Vermont Part 11

The English government having determined to attempt making terms with the Americans, commissioners were appointed for that purpose, and arrived in America in June, 1778. They addressed a letter to the president of Congress, inclosing their commission from the crown. Their propositions were objected to by Congress, on the ground that they were founded on dependence, which was utterly inadmissible. Congress was inclined to peace, but it could only be treated for upon an acknowledgment of the independence of the States, or the withdrawal of the king's fleets and armies.

The commissioners were empowered to treat with such bodies politic or corporate, a.s.semblies of men, person or persons, as they should think meet and sufficient for the purpose of considering the grievances supposed to exist in the government of any of the colonies respectively; to order and proclaim a cessation of hostilities on the part of the king's forces, as they should think fit; and also to appoint governors of provinces. These powers were to be transferred to Sir Henry Clinton in case Sir William Howe, one of the commissioners, should be disabled from exercising them. This did occur, and Sir Henry Clinton acted as a peace commissioner for a time beyond the limitation of the first commission, which was June, 1779.

Having failed with Congress, the commissioners appealed to the public in a manifesto offering to the colonies at large or separately a general or separate peace, with the revival of their ancient governments, secured against any future infringement, and protected forever from taxation by Great Britain.

The geographical situation of Vermont, bordering on the great thoroughfare from Canada southward, her controversy with the neighboring colonies, and the unfriendly att.i.tude of Congress toward her, especially invited the overtures of the British agents.

In March, 1779, Lord George Germaine, Secretary of Colonial Affairs, wrote to General Haldimand: "The minister says, the separation of the Inhabitants of the country they style Vermont from the Provinces in which it was formerly included is a Circ.u.mstance from which much advantage might be derived, and sees no objection to giving them reason to expect, the King will erect their country into a Province."

The first overture was made, under the direction of Sir Henry Clinton, by Colonel Beverly Robinson, afterward engaged in the plot with Arnold.

In March, 1780, he wrote to Ethan Allen, to whom the letter was delivered in July in the streets of Arlington by a British soldier disguised as a Yankee farmer. Robinson began by saying that he had been informed that Allen and most of the inhabitants of Vermont were opposed to the wild and chimerical schemes of the Americans in attempting to separate the continent from Great Britain, and that they would willingly a.s.sist in uniting America again to the mother country. He invited Allen to communicate freely whatever proposals he wished to make, and thought that upon his taking an active part, and embodying the inhabitants of Vermont in favor of the crown, they might obtain a separate government under the king, and the men be formed into regiments under such officers as Allen should recommend.

Allen at once laid the letter before Governor Chittenden and a few of the leading men, who all agreed that it was best to return no answer.

In September following, Governor Chittenden wrote to General Haldimand asking a cartel for the exchange of some prisoners who had been captured in the spring by scouting parties from Canada. In October a large British force came up the lake to Crown Point, and the commander, Major Carleton, brought an answer to Chittenden's letter, and wrote to Ethan Allen, commanding the Vermont troops, acquainting him that he had appointed Captain Sherwood to treat with him and Governor Chittenden on the subject of an exchange; also that no hostilities should be committed by the British on posts or scouts within the boundaries of Vermont during the negotiations, while Allen would be expected to observe the same, "and recall his scouts to prevent the appearance of not adhering to the above."

Allen asked that the cessation of hostilities might be extended to the northern posts and frontiers of New York, to which, after some demur, Carleton finally agreed. The Vermont militia returned to their homes, much to the surprise of the New York militia serving on their borders, and the British retired to winter quarters in Canada without making any hostile demonstration against Vermont.

Ira Allen and Joseph Fay were appointed on the part of Vermont to confer with the British commissioners, Captain Sherwood and Dr. Smyth, both Tories, on the subject of a cartel, and all proceeded together from Crown Point toward Canada. An early winter was coming on; and as they made their way down the lake, its waters were steaming like a cauldron, and lofty columns of vapor swept past the boats like an army of gigantic spectres. The pa.s.sage of the boats was soon opposed by a more material obstacle in the rapidly forming ice, and as the men were breaking the way through this, Ira Allen says, "much political conversation and exhibit of papers took place." After some days of battling with the ice, the Vermont commissioners abandoned the struggle and went home, promising that they or other commissioners should visit Canada as soon as possible.

