A Manual of Ancient History Part 32

17. Return of Sylla to Italy, and a terrible civil war, which ends only with the extermination of the democratic faction, and his own elevation to the perpetual dictators.h.i.+p. Although his enemies had so much advantage over him in point of numbers, yet their party was so little consolidated, that he with his veterans could not fail to obtain an easy victory. The slaughter during this war fell for the most part upon the Italian tribes, who had joined the party of Marius, and this afforded Sylla the means of giving settlements to his own soldiers; but most of the horrors of this revolution which fell to the share of Rome, were reserved till the day of victory was past. Sylla's proscription, which should only have punished his personal enemies, was the signal for a general ma.s.sacre, as every one took that opportunity to rid himself of his private foes; and avarice did as much as vengeance. Who in these days, so terrible to Italy, was sure of his life or property? And yet, when we consider the dreadful circ.u.mstances which attended the foregoing dominion of the people, deduct all that was done without Sylla's knowledge, and consider how much he was obliged to do in order to satisfy his army, we shall find it difficult to say how far he deserves the reproach of wanton cruelty.

Sylla's arrival; victory over Norba.n.u.s immediately after, and seduction of the army of the consul Scipio, 82. After this almost every person of distinction declared in his favour, and the young Pompey having brought to him an army which he had himself raised, his party acquired more consideration, and himself more power. Victory over the younger Marius, near Sacriportum, who throws himself into Praeneste, where he is besieged. But the great and decisive battle gained before the gates of Rome, over the Samnites under the command of Telisinus, is followed by the fall of Praeneste and the capture of Rome. After the proscription which immediately ensued, Sylla is created perpetual dictator, and secures his power in Rome by the emanc.i.p.ation of ten thousand slaves, whose masters he had proscribed; and in Italy by colonies of his veterans, whom he establishes at the expense of his enemies.

18. Great reform in the const.i.tution during the two years' dictators.h.i.+p of Sylla. The aristocracy of the senate, which he filled up with knights, was not only reestablished, but he also stopped the sources from which the great disorders of the democracy had hitherto proceeded.

It seems probable that his natural indolence, which led him to prefer a life of luxurious ease to one of laborious activity, when he was no longer spurred to the latter by his pa.s.sions, was the chief cause of his voluntary abdication. He had, however, the great advantage over Marius, of not being the sport of his own feelings. The conduct of Sylla, indeed, was so consistent throughout, that it satisfactorily shows he knew very well what was his ultimate aim--which Marius never did.

Internal regulations of Sylla by the _leges Corneliae_. 1. Law to restrain the influence of the tribunes, by taking from them their legislative power. 2. Law respecting the succession to the magistracy; the number of praetors fixed to eight, and the quaestors to twenty. 3.

_Lex de majestate_, especially to limit the power of the governors of provinces, and to abolish their exactions. 4. _Lex de judiciis_, whereby the _judicia_ were again restored to the senate. 5. Several police regulations, _de sicariis_, _de veneficiis_, etc. for the preservation and tranquillity of Rome, upon which everything depended.

6. The _lex de civitate_, taking from the Latins and several Italian cities and tribes the privileges of Roman citizens, upon which they set so much store, although we scarcely know in what they consisted.

_Foreign wars_: War in Africa against the leaders of the democratic faction, Cn. Domitius and king Hiarbas, which is ended by a triumph to Pompey, 80. Second war against Mithridates begun by Murena, in hopes of obtaining a triumph, to whom Archelaus came over; but which, under the command of Sylla, terminates in an accommodation.

19. Nevertheless it was impossible that the enactments of Sylla should be long observed; as the evil lay too deep to be eradicated by laws.

A free state like that of Rome, with no middle cla.s.s, must, from its nature, be exposed to continual convulsions, and these will be more or less violent in proportion to its greatness. Besides, as in the last revolution almost all property had changed hands, there was spread over all Italy a powerful party, who desired nothing so much as a counter-revolution. And to this we may add, that there were many young men, such as Lucullus, Cra.s.sus, and above all Pompey, who had opened to themselves a career during the late troubles, which they would scarcely yet wish to bring to a close. It will not then appear strange, that immediately after the death of Sylla (! 88), a consul, M. aemilius Lepidus, should form the design of becoming a second Marius; a design which could only be frustrated by the courage and activity of such a patriotic citizen as Q. Lutatius Catulus, his colleague.

