Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 22

Yet Burke's declaration is not intended to relieve the representative of a const.i.tuency from the duty of attending to its administrative necessities. "Only members of Parliament," said Mr. Gulland, M.P., "appreciate how largely their time is taken up with local matters. They have to approach the different Government Departments upon an endless variety of topics." But Mr. Gulland proceeds: "These matters as a rule have no reference to existing Parliamentary divisions, and in a city it would be very much better if a man were member for the whole city rather than for a division. And in the case of a county, including burghs, it would be better that the general interests of the county should be attended to by members representing the county as a whole than by a member who is only the representative of the burgh."[6] It is also possible that the interests of some division of the city or county might be opposed to the interests of the city as a whole, and this is an additional reason against the subdivision of such const.i.tuencies for the purpose of parliamentary representation. An admirable ill.u.s.tration occurs in a speech made in the Canadian House of Commons by Mr. F. D.

Monk, K.C. "In a very large const.i.tuency," said he, "say of the size of the entire island of Montreal, it would be impossible to resort to the promise of a great many small public works, which by the admission of everybody are not at present advantageous, when we have such large problems to solve in connexion, for instance, with the problem of transportation. n.o.body in a const.i.tuency such as I have just indicated could advocate the construction of a small wharf or a small public building, but would be obliged to consider the relation of such a large territory as the island and city of Montreal to the all-important question of transportation. He would be obliged to lay before the electors, not promises of small and very often useless, though comparatively costly improvements, but the necessity of carrying out such a plan of transportation as was laid before the country and the Government some years ago by a commission composed of very experienced men, who after considerable labour had in my opinion solved that very vital question in every part of the country."[7] If local representation is necessary it would therefore appear to be most desirable that the representatives should be able to speak in the name of the whole of the town or of the county, as the case may be, and that is the kind of local representation which a system of proportional representation provides.

The members for the larger area can and do take a wider view than the member for the smaller electorate.

But what kind of local representation does a system of single-member const.i.tuencies provide? A large number of const.i.tuencies are represented by members who have no connexion with the locality other than that of being its spokesman in Parliament. Mr. Winston Churchill, defeated in a division of Manchester, is elected member for Dundee, a Scottish const.i.tuency. In what sense is the local representation of Dundee preserved? What were the special qualifications possessed by Mr.

Churchill for giving utterance to the needs of a Scottish const.i.tuency?

Doubtless Mr. Churchill made every effort to become acquainted with the local conditions of Dundee, and the necessity of doing so must have made considerable demands upon his time and energy. Yet it is more than doubtful whether Mr. Churchill can ever be an ideal representative from the standpoint of locality of a const.i.tuency to whose local life he is a stranger. Mr. Churchill's experience is in no sense singular. Mr.

Gladstone found it necessary to leave Greenwich for Midlothian; Lord Morley to leave Newcastle for Forfars.h.i.+re; Sir William Harcourt to leave Derby for Monmouths.h.i.+re; Mr. Balfour to leave Manchester for the City of London, and, however honoured the new const.i.tuencies might be by the distinction of their members, it cannot be said that the intimate relation between the representative and the const.i.tuency was maintained.

Under proportional representation the representation of localities becomes much more real. Excellent examples can be seen in the working of the system in Belgium. Before the introduction of the new methods leaders of political parties in Belgium were compelled, as in England, to leave the towns with which they were identified and to seek election for const.i.tuencies, in which, comparatively speaking, they were unknown.

Here the cause was not the subdivision of const.i.tuencies but the absence of any provision for the representation of minorities. M. Anseele, the leader of the Socialists in Ghent, and intimately acquainted with the life of that city, had to seek entrance into the Chamber of Deputies as one of the Socialist representatives of Liege. Similarly, M.

Vandervelde, whose activities had always been identified with Brussels, had to proceed to Charleroi in order to secure election. But on the introduction of the proportional system, M. Vandervelde returned to Brussels and was immediately elected as one of the Socialist members of the const.i.tuency, of whose special requirements he could, if need be, speak with effect in Parliament. M. Anseele returned to Ghent and was elected as one of the members for the city with which the whole of his life had been a.s.sociated. He was relieved from the double burden of continuing his work in Ghent and of acting as the representative of a const.i.tuency in another part of the country. It is abundantly clear, if it is desired to maintain the local character of representation, that a proportional system secures such representation in its most efficient form.