This Dr. Jonas Fay undertook in the winter, and went as far as Split Rock, where he found the ice still an enemy, now refusing to bear him further, and he was obliged to abandon the journey.

On the 23d of February, 1781, Ethan Allen received a second letter from Beverly Robinson, inclosing a copy of the first, which he feared had miscarried. He now confidently a.s.sured Allen that the terms mentioned in the first letter might be obtained, provided he and the people of Vermont took an active part with Great Britain. Allen returned no answer, but transmitted both letters, with one from himself, to Congress. His letter closed with bold and characteristic words: "I am confident that Congress will not dispute my sincere attachment to the cause of my country, though, I do not hesitate to say, I am fully grounded in opinion that Vermont has an indubitable right to agree on terms of cessation of hostilities with Great Britain, provided the United States persist in rejecting her application for a union with them; for Vermont, of all people, would be most miserable were she obliged to defend the independence of the United claiming States, and they at the same time at full liberty to overturn and ruin the independence of Vermont. I am persuaded, when Congress considers the circ.u.mstances of this State, they will be more surprised that I have transmitted them the inclosed letters than that I have kept them in custody so long, for I am as resolutely determined to defend the independence of Vermont as Congress are that of the United States, and rather than fail will retire with hardy Green Mountain Boys into the desolate caverns of the mountains, and wage war with human nature at large."

On the 1st of May, which being his birthday he deemed propitious, Ira Allen, as sole commissioner, set forth for Isle aux Noix in considerable state, being attended by a guard consisting of a lieutenant, two sergeants, and sixteen privates. Afterward, when the British were again in force upon the lake, General Haldimand objected to the agents of Vermont being attended by so large a retinue, and forbade more than five persons being received. Allen was treated with great politeness by the commander, Major Dundas, who was empowered to act only in the exchange of prisoners. On the second day, as Sherwood and Allen were walking in the gray of the soft spring morning beneath the wide ramage of the nut-trees that gave the island its name, the Tory captain informed the handsome young colonel that he and Dr. Smyth were to settle the armistice with him, and concert measures to establish Vermont as a royal colony. For his better opportunities of conducting them, the negotiations with Vermont had been committed to General Haldimand's management, and he had given his instructions to Sherwood and Smyth on the 20th of the preceding December. These instructions authorized "positive a.s.surances that their country will be erected into a separate province, independent and unconnected with every government in America, and will be ent.i.tled to every prerogative and immunity which is promised to other provinces in the proclamation of the King's commissioners." It was proposed to raise two Vermont battalions of ten companies each, of which Haldimand should be colonel, but all other officers should be Vermonters, and ent.i.tled to half pay. The instructions still further state, "I am so much convinced of the present infatuation of these people, ... I agree that this negotiation should cease, and any step that leads to it be forgotten, provided the Congress shall grant the State of Vermont a seat in their a.s.sembly, and acknowledge its independency." Sherwood said the reception of the British overtures during the ice-bound voyage on the lake was such that they had great hope of success. This hope it was the policy of Vermont to encourage, in order to secure the safety of the people, since all the Continental troops had been ordered out of the State, the New York troops withdrawn from Skenesborough, and Vermont had no adequate force wherewith to oppose the British force of 7,000 men in Canada. Thus abandoned, as it appeared to them designedly, that they might be forced into submission to New York, the leaders saw no hope of safety for the State but in an adroit management, to their own advantage, of these attempts of the British.

In his interviews with the commissioners, Allen was non-commital, and "very cautious and intricate," as they reported. He would make no proposals, nor talk of anything beyond the neutrality of Vermont during the war, at the close of which it must, as a separate government, be subject to the ruling power, if that power would give the State a free charter.

A cartel for the exchange of prisoners was arranged, and a verbal agreement made that hostilities should cease between the British forces and those of Vermont until after the session of the legislature of the State, and longer "if prospects were satisfactory to the commander-in-chief." After seventeen days the present negotiations ended, and, with expressions of his satisfaction with the treatment he had received, Allen departed with his attendants, voyaging homeward past green forested sh.o.r.es, above which, far to the eastward, the Crouching Lion, h.o.a.ry with yet unmelted snows, reared his majestic front, as if guarding the beloved land of the Green Mountain Boys.