Attempt of Lepidus to rescind the acts of Sylla, 78. Defeated, first before Rome and again in Etruria, by Catulus and Pompey, 77, after which he dies in Sardinia.

20. But much more dangerous for Rome might have been the civil war kindled by Sertorius in Spain, if the plan of that exalted republican to invade Italy had succeeded. Even Pompey himself, after a six years'

struggle, would hardly have prevented it, had it not been for the worthlessness of the Roman vagabonds who surrounded him, and his a.s.sa.s.sination by Perpenna. The rapid termination of the war after the fall of its conductor, is a circ.u.mstance much more creditable to Sertorius than to the conqueror Pompey.

The forces of Sertorius in Spain, consisted not only of the party of Marius which he had collected, but more essentially of the Spaniards, particularly the Lusitanians, whom he had inspired with an unbounded confidence in himself. Very variable success of the war against Metellus and Pompey, who receive but very little support from Rome, 77-75. Negotiation of Sertorius with Mithridates the Great, and interchange of emba.s.sies without any important result, 75. Sertorius a.s.sa.s.sinated by Perpenna, 72.

21. Before, however, the flame of war was totally extinguished in the west, Mithridates kindled a new and much fiercer one in the east; at the same time a war of slaves and gladiators was raging with terrible fury in Italy itself; and whole fleets of pirates not only ravaged the Italian coasts, but threatened Rome herself with a famine, and obliged her to have recourse to a mode of naval warfare altogether peculiar. All these enemies were not without intelligence with one another; and colossal as was the power of the republic at that time, and rich as Rome was in distinguished men, it seems probable that the storm which beat on every side between 75-71, would have razed her to the ground, if a stricter alliance could have been formed between Sertorius, Spartacus, and Mithridates. But the great difficulty of communication which at that time existed, and without which probably a republic such as the Roman never could have been formed, proved of more a.s.sistance at this crisis than at any other.

The third Mithridatic war, occasioned by the will of Nicomedes king of Bithynia, who had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome (see above, p. 294), was carried on in Asia Minor, first by Lucullus, 74-67, and afterwards by Pompey, 66-64. Mithridates, being better prepared, had already concluded an alliance with Sertorius in Spain, 75. But the deliverance of Cyzicus by Lucullus, 73, and the defeat of the king's fleet, intended to act against Italy, not only frustrated all his original plans, but were followed by the occupation of his own dominions, 72 and 71, by the enemy, notwithstanding a new army which Mithridates collected, mostly from the nomad hordes of Northern Asia. Flight of Mithridates to Tigranes, 71, who positively refused to deliver him up, and formed an alliance with him, 70; while the Parthian, Arsaces XII.

held both parties in suspense by negotiations. Victory of Lucullus over the allied sovereigns, near Tigranocerta, 69, and Artaxata, 68; but the mutinies which now broke out among his troops not only hindered him from following up these advantages, but turned the scale so much in Mithridates's favour, that in 68 and 67 he quickly regained almost all his dominions, even while the Roman commissioners were on their route to take possession of them. Lucullus, by his reform in the finances of Asia Minor, raises a powerful party against himself in Rome, and thereby loses his command.

22. The war of the slaves and gladiators, which happened nearly at the same time, was, from the theatre of action being in its neighbourhood, equally dangerous to Rome; it became still more terrible from the violence with which these outraged beings sought to revenge their wrongs, and more formidable from the talents of their leader, Spartacus; and the conclusion of this struggle seemed, therefore, of so much importance to Rome, that it gave M. Cra.s.sus a much higher influence in the state than he could ever have obtained by his riches alone.

Commencement of this war by a number of runaway gladiators, who, being strengthened by an almost general revolt of the slaves in Campania, 73, soon became very formidable. The defeat of four generals, one after the other, throws open to Spartacus the road to the Alps, and enables him to leave Italy; but the greediness of booty manifested by his hordes, who wished to plunder Rome, obliged him to return. Cra.s.sus takes the command and rescues Rome, 72; upon which Spartacus retires into Lower Italy, hoping to form a junction with the pirates, and to carry the war into Sicily, but is deceived by them, 71. His complete overthrow near the Silarus, 71. Pompey, then returning from Spain, finds means to seize a sprig of the laurel chaplet which by right should have adorned only the brow of Cra.s.sus; hence arises a misunderstanding between these two commanders, during their consulate, 70, which threatened to be dangerous to the state.

