A Manual of Ancient History Part 10

Repeated and b.l.o.o.d.y wars with Dionysius I. between the years 410-368. Neither party able to expel the other: terms of the last peace; that each party should remain in possession of what he then occupied. Second commercial treaty with Rome.

Crafty advantage taken by the Carthaginians of the internal commotions at Syracuse during and subsequent to the reign of Dionysius II: they endeavour to obtain their end; but are thwarted by the heroism of Timoleon, 345-340.

A new and frightful war with Agathocles, the seat of which is transferred from Sicily into Africa itself; it at last terminates in favour of Carthage, 311-307.

The war with Pyrrhus, 277-275, whose ambition gave rise to an alliance between Carthage and Rome, contributed likewise to increase the preponderance of the Carthaginians in Sicily; and probably the perseverance of that people, and their skill in profiting by circ.u.mstances, would at last have enabled them to attain their object, had not the seeds of war been thereby scattered between Carthage and Rome.

5. What effect these Sicilian wars had upon the state we are not informed. They were probably regarded in Carthage as a beneficial channel for carrying off the popular fermentation;--nevertheless, two attempts, both unsuccessful, were made by some of the aristocratical party, to overthrow the const.i.tution; first by Hanno, 340, and afterwards by Bomilcar, 308.--At the breaking out, however, of the war with Rome, the commonwealth was so formidable and mighty, that even the finances of the state do not appear to have been at all affected; a circ.u.mstance of the highest importance. What consequence was it to Carthage whether 100,000 barbarians more or less existed in the world, so long as there remained plenty of men willing to suffer themselves to be sold, and she possessed money to purchase them?

THIRD PERIOD.

_From the beginning of the wars with Rome, to the downfal of Carthage, B. C. 264-146._

1. The wars between Carthage and Rome were the necessary consequences of a desire of aggrandizement in two conquering nations; any one might have foreseen the struggle between the two rivals as soon as their conquests should once begin to clash. It is, therefore, a question of little importance, to enquire which was the aggressor; and although Rome may not be entirely cleared of that charge, we cannot help observing that, according to the principles of sound policy, the security of Italy was hardly compatible with the sole dominion of the Carthaginians over the island of Sicily.

First war with Rome, 264-241, (twenty-three years,) waged for the possession of Sicily, and decided almost at its commencement by Hiero's pa.s.sing over to the Roman side. (For the history of it, see below, in the Roman history, Book V. Period ii, parag. 2 sq.)

2. This war cost the republic, Sicily and the sovereignty of the Mediterranean, by which the fate of its other external possessions was already predetermined. But that which appeared at the first view to threaten the greatest danger, was the total exhaustion of its finances; a circ.u.mstance which will no longer surprise us, when we consider how many fleets had been destroyed and replaced, how many armies had been annihilated and renewed. Carthage had never before been engaged in such an obstinate struggle as this; and the immediate consequences were more terrific even than the war itself.

3. The impossibility of paying the mercenaries produced a mutiny among the troops, which rapidly grew into a rebellion of the subject nations, who had been most cruelly oppressed during the war. The consequence was a civil war of three years and a half, which probably would have spared the Romans the trouble of destroying Carthage, had not the state been s.n.a.t.c.hed from ruin by the heroism of Hamilcar.

This war, which lasted from 240 to 237, produced lasting consequences to the state; it gave rise to the feud between Hamilcar and Hanno the Great, which compelled Hamilcar to seek for support against the senate by becoming the leader of a democratic faction.

4. The revolt spread abroad; it reached Sardinia and caused the loss of that most important island, of which the Romans, flushed with power, took possession, in spite of the terms of the peace.

5. The influence of the family of the Barcas, supported in their disputes with the senate by the popular party, now got the upper hand in Carthage; and the first fruit of their power was the new and gigantic project of repairing the loss of Sicily and Sardinia by the conquest of Spain; a country where the Carthaginians already had some possessions and commercial connections. The immediate object of the Barcas was the support of their family and party; but the Spanish silver mines soon furnished the republic with the means of renewing the contest with Rome also.