So flimsy and contradictory are some of the arguments brought against proportional representation that it is not surprising that certain critics, impressed by such facts as are recorded in the previous paragraph, have alleged that the system will so favour the representation of localities that no one but a local candidate will ever have any chance of success. The conclusion is drawn that proportional representation will militate against the return of eminent politicians, and is, for this reason, undesirable. But the facts cited as to Belgium bear no such interpretation. It is true that under all electoral systems the local candidate has, other things being equal, an advantage, and rightly so, over candidates who are not directly connected with the const.i.tuency, but it is also true that under all systems local candidates give way, if necessary, to distinguished statesmen. In Belgium the Socialists of Liege and Charleroi willingly accepted as their representatives M. Anseele and M. Vandervelde when these failed to secure representation in their own towns. So welcome are eminent politicians that there can be no ground for supposing that they will suffer from a proportional system. Indeed, large const.i.tuencies returning several members give to these a much surer foothold in Parliament than they can possibly secure with single-member areas. The distinguished candidate can appeal almost with certainty of success for the "quota" of votes which is sufficient to secure his election. The only change that will be made by the proportional system is that he will be able to retain his seat in the const.i.tuency with which he is really identified; he will no longer be compelled to wander from place to place with every swing of the pendulum.

_The member and his const.i.tuents._

There is perhaps one other aspect of the representation of localities which deserves attention. The fictions are still maintained that a member of Parliament represents and is intimately a.s.sociated with all his const.i.tuents. As regards the latter, it is obvious that only in a very small const.i.tuency can a member become personally acquainted with the electors. This might have been feasible in the days of the restricted franchise prior to 1867, but in modern const.i.tuencies which, on an average, contain some 11,000 voters it is impossible. Further, in respect of representation, since votes, save those of ignorant and corrupt electors, are given more and more on political grounds, an elector can derive but little consolation from the fact that he is "represented" in Parliament by the candidate whom he did his best to defeat, nor does such an elector, should he take a considerable interest in political work, care to approach the member in any cause; he prefers to seek help of a member of his own party who is the representative of another const.i.tuency. If a member of Parliament is elected to defend Free Trade he cannot possibly represent the political convictions of const.i.tuents who believe that Free Trade is disastrous to the country.

But under a proportional system Free Traders and Tariff Reformers would each have their own representatives, and whilst all the members would be able to speak for the const.i.tuency when its local interests were concerned, the various parties within the const.i.tuency would find expression given to their views when the question of Free Trade or of Tariff Reform was under discussion. So far as modern conditions permit, the relations between the member and his const.i.tuents would be of an intimate character, and at least there would be that bond of sympathy which springs from ident.i.ty of purpose and of political faith.

_Objections of party agents._

Count Goblet d'Alviella has stated that the most strenuous and persistent opposition to the introduction of proportional representation in Belgium came from party agents and from the political men, that is, from the extreme partizans. It is perhaps only natural to expect that party agents should object to a system which would introduce a considerable change in the method of party organization and in the conduct of elections, but a good many of their fears are based upon misapprehensions. It is true that political organizations might not control nominations as much as they do now, but the work of organizers would perhaps be even in greater demand than now. Thus, in Belgium, before the introduction of proportional representation, many const.i.tuencies were uncontested, some not for twenty years, and the political organizations of the minority in these const.i.tuencies fell into decay, in many places being completely abandoned. Similarly in England, it is often extremely difficult to maintain political organizations in those const.i.tuencies in which the position of the minority is hopeless. The new electoral methods have been followed in Belgium with a great increase of political activity; no const.i.tuency is now uncontested, and each of the parties maintains an active organization in every district.

