The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914 Part 49

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded war as imminent[553]. But why? Even in the East matters did not as yet threaten such a conflict. Russia had declared that Servia was not to be made a va.s.sal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration, she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. But neither Russia nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554].

Austria seems to have expected a _limited_ war, _i.e._ only with the Serbs. She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long as she did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to va.s.salage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia's intervention, as in 1909[555]. The German proposals of July 29 are the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved while Holland would be left alone. In the course of his remarks the Chancellor said that "he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany"--a reference to the German offers of 1912 described in this chapter. As at that time the Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so, too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both Goschen and Grey must have seen the snare. The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553: M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to England's att.i.tude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized.

All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]

[Footnote 554: Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 161. _J'accuse_ (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey's actions which betokened tension with Germany. Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to be crowned with success. On July 20, that is three days before Austria precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to moderate her demands on Servia. The day after the Austrian Note he urged a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria who negatived this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey worked for peace, with the approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria. But on July 31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts. On July 31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia (a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier), sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours; also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust. Russia could not have a.s.sented without occupying an inferior position to Austria. If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same action for each of the disputants. Further, while blaming the Russians for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps, including what is called _Kriegsgefahr_, which made her army far better prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, if the Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to await the arrival (on August 1) of the special envoy, Tatisheff, whom, on the night of July 30, the Tsar had despatched to Berlin[556]? There is not a single sign that the Berlin Government really feared "the Eastern Colossus,"

though statements as to "the eastern peril" were very serviceable in frightening German Socialists into line.

[Footnote 556: German White Book, No. 23_a_; _J'accuse_, Section III. B, pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W.

Headlam, _History of Twelve Days,_ p. 183.)]

The German ultimatum failed to cow Russia; and as she returned no answer, the Kaiser declared war on August 1. He added by telegram that he had sought, _in accord with England,_ to mediate between Russia and Austria, but the Russian mobilisation led to his present action. In reply to the German demand at Paris the French Premier, M. Viviani, declared on August 1 at 1 P.M. that France would do that "which her interests dictated"--an evasive reply designed to gain time and to see what course Russia would take. The Kaiser having declared war on Russia, France had no alternative but to come to the a.s.sistance of her Ally. But the Kaiser's declaration of war against France did not reach Paris until August 3 at 6.45 P.M.[557] His aim was to leave France and Belgium in doubt as to his intentions, and meanwhile to ma.s.s overwhelming forces on their borders, especially that of Belgium.

[Footnote 557: German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No.

147.]

Meanwhile, on August 1, German officials detained and confiscated the cargoes of a few British s.h.i.+ps. On August 2 German troops violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. On the same day Sir Edward Grey a.s.sured the French amba.s.sador, M. Paul Cambon, that if the German fleet attacked that of France or her coasts, the British fleet would afford protection.

This a.s.surance depended, however, on the sanction of Parliament. It is practically certain that Parliament would have sanctioned this proceeding; and, if so, war would have come about owing to the naval understanding with France[558], that is, if Germany chose to disregard it. But another incident brought matters to a clearer issue. On August 3, German troops entered Belgium, though on the previous day the German amba.s.sador had a.s.sured the Government of King Albert that no such step would be taken. The pretext now was that the French were about to invade Belgium, as to which there was then, and has not been since, any proof whatever.

[Footnote 558: British White Paper, No. 105 and _Enclosures_, also No.

116.]

Here we must go back in order to understand the action of the British, French, and German Governments. They and all the Powers had signed the treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the independence of Belgium; and nothing had occurred since to end their engagement. The German proposals of July 29, 1914, having alarmed Sir Edward Grey, he required both from Paris and Berlin a.s.surances that neither Power would invade Belgium. That of France on August 1 was clear and satisfactory. On July 31 the German Secretary of State, von Jagow, declined to give a reply, because "any reply they [the Emperor and Chancellor] might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." As on August 2 the official a.s.surances of the German amba.s.sador at Brussels were satisfactory, the British Foreign Office seems to have felt no great alarm on this topic. But at 7 P.M. of that evening the same amba.s.sador presented a note from his Government demanding the right to march its troops into Belgium in order to prevent a similar measure by the French. On the morrow Belgium protested against this act, and denied the rumour as to French action. King Albert also telegraphed to King George asking for the help of the United Kingdom.

The tidings reached the British Cabinet after it had been carefully considering whether German aggression on Belgium would not const.i.tute a _casus belli_[559].

[Footnote 559: British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 20-25. For a full and convincing refutation of the German charges that our military attaches at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had bound us by _conventions_(!) to land an army in Belgium, see second Belgian Grey Book, pp. 103-6; Headlam, _op. cit._, ch. xvi., also p.

377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium.]

The news of the German demand and the King's appeal reached Westminster just before the first debate on August 3. Sir Edward Grey stated that we were not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance, of which we did not know the exact terms; and there was no binding compact with France; but the conversations on naval affairs pledged us to consult her with a view to preventing an unprovoked attack by the German navy. He explained his conditional promise to M. Cambon. Thereupon Mr. Redmond promised the enthusiastic support of all Irishmen. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, though demurring to the policy of Sir Edward Grey, said, "If the Right Honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could a.s.sure us that he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him." Now, the Cabinet had by this time resolved that the independence of Belgium should be a test question, as it was in 1870. Therefore, there seemed the hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party would give united support to the Government. By the evening debate official information had arrived; and, apart from some cavilling criticisms, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of decided action on behalf of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum demanding the due recognition of Belgian neutrality by Germany. No answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany entered on a state of war shortly before midnight of August 4.