6. During the nine years in which Hamilcar commanded, and in the following eight in which Hasdrubal, his son-in-law and successor, was at the head of the army, the whole of the south of Spain, as far as the Iberus, was brought under subjection to Carthage, either by negotiation or force of arms. The further progress of the Carthaginians was only arrested by a treaty with the Romans, in which the Iberus was fixed upon as a frontier line, and the freedom of Saguntum acknowledged by both powers. Hasdrubal crowned his victories as a general and as a statesman by the foundation of New Carthage, (Carthagena,) which was to be the future seat of Carthaginian power in the newly-conquered country.

Hasdrubal having fallen by the hand of an a.s.sa.s.sin in the year 221, the party of the Barcas succeeded in appointing Hamilcar's son, Hannibal, a young man of one-and-twenty, for his successor. Hannibal found every thing already prepared in Spain for the furtherance of the hereditary project of his family, which was a renewal of the contest with Rome; and the vigour with which this project was pursued, clearly proves how great must have been the preponderance of the Barcine influence, at that time, in Carthage. Had the commonwealth attended to the marine with the same ardour as their great general did to the land service, the fate of Rome would perhaps have been very different.

Second war with Rome, 218-201, (seventeen years,) first in Italy and Spain, afterwards, from 203, in Africa itself. (See the history of this war below, in the Roman history, Book V, Period ii, parag. 6 sqq.)

7. Until Africa became the scene of action, the second war cost the republic much less than the first; the expenses being princ.i.p.ally defrayed by Spain and Italy. Hanno, however, was at the head of a powerful party at home, who were clamorous for peace, and who can say they were wrong? As might be expected, the family of the Barcas were for war, and their influence carried the day. That general who, with hardly any support from Carthage, was yet able to maintain a footing in the country of his powerful foes for no less than fifteen years, and that, too, as much by policy as by force of arms, must extort our admiration.

It cannot, however, be denied, that during the struggle one favourable opportunity, at least, was let slip of making peace; a fatal omission, for which the hero of Cannae paid dearly enough, by the failure of his darling project.

8. By the second peace with Rome, Carthage was deprived of all her possessions out of Africa, and her fleet was delivered into the hands of the Romans. She was now to be a mere trading city under the tutelage of Rome. But Carthage found by this peace her most formidable enemy on the soil of Africa itself. Ma.s.sinissa had been elevated to the dignity of king of Numidia; and his endeavours to form his nomads into an agricultural people, and to collect them into cities, must have changed the military system that Carthage had hitherto followed. Roman policy, moreover, had taken care that the article inserted in his favour in the last treaty of peace, should be so ambiguously worded, as to leave abundant openings for dispute.

9. Even after this disgraceful peace, the family of the Barcas still preserved their influence, and Hannibal was placed as supreme magistrate at the head of the republic. He attempts to reform the const.i.tution and the finances, by destroying the oligarchy of the hundred, by whom the finances had been thrown into confusion. Complete as was the success of the first blow, it soon became apparent that aristocratic factions are not so readily annihilated as armies.

The democratic faction to which even the Barcas owed their first elevation, was the cause of the degeneracy of the Carthaginian const.i.tution. By that faction the legislative authority of the senate and magistrates was withdrawn and transferred to the _ordo judic.u.m_--probably the same as the high state tribunal of the hundred--which now a.s.sumed the character of an omnipotent national inquisition; and the members being chosen for life exercised oppressive despotism. This tribunal was formed of those who had served the office of ministers of finance, with whom it shared unblus.h.i.+ngly the revenues of the state. Hannibal destroyed this oligarchy by a law, enacting that the members should hold their office but for one year; whereas before they held it for life. In the reform wrought by this law in the finances it was seen, that after all wars and losses, the revenues of the republic were still sufficient, not only for the usual expenditure and the payment of tribute to Rome, but also for leaving a surplus in the public treasury. Ten years had hardly elapsed before Carthage was enabled to pay down at once the whole of the tribute which she had engaged to furnish by instalments.

10. The defeated party, whose interests were now the same with those of Rome, joined the Romans, to whom they discovered Hannibal's plan of renewing the war in conjunction with Antiochus the Great, king of Syria.