The objections generally advanced by party agents are the increased inconvenience and cost which would result from the enlargement of the const.i.tuencies. It is alleged that it would be impossible for candidates in country areas to make themselves known to the electors. But to what extent does this objection hold good? Prior to 1885 many of the const.i.tuencies were much larger than they are to-day. The county of Northumberland, which is now divided into six divisions, was then divided into two. With the more rapid means of communications and of transit now available a candidate can cover a county const.i.tuency with much more ease than was possible a generation ago. The decrease in the size of const.i.tuencies since 1885 has not given any greater leisure to the candidates during the period of his candidature. Every moment of his time is filled up and, indeed, there is often an unnecessary expenditure of time and energy upon public meetings, the number of which, owing to an insane compet.i.tion, has been multiplied to an absurd degree.

Candidates are now expected to address meetings at the breakfast hour, meetings at the luncheon hour, and meetings in the evening; if const.i.tuencies were enlarged the time of the candidate would doubtless be carefully mapped out to meet the new conditions. Moreover, the const.i.tuencies required by a system of proportional representation in the United Kingdom would still be small compared with the const.i.tuencies in the Colonies, and even though large electoral areas may have some disadvantages the benefits to be gained from a true system of representation completely outweigh them.

_Alleged difficulties in the organization of elections._

Some valuable lessons were learned during the course of the Johannesburg munic.i.p.al elections in 1909, as to the organization of contests under the system of the single transferable vote. There was no previous experience to guide either the candidate or their agents. The methods pursued differed according to the rigidity of the discipline existing within the party. A committee representative of commercial and other interests, presided over by the Hon. W. A. Martin, M.L.C., selected the names of ten candidates--there were ten vacancies--and this committee asked the citizens of Johannesburg to vote for the candidates whose names figured upon this ticket--the "ticket of the ten good men," as it was called. The committee did not attempt to instruct the electors as to the order in which preferences should be expressed for these candidates.

The electors were asked to place them in such order as they pleased.[8]

The candidature of the ticket, as such, was in some respects also loosely organized. The various candidates gave separate and special attention to the districts with which they were most closely identified, but they also appeared in twos and threes on the same platform at public meetings. In every district the names of all ten candidates appeared upon the posters, but special prominence was given to the name of some one candidate--the candidate a.s.sociated with the district. The final appeal to the public, in the form of a specimen ballot paper, had all the ten names printed in bold type. In this way the committee was enabled to appeal to the town to support the ticket as a whole, whilst the individual members of the ticket were free to solicit first preferences in the districts and circles in which they were best known.

Such an arrangement shows how easily the difficulties of candidature under the new system can be overcome. If the arrangements outlined above were adopted by party organizers the difficulties of an electoral campaign would be no greater than with a system of single-member const.i.tuencies. Each candidate on the ticket would canva.s.s a portion of the const.i.tuency--which would be no larger than a single-member area--whilst at convenient centres the members of the ticket would appear upon a common platform. The campaign of the Labour Party was more rigidly organized. The leaders nominated a ticket of three candidates, but instead of leaving their supporters free, instructed them to vote for the candidates on the ticket in a definite order, although this order was varied in different wards. In the official instructions the elector is asked to vote by placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate he likes best, and some risk is run by an organization which advises its supporters to express their first preference for some candidate who is not the party's true first choice. It is sufficient for organizers to advise their supporters to record preferences for all the candidates of the party, leaving the elector free to decide the order in which those preferences should be given.

_Alleged increase of cost._

These elections threw some light on another difficulty urged against proportional representation by party agents, namely, the increased expenditure involved. Considerable sums of money were certainly spent in the prosecution of the candidature of the "ten good men," but these elections proved conclusively that excessive expenditure had much less influence in determining the result than in our parliamentary and munic.i.p.al elections. The total expenses of the three Labour candidates in Johannesburg were returned at 18, 5s., and even if there is added thereto the expenditure incurred by the Labour Representation Committee, amounting to 34, 3s. 6d., the total sum cannot be said to be excessive.

Two of these three candidates were successful. The expenditure of the successful Labour candidate in Pretoria was practically nil. Further, the Mayor of Johannesburg, who, relying upon his record of past work, personally took no action beyond the issue of a manifesto to the electors, was returned at the head of the poll.

