The Great War in England in 1897 Part 19

CHAPTER XXII.

PANIC IN LANCAs.h.i.+RE.

The Russians were within gunshot of Manchester! A profound sensation was caused in that city about eight o'clock on the evening of September 6th, by an announcement made by the _Evening News_--which still appeared in fitful editions--that a Cossack patrol had been seen on the road between Macclesfield and Alderley, and that it was evident, from the manner of the Russian advance, that they meant to attack the city almost immediately.

The utmost alarm was caused, and the streets were everywhere crowded by anxious, starving throngs, eager to ascertain fuller details, but unable to gather anything further beyond the wild conjectures of idle gossip.

The great city which, on the outbreak of war, was one of the most prosperous in the world, was now but a sorry semblance of its former self. Heated, excited, turbulent, its streets echoed with the heartrending wails of despairing crowds, its factories were idle, its shops closed, and its people were succ.u.mbing to the horrible, lingering death which is the result of starvation.

Wealth availed them naught. Long ago the last loaf had been devoured, the last sack of flour had been divided, and the rich living in the suburbs now felt the pinch of hunger quite as acutely as factory operatives, who lounged, hands in pockets, about the streets.

Manchester, like most other towns in England, had come to the end of her supplies, and death and disease now decimated the more populous districts, while those who had left the city and tramped north had fared no better, and hundreds dropped and died by the roadside.

The situation in Lancas.h.i.+re was terrible. At Liverpool a few vessels were arriving from America, under escort of British cruisers, bringing supplies, but these were mostly purchased at enormously high rates, and sent to London by way of Manchester and Sheffield, railway communication by that route being still open. This fact becoming known in Manchester caused the greatest indignation, and the people, rendered desperate by hunger, succeeded on several occasions in stopping the trains, and appropriating the food they carried. The situation in Manchester was one of constant excitement, and fear that the enemy should repeat the success they had achieved at Birmingham. The hundreds of thousands of hungry ones who flocked Manchester streets and the grimy thoroughfares of Stockport, Ashton, Oldham, Bolton, and other great towns in the vicinity, feared that they, like the people of Birmingham, would be put to the sword by the ruthless invaders.

The week that had elapsed had been an eventful one, fraught with many horrors. After the success of the Russians at Birmingham, the British troops, both Regulars, Volunteers, and improvised, fell back and formed up north of the city, being practically nothing more than a strong line of outposts without reserves, extending from Dudley, through West Bromwich and Sutton Park, to Tamworth. This scheme, however, was ill-devised, for the defenders, in order to act successfully, should have fallen back much further, and concentrated their forces at one or two strategical points on the line to Manchester, as it had been ascertained from spies that a swift and vigorous attack on that city was meditated.

The day following the taking of Birmingham was devoted by the enemy to the reorganisation of their forces, and the rearrangement of their transport and ammunition train. Large quant.i.ties of waggons and war stores of all kinds had been found in the town and annexed by the victors, and at Kynoch's Factory at Aston some hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition had been seized. These had been made for a foreign government, and fitted both rifles and machine guns of the Russians.

Having thus reorganised, the Russians, leaving 10,000 men in Birmingham as a base, resumed their march north on the third day. The left flank, consisting of 2000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry, took the road through West Bromwich to Wednesbury and Bilston, but quickly found themselves entrapped, for on account of the many ca.n.a.ls their cavalry were unable to act, and their transport was cut off. The miners and factory men had armed themselves, and, acting in conjunction with the British troops from Dudley and Great Barr, succeeded, after some hard fighting around Tipton and Coseley, in completely annihilating the enemy, taking 5000 prisoners and killing the remaining 9000.

Meanwhile the right flank had pa.s.sed out of Birmingham by way of Castle Bromwich, and had advanced without opposition through Wishaw and Tamworth to Lichfield, driving the defenders before them. The Russian main column, however, were not allowed to go north without a most desperate endeavour on the part of our men to hold them in check.

Indeed, if ever British courage showed itself it was during those dark days. Advancing through Aston and Perry to Sutton along the ancient highway, Icknield Street, the Russians sent a large force through the woods to the high ground between Wild Green and Maney. Here the British had established strong batteries, but after some desperate fighting these were at length captured, the enemy losing heavily. At the same time, fierce fighting occurred in Sutton Park and across at Aldridge, the defenders making the most strenuous efforts to break the force of the invaders. All was, alas! to no purpose. The British, outnumbered as before, were compelled to fall back fighting, with the result that the enemy's main column, pus.h.i.+ng on, effected a junction with its right flank, which had bivouaced on Wittington Heath, near Lichfield, and occupied the barracks there.