23. The war against the pirates of Sicily and Isauria was not only very important in itself, but still more so in its consequences. It procured for Pompey a legal power such as no Roman general had ever before enjoyed; and the quick and glorious manner in which he brought it to a close, opened for him the way to the great object of his ambition--the conduct of the war in Asia against Mithridates.

The extraordinary power acquired by these pirates was owing partly to the great negligence of the Romans in sea affairs, (see page 340), partly to the war against Mithridates, who had taken the pirates into his pay, and partly also to the Roman oppressions in Asia Minor. War had been undertaken against them as early as 75, by P. Servilius; but his victories, though they procured him the t.i.tle of _Isauricus_, did them but little harm. They were to be dreaded, not only for their piracies, but because they also offered an easy means of communication between the other enemies of Rome from Spain to Asia. The new attack of the praetor M. Antonius upon Crete, proved a complete failure; but it was the cause of that hitherto independent island being again attacked, 68, by Metellus, and reduced to a Roman province, 67. Pompey takes the command against the pirates with extraordinary privileges, obtained for him by Gabinius, and finishes the war in forty days, 67.

24. After these triumphs over so many enemies, Mithridates was the only one which now remained; and Pompey had here again the good fortune to conclude a struggle already near its end; for notwithstanding his late success, Mithridates had never been able completely to recover himself.

His fall undoubtedly raised the power of Rome in Asia Minor to its highest pitch; but it brought her, at the same time, into contact with the Parthians.

Pompey obtains the conduct of the war against Mithridates with very extensive privileges, procured for him by the tribune Manilius (_lex Manilia_), notwithstanding the opposition of Catulus, 67. His victory by night, near the Euphrates, 66. Subjection of Tigranes, while Mithridates flies into the Crimea, 65, whence he endeavours to renew the war. Campaign of Pompey in the countries about the Caucasus, 65; he marches thence into Syria, 64. Mithridates kills himself in consequence of the defection of his son Phraates, 63. Settlement of Asiatic affairs by Pompey: besides the ancient province of Asia, the maritime countries of Bithynia, nearly all Paphlagonia and Pontus, are formed into a Roman province, under the name of Bithynia; while on the southern coast Cilicia and Pamphylia form another under the name of Cilicia; Phoenicia and Syria compose a third, under the name of Syria.

On the other hand, Great Armenia is left to Tigranes; Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes; the Bosphorus to Pharnaces; Judaea to Hyrca.n.u.s (see page 310); and some other small states are also given to petty princes, all of whom remain dependent on Rome. The tribes inhabiting Thrace during the Mithridatic war, were first defeated by Sylla, 85, and their power was afterwards nearly destroyed by the proconsuls of Macedonia: as by Appius, in 77; by Curio, who drove them to the Danube, 75-73; and especially by M. Lucullus, while his brother was engaged in Asia. Not only the security of Macedonia, but the daring plans of Mithridates rendered this necessary.

25. The fall of Mithridates raised the republic to the highest pitch of her power: there was no longer any foreign foe of whom she could be afraid. But her internal administration had undergone great changes during these wars. Sylla's aristocratic const.i.tution was shaken by Pompey, in a most essential point, by the reestablishment of the power of the tribunes, which was done because neither he nor any leading men could obtain their ends without their a.s.sistance. It was by their means that Pompey had procured such unlimited power in his two late expeditions, that the existence of the republic was thereby endangered.

It was, however, a fortunate circ.u.mstance for Rome, that Pompey's vanity was sufficiently gratified by his being at the head of affairs, where he avoided the appearance of an oppressor.

Reiterated attempts of the tribune Sicinius to annul the const.i.tution of Sylla defeated by the senate, 76. But as early as 75 Opimius obtained that the tribunes should not be excluded from honourable offices, and that the judgments (_judicia_) should be restored to the knights (_equites_). The attempts of Licinius Macer, 72, to restore the tribunes to all their former powers, encountered but a short opposition; and their complete reestablishment was effected by Pompey and Cra.s.sus during their consulate, in 70.

26. This victory of the democratic faction, however, in consequence of the use made of it by some leading men, necessarily led the way to an oligarchy, which after the consulate of Pompey and Cra.s.sus became very oppressive. Catiline's conspiracy, which was not matured till after several attempts, would have broken up this confined aristocracy, and placed the helm of state in the hands of another and still more dangerous faction: a faction composed in part of needy profligates and criminals dreading the punishment of their crimes, and partly of ambitious n.o.bles. It occasioned a short civil war; but procured Cicero a place in the administration. With what pleasure do we forgive the little weaknesses and failings of one so gifted with talents and great virtues!

of one who first taught Rome, in so many ways, what it was to be great in the robe of peace!