In compliance with a request of the a.s.sembly, Ira Allen appeared before them in June, and gave a report of his mission to Canada to arrange a cartel, in which he had happily succeeded. He also stated that he had "discovered among the British officers a fervent wish for peace," but disclosed nothing concerning the overtures made to him.[83] These were then known to but ten persons, and were never disclosed to but few.

That all might share alike the dangers and responsibilities of these negotiations, a paper giving approval of Colonel Ira Allen's policy by feigning or endeavoring to make them believe that the State of Vermont had a desire to negotiate a treaty of peace with Great Britain, and stating it "to be a necessary political manoeuvre to save the frontiers of this State," was signed by Jonas Fay, Samuel Safford, Samuel Robinson, Joseph Fay, Thomas Chittenden, Moses Robinson, Timothy Brownson, and John Fa.s.sett, eight of the most ardent patriots of the State, who then and ever afterwards enjoyed the full confidence of the people. In the exposed and dangerous condition of the State, they deemed it justifiable to resort to stratagem, always practiced in war to ward off the blows of an enemy.

In July, Major Fay was sent to the enemy on Lake Champlain, to complete the exchange of prisoners, and was received on board the Royal George.

The British found him as unprepared as Colonel Allen had been to close with the proffered terms, but wis.h.i.+ng to continue the negotiations till November. The British agents suspected that the Vermonters were procrastinating to save themselves from an invasion by king or Congress.

"Upon the whole," they said, "it appears to us that interest, not loyalty, induces the leading men of Vermont to unite with Canada. One fifth of the people wish it from the same motive, near another fifth from principles of loyalty, and the remainder are mad rebels." Yet the hope of drawing such a rebellious people to the king's cause was not abandoned, and the correspondence continued.

Emissaries from Canada came now and then to Ethan Allen and his brother Ira. Unmolested if not undiscovered, they made their stealthy journeys between Canada and the Vermont settlements. Gliding in light canoes along the lake in the shadow of cedar-clad sh.o.r.es, up the solitude of wooded streams where only the silent flight of the disturbed heron heralded their approach, and stealing along the byways of almost forgotten Indian trails, they found at last safe hiding during their brief tarries, delivered in the dusk their precious packets, received others, and then returned by the ways they had come.

In July, Ira Allen wrote to General Haldimand that he and two others had been appointed agents to Congress, with full powers to make and receive proposals for articles of union between the United States and Vermont.

"It is expected that the said agents will make proposals to Congress that will not be accepted, and show that Congress means nothing more than to keep this State in suspense till the end of the war, and then divide the territory among the claiming States." Yet when, soon afterward, Allen was acting as agent to Congress, he so far yielded the claim of Vermont to her east and west unions that the boundaries proposed by him through a member from Connecticut were at once accepted by Congress, though afterward rejected by Vermont on the ground that the proposals had not been officially made by her agents. This shows that his real preferences were not such as he would lead Haldimand to believe.

A letter from Lord George Germaine to Sir Henry Clinton, which had been intercepted by the French and taken to Paris, was received by Congress, to whom it had been sent by Dr. Franklin. "The return of the people of Vermont to their allegiance," it said, "is an event of the utmost importance to the king's affairs, and at this time, if the French and Was.h.i.+ngton really meditate an irruption into Canada, may be considered as opposing an insurmountable bar to the attempt. General Haldimand, who has the same instructions with you to draw over those people and give them support, will, I doubt not, push up a body of troops to act in conjunction with them to secure all the avenues through their country to Canada." This letter had an immediate effect upon the action of Congress, for a committee was at once appointed by that body to confer with persons to be appointed by the people of the Grants, who should have full power to agree upon and ratify terms and articles of union and confederation with the United States of America.

Ira Allen, who with Jonas Fay and Bezaleel Woodward had in June been appointed agents to Congress, and were now on their way to Philadelphia, says: "This information had greater influence on the wisdom and virtue of Congress than all the exertions of Vermont in taking Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and the two divisions from General Burgoyne's army, or their pet.i.tion to be admitted as a State in the general confederation, and offers to pay their proportion of the expenses of the war."