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald also objects to proportional representation because of the cost involved in contesting large areas.[9] Johannesburg, for the purpose of its munic.i.p.al election, was polled as one const.i.tuency, and the evidence furnished by this election is, therefore, of considerable value. Further, this evidence is confirmed by the experience of Socialist parties in Belgium, in Finland and elsewhere, which apparently find no difficulty in fighting large const.i.tuencies. The electoral conditions in these countries doubtless differ from those in England, but an a.n.a.lysis of the expenses incurred by Labour candidates at home show that single-member const.i.tuencies and small expenditure do not go together. The cost of these candidatures, even apart from returning officers' expenses, usually exceeds 500, and sometimes 1000. Such sums could be spent to much greater advantage in large areas in bringing all the adherents of a party to the poll.

It has already been shown that the practice of "nursing" a const.i.tuency is one of the indirect results of the single-member system. Indeed, no system gives so great an advantage to the candidate with a long purse; he can more easily influence those non-political electors whose votes may decide the issue. A consideration of the working of the new system will show that the cost of elections will in all probability be greatly diminished. At present in a city returning seven members a party must find seven candidates each with his separate organization and separate expenses; with proportional representation there will be but one organization for all candidates of the same party, and as no party can hope to monopolize the representation, it is unlikely that any will run as many as seven candidates. A well-organized party will get its due share of representation without subscribing to clubs and flower shows.

The illegitimate power of money will be weakened, and the total amount spent considerably reduced.

_The accuracy of representation._

A final criticism made against proportional systems of voting is that they do not secure the exact representation of all the electors in a country. Thus the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, whilst admitting that the new method would generally produce more accurate results, mathematically at least, than the existing method, qualified their statement by saying that their success "in producing in Parliament the 'scale map of the country,' which they held up as the ideal, can be only partial"; and in another paragraph the Report contains this remarkable statement: "On the a.s.sumption, however, that proportional representation is desirable, can any system yet invented be guaranteed or reasonably expected to ensure it? In our opinion, only in a limited and generally unascertainable degree." No responsible advocate of proportional representation has contended that proportional systems, save when the country is treated as one const.i.tuency, will result in a mathematically accurate representation of opinion. But the close approximation to accuracy obtained in the practical application of proportional systems is so p.r.o.nounced that the statement of the Commission is wholly misleading. The following figures of the Belgian election of 1910 will show to what extent accuracy is obtained by a proportional system, even when, as in this case, the mechanism slightly favours the larger party:

BELGIAN ELECTION, 1910

Seats Seats in Parties Votes. Actually Proportion Obtained. to Votes.

Catholics . . . . . 676,939 49 47.0 Liberals and Socialists . 561,052 36 37.5 Christian Democrats . . 16,170 ---- 1.0 Independents . . . . 20,428 ---- 1.5

In Finland, where another system of proportional representation is in operation, the result of the election of 1909 was as follows:--

FINLAND ELECTION, 1909

Seats Seats in Parties Votes. Actually Proportion Obtained. to Votes.

Social Democrat . . . . 337,685 84 80 Old Finn . . . . . . 199,920 48 47 Young Finn . . . . . 122,770 28 29 Swedish . . . . . . 104,191 25 25 Agrarian . . . . . . 56,943 14 13 Christian Labourers . . 23,259 1 6

The single transferable vote has yielded results which are remarkably accurate. It has been used in Tasmania, with adult suffrage, in the Transvaal, with the munic.i.p.al franchise, and in the election of the Senate for United South Africa, by members of Parliament. Each of the five const.i.tuencies in Tasmania returned six members, and the total result was as follows:--

TASMANIAN ELECTION, 1909

Seats Seats in Parties Votes. Actually Proportion Obtained. to Votes.

Labour . . . . . . 19,067 12 11.7 Non-Labour . . . . . 29,893 18 18.3

These figures speak for themselves. In the munic.i.p.al elections in the Transvaal each of the parties obtained its fair share of representation.

