Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 27

In common with all continental systems, supplementary members (suppleants) were chosen for the purpose of taking the place of an elected member who might die or retire before the council had run its course. The method adopted in Sweden is peculiar to itself. In Belgium the same rules serve for the election of the suppleants as for the election of members, and they are called upon to serve in the order in which they stand at the declaration of the poll. In Sweden it is held that each elected member must have a suppleant, or deputy, special to himself. The method of selection may be ill.u.s.trated from the Carlskrona election. The candidate who was to be regarded as suppleant to Burgomaster Holmdahl (the first on the Moderate list) was chosen as follows: Holmdahl had received 20,334 votes, his name having appeared on every ballot paper of the Moderate party; the votes recorded for the unelected candidates on these papers were ascertained, the result being:--

Neuendorfs . . . . . 20,334 von Otter . . . . . 20,242 Stromberg . . . . . 19,913 Mattsson . . . . . 20,119 Johansson . . . . . 20,237 Andren . . . . . . 20,170

Neuendorff being the candidate who had received the highest number of votes on these papers, was declared elected as suppleant to Holmdahl. A suppleant for Nordstrom, the second elected member, was then chosen from among the remaining five non-elected members. Nordstrom's votes were 20,235, and the votes recorded for the non-elected members on the same papers were:--

von Otter 20,143 Stromberg 19,913 Mattsson 20,055 Johansson 20,195 Andren 20,071

Johansson, being highest with 20,195 votes, was declared suppleant to Nordstrom.

This method of choosing the suppleant seems to be unsatisfactory. The party as such does not determine who shall be called upon to fill a vacancy in its ranks; whether a non-elected member succeeds to a vacancy as a suppleant depends very largely on accident. A good ill.u.s.tration occurred in the selection of a suppleant from the Labour list. The party's candidates were as follows:--

Kloo.

Karlsson.

Ostergren.

Olsson.

Ek.

Johansson.

Jensen.

f.a.gerberg.

Pettersson.

The first candidate on the list had been declared elected, and obviously, in the opinion of the party, the next favourite was Karlsson, and had there been a second seat awarded to the list Karlsson would have been declared elected. In determining, however, whether he should be declared elected as a suppleant, his position on the list did not count, and as the party list had been voted for without alteration by most of the Labour voters, five of the non-elected candidates were credited with the same number of votes. The choice of the suppleant was made by lot, and fell in this case upon Johansson, the sixth name on the list. It may be said that there is; considerable dissatisfaction with the method of electing suppleant candidates, and the Stockholm _Dagblad_, in its issue of the 29 May 1910, stated that the choice of suppleant, although there might have been many thousand votes given to every candidate, depended upon so small a difference in the totals received by each that even one ballot paper might determine the result. This is a detail in the system that can easily be remedied, and steps are already being taken to bring the election of suppleants into agreement with the election of ordinary members.

_Comparison with Belgian system._

It will be of interest to compare the Swedish with the Belgian system.

It has been shown that the method of allotting seats to different groups is identical in principle in both countries. This method, the d'Hondt rule, favours the largest parties, and this explains why, in the smaller Belgian const.i.tuencies, cartels or combinations of parties take place.

The Swedish system enables such combined action to take place with greater facility. It enables two parties to make use of the same motto without presenting a common list of candidates. No inter-party negotiations are required, as in Belgium, with reference to the order in which the names of candidates shall appear upon the list. In Sweden each group can put forward its own list of candidates, and so long as the electors make use of the same motto at the head of the ballot paper the combination gains the additional representation which may fall to it as a result of being treated as one party, whilst the share falling to each section is determined by the number of votes recorded for their respective candidates.

The Swedish method of choosing the successful candidates from the various lists differs materially from that used in Belgium. In Sweden the d'Hondt rule is used not only for the allotment of seats to parties, but also in the selection of the successful candidates. In Belgium the use of the d'Hondt rule is restricted to the former purpose, and when once the electoral quotient is ascertained the rule is discarded. The difference in the two methods can be ill.u.s.trated from the Stockholm munic.i.p.al election of 1910. In the fifth ward the ballot paper of the Moderate party was as follows:--

Welin.

Norstrom.

Boalt.

Roberg.

Palmgren.

Bohman.

Ringholm.

Herlitz.

------------------ Hafstrom.

Svensson.

von Rosen.

Freden.

The line in the ballot paper divides the eight candidates for election as members from those who were standing for election as suppleants only.