In September, 1781, there were further negotiations at Skenesborough between the British commissioners and Colonel Allen and Major Joseph Fay, acting for Vermont. The plan of government for Vermont was considered, and it was agreed it should be essentially the same as that established by her Const.i.tution, excepting the governor should be appointed by the king in council.

The commissioners proposed to make prisoners of several persons in Vermont who were most opposed to the negotiations, and insisted that Vermont should declare itself a British colony, and proposed an expedition against Albany. By uniting with the British troops, they said, the Vermonters would be able to defend themselves against the other States, and declared that something effectual must be determined on before they parted, or the armistice must cease, for the commander-in-chief would not lose this campaign by inactivity.

The agents of Vermont would not consent to the first proposal, which would make active enemies of those who should be conciliated. Against the others they set forth the extent of the frontier of Vermont, which it would be impossible for the king's troops to defend in winter, when, unsupported by them, their friends in Vermont would be overpowered; that there were many zealous Whigs among the inhabitants who might better be conciliated than openly opposed; that, by continuing the truce, other unions than those already existing might be established; and that, by the pursuit of the present policy, better results might be attained by the British than by those proposed by the commissioners. The commissioners took down in writing the heads of these objections, and then suggested an instruction, which they could not deviate from without putting an end to the armistice, which was, that General Haldimand should, in pursuance of full powers vested in him by his Majesty in council, issue a proclamation offering to confirm Vermont as a colony under the crown; that an army should come up the lake in October with said proclamations and distribute them while the legislature was in session, which must accept them, and with the British take measures for common defense. The agents strengthened their previous arguments by saying that, considering the climate and bad roads, and the absence of all necessary preparations, the season was too far advanced for such operations; that one winter would have great effect in changing the minds of the people for a new order of things. But if, in spite of these reasons, the general should still insist on such a proclamation, they trusted that he would learn the temper of the people before issuing it.

With this understanding they consented to the proclamation rather than break the armistice.

Small chance was there of the acceptance of such a proclamation by a legislature chosen from a people three fifths of whom were known to be "mad rebels," to cure whose madness it does not appear that any attempt had been made by the men who on the part of Vermont were conducting these negotiations. The conference now ended, and the agents departed, leaving the British commissioners very hopeful of success.

In October, while the legislature was in session at Charlestown, in the eastern union, General St. Leger came up the lake to Ticonderoga with a force so large that the narrow channel was black with the swarming armament. About the 25th a small scouting party, sent out for appearance's sake by the commander of the Vermont troops, General Enos,[84] who was in the secret of the negotiations, was fired upon while watching the movements of the British, and the leader, Sergeant Tupper, was killed. His body was buried with military honors, and his clothes, with an open letter expressing regret for his death, were sent by St. Leger to General Enos at Castleton. These being publicly delivered, considerable stir was caused among the troops, and no less in Charlestown when the news arrived there by a messenger bearing letters from General Enos to Governor Chittenden. These letters related as well to the private negotiations with the British as to public affairs; and while the governor, sitting with others in a public room, was acquainting himself with their contents, Major Reynolds, commanding New Hamps.h.i.+re troops there, came in and demanded of Colonel Allen why a British general should be sorry for the death of an enemy. Allen answered that he did not know, unless that good men were sorry when good men were killed. Angry words ensued; and while the spectators were agog to hear the quarrel, copies of the letters were made, excluding all that pertained to the negotiations. These were publicly read in place of the original letters, and the people were quieted. Ira Allen wrote to the commissioners, now with General St. Leger, reporting rumors of Cornwallis's surrender, which, whether true or not, had the same effect on the people, and advised that in the present situation the proclamation would best be withheld for a while. He also sent a list of the members of the new legislature, representing that the changes were favorable to the success of the negotiations. The letter was delivered at Ticonderoga about ten o'clock in the morning, and an hour afterward an express arrived from the south with tidings of the surrender of Cornwallis.

Before evening, St. Leger began the embarkation of his stores and troops, and, with a favoring wind, set forth toward Canada. The campaign had ended with barren results to the English, and no injury to Vermont but the death of poor Sergeant Tupper, perhaps slain only to "try the temper of the people." The commissioners flattered themselves that this affair had resulted very favorably to them.