On the day following the invaders broke into two columns and marched again north, practically in battle formation, the right column continuing along Icknield Street, through Burton, Derby, Bakewell, and Marple, driving back the defenders, while the left column took a route that lay through the hilly and wooded country near Cannock Chase. Both columns, advancing in echelon of division, with cavalry on their flanks, were constantly hara.s.sed in the rear by the British, and in their advance lost numbers of waggons and a large quant.i.ty of ammunition; but they succeeded in travelling so quickly north that they were actually marching on Manchester before the people in that city could realise it.

Signal acts of bravery were being everywhere reported, but what could individual heroism effect against the fearful odds we had to face?

Thousands of men in Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Wigan, Rochdale, and other neighbouring towns had already armed themselves, and, on hearing that Manchester was threatened, poured into the city to act their part bravely in its defence.

It must be admitted that the British General commanding had, on gaining knowledge of the intentions of the Russians, taken every precaution in his power to prevent an advance on Manchester.

Our troops which had been defeated and driven back from Birmingham, had at once retreated north to the Peak district, and about one-quarter of the number had taken up excellent defensive positions there, while the remainder, with small reinforcements of Regulars drawn from Lancaster, Warrington, Bury, Chester, Wrexham, Burnley, Ashton-under-Lyne, York, Halifax, and as far distant as Carlisle, had, in addition to those from Manchester, been ma.s.sed along the north bank of the Mersey from Stockport to Flixton, with a line of communication stretching across to Woodley Junction, and thence over Glossop Dale to the Peak.

Thus Manchester was defended by a force of 38,000 cavalry, infantry, Volunteers, and colonials, against the Russian army, consisting of the remaining 65,000 of the force which attacked Birmingham, and reinforcements of 10,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry that had been pushed rapidly forward from Suss.e.x over the ground that the main body had travelled. The total force of Russians was therefore 80,000.

From Stockport, the north bank of the Mersey to its confluence with the Irwell past Flixton was well guarded. Earthworks had been raised, trenches dug, walls had been loopholed, and houses placed in a state of hasty defence. Among the reinforcements now under arms were several portions of battalions of Lancas.h.i.+re Volunteer Artillery who had not gone south to their allotted positions in the defence of London, and five companies of the 1st Ches.h.i.+re and Carnarvons.h.i.+re Artillery under Col. H. T. Brown, V.D., together with the Ches.h.i.+re Yeomanry under Col.

P. E. Warburton. The Manchester Brigade was a strong one, consisting of six Volunteer battalions of the Manchester Regiment, the 1st under the Earl of Crawford, V.D., the 2nd under Col. Bridgford, V.D., the 3rd under Col. Eaton, V.D., the 4th under Col. Lynde, V.D., the 5th under Col. Rocca, V.D., and the 6th under Col. Lees; the Ches.h.i.+re and Lancas.h.i.+re Brigades included three Volunteer battalions of the Lancas.h.i.+re Fusiliers under Colonels Young, Philippi, and Haworth, and two battalions of the South Lancas.h.i.+re Regiment; while the Northern Counties Brigade, composed of one Volunteer battalion of the Royal Lancaster Regiment under Col. Strongitharm, two battalions of the East Lancas.h.i.+re Regiment under Col. A. I. Robinson, V.D., and Col. T.

Mitch.e.l.l, V.D., and two of the Loyal North Lancas.h.i.+re under Col. Widdows and Col. Ormrod, also mustered their forces and performed excellent defensive work. It was here, too, that the Volunteer cyclists were found of the utmost value in scouting and carrying despatches.

The excitement in Manchester on that memorable September night was intense. That a desperate and b.l.o.o.d.y fray was imminent, every one knew, and the people were trusting to the defensive line on the river bank to protect them from the foreign destroyer. Would they be strong enough to effectively resist? Would they be able to drive back the Russians and defeat them?

The people of Lancas.h.i.+re who condemned our military administration did not do so without cause. It had been claimed by many that England could never be invaded; nevertheless our course should have been to prepare for possible events. Our Army, being small, should have been better equipped and armed, as well as trained to balance weakness in numbers.

Again, there had always existed a hideous hindrance to the efficiency of the Auxiliaries--the arms. Many of the Martini-Henrys carried by the Volunteers bore date of a quarter of a century ago, and their barrels were so worn they could not be fired accurately; while others possessed the Snider, which was practically a smoothbore from wear. What was the use of weapons surpa.s.sed in power by those of other nations? It was an unpalatable truth that had now at last dawned upon Britain, that in arming her soldiers she was far behind the rest of the world.