The votes recorded for the Moderate party numbered 118,483, of which 86,851 were given for the party ticket as printed. The number of votes accepting the party order of the first three candidates was about 93,000. This latter number was more than three-fourths, but less than four-fifths of the total, and therefore only the first three candidates on the ballot paper could be declared elected in accordance with the rule of the order of preference. The remaining four members had to be chosen by the reduction rule; the votes recorded for the five non-elected candidates were ascertained, the papers containing the names of the three elected candidates being treated for this purpose as of the value of one-fourth.

Some of the supporters of the eighth and sixth candidates had struck out the names of the fourth and other candidates. This manoeuvre had the result of placing these two candidates in the order named at the head of the poll at the fourth and fifth counts, and they were accordingly elected. Other candidates had received exclusive support, and it should be pointed out that it is the total amount of exclusive support recorded for all candidates which determines how soon the application of the rule of the order of preference breaks down. As soon as this takes place the election of any one candidate may depend, as in the election of the suppleants, upon the action of a comparatively small number of voters. Thus, some supporters of the fifth candidate, a Miss Palmgren, had struck out the names of all candidates save hers. Those papers which contained her name alone were treated as of full value, and although the votes of these supporters only numbered 1100, or less than 1 per cent.

of the whole, they were sufficient to turn the scale in her favour. As, however, 86,851 votes out of a total of 118,453, had been recorded for the list as printed, showing that this proportion of voters preferred the fourth candidate to those that succeeded him, it would certainly seem that the result was not fair to this candidate. In Belgium if seven seats were won by a party which polled 118,453 votes, the electoral quotient would not be more than one-seventh of this total, and the election of the first candidate, instead of absorbing one-half the value of the votes, would consume only one-seventh. The election of the first two candidates would absorb two-sevenths instead of two-thirds, the election of three candidates would consume three-sevenths instead of three-fourths, and the election of four candidates would consume four-sevenths instead of four-fifths. In the Stockholm election more than five-sevenths of the voters had supported the party list as it was printed, and according to the Belgian system the first five candidates would have been declared elected.

_The system and party organization_.

The Swedish rule of selecting successful candidates is defended on the ground that it confers great power upon the electors. These can if necessary more effectively express their disapproval of the list put forward by the party organization, and as it is thought that a large number of voters too readily accept the party lead, a counterpoise is considered desirable. Recent experience in Belgium, however, would tend to show that a greater knowledge of their power has induced more and more electors to make use of the opportunity which that system allows of expressing individual preferences. If we regard a party as consisting of two groups--those that follow the party lead, and those which, whilst supporting the party, desire to a.s.sert their own preferences--then as between these two groups the Belgian system is strictly fair. If a party wins seven seats and four-sevenths of the party support the official list, this group would obtain four out of the seven seats; but in Sweden, as has been shown, at least four-fifths must support the official list before the first four candidates can be sure of election.

The Swedish system discriminates in favour of the dissentients within a party, and this discrimination may have unexpected effects on party organization. The Belgian method has induced parties to welcome the support of all sections, knowing that such sections will not obtain more than their fair share of influence. In Sweden the tendency may be for party organizers to regard the support of various sections with suspicion, because, whilst these sections will obtain the full advantage of the party vote, their independent action may result in the gain of the section at the expense of the party as a whole. As a result of the Stockholm election referred to, the opinion was expressed by party organizers that it would be necessary to limit the number of candidates on a list to the number which the party knew it could carry. This would be an undesirable outcome of a rule designed to secure greater freedom for the elector, for it would tend to make party discipline more strict and parties exclusive rather than inclusive, as is the case in Belgium.

It should, however, be added that in the large majority of the provincial council elections the selection of candidates was made in accordance with the rule of the order of preference. It would, therefore, seem that party organizers, as a rule, took care to present lists of candidates acceptable to the party as a whole.

_The great improvement effected by the Swedish system_.

The new Swedish electoral system, like all proportional systems, const.i.tutes a striking advance upon the previous electoral conditions.

The extent of the improvement will, of course, be seen from a comparison of some of its results with those of former years. For example, Stockholm used to be represented in the Lower Chamber by twenty-two members chosen by the "block" system, or _scrutin de liste_. The party in the majority monopolized the representation, and the absurdity of the system was well ill.u.s.trated by an incident in the election of 1882, which was preceded by a severe struggle between the advocates of free trade and protection. At this election Stockholm returned twenty-two free traders, but as one of the elected members had not paid his taxes, all the voting papers containing his name were declared to be invalid.

In consequence the twenty-two free traders were unseated and the twenty-two protectionist candidates were declared elected in their place. An attempt was made to ameliorate the evils of this system by dividing the town into five parliamentary districts, but, although so divided, Stockholm in 1908 returned twenty-one members, all of whom were either Liberals or Socialists, the large minority of Moderates being unrepresented. When the proportional system was applied in March 1910 to the election of the munic.i.p.al council, each party obtained its fair share of representation in each of the six wards of the city, and the total result shows how large an improvement is effected by the new method:--

Parties. Votes Seats Seats in Obtained. Obtained. Proportion to Votes.