Catiline's first conspiracy, in which Caesar and Cra.s.sus seem to have been implicated, 66, as well as in the second, 65: failure of the former by chance--of the latter through Piso's death. The third broke out in 64, as well in Rome, where the conspirators, having no armed force, were soon suppressed by the vigilance and activity of Cicero, 63, as in Etruria, where a victory of the proconsul Antonius over Catiline, who was left dead on the field, concluded it, 62.

27. The suppression of this conspiracy, however, did not stay the effect which the recently concluded Asiatic war had upon Roman manners. The luxury of the east, though united with Grecian taste, which had been introduced among the great by Lucullus; the immense riches poured into the treasury by Pompey; the tempting examples of unlimited power, which single citizens had already exercised; the purchase of the magistracy by individuals, in order, like Verres, after the squandering of millions, to enrich themselves again in the provinces; the demands of the soldiers upon their generals; and the ease with which an army might be raised by him who had only money enough to pay it; all these circ.u.mstances must have foreboded new and approaching convulsions, even if the preceding storms in this colossal republic, in which we must now judge of virtues and vices, as well as of riches and power, by a very magnified standard, had not formed men of that gigantic character they did:--men like Cato, who struggled alone to stem the impetuous torrent of the revolution, and was sufficiently powerful to r.e.t.a.r.d its progress for a time; or, like Pompey, who by good fortune and the art of acquiring influence, arose to a degree of authority and power never before attained by any citizen of a free state; or, like Cra.s.sus, "who only considered him as rich that could maintain an army by his own private means," founding their pretensions on wealth; or, finally, like the aspiring and now powerful Caesar, whose boundless ambition could only be surpa.s.sed by his talents, and courage, "who would rather be the first in a village than the second in Rome." The return of Pompey from Asia, threatening the senate with a new dictator, appeared an eventful moment.

Attempt of Pompey, through the tribune Metellus Nepos, to be allowed to return to Rome at the head of his army, frustrated by the firmness of Cato, 62.

28. The arrival of Pompey in Rome renewed the struggle between the senate and that powerful general, although he had disbanded his army on landing in Italy. The ratification of his management of affairs in Asia, which was the chief point of contention, was opposed by the leading men of the senate, Cato, the two Metelli, and Lucullus, which induced Pompey to attach himself entirely to the popular party, by whose means he hoped to obtain his end; Caesar's return, however, from his province of Lusitania, entirely changed the face of affairs.

29. Close union between Caesar, Pompey, and Cra.s.sus; that is, a secret alliance, formed by the interposition of Caesar. That which formed the height of the ambition of Pompey and Cra.s.sus was only regarded by Caesar as the means by which he might be able to effect his. His consulate--a kind of dictators.h.i.+p under the mask of great popularity--necessarily paved the way to his future career, as by giving him the government of the two Gauls and Illyria for five years, it opened a wide field for conquest, and gave him an opportunity of forming an army devoted to his will.

Caesar's abode and campaign in Gaul from the spring of 58 till the end of the year 50. By arresting the emigration of the Helvetians, and by the expulsion of the Germans, under Ariovistus, from Gaul, 58, Caesar gained an opportunity of intermeddling in the internal affairs of that country, and afterwards of subduing it, which was completed by his victory over the Belgae, 57, and the Aquitani, 56; so that Caesar was at liberty to undertake his several expeditions, as well in Britain, 55 and 54, as in Germany, 54 and 53. But the repeated revolts of the Gauls, 53-51, especially under Vercingetorix, 52, occasioned a war no less obstinate than their first conquest. Roman policy continued the same throughout. The Gauls were subdued, by the Romans appearing as _their deliverers_; and in the country they found allies in the aedui, Allobroges, etc.

30. The triumvirate, in order to establish their power upon a solid foundation, took care, by the management of the tribune Clodius, to get rid of the leaders of the senate, Cato and Cicero, before the departure of Caesar; and this they did by giving the former a kingdom to govern, and by procuring the banishment of the latter. They must however soon have discovered, that so bold a demagogue as Clodius could not be used as a mere machine. And, indeed, after Caesar's departure he raised himself so much above the triumvirs, that Pompey was soon obliged, for his own preservation, to permit Cicero to return from exile, which could only be effected by the most violent efforts of the tribune Milo. The power of Clodius, however, was but little injured thereby, although Pompey, to put a stop to the source of these disorders, and revive his own popularity, procured the nomination of himself as _praefectus annonae_, or superintendent of provisions.