While Manchester spent the sultry night in feverish excitement at the knowledge that the enemy had advanced almost to their doors, the British outposts were being hara.s.sed by the enemy, who, flushed with success, were advancing gradually onward towards the line of defence. The Russian front had been suddenly widely extended, evidently aiming at a concentric attack on Manchester, and an attempt to wholly envelop the defenders' position by cavalry operating on both flanks.

Some terribly desperate encounters took place during a frightful thunderstorm which lasted a portion of the night, and many a brave Briton fell while performing valiant deeds for the honour of his country. The anxiety within the British lines that hot night was intense.

Reports coming in told of fierce fighting all along the line. Soon after midnight a British patrol, supported by cavalry, that had been sent out from Northenden to Baguley, was suddenly attacked by a party of Russians, who lay in ambush close to Wythenshaw Hall. A short but fierce fight ensued, but the British, knowing that part of the country well, succeeded in totally annihilating their antagonists. The firing, however, attracted attention in the Russian lines, with the result that a second attack was quickly made upon them, compelling them to retire up the hill at Lawton Moor, where they dashed into a small wood, closely pressed by the enemy. The attack was desperate. There is something terrible in a fight in a wood at night. The combatants could see nothing save an occasional flash in the impenetrable darkness, and hoa.r.s.e cries went up from the mysterious inferno. Neither invader nor defender could distinguish each other, and in the half-hour that followed, many a Russian shot his comrade in mistake for his foe.

At last the defenders, finding that the slightest rustling of boughs brought down a volley from magazine rifles, stood motionless, scarcely daring to breathe, and waited anxiously, until at last the enemy, seeing that their efforts to drive them out were useless, withdrew, and went off towards Baguley.

In another direction, close to Henbury, near Macclesfield, a squadron of British cavalry surprised a small outpost camp of Russians, and cut it up terribly, killing half the number; but pus.h.i.+ng on to Marthall, six miles across country, they came into collision with a body of Russian dragoons, and after a very fierce encounter were compelled to fall back again after considerable loss. On the outskirts of Northwich, and on the borders of Delamere Forest, skirmishes occurred, resulting in serious loss on both sides. A reconnoitring party of Russians was totally swept away and every man killed, by a British party who were concealed in an old farm building close to Alderley village; while another engaged in surveying the roads to Altrincham had been forced to retreat, leaving half their number dead or wounded on the edge of Tatton Park.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE EVE OF BATTLE.

Some idea of the gallant conduct of our Volunteers during the night may be gathered from the following extract from a letter by Lieutenant John Rowling of the 2nd Volunteer Battalion of the East Lancas.h.i.+re Regiment, to a friend a few days afterwards. He wrote--

"You will no doubt have heard something about the warm work we had on the night before the Battle of Manchester. The city, as you know, was covered on the south by a long straggling line of outposts, extending practically from Stockport to Altrincham. Late in the afternoon of September 6th we received an order to proceed to Mere, about four miles from Altrincham, having been detailed to form the section of the outposts from New Tatton to Goodier's Green, and on arrival at Mere half of our force of 600 was left in reserve there; the supports were moved about half a mile down Watling Street, and the remainder was divided into three piquets, No. 1 at Bentley Hurst Farm, No. 2 at Moss Cottage, and No. 3 near Mereplatt Farm, with four double sentry posts out in front of each piquet.

"I was in command of No. 2 picket, with Anderson and Wishton as subs, and as soon as I returned to the piquet, after posting the sentries, I sent the former with two sections to form a detached post at Over Tabley, and instructed him to send a reconnoitring patrol as far down Watling Street as he might consider consistent with safety. Anderson posted his men, and returned to me about ten o'clock with a corporal and two men, bringing in a man who had been pointed out to him at Over Tabley as a suspicious character--in fact, he was said to be a spy. He had been staying at an inn there for two or three days, and had very little luggage. Anderson had examined his portmanteau, but found nothing there; and as the man refused to give any account of himself, he made him a prisoner. Fresh fires were continually breaking out, therefore I thought it best to waste no time questioning him, but took him into a room at Moss Cottage, where he was thoroughly searched. Notes were found upon him from which it was evident that he had been obtaining information for the enemy for some time, and, better still, particulars of their proposed operations for the investment of Manchester, showing that they were advancing in our direction along the old Watling Street.

