An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake Part 1

An a.s.sessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake: Findings and Actions Taken.

by Various.

CHAPTER I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS

A. BACKGROUND

After viewing the destruction wrought by the eruption of Mt. St.

Helens in Was.h.i.+ngton State in May 1980, President Carter became concerned about the impacts of a similar event of low probability but high damage potential, namely a catastrophic earthquake in California, and the state of readiness to cope with the impacts of such an event.

As a result of the President's concern, an _ad hoc_ committee of the National Security Council was formed to conduct a government review of the consequences of, and preparation for such an event. In addition to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Committee included representatives from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the United States Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, and the National Communications System, at the Federal level; State of California agencies and California local governments at the State and local levels; and consultants from the private sector. During the summer of 1980, the partic.i.p.ants in this review prepared working papers on relevant issues and problem areas for the consideration of the _ad hoc_ committee. Pertinent facts, conclusions and recommendations were reviewed with the Governor of the State of California. The President reviewed the _ad hoc_ committee's findings and approved the recommendations for Federal action. This report summarizes the results of the a.s.sessment and notes these actions.

A number of Federal legislative and administrative actions have been taken to bring about, in the near future, an increased capability to respond to such an event. The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-124) authorizes a coordinated and structured program to identify earthquake risks and prepare to lessen or mitigate their impacts by a variety of means. The coordination of this program, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), is the responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is charged with focusing Federal efforts to respond to emergencies of all types and lessen their impacts before they occur.

The NEHRP has six high-priority thrusts:

Overall coordination of Federal departments and agencies'

programs

Maintenance of a comprehensive program of research and development for earthquake prediction and hazards mitigation

Leaders.h.i.+p and support of the Federal Interagency Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction as it develops seismic design and construction standards for use in Federal projects

Development of response plans and a.s.sistance to State and local governments in the preparation of their plans

a.n.a.lysis of the ability of financial inst.i.tutions to perform their functions after a creditable prediction of an earthquake as well as after an event, together with an exploration of the feasibility of using these inst.i.tutions to foster hazard reduction

An examination of the appropriate role of insurance in mitigating the impacts of earthquakes.

More recently, a cooperative Federal, State, local, and private-sector effort was initiated to prepare for responding to a credible large-magnitude earthquake, or its prediction, in Southern California.

B. SUMMARY

The review provided the overall a.s.sessment that the Nation is essentially unprepared for the catastrophic earthquake (with a probability greater than 50 percent) that must be expected in California in the next three decades. While current response plans and preparedness measures may be adequate for moderate earthquakes, Federal, State, and local officials agree that preparations are woefully inadequate to cope with the damage and casualties from a catastrophic earthquake, and with the disruptions in communications, social fabric, and governmental structure that may follow. Because of the large concentration of population and industry, the impacts of such an earthquake would surpa.s.s those of any natural disaster thus far experienced by the Nation. Indeed, the United States has not suffered any disaster of this magnitude on its own territory since the Civil War.

The basis for this overall a.s.sessment is summarized below and discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this report.

C. LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE EARTHQUAKES

Earth scientists unanimously agree on the inevitability of major earthquakes in California. The gradual movement of the Pacific Plate relative to the North American Plate leads to the inexorable concentration of strain along the San Andreas and related fault systems. While some of this strain is released by moderate and smaller earthquakes and by slippage without earthquakes, geologic studies indicate that the vast bulk of the strain is released through the occurrence of major earthquakes--that is, earthquakes with Richter magnitudes of 7.0 and larger and capable of widespread damage in a developed region. Along the Southern San Andreas fault, some 30 miles from Los Angeles, for example, geologists can demonstrate that at least eight major earthquakes have occurred in the past 1,200 years with an average s.p.a.cing in time of 140 years, plus or minus 30 years.

The last such event occurred in 1857. Based on these statistics and other geophysical observations, geologists estimate that the probability for the recurrence of a similar earthquake is currently as large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the next 30 years. Geologic evidence also indicates other faults capable of generating major earthquakes in other locations near urban centers in California, including San Francisco-Oakland, the immediate Los Angeles region, and San Diego. Seven potential events have been postulated for purposes of this review and are discussed in chapter II. The current estimated probability for a major earthquake in these other locations is smaller, but significant. The aggregate probability for a catastrophic earthquake in the whole of California in the next three decades is well in excess of 50 percent.

D. CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE

Casualties and property damage estimates for four of the most likely catastrophic earthquakes in California were prepared to form a basis for emergency preparedness and response. Chapter III gives details on these estimates. Deaths and injuries would occur princ.i.p.ally because of the failure of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory, and unreinforced brick masonry buildings built before the adoption of earthquake-resistant building codes. Experience has shown that some modern multistory buildings--constructed as recently as the late 1960's but not adequately designed or erected to meet the current understanding of requirements for seismic resistance--are also subject to failure. Strong ground shaking, which is the primary cause of damage during earthquakes, often extends over vast areas. For example, in an earthquake similar to that which occurred in 1857, strong ground shaking (above the threshold for causing damage) would extend in a broad strip along the Southern San Andreas fault, about 250 miles long and 100 miles wide, and include almost all of the Los Angeles-San Bernardino metropolitan area, and all of Ventura, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Kern counties.

For the most probable catastrophic earthquake--a Richter magnitude 8+ earthquake similar to that of 1857, which occurred along the Southern San Andreas fault--estimates of fatalities range from about 3,000, if the earthquake were to occur at 2:30 a.m. when the population is relatively safe at home, to more than 13,000, if the earthquake were to occur at 4:30 p.m. on a weekday, when much of the population is either in office buildings or on the streets. Injuries serious enough to require hospitalization under normal circ.u.mstances are estimated to be about four times as great as fatalities. For the less likely prospect of a Richter magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault in the immediate Los Angeles area, fatalities are estimated to be about 4,000 to 23,000, at the same respective times. Such an earthquake, despite its smaller magnitude, would be more destructive because of its relative proximity to the most heavily developed regions; however, the probability of this event is estimated to be only about 0.1 percent per year. Smaller magnitude--and consequently less damaging--earthquakes are antic.i.p.ated with greater frequency on a number of fault systems in California.

In either of these earthquakes, casualties could surpa.s.s the previous single greatest loss of life in the United States due to a natural disaster, which was about 6,000 persons killed when a hurricane and storm surge struck the Galveston area of the Texas coast in 1900. The highest loss of life due to earthquakes in the United States occurred in San Francisco in 1906, when 700 people were killed. By way of comparison (in spite of the vast differences in building design and practices and socioeconomic systems) the devastating 1976 Tangshan earthquake in China caused fatalities ranging from the official Chinese Government figure of 242,000 to unofficial estimates as high as 700,000. Fortunately, building practices in the United States preclude such a ma.s.sive loss of life.

Property losses are expected to be higher than in any past earthquake in the United States. For example, San Francisco in 1906, and Anchorage in 1964, were both much less developed than today when they were hit by earthquakes. And the San Fernando earthquake in 1971, was only a moderate shock that struck on the fringe of a large urban area.

Each of these three earthquakes caused damage estimated at about $0.5 billion in the then current dollars. Estimates of property damage for the most probable catastrophic earthquake on the Southern San Andreas (Richter magnitude 8+) and for the less probable but more damaging one (Richter magnitude 7.5) on the Newport-Inglewood fault, are about $15 billion and $70 billion respectively. By comparison, tropical storm Agnes caused the largest economic loss due to a natural disaster in the United States to date but it amounted to only $3.5 billion (in 1972 dollars).

It should be noted, however, that substantial uncertainty exists in casualty and property damage estimates because they are based on experience with only moderate earthquakes in the United States (such as the 1971 San Fernando earthquake) and experience in other countries where buildings are generally less resistant to damage. The uncertainty is so large that the estimated impacts could be off by a factor of two or three, either too high or too low. Even if these lowest estimates prevail, however, the a.s.sessment about preparedness and the capability to respond to the disasters discussed in this report would be substantially unchanged.

a.s.suming a catastrophic earthquake, a variety of secondary problems could also be expected. Search and rescue operations--requiring heavy equipment to move debris--would be needed to free people trapped in collapsed buildings. It is likely that injuries, particularly those immediately after the event, could overwhelm medical capabilities, necessitating a system of allocating medical resources to those who could be helped the most. Numerous local fires must be expected; nevertheless, a conflagration such as that which followed the Tokyo earthquake of 1923, or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, is improbable, unless a "Santa Ana type" wind pattern is in effect. Since the near failure of a dam in the San Fernando, California, earthquake of 1971 (which was a moderate event), substantial progress has been made in California to reduce the hazard from dams, in some cases through reconstruction. For planning purposes, however, experts believe that the failure of at least one dam should be antic.i.p.ated during a catastrophic earthquake in either the Los Angeles or San Francisco regions.