In Johannesburg the elections were fought by a commercial ticket of ten candidates, a Labour ticket of three candidates, and ten Independent candidates; the number of valid votes was 11,788, and the quota--that is, the proportion of votes which would ensure the election of a representative--amounted to 1072. The ticket of "ten good men" polled in all some 6185 votes, or 247 votes short of six quotas, and the ticket succeeded in returning six members. This result was strictly fair, for the deficiency in votes was made up by those supporters of independent candidates who, having failed to return their first choice, had indicated members of this ticket as their next choice. The three Labour candidates polled in all 2126 votes, or 18 votes short of two full quotas, and the Labour Party was successful in securing two representatives. The remaining two seats fell to two Independent candidates, each of whom had a considerable personal following. In the third test, the election of South African Senators, each of the parties obtained representation in proportion to their force in the Parliaments of the respective colonies. The details of the voting have not been published,[10] but the returning officers have all borne testimony to the satisfactory working of the system and absolute fairness of the results.

In the light of these facts, what meaning can be attached to the statement that proportional systems only secure proportional representation in a limited and generally unascertainable degree? The results of proportional systems are seen in a still more favourable light if contrasted with the working of non-proportional methods. Thus the Liberals of Surrey, Suss.e.x, and Kent were without representation in the Parliament of 1910. The Unionists of Wales were in the same plight in the previous one. In the election of the Australian Senate (1910) the Labour Party obtained eighteen seats, all other parties none. In the same year, the Munic.i.p.al Reformers elected all the aldermen of the London County Council, the Progressives none. In the election of Representative Peers of Scotland no Liberal peer is ever chosen.

_Summary of objections._

The various objections which have been raised from time to time against proportional representation have been almost wholly disproved. Before it was put into operation it was said to be impracticable; wherever the new methods have been introduced the proceedings have in every case pa.s.sed off without a hitch. Proportional representation, it was said, would result in unstable governments; now complaint is made that it has been difficult in Belgium under the new system to effect a change of government, the majority of the electors apparently being content with things as they are. It was alleged that faddists would obtain undue representation; it is now complained, under some misapprehension, that independent political thought will fail to secure an adequate hearing.

Objections of a minor character are also raised; that proportional representation will increase the difficulties of electioneering; that it will increase the cost of elections--a conclusion not in accordance with the experience of countries in which it has been applied; or that it will destroy the sporting element in politics, as if the pursuit of politics by itself was lacking in interest. Yet all the time the demand for electoral reform is increasing, and whilst the figures in the foregoing paragraphs show to what extent proportional systems secure accuracy in representation, it can also be shown that proportional representation will facilitate the solution of those other electoral reforms which are also demanded upon the ground that they will add to the representative character of the House of Commons.

[Footnote 1: _Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd.

5163), par. 81.]

[Footnote 2: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.]

[Footnote 3: Annual Meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, June 1910.--_Representation_, vol. iii. p. 79.]

[Footnote 4: Scottish Conservative Club, Glasgow, 5 October 1910.]

[Footnote 5: Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 3 November 1774.]

[Footnote 6: Minutes of Evidence: _Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd. 5352), p. 118.]

[Footnote 7: 15 March 1909.]

[Footnote 8: The following is taken from a letter sent to the press by the Chairman of the Committee: "I am aware that many people are opposed to the principle of a ticket on the ground that it savours of 'dictation,' &c. &c. We are exceedingly anxious that every voter should be in a position to exercise his privilege of choice to the fullest extent.... It is not reasonable to expect him, without advice, to express an order of preference in the case of men he does not know. This is exactly one of the strongest justifications for a representative committee to come forward as we do, to say: 'We have carefully inquired as to the character, capacity, and ability of all the candidates, and having taken everything into consideration we recommend you to vote for the ten whose names are on our ticket, _placing them in such order of preference as you please_.'"]

[Footnote 9: Labour Party Conference, Leicester, February 1911.]

[Footnote 10: Owing to the small numbers taking part in the election, the publication of the details might possibly have furnished a clue to the votes of individual members of Parliament. For this reason the returning officers and the scrutineers were pledged to secrecy. The fairness of the results were fully recognized by the press, as the following extracts show:

"The result has demonstrated the absolute fairness of the single transferable vote."--_Bloemfontein Friend_.