A Roman emba.s.sy was sent over to Africa, under some other pretext, to demand that Hannibal should be given up. The Carthaginian general secretly fled to king Antiochus, at whose court he became the chief fomenter of the war against Rome; although unsuccessful in his endeavour to implicate the Carthaginian republic in the struggle.

See hereafter the history of Syria, Book IV, Period iii, separate kingdoms. I. Seleucidae, parag. 18; and Book V, Period ii, parag.

10 sq.

11. In consequence of the absence of Hannibal, Carthage fell once more under the dominion of the Romans, who contrived, by taking a crafty advantage of the state of parties, to give a show of generosity to the exercise of their power. Even the patriotic faction, if we may judge by the violent steps which they took more than once against Ma.s.sinissa and his partisans, seem to have been but a tool in the hands of Rome.

12. Disputes with Ma.s.sinissa, which led to the gradual part.i.tion of the Carthaginian territory in Africa. The manner in which this territory had been acquired, facilitated the discovery of claims upon each of the component parts; and the interference of Rome, sometimes disinterested, but oftener swayed by party feeling, ensured the possession of the territory to the Numidian.

Even in 199, a disadvantageous treaty framed with Ma.s.sinissa for fifty years: nevertheless the rich province of Emporia is lost in 193.--Loss of another province unnamed, to which Ma.s.sinissa inherited some claims from his father.--Seizure of the province of Tysca, with fifty cities, about 174. Probable date of Cato's emba.s.sy, who returned in disgust, because his decision had been rejected, and became the fomenter of a project to destroy Carthage.--New disputes about 152.--Ma.s.sinissa's party is expelled Carthage.--War breaks out in consequence, during which the king in his ninetieth year personally defeats the Carthaginians; and what with famine and the sword, Hasdrubal's army, which had been surrounded by the enemy, was nearly exterminated; in the mean while the Roman amba.s.sadors, who had come to act as mediators, obeying their private instructions, looked on with quiet indifference.

13. Though it is evident that the party spirit raging between Cato and Scipio Nasica had a considerable influence in hastening the destruction of Carthage; and though it is equally clear that Ma.s.sinissa's late victory paved the way for the immediate execution of that project; yet it is difficult to unravel the web, by which, long before the declaration of war now about to follow, treachery prepared the final scene of this great tragedy. Was the account that Cato at his return gave of the resuscitated power of Carthage consonant to truth? Was not the sudden secession of Ariobarzanes, the grandson of Syphax, who was to have led a Numidian army to defend Carthage against Ma.s.sinissa, previously arranged with Rome? Was not the turbulent Gisgo, who first incited the populace to insult the Roman amba.s.sadors, and then opportunely rescued them from the fury of the mob, in the pay of Rome?

These questions give rise to suspicions, although they cannot satisfactorily be answered. At any rate, it may be said, that the conduct of Rome, after war had broken out, corroborates the suspicion.

The whole history of the last period sufficiently proves, that it was not so much the debased character of the nation, as party spirit, and the avarice of the great, which produced the fall of Carthage. Advantage was taken of that party spirit and avarice by Roman policy, which, although acting according to the dictates of blind pa.s.sion, knew how to profit by dark and base intrigue.

Third war with Rome and destruction of Carthage, 150-146. See hereafter the Roman history, Book V, Period ii, parag. 19 sq.

SECOND BOOK.