Experience in past earthquakes, particularly the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, has demonstrated the potential vulnerability of commercial telephone service to earthquakes, including the possibility of damage to switching facilities from ground shaking and rupture of underground cables that cross faults. This is especially serious because immediately following earthquakes, public demand for telephone services increases drastically. This increased demand overloads the capability of the system, even if it had not been damaged, and therefore management action to reduce the availability of service to non-priority users and to accommodate emergency calls is mandatory.

Radio-based communication systems, particularly those not requiring commercial power, are relatively safe from damage, although some must be antic.i.p.ated. The redundancy of existing communication systems, including those designed for emergency use, means that some capability for communicating with the affected region from the outside would almost surely exist. Restoration of service by the commercial carriers should begin within 24 to 72 hours as a result of maintenance and management actions; however, total restoration of service would take significantly longer.

While numerous agencies have the capability for emergency communication within themselves, non-telephonic communication among ent.i.ties and agencies in the affected area is minimal. This is true for Federal, State, and local agencies. This weakness has been pointed out repeatedly by earthquake response exercises, and the problem is raised by almost every emergency preparedness official at every level of government. Consequently, a major problem for resolution is the operational integration of communications systems and networks among the relevant Federal, State, and local agencies.

Because of their network-like character, most systems for transportation and water and power generation and distribution, as a whole, are resistant to failure, despite potentially severe local damage. These systems would suffer serious local outages, particularly in the first several days after the event, but would resume service over a few weeks to months. The princ.i.p.al difficulty would be the greatly increased need for these systems in the first few days after the event, when lifesaving activities would be paramount.

Portions of the San Francis...o...b..y Area and of the Los Angeles Area contain substantial concentrations of manufacturing capacity for guided missiles and s.p.a.ce vehicles, semiconductors, aircraft parts, electronic computing equipment, and airframes. Their specific vulnerability to the postulated earthquakes was not a.n.a.lyzed. In the event of major damage, however, the long-term impacts may be mitigated somewhat by such measures as the use of underutilized capacity located elsewhere, subst.i.tution of capacity from other industries, imports, use of other products, and drawing-down of inventories.

Since we have not recently experienced a catastrophic earthquake in the United States, there are many unknowns which must be estimated with best judgment. This is true particularly for the response of individuals as well as governmental and other inst.i.tutions. Popular a.s.sumptions of post-disaster behavior include antisocial behavior and the need for martial law, the breakdown of government inst.i.tutions, and the requirement for the quick a.s.sertion of outside leaders.h.i.+p and control. Practical experience and field studies of disasters, however, indicate that these a.s.sumptions are not necessarily correct. On the contrary, the impacts of the disaster commonly produce a sense of solidarity and cooperativeness among the survivors. Nonetheless, the perception remains among emergency response officials that there will be an increased need for law enforcement following the event.

Another major unknown involves whether a medium or short-term warning of the event would be possible and how such a warning could be utilized most effectively. The technology for earthquake prediction is in an early stage of development and, therefore it is problematical that researchers will succeed in issuing a short-term warning before a catastrophic earthquake, should the event occur in the next few years. Yet as research progresses, scientifically-based, intermediate-term warnings are possible, but subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Consequently, response preparations must be made for both an earthquake without warning, and one with a short-or intermediate-term warning, possibly with a significant level of uncertainty.

E. CAPABILITY FOR RESPONSE

Planning for response to a large-scale disaster is a complicated process encompa.s.sing many variables such as population densities and distribution characteristics; land-use patterns and construction techniques; geographical configurations; vulnerability of transportation; communications and other lifeline systems; complex response operations; long-term physical, social, and economic recovery policies. These factors, together with the realization that an earthquake has the potential for being the greatest single-event catastrophe in California, make it inc.u.mbent upon the State to maintain as high a level of emergency readiness as is practicable, and to provide guidance and a.s.sistance to local jurisdictions desiring to plan and prepare for such events. Annex 2 reviews the general nature of preparedness planning and the basic characteristics of California and Federal Government plans.

