The Geneva Protocol Part 15

Great Britain ........ 155,935 Latvia ............... 20,000 Germany .............. 100,000 Lithuania ............ 15,000 Austria .............. 21,500 Poland ............... 250,000 Hungary .............. 35,000 Norway ............... 16,000 Jugo Slavia .......... 130,000 Sweden ............... 32,000 Rumania .............. 125,000 Denmark .............. 27,000 Czecho Slovakia ...... 149,877 Greece ............... 110,000 Netherlands .......... 163,262 Bulgaria ............. 20,000 Italy ................ 250,000 Turkey ............... 88,000 Switzerland .......... 500,000 France ............... 732,248 Soviet Union ......... 1,003,000 Belgium .............. 86,531 Finland .............. 30,000 Spain ................ 240,113 Esthonia ............. 16,000 Portugal ............. 40,000

Total armed forces in Europe, 1924 ........... 4,356,466

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CHAPTER XVII.

DEMILITARIZED ZONES.

Emphasis is laid by the Protocol on the creation and maintenance of demilitarized zones along frontiers. Article 9 of the Protocol treats of such zones, and their violation is, by Article 10 made the equivalent of a resort to war.

Any question of the real value, in the strict military sense, of agreements for demilitarized zones, may be left at one side.

Undoubtedly, expert opinions differ in this matter. At least it may be said that such agreements have a value in the realm of feeling, which is as much a reality in international affairs as is a fleet of battles.h.i.+ps.

If countries feel more secure because of the creation of such zones, certainly agreements regarding them are worth while on each side of a frontier.

As mentioned above, the question of demilitarized zones will certainly be one of the items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

There are quite a number of precedents for the creation of such zones in recent international agreements. For example, the Treaty of Versailles[1] creates a demilitarized zone for fifty kilometres east of the Rhine. The Aaland Islands were demilitarized by the Treaty[2]

which attributed them to Finland; and the Treaty of Lausanne[3] creates certain demilitarized zones, not only on each side of the Straits, but also in Western Thrace.

It is such agreements as these that are referred to in Article 9 of the Protocol as those "already existing under the terms of certain treaties." It is these zones, and others which may be established by consent of the neighboring States, which, according to Article 9, may be placed under a system of supervision by the League, either temporary or permanent. Obviously, any such supervision would come about by means of the voluntary agreement of the States concerned; and, in view of the fact that the Protocol makes a violation of a demilitarized zone the {102} equivalent of a resort to war (Article 10), supervision by the League of the carrying out of these essential agreements would seem to be highly desirable.

Indeed, it may be said here that it will almost certainly be found that a system of international inspection will inevitably be a part of agreements for the reduction and limitation of armaments. A system of general international inspection was suggested as one of the parts of the so-called American Plan,[4] and the proposal for a system of supervision of demilitarized zones under the League of Nations is a part of that general idea.

I do not think it should be lost sight of that the thought of certain places where violence is forbidden has roots which go far back in human history. The idea of "sanctuary" is as old as any records that we have; and, if it be thought that I am going very far afield in speaking of sanctuary, I mention that the legal development of this general notion is a very early development. At least as long ago as Anglo-Saxon law in England, it was a peculiarly heinous offence to commit a crime on the King's Highway. It was a much more serious matter to break the peace there than elsewhere, because it was a breach of the King's peace; and this notion of the King's peace is said by high authority to be as old as the Salic Law.

We have heard much in the past of strategic frontiers. A great deal of ability and learning have been devoted toward the problem of making frontiers available for attack or for defence. It is perhaps true, as some critics appear to think, that the development of war in the air and of chemical warfare has made questions of strategic frontiers in general less important than heretofore. Perhaps that is so. I suggest, however, that even if it is so, that same ability and learning may be able to find in a combination of the ideas of demilitarized zones and international supervision a real solution of the problems arising from these new methods and discoveries; and, as I have pointed out, there is a very ancient human feeling behind this whole idea of peaceful places, on which popular support for such a programme may be based.

[1] Articles 42 to 44.

[2] A. J. I. L. Supplement 1923, Vol. XVII, p. 1.