_History of the Persian Empire, from B. C. 560-330._

Sources. Preservation of historic records among the Persians themselves under the form of royal annals; origin and nature of those annals. As these have been destroyed, we are obliged to deduce the history from foreign writers, some of whom, however, availed themselves of the Persian annals. 1. _Greeks_: their authority as writers, contemporary, but not always sufficiently acquainted with the east. (_a_) CTESIAS. His court history compiled from Persian annals, would be the princ.i.p.al work did we possess the whole; we have, however, only an extract from it preserved by Photius. (_b_) HERODOTUS: who probably availed himself of similar sources in some portion of his work. (_c_) XENOPHON. To this period of history belong, not only his Anabasis and h.e.l.lenica, but also his Cyropaedia, or portraiture of a happy empire and an accomplished ruler, according to eastern ideas, exhibited in the example of Cyrus: of use so far as pure historic records are interwoven with the narrative. (_d_) DIODORUS, etc. 2. _Jewish writers._ The books of ESDRAS and NEHEMIAH; and more particularly that of ESTHER, as containing a faithful representation of the Persian court and its manners. 3. The accounts of the later _Persian chroniclers_, MIRKHOND in particular, who flourished in the thirteenth century of the christian era, can have no weight in the scale of criticism; they are nevertheless interesting, inasmuch as they make us acquainted with the ideas that the inhabitants of the east form of their early history.

The modern authors on Persian history are princ.i.p.ally those who have written on ancient history in general: see p. 2. A treatise on Persian history, deduced from eastern sources, will be found in the _Ancient Universal History_, vol. iv.

BRISSONIUS, _de Regno Persarum_, 1591, 8vo. A very laborious compilation.

The section concerning the Persians in # HEEREN, _Ideas_, etc.

vol. i, part 1.

[MALCOLM, SIR JOHN, _History of Persia_, from the earliest ages to the present times. Lond. 1816, 4to. 2 vols. "A valuable work."]

1. State of the Persian nation previous to Cyrus; a highland people, subject to the Medes, dwelling in the mountainous parts of the province of Persis, and leading wholly, or for the most part, a nomad life.

Division into ten clans, among which that of the _Pasargadae_, the n.o.blest and ruling horde, is particularly remarkable on account of the figure it makes in subsequent history.--The result of this division was a patriarchal government, the vestiges of which remain visible in the whole of the following history of the Persians. Permanent distinction between the tribes in reference to their mode of life, observable even during the most flouris.h.i.+ng period of the Persian state: three of the n.o.bles or warriors, three of the husbandmen, and four of the shepherds.

Argument thence deduced, that the history of the Persians as a dominant nation, _is that of the n.o.bler clans alone, and of the_ PASARGADae _more especially_.

2. The personal history of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian monarchy, was, even in the time of Herodotus, so obscured under the veil of romance, that it was no longer possible to detect the real truth. It is, however, evident, that the course of the revolution wrought by him was, on the whole, the same as was followed in all similar empires founded in Asia. Gengis-khan, in a later age, was placed at the head of all the Mogol hordes; in the same manner was Cyrus elected chief of all the Persian tribes, by whose a.s.sistance he became a mighty conqueror, at the time that the Babylonian and Median kingdoms of Inner Asia were on the decline, and before the Lydian empire, under Croesus, had been firmly established.

Descent of Cyrus from the family of Achaemenes, (Jams.h.i.+d?). That family belonged to the Pasargadae tribe, and therefore remained the ruling house.

3. Rise of the Persian dominion, in consequence of the overthrow of the Medo-Bactrian empire, after the defeat of Astyages at Pasargada. Rapid extension by further conquest. Subjection of Asia Minor after the victory won by Cyrus in person over Croesus, and capture of the Greek colonies by the generals of the Persian monarch. Conquest of Babylon and all the Babylonian provinces. The Phoenician cities submit themselves of their own accord. Even in Cyrus's time, therefore, the frontiers of the Persian empire had been extended in southern Asia to the Mediterranean, to the Oxus, and to the Indus; but the campaign against the nomad races, inhabiting the steppes of Central Asia, was unsuccessful; and Cyrus himself fell in the contest.

It cannot be denied but that in the narration of the separate wars waged by Cyrus, discrepancies are found in Herodotus and Ctesias; those two authors, however, agree in the main facts: and, indeed, the differences which exist between them cannot be considered always as direct contradictions.

4. Immediate consequences of this great revolution in respect both of the conquerors and the conquered. Among the former, even in the time of Cyrus, the civilization and luxury of the Medes, their legislation and national religion, and the sacerdotal caste of the magi, who were guardians of that religion, had been introduced, and the whole system of the Persian court had been remodelled upon that of the Medes.