There is no record of any subsequent interview of the agents of Vermont and the British commissioners, though there were frequent communications pa.s.sing between them during the next year. One of the commissioners wrote to Ira Allen in February, 1782, expressing his anxiety to know what effect the surrender of Cornwallis had made upon the people of Vermont. He reminded Allen that it was well to consider the many chances and vicissitudes of war; that, however brilliant the last campaign might appear, the next might wear a very different aspect; and of the probability of the ruin of Vermont by her "haughty neighbors, elated by what they call a signal victory;" and hoped that Allen might see, as he did, that it was more than ever the interest of Vermont to unite with those who would make her a free and happy government.

In April General Haldimand wrote to Sir Henry Clinton that "coercion alone must now decide the part Vermont will take;" that it had made concessions to Congress by relinquis.h.i.+ng its claims to the east and west unions, the confirmation of which had been promised by him.

In June Ethan Allen wrote to Haldimand that "the last refusal of Congress to admit the State into the union has done more to awaken common people to a sense of their interest and resentment of their conduct than all which they had done before. By their own account, they declare that Vermont does not and shall not belong to their confederacy; the consequence is, that they may fight their own battles. It is liberty which they are after, but they will not extend it to Vermont; therefore Vermont does not belong to the confederacy or the controversy, but are a neutral republic." He offers to meet General Haldimand on any part of Lake Champlain, and closes in bitterness of spirit: "There is a majority in Congress, and a number of the princ.i.p.al officers of the Continental army continually planning against me. I shall do everything in my power to render this State a British province."

Ira Allen was again sent to Canada early in July with a request from Governor Chittenden for the release of two Vermont officers then prisoners in Canada, a request which was granted. About this time a letter attributed to Ira Allen, though it was a wide departure from his cautious practice of making only verbal communications on such delicate affairs, was written from Quebec to General Haldimand. It begins with the request that a supposed charter to Philip Skene, for a government comprehending Vermonters with the tract of country called the "Western Union," might be produced, as the limits of Vermont would thereby be established according to an act of Congress confirming all royal charters and government lines established before the Declaration of Independence. The writer represents that the people of the Western Union "are mostly in favor of government, and would be of great use in bringing about the wished-for revolution." If General Haldimand advised it, the Vermont leaders would endeavor to raise a regiment or two from the other provinces, to consist of the most loyal or at least moderate men, with no officers but known and tried friends of government, to be stationed in Vermont under pretense of protecting the frontiers; such regiments to be supplied by the king, and always ready to act in or out of Vermont as ordered. "Thus far," he says, "I have not deviated from the principles of my employers, the ruling men of Vermont." But now, unauthorized, he proposes an immediate recognition of Vermont under government; that the princ.i.p.al gentlemen of Vermont promised to abide by any agreement he should enter into, provided it should be kept a profound secret till the British government could protect and a.s.sist them; and that they should not be obliged to go out of Vermont to make war with the other States; but if other colonies should invade Canada, they would oppose them as much as possible, but could not consistently go to Canada for its defense and leave their own State exposed to ruin; and also promised never to take arms again in opposition to British government, or a.s.sist Congress on any pretense whatever. In conclusion, the writer intimates that some of the king's money will be necessary to carry out these plans. There is only circ.u.mstantial evidence that Ira Allen was the author of this letter; although it is probable that he was, yet it contains contradictions hardly consistent with his usual shrewdness. Later in the same month General Haldimand wrote to Sir Guy Carleton: "I have brought it [the negotiation] to a very embarra.s.sing crisis with regard to myself, having urged the people to the declaration in favor of government by a long series of persuasion, and the strongest a.s.surances of support and reward. Uninformed as I am of the intentions of administration, except in general terms that they are pacific, I can no longer act with Vermont upon any certain grounds until I receive instructions for that purpose. In the mean time I shall amuse the messenger, who is very pressing for answers to his proposals, in the best way I can." In August he writes to Governor Chittenden: "You may rest a.s.sured that I shall give such orders as will effectually prevent hostilities of any kind being exercised in the district of Vermont until a breach on your part, or some general event, may make the contrary my duty."