Federal, State, and local emergency response capabilities are judged to be adequate for moderate earthquakes--those that are most likely to occur frequently in California and cause property damage in the range of $1 billion. Such an event, however, would severely tax existing resources and provide a major test of management relations.h.i.+ps among different governmental levels. Federal, State, and local officials, however, are quick to point out serious shortcomings in their ability to respond to a catastrophic earthquake. An a.n.a.lysis of the preparedness posture of 60 local governments, 34 California State organizations, and 17 Federal agencies, carried out by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) and FEMA, indicates that response to such an earthquake would become disorganized and largely ineffective. Many governmental units have generalized earthquake response plans, some have tailored earthquake plans, and several plans are regularly exercised. The coordination of these plans among jurisdictions, agencies, and levels of government, however, is inadequate. In addition, the potential for prediction is not incorporated; long-term recovery issues are not considered; and communications problems are significant, as discussed above. Overall, Federal preparedness is deficient at this time. Early reaction to a catastrophic event would likely be characterized by delays, ineffective response, and ineffectively coordinated delivery of support.

FEMA Region IX (San Francisco) has drafted an Earthquake Response Plan for the San Francis...o...b..y area. Annex 2 gives an overview of this draft plan. This is a site-specific plan for response to potential catastrophic earthquake occurrences. The emergency response portion relies upon a decentralized approach which provides for Federal disaster support activities to be a.s.signed to selected Federal agencies by mission a.s.signment letters. No specific plans have been prepared in this detail for other seismic risk areas, although it is expected that the Bay Area plan could be easily adapted to other areas. The Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation are developing detailed earthquake plans that would ensure a well-organized and adequate response to mission a.s.signments for a major earthquake. The plans of other agencies need further development.

Very significant capabilities to a.s.sist in emergency response exist within the California National Guard, California Highway Patrol, the Departments of Health Services and Transportation, and the U.S.

Department of Defense. Capabilities exist for such lifesaving activities as _aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, emergency medical services, emergency construction and repair, communications, and emergency housing and food_. Current estimates by both Federal and State officials, however, indicate that at least 6 to 8 hours would be required before personnel and equipment can be mobilized and begin initial deployment to the affected area. During the period before the arrival of significant outside a.s.sistance critical to the saving of lives (especially of those trapped in collapsed buildings), the public would be forced to rely largely upon its own resources for search and rescue, first aid, and general lifesaving actions. The current level of public preparation for this critical phase of response can be described as only minimal. Much of the current state of preparedness arises from past programs aimed at a wide spectrum of emergencies, particularly civil defense against nuclear attack. New or strengthened programs are needed to enhance public preparedness.

FEMA has recently entered into a cooperative effort with California State and local governments to prepare an integrated prototype preparedness plan to respond to a catastrophic earthquake in Southern California or to a prediction of such an event. The plan's completion, in late 1981, promises to improve substantially the state of readiness to respond to the prediction and the occurrence of an earthquake in that area and to provide a model which could be applied to other earthquake-p.r.o.ne regions of California and the rest of the country.

F. FINDINGS, ISSUES, AND ACTIONS

The _ad hoc_ committee responsible for this review developed several significant findings related to the implications of major earthquakes in California and our capabilities to respond to them. It then identified major relevant issues raised by these findings and caused a number of actions to be taken. A brief discussion of the results of its review follows.

1. Leaders.h.i.+p

=Finding=: _Effective leaders.h.i.+p at all governmental levels is the single most important factor needed to improve this Nation's preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake in California._ The problem of emergency preparedness is severely complicated because responsibilities for preparation and response cut across normal lines of authority. Further complication arises from the large areal extent of the impacts expected from a major earthquake, affecting literally dozens of government ent.i.ties. The emergency services coordinator at any level of government is effective only to the extent he or she is backed by the political leaders.h.i.+p at that level. This is especially true when preparedness activities must be done, for the most part, within existing resources. City and county officials must increasingly accept their share of the responsibility for preparedness, but commitment by State or Federal leaders is also essential. The general tendency among elected officials and the public is to ignore the existing hazard problem. Experience, however, teaches that effective response mechanisms must be in place before the disaster; they cannot be developed in the time of crisis. Overcoming this apathy and developing the organizational arrangements among Federal, State, and local government and volunteer agencies--together with the private sector and the general public will require, above all, leaders.h.i.+p.