Exile of Cicero, the greater part of which he spent in Macedonia, from April, 58, till 4th Sept. 57. Ptolemy king of Cyprus deposed, and that island reduced to a Roman province by Cato, on the proposition of Clodius, 57 (see page 264). The personal dislike of Clodius and the riches of the king were the causes that brought upon him this misfortune.

MIDDLETON'S _Life of Cicero_, 2 vols. 8vo. This work is almost a complete history of Rome during the age of Cicero; for whom the writer discovers an undue partiality.

# M. TULLIUS CICERO, _all his Letters translated, in chronological order, and ill.u.s.trated with notes_, by C. M. WIELAND. Zurich, 1808.

With a preliminary view of the life of Cicero. Of all Germans the writings of Wieland, whether original or translations (and to which can we give the preference?) afford the most lively insight into Greek and Roman antiquity at various periods. What writer has so truly seized its spirit, and placed it so faithfully and elegantly before his readers? His labours on the Letters of Cicero (whose foibles he exposes with a rigorous and unflinching hand) serve to make us much better acquainted with Rome, as it then was, than any Roman history.

31. A jealousy arises between the triumvirate, as Caesar, though absent, still found means to keep up his party at Rome in such watchful activity, that Pompey and Cra.s.sus considered it impossible to maintain their own influence, except by procuring such concessions as had been made to him. Harmony once more restored by an accommodation at Lucca, as the parties found it necessary to preserve a good understanding with each other.

The terms of this accommodation were; that Caesar should have his government prolonged for another five years; and that Pompey and Cra.s.sus should enjoy the consuls.h.i.+p for the ensuing year, the former receiving the provinces of Spain and Africa; and the latter that of Syria, for the purpose of carrying on a war against the Parthians. In proportion as these conditions were kept secret, there remained less secrecy respecting the alliance itself.

32. Second consulate of Pompey and Cra.s.sus. It was only amidst violent storms that they could effect their purposes; as it depended upon which faction should first gain or keep possession of the forum. The resistance they met with from the inflexible disposition of Cato, who in his austere virtue alone found means to secure himself a powerful party, shows how unfairly those judge who consider the power of the triumvirate as unlimited, and the nation as entirely corrupted.

Campaign of Cra.s.sus against the Parthians, undertaken at his own expense, 54. Instead, however, of gathering laurels like Caesar, he and his whole army were completely overthrown in Mesopotamia, 53; and the Parthians from this time maintain a powerful preponderance in Asia (see above, p. 302).

33. As the triumvirate by this failure of Cra.s.sus was reduced to a duumvirate, Pompey (who remained in Rome, and governed his provinces by lieutenants), in the midst of continual domestic broils, which he cunningly took care to foment, was evidently aiming to become the acknowledged head of the senate and republic. The idea that a dictator was necessary prevailed more and more during an anarchy of eight months, in which no appointment of a consul could take place; and notwithstanding the opposition of Cato, Pompey succeeded, after a violent commotion, in which Clodius was murdered by Milo, in getting himself nominated sole consul; a power equal to that of dictator.

Consulate of Pompey, 52, in which, at the end of seven months, he took as colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio. The government of his provinces, which afterwards became the chief seat of the republicans, is prolonged for five years.

34. From this time civil war became inevitable; for not only the chiefs of the parties, but also their adherents desired it. The approach of the time when Caesar's command would expire, necessarily hastened the crisis.

Could it be supposed that the conqueror of Gaul would return to a private life, and leave his rival at the head of the republic? The steps taken on both sides towards an accommodation were only made to escape the odium which would attach to him who struck the first blow. But Pompey unfortunately could never understand his opponent, who did all himself, all completely, and all alone. The brilliant light in which Pompey now appeared, as _defender of the republic_, delighted him so much, that it made him forget what belonged to its defence; while Caesar avoided, with the greatest care, every appearance of usurpation. The friend, the protector of the people against the usurpations of their enemies, was the character which he now chose to a.s.sume.

