but as their own inst.i.tution. They own all its capital and most of its resources, and they control its management through the directors they elect, subject always to the supervision of the Reserve Board. At the reserve bank they may borrow as a standing right and not as a favor which may be cut off. They no longer have to buy or carry bonds to serve as security for loans; the paper of their own customers, large or small, will now serve as their security. While panics in the past may not have affected them, they have been disastrous to the business interests of the country, who are their customers; and their contributions to the reserve bank should be recognized as a form of insurance not merely for themselves but for their customers as well. If this insurance is expensive and makes some changes in the nature of their business, the act should be carefully studied with a view to making the most of the new functions it provides. New avenues of activity should be looked for.

The banks which will get the most out of members.h.i.+p are those which are the first to see and develop the opportunities it provides and to educate their customers to the protection and facilities they will enjoy through the system. The occasion is a favorable one also for the correction of abuses. Customers will do things in the name of the Federal Reserve System which they have never done before. The experience of banks in using the forms provided by the reserve bank to get statements from their borrowers is evidence of this. The occasion should be seized also to increase the balances of depositors who carry unprofitable accounts. To a.s.sist member banks in studying their accounts this bank has had under preparation by chartered public accountants a reasonably simple form for a.n.a.lyzing accounts which may be obtained by banks desiring to use it.

It is the duty of the directors and officers to understand not only the problems of the reserve bank but those of the member banks as well; and it has been their endeavor during the past year to give special study to those of the country bank. Several suggestions for the relief of the country bank have come to their notice.

One of these, which the American Bankers' a.s.sociation at its 1915 Seattle convention favored, was to permit the 3 per cent. of reserve which the member bank may carry either in its vaults or in the reserve bank, to be deposited with member banks not more than 300 miles distant and count as reserve. This seems to be contrary to the spirit and intent of the act, which is primarily to centralize reserves in Federal Reserve Banks.

Another suggestion which seems more worthy of consideration is that the percentage of reserve required for country banks should be somewhat further reduced. When the reserve transfers are completed checks in transit can no longer count as reserves. It is clear, therefore, that the reserve reduction contemplated by the act will not be realized in practice. A further reduction in the reserve requirements would, in the case of many banks, result in a reserve less than the amount their business actually required, and would enable them to carry the amount thus freed wherever it would best serve their particular business, and, if they so desired, to maintain some relations with present city correspondents. It would lead away from the present rigidity of bank reserves toward greater flexibility and a better understanding of their meaning and purpose.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS AND ITS MEMBERS

[304]The Ninth Federal Reserve Bank has sought to make the Federal Reserve Act fully operative within its district. During the spring of 1915 it had opportunity to demonstrate its effectiveness in meeting the requirements of agriculture in the Northwest during the planting season, and rediscounted liberally for member banks, in order to enable them to better satisfy the requirements of farmers. It relieved local pressure at a number of points where manufacturing enterprises and general business were depressed because of war conditions, and had opportunity to show that it can efficiently meet the demands of industry. Again, in the fall of the year, when an adverse season had created large amounts of immature corn, it was able to perform a very valuable service in a.s.sisting member banks to meet the requirements of farmers who were suddenly compelled to make provision for utilizing a valuable forage crop. During the prevalence of the foot-and-mouth disease it was able to come to the a.s.sistance of many banks in the western part of its territory, which had applications for loans from numerous stockmen who had cattle ready for market, but were unable to s.h.i.+p on account of quarantine conditions. The service above indicated, while not perhaps of notable consequence in any single case, consists in the aggregate of a very valuable degree of a.s.sistance, which would not have been available except for the Federal Reserve Bank, and without which, portions of the district would have encountered considerable hards.h.i.+ps.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON AND ITS MEMBER BANKS

[305]Owing to the unusual conditions existing in the money market, and to the fact that the reserve city banks offer facilities to the country banks which this bank has not yet developed, more particularly in connection with the collection of checks and other items, the latter banks have carried only their minimum reserve requirements with this bank and have used its facilities only to a limited extent. The relations between country bank officials and the officials of this bank have been most cordial. While many of the banks in this district are borrowing, most of them find it much more convenient to go to their correspondent bank and borrow, either in the form of a demand loan, with or without collateral, or against a certificate of deposit.