[3] A. J. I. L., Vol. XVIII, January, 1924, pp. 58, 63.

[4] Annex F, p. 263.

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CHAPTER XVIII.

SECURITY AND THE PROTOCOL.

For me to discuss the bearing of the Protocol of Geneva upon the security of States means that I go outside my brief.

No technical juristic reasoning is applicable to a feeling which lies at the heart of national sentiments, sentiments of patriotism and of devotion to country, which are as deep rooted in the souls of millions as are the love of family and the belief in religion.

This matter of security is in verity a matter of national feeling, a state of mind in the truest sense. For no human agency, no belief, no will, outside of the country concerned, can alter or affect it.

Ourselves alone must say, we and our rulers, whether or not we are in fact secure--if we say yes, that is enough; but if we say no, it is not for any one else to question, much less for any one else to seek to argue the matter.

So I shall merely seek to state the theory of the Protocol in regard to this matter of security. That theory is this: if the nations of the world will agree to outlaw war, if they will agree to subst.i.tute law for force, to settle by pacific means all disputes among them, if they will agree to unite against any people which so agrees but then betrays humanity by tearing up its own agreement, then we may develop intra-nationally a belief in security, a confidence in a settled order, a hope for the future, which will slowly but inevitably disarm the forces for war and lift the curtain on a new day.

Such is the theory of the Protocol of Geneva.

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CHAPTER XIX.

INTERPRETATION OF THE PROTOCOL.

Article 20 of the Protocol provides that any dispute as to its interpretation shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. No provision similar to this is to be found in the Covenant.

The importance of this provision does not consist chiefly in its application to the Protocol. Even if and when the Protocol comes into effect the provision in itself will not be very important, because the Protocol is only a temporary doc.u.ment to be transformed into amendments to the Covenant. If these amendments include the incorporation into the Covenant of a similar provision to the effect that any dispute as to its interpretation shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice, such an amendment will be of supreme importance.

With the Protocol embodied in the Covenant, the latter doc.u.ment will be by far the most important international treaty in existence. If all questions of its interpretation are to be submitted to the Permanent Court, that tribunal will have judicial powers of the most far-reaching character.

It is true that the extension of the powers of the Court so that they would include the interpretation of the Covenant is logical in so far as it relates to the settlement of disputes between Members of the League or other States; but the Covenant contains many other provisions bearing only indirectly upon such disputes. The Covenant provides for the Council and the a.s.sembly and for their meetings, their powers and procedure, powers which under Articles 11 and 19 of the Covenant, for example, are expressed in the most general terms. The Covenant provides for the mandate system for certain territories and for the supervision by the League of numerous international agreements and bureaus of all sorts. Now, in most of these matters the method of interpreting the Covenant has been by consent. Members of the Council or, as the case may be, of the a.s.sembly agree on what {105} they may do and proceed accordingly. If differences of view as to the interpretation of the Covenant in this regard are to be submitted to the Permanent Court, that tribunal would have in some respects a power superior to that of either the Council or the a.s.sembly.

Let me give an instance. The fifth paragraph of Article 4 of the Covenant provides as follows:

"Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a Member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interest of that Member of the League."

This paragraph gave rise to a difference of opinion as to what States are ent.i.tled to sit on the Council when it considered questions arising under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles and similar Articles in the other Peace Treaties relating to the investigations by the Council of the armaments of Germany and other countries. When the question came up, the Council took the opinion of Jurists on it and reached a common sense result.[1] Under a general clause giving jurisdiction to the Court in all matters of interpretation,[2] it would seem that any Member of the League could require a question as to the composition of the Council on a particular occasion to be decided by the Court before the Council could meet. It is obvious that any such method of regulating procedure would give rise to impossibilities which should be avoided.

[1] See League of Nations Official Journal, July, 1924, p. 922 and Cmd.

2287 (Miscellaneous No. 20, 1924), p. 16.

[2] Many people suppose that the Supreme Court of the United States has such general powers regarding our Const.i.tution, but this is not so.

Read, for example, Article I, Section 5 of the Const.i.tution; and see Ma.s.sachusetts _v._ Melton, 262 U. S., 447.

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CHAPTER XX.