Commencement of the contest upon Caesar's demand to be allowed to hold the consuls.h.i.+p while absent, 52. Caesar, by the most lavish corruption, had increased his adherents in Rome, gained the tribunes, and among them especially the powerful speaker C. Curio (whom he did not think too dearly purchased at the price of about half a million sterling); by this man it was suggested to Caesar that he should give up his command, and leave a successor to be appointed in his place, 51, if Pompey would do the same: a proposition which created a prejudice much in his favour. Repeated, but insincere offers of both parties for an accommodation, 50, till at last a decree of the senate was pa.s.sed, Jan. 7, 49, by which Caesar was commanded "to disband his army under the penalty of being declared an enemy to the republic," without regard to the intercessions of the tribunes, whose flight to him gave an appearance of popularity to his party. Caesar crosses the Rubicon, the boundary of his province.

35. The civil war now about to break out, seemed likely to spread over nearly all the countries of the Roman empire; as Pompey, finding it impossible to maintain himself in Italy, had chosen Greece for the princ.i.p.al theatre of the war; while his lieutenants, with the armies under their command, occupied Spain and Africa. Caesar, by the able disposition of his legions, was everywhere present, without exciting beforehand any suspicion of his movements. A combination of circ.u.mstances, however, carried the war into Alexandria, and even as far as Pontus; indeed it might be called rather a series of six successive wars than merely one, all of which Caesar, by flying with his legions from one quarter of the world to the other, ended, within five years, victoriously and in person.

Rapid occupation of Italy in sixty days (when the troops under Domitius surrendered at Corfinus), which, as well as Sicily and Sardinia, were subdued by Caesar almost without opposition; Pompey, with his troops and adherents, having crossed over to Greece. Caesar's first campaign in Spain against Pompey's generals, Afranius and Petreius, whom he forces to surrender; this, however, is counterbalanced by the loss of the legions under Curio in Africa. In December, 49, however, Caesar is again in Italy, and named dictator, which he exchanges for the consulate. Spirited expedition into Greece with the s.h.i.+ps he had been previously collecting together, Jan. 4, 49.

Unfortunate engagement at Dyrrachium. Removal of the war into Thessaly, and decisive battle of Pharsalia, July 20, 48, after which Pompey flies to Alexandria, where he is killed on his landing. Caesar arrives three days after him at Alexandria.

36. Caesar, after the victory of Pharsalia, again nominated dictator, with great privileges. The death of Pompey, however, does not destroy his party; and the six months' war of Alexandria, as well as the expedition into Pontus against Pharnaces, gave them time to rally their forces both in Africa under Cato, and in Spain under the sons of Pompey.

During the Alexandrine war (see above, p. 266) and the expedition against Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates,--who had obtained the kingdom of his father, but was slain by Caesar immediately after his arrival, 47,--great disorders had broken out in Rome, caused by the tribune Dolabella's flattering the people with the abolition of debts (_novae tabulae_), notwithstanding the military power of M. Antony, whom Caesar had sent to Rome as master of the horse (_magister equitum_), as this abandoned sensualist at first actually favoured the projects of the tribune. Caesar's return to Rome, December, 47, put an end, it is true, to these disorders; but the increase of the opposite party in Africa, and an insurrection among his soldiers, obliged him to set out for Africa immediately, January, 46. Victory near Thapsus over Scipio and Juba; after which Cato kills himself at Utica. Numidia, the kingdom of Juba, becomes a Roman province. Caesar after his return to Rome in June, is only able to stay there four months, as, before the end of the year, he is obliged to set out for Spain to crush the dangerous efforts of Pompey's two sons. b.l.o.o.d.y battle at Munda, March, 45, after which Cneius is killed, but s.e.xtus escapes to the Celtiberians.

37. Nothing seems more evident than that Caesar did not, like Sylla, overthrow the republic for the purpose of reestablis.h.i.+ng it; and it is perhaps impossible to say what could be the final views of a childless usurper, who throughout his whole career, seemed only to be guided by an inordinate ambition, springing from a consciousness of superior powers, and to satisfy which, no means seemed to him difficult or unlawful. The period of his dictators.h.i.+p was so short, and so much interrupted by war, that his ultimate plans had not time for their development. He endeavoured to establish his dominion by popular measures; and although his army must still have been his main support, yet no proscription was granted to satisfy it. The reestablishment of order in the distracted country of Italy, and particularly in the capital, was his first care; and he proposed to follow that by an expedition against the powerful Parthian empire. His attempts, however, to obtain the diadem, seemed to place it beyond a doubt that he wished to introduce a formal monarchy.

But the destruction of the form of the republic was shown to be more dangerous than the overthrow of the republic itself.