Moderate 281,743 22 24 Liberal 142,639 12 12 Socialist 160,607 16 14 ----------------------------------- 584,989 50 50

In the election of the provincial council of Bleking the result was as follows:--

Parties. Votes Seats Seats in Obtained. Obtained. Proportion to Votes.

------------------------ ----------------------- Moderate 54,465 22 22.4 Liberal 36,595 10 15.1 Socialist 3,617 1 1.5 ---------------------------------- 94,677 39 39

The general fairness of these results is all the more remarkable, because in Stockholm there was a very considerable variation in the value of a vote in the different wards, whilst many of the const.i.tuencies in the province of Bleking returned only a few members, and these did not give full play to the proportional system. The figures confirm the experience of all other countries, that a proportional system, even when applied to comparatively small const.i.tuencies, yields results which approximate very closely to the ideal aimed at, the true representation of the electors.

[Footnote 1: The town councils were elected in one stage; each elector had one vote for every 100 kroner income, subject to a limit of 100 votes. The members of the town council, when electing members of the provincial councils, had only one vote each.]

[Footnote 2: A ballot paper is not declared invalid even if it contains the names of more candidates than there are members to be elected (except at the elections of parliamentary committees). The names in excess are regarded as suppleant candidates (see _Election of Suppleants_) to the number of two in the elections for the Riksdag and the town councils, and to a number equal to the number of members at the election for the provincial councils. Any additional names on a ballot paper are regarded as non-existent.]

[Footnote 3: This paper bore the signature of the elector.]

APPENDIX IV

THE FINLAND SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

_The influence of the Belgian system._

The system of proportional representation introduced into Finland by the electoral law of 1906, while it presents little or no difficulty to the voter, is, in its method of counting the votes, perhaps the most complicated of the systems at present in force. It has for its basis the Belgian List system and the d'Hondt rule, but the variations which were introduced with the object of safeguarding the rights of the electors against the possible tyranny of party managers are so important that at the first glance its resemblance to the parent system is not easily recognized. The Belgian model is followed more closely in the method of distributing the seats to the various parties than in the manner in which the successful candidates are chosen from the party lists. In its internal party arrangement the Finnish system shows boldness, originality, and, it must be added, no little complexity of procedure.

_Schedules and "compacts" in place of lists._

Finland is divided into sixteen electoral districts returning from six to twenty-three members, with the one exception of Lapland, which is a single-member const.i.tuency. In each const.i.tuency any group of not less than fifty electors can put forward a schedule of not more than three candidates, however many may be the total number of members to be elected. Each of these schedules may be headed with the name of a party or some political motto. The persons responsible for these schedules may, and commonly do, combine them in groups known as "compacts," and it is these compacts, and not the original schedules, which correspond roughly to the party "lists" of the Belgian system, the only limit to this power of combination being that the combined schedules must not contain the names of more candidates than there are vacancies to be filled. But as the names of the same candidates may, and constantly do, occur in many different schedules within a single compact, a first glance at a Finnish polling paper would seem to show in each combination the names of more candidates than there are vacancies. The compact bears the name of the political party to which it belongs. Combination into compacts is, of course, optional, and a certain number of schedules are put forward independently. A vacant corner is reserved on the ballot paper where any elector who is not content with any of the schedules submitted may make his own schedule.

_An election in Nyland_.

The system may be more fully understood from some details of the election of 1907 in the Nyland division. In this division, the largest in Finland, returning twenty-three members, no less than seventy-two schedules were presented, or which all except five were combined into compacts. The five remained isolated. Of the combined schedules seventeen were included in the compact of the Swedish party, but the individual candidates in these seventeen schedules numbered only twenty-three, the legal limit, the same names being repeated in several schedules. The old Finnish compact contained thirteen schedules, the Young Finns seventeen, the Social Democrats eight, the "Christian"

compact seven, the "Free Christian" compact three, and the Radicals two.

As already stated, the voter's task is not difficult. He, or she, simply marks the schedule of his, or her, choice. The voter can also, if he wishes, alter the order of the names in a schedule. The effect of doing this will be apparent in a moment. That the task is simple is conclusively shown by the fact that the percentage of spoilt votes was in the Nyland division only 0.58 per cent. For the whole country the percentage was only 0.93, and this with universal adult suffrage and a poll of 899,347, or 70.7 per cent, of the electorate.