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears the aggressive character of German policy. Some of her Ministers doubted the advisability of war, and hoped to compa.s.s their ends by threats as in 1909 and 1913; but they were overborne by the bellicose party on or shortly before July 29. Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but German diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having been forced on by military men. Bethmann-Hollweg was never remarkable for breadth of view and clearness of insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated the follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of the civilised world in order to gain a few days' start over France and stab her unguarded side. It is a clumsy imitation of the policy of Frederick in 1756.

As to the forbearance of Great Britain at the crisis, few words are needed. In earlier times the seizure of British s.h.i.+ps and their cargoes (August 1) would have led to a rupture. Clearly, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues clung to peace as long as possible. The wisdom of his procedure at one or two points has been sharply impugned. Critics have said that early in the crisis he should have empowered Sir George Buchanan, our amba.s.sador at Petrograd, to join Russia and France in a declaration of our resolve to join them in case of war[560]. But (1) no British Minister is justified in committing his country to such a course of action. (2) The terms of the Ententes did not warrant it. (3) A menace to Germany and Austria would, by the terms of the Triple Alliance, have compelled Italy to join them, and it was clearly the aim of the British Government to avert such a disaster. (4) On July 30 and 31 Grey declared plainly to Germany that she must not count on our neutrality in all cases, and that a Franco-German War (quite apart from the question of Belgium) would probably draw us in[561].

[Footnote 560: British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book, No. 17.]

[Footnote 561: British White Paper, Nos. 101, 102, 111, 114, 119. I dissent from Mr. F.S. Oliver (_Ordeal by Battle,_ pp. 30-34) on the question discussed above. For other arguments, see my _Origins of the War,_ pp. 167-9. The ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were looser; but anything of the nature of a general threat to the Central Powers would probably have ranged her too on their side.]

Sir Edward is also charged with not making our intentions clear as to what would happen in case of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

But he demanded, both from France and Germany, a.s.surances that they would respect that neutrality; and on August 1 he informed the German amba.s.sador in London of our "very great regret" at the ambiguity of the German reply. Also, on August 2 the German amba.s.sador at Brussels protested that Belgium was quite safe so far as concerned Germany[562].

When a great Power gives those a.s.surances, it does not improve matters to threaten her with war if she breaks them. She broke them on August 3; whereupon Grey took the decided action which Haldane had declared in 1912 that we would take. The clamour raised in Germany as to our intervention being unexpected is probably the result of blind adherence to a preconceived theory and of rage at a "decadent" nation daring to oppose an "invincible" nation. The German Government of course knew the truth, but its education of public opinion through the Press had become a fine art. Therefore, at the beginning of the war all Germans believed that France was about to invade Belgium, whereupon they stepped in to save her; that the Eastern Colossus had precipitated the war by its causeless mobilisation (a falsehood which ranged nearly all German Socialists on the side of the Government); that Russia and Servia had planned the dismemberment of Austria; that, consequently, Teutons (and Turks) must fight desperately for national existence in a conflict forced upon them by Russia, Servia, and France, England perfidiously appearing as a renegade to her race and creed.

[Footnote 562: British White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, 125; Belgian Grey Book, No. 19.]

By these falsehoods, dinned into a singularly well-drilled and docile people, the Germans were worked up to a state of frenzy for an enterprise for which their rulers had been preparing during more than a decade. The colossal stores of war material, ama.s.sed especially in 1913-14 (some of them certain soon to deteriorate), the exquisitely careful preparations at all points of the national life, including the colonies, refute the fiction that war was forced upon Germany. The course of the negotiations preceding the war, the a.s.siduous efforts of Germany to foment Labour troubles in Russia before the crisis, the unpreparedness of the Allies for the fierce and sustained energy of the Teutonic a.s.sault,--all these symptoms prove the guilt of Germany[563].

The crowning proof is that up to the present (August 1915) she has not issued a complete set of diplomatic doc.u.ments, and not one despatch which bears out the Chancellor's statement that he used his influence at Vienna for peace. The twenty-nine despatches published in her White Book are a mere fragment of her immense diplomatic correspondence which she has found it desirable to keep secret, and, as we have seen, her officials suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 urging that the Austro-Serb dispute be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

[Footnote 563: See the d.a.m.ning indictment by a German in _J'accuse_, Section III., also the thorough and judicial examination by J.W.

Headlam, _The History of Twelve Days_.]

The sets of despatches published by the Allies show conclusively that each of them worked for peace and was surprised by the war. Their unpreparedness and the absolute preparedness of Germany have appeared so clearly during the course of hostilities as to give the lie to the German pamphleteers who have striven to prove that in the last resort the war was "a preventive war," that is, designed to avert a future conflict at a time unfavourable to Germany. There is not a sign that any one of the Powers of the Entente was making more than strictly defensive preparations; and, as has been shown, the Entente themselves were formed in order to give mutual protection in case of aggression from her. The desperate nature of that aggression appeared in her unscrupulous but successful efforts to force Turkey into war (Oct.-Nov. 1914). No crime against Christendom has equalled that whereby the champions of _Kultur_ sought to stir up the fanatical pa.s.sions of the Moslem World against Europe. Fortunately, that design has failed; and incidentally it added to the motives which have led Italy to break loose from the Central Powers and a.s.sist the Allies in a.s.suring the future of the oppressed nationalities of Europe.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE PARt.i.tION OF AFRICA IN 1902.]