"I sent the prisoner under escort to the commander of the outposts, and at the same time sent word to Nos. 1 and 3 piquets, after which Anderson and I went down to Over Tabley, leaving Wishton in charge of No. 2. The machine gun that had been allotted to my piquet I also ordered to Over Tabley, and on arrival there we threw up barricades, hastily constructed of barrels, doors, and logs, banked with earth, across the road between the Vicarage and the church. A quant.i.ty of barbed wire was found in the village, and this came in very useful, for we stretched several lengths of it across the roads on the off-side of the barricade.

"There were under thirty of us, but every man was determined to do his duty unflinchingly. By this time it was past eleven, and very dark, yet there was just light enough to train the gun on to the centre of the cross-roads by Dairyhouse Farm. Very soon we could hear the enemy approaching, and as their spy had not met them outside, they evidently concluded that the village was unoccupied, and advanced in comparatively close order, Cossacks leading, and the infantry so close that there was practically no division between their vanguard and mainguard. The first section of Cossacks very soon found our first wire, and the whole of their horses came to grief. Those in the rear, thinking probably that there was no other obstruction in the way, spurred their horses and galloped over their friends, only to meet with a similar fate further on.

"The pioneers doubled up, and began to cut the wires, and fearing that the infantry in the rear would soon deploy, I gave the order for independent firing. The Russians stood it for some minutes, and attempted to reply, but not a man of ours was visible, and they soon retreated to Tabley Hall, where I had no means of following them.

"It must be remembered that we were all Volunteers, the Regulars being on the Stockport flank of the outpost line. My men behaved splendidly, and the firing was excellent from first to last."

About the same time as the unsuccessful attack was made on the outposts at Mere, the British line was broken through at Heald Green and Appletree.

A cavalry patrol, supported by infantry, was feeling its way along the road to Wilmslow, and had pa.s.sed Willow Farm, at which point the road runs beside the railway embankment.

The storm had burst, the thunder rolled incessantly, rain fell in torrents, and the lightning played about them, causing their arms to gleam in its vivid flashes.

Slowly, and without undue noise, the patrol was wending its way up the hill towards Finney Green, when suddenly there was a terrific rattle of musketry, and they discovered to their surprise that the enemy, who were occupying the embankment of the North-Western Railway on their left, were pouring upon them a fire sufficient to blanch the cheek of the bravest among them.

Along the embankment for a mile or more were stationed infantry with magazine rifles, and in addition they had brought two machine guns into play with appalling effect. So sudden did this galling fire open upon them, that men and horses fell without being able to fire a shot in return. British infantry, however, stood their ground, and as the lightning flashed, disclosing the position of the enemy, every Russian who dared to stand up or show himself was promptly picked off. But against the awful rain of deadly bullets ejected from the machine guns, at the rate of 600 a minute, no force could make a successful defence.

Many British heroes fell pierced by a dozen bullets; still their comrades, seeking what shelter they could, continued the defensive.

Meanwhile over the dismal muddy road the survivors of the cavalry galloped back, and quickly reported to the commander of the piquet at Appletree that the enemy were in strong force on the other side of the embankment between Oaklands and Wilmslow Park, and as they had heard a train run into Wilmslow Station and stop, it was evident that the enemy had reopened the line from Crewe, and intended concentrating part of their reinforcements to the general advance. The facts that the enemy had succeeded in cutting all the telegraph lines in the district, and had now obtained complete control over the railway, were most alarming, and the outlook of the defenders was rendered doubly serious by the large force they were compelled to keep east of Stockport, and in the Peak district, to prevent the invaders getting round to attack Manchester from the north.

On receipt of the news of the disaster to the patrol, the commander of the piquet at Appletree immediately sent information to the commander of the piquet posted at the railway station at Cheadle Hulme; but by a strange oversight, due no doubt to the excitement of the moment, sent no report to the commander of the outposts. The infantry engaging the Russians on the embankment, though exhibiting most gallant courage, were so exposed that it was little wonder they were soon completely annihilated, only half a dozen escaping.

The enemy must have detrained a large number of troops at Wilmslow, for the British cavalry scouts were quickly followed up by Cossacks and the Tsar's Dragoons. Quickly the sentries between Heald Green and Appletree were driven back on their piquets, the latter extending in skirmis.h.i.+ng order. Such a manoeuvre, however, proved fatal in the darkness and on the heavy ploughed land over which they were fighting.

Alas! very few succeeded in reaching the supports, and when they did, they all fell back hurriedly on the reserves at Pimgate.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE BATTLEFIELD OF MANCHESTER.]