After the signing of the preliminary articles of peace between Great Britain and the United States, but before Was.h.i.+ngton had proclaimed the cessation of hostilities, or the news of the peace, though expected, had reached Canada, General Haldimand dispatched his last letter to Vermont.

"While," says this letter, "his Excellency sincerely regrets the happy moment which, it is much to be feared, cannot be recalled, of restoring to you the blessings of the British government, and views with concern the fatal consequences approaching which he had so long and so frequently predicted from your procrastination, he derives some satisfaction from a consciousness of not having omitted a circ.u.mstance which could tend to your persuasion and adoption of his desired purpose.

If the report now prevailing has any foundation, a very short time will determine the fate of Vermont. Should anything favorable present, you may still depend on his Excellency's utmost endeavor for your salvation."

This closed the negotiations which had been continued for three years between the Vermont leaders and the British in Canada, and which, during that period, had saved the State from invasion on the one hand and disruption on the other. While it may be conceded that in the conduct of this policy the Vermonters did not exhibit the most exalted devotion to the faithless Congress,[85] though in it they did indeed serve it well, it must also be conceded that it was the only course by which they could preserve the autonomy of their State. This, antedating by eight years that of any other colony, could but be more precious to them than mere existence as a part or parts of other colonies, one of whom, and the princ.i.p.al claimant of their territory, had been, and still continued to be, more tyrannical and oppressive than Great Britain.

They had rendered a most valuable service to the cause of America in the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the first offensive operations of the Americans; on their own soil had fought their country's battles, one of which was largely instrumental in the defeat of Burgoyne; and had contributed a regiment of Green Mountain Boys to the Continental army.

But when, after they had declared the independence which they had so long maintained, they asked to be admitted to a union with the sister States, Congress turned a deaf ear to their appeal, and listened only to the dissentient voices of New York and New Hamps.h.i.+re, greedy for spoil, and to the Southern States, jealous even so early of a preponderance of Northern commonwealths.

Abandoned by those to whom they naturally looked for aid when threatened by the common enemy, whose advance upon their wide frontier they were too feeble to oppose, they took advantage of the attempts of that enemy to corrupt them to procure a cessation of hostilities, which saved not only their own State but the frontiers of New York from invasion. If, at any time, they really contemplated more than this, and a wholesome admonition to Congress to respect their rights, they never sought to work injury to the Confederation from which they were excluded; and in the very beginning General Haldimand promised, if Vermont should be admitted an independent State in that Confederation, the "negotiation should cease, and any step that leads to it be forgotten."

There was no treason. The Vermonters could plot no treason against a government in which they had no part. As independent as the United States, their right was as absolute to make terms with Great Britain, even to becoming a province under it, as they boldly declared to Congress they would do rather than submit to the government of New York.

Ira Allen did not scruple to carry misrepresentation beyond even the vaguely defined limits of diplomacy, and to him is chiefly due any doubts of the integrity of his a.s.sociates, the wise and patriotic fathers of the State.

In the necessarily secret conduct of the policy adopted, they incurred the suspicious of friends and foes alike. Their own Warner and Stark, who had led the Green Mountain Boys to victory, suspected them, and General Haldimand complained of treachery; but they steadfastly pursued their course, to the accomplishment of all they desired.[86]

FOOTNOTES:

[83] A British spy who was in Bennington at the time gave a report of the proceedings rather unfavorable to the success of the British cause.

[84] When Ethan Allen resigned, General Enos was appointed in his place.

[85] Winsor says in his _Critical History_, vol. vii. p. 188: "These tergiversations of Congress were not inducive of steadfast patriotism in the new State."

[86] _Vt. Hist. Soc. Collections_, vol. ii.; _Governor and Council_, vol. ii.; _Early History of Vermont_, Hiland Hall; _History of Vermont_, Ira Allen; Williams's _History_, vol. ii.; Thompson's _Vermont_.

The Haldimand correspondence, in a voluminous cipher, was obtained from the British Archives and sent to the distinguished antiquarian, Henry Stevens, of Barnet. These papers, now in the office of the secretary of state, were published in full by the Vermont Historical Society in 1871.

CHAPTER XVI.