Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 8

Candidate. First Count. Transfer of O'Hanlou's Votes. Result.

Curran (Labour) 4,698 +1,000 5,698 Rose-Innes (Unionist) 3,930 + 122 4,052 Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +1,000 4,474 O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,122 -2,112 --

Total 14,224 -- 14,224

Only three candidates now remain for consideration, and their position on the poll as the result of the transfer is as follows:--

Curran . . . . . . 5,698 Hughes . . . . . . 4,474 Rose-Innes . . . . . 4,052

As neither has as yet obtained a majority of the total votes polled, it becomes necessary that the votes given for Mr. Rose-Innes, who is now lowest on the poll, should be transferred in accordance with the next preferences of his supporters. It is conceivable that the larger proportion of these preferences would have been given for the Liberal candidate, Mr. Hughes, rather than for Mr. Curran, and, if so, the final result might easily have been the election of Mr. Hughes as member for Jarrow.

_The alternative or contingent vote in Queensland_.]

Before considering the value of the transferable vote in single-member const.i.tuencies as a means of securing a true expression of the national will, it may perhaps be pointed out that the procedure prescribed by the Queensland Act differs from that contained in the English Bills. The regulations of the Queensland Act are as follows:--

"When one member only is to be returned at the election, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates except those two who receive the greatest number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates.

"When two members are to be returned, and there are more than four candidates, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates except those four who receive the greatest number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates."

It will be seen that the system here prescribed approximates to the German form of the second ballot, according to which only the two candidates highest on the poll may stand again. Were the Queensland form of preferential voting applied to the Jarrow election, both Mr. Hughes and Mr. O'Hanlon would be declared defeated candidates, and only the further preferences recorded by their supporters would be taken into account in determining the relative position of the two highest candidates, Curran and Rose-Innes. The provisions of the West Australian Act of 1907, and of Mr. Deakin's Bill of 1906, followed the more elastic and undoubtedly superior method embodied in the English proposals.

Sir J.G. Ward, in introducing the Second Ballot Bill into the New Zealand Parliament in 1908, defended the selection of this electoral method on the ground that the system of preferential voting introduced into Queensland had been a partial failure. He stated that the privilege of marking preferences had not been extensively used, and quoted the opinion of Mr. Kidston, a former Queensland Premier, that the marking of preferences should be made compulsory. As explained in the course of the New Zealand debates, part of the alleged failure of the Queensland system was due to the unnecessarily c.u.mbrous nature of the regulations.

The Queensland Electoral Acts still retain the old method of voting--that of striking out from the ballot paper the names of such candidates as the elector does not intend to vote for. The confusion produced in the mind of the elector may readily be imagined when he is instructed to strike out the names of candidates for whom he does not intend to vote in the first instance, and then to mark such candidates in the order of his choice. Moreover, the provisions, as detailed above, for giving effect to preferences are so defective that only a proportion of the preferences marked can be taken into account. Even so, preferential voting in Queensland sometimes has a decisive influence upon the result of the election, as the following example, taken from the elections of 1908, will show:--

WOOLLOONGABBA ELECTION

_First Count_.

Votes.

1st Candidate . . . 1,605 2nd " . . . 1,366 3rd " . . . 788 ----- Total . . . 3,759

The votes recorded for the third candidate were then distributed according to the preferences marked, which were as follows:--

1st Candidate . . . 15 2nd ,, . . . 379 No preferences . . . 394 --- 788

The result of the distribution brought the second candidate to the top of the poll, the final figures being as follows:--

2nd Candidate . . . 1,745 1st ,, . . . 1,620

_West Australia_

Where the more simple and straightforward instructions have been adopted, as in West Australia, it has been found that a larger percentage of the electors make use of the privilege of marking preferences. Here are the figures for the const.i.tuency of Claremont in the elections of 1908:--

_First Count._

Foulkes . . . . 1,427 Briggs . . . . 825 Stuart . . . . 630 ----- Total . . . 2,888

When the votes recorded for the candidate lowest on the poll were distributed it was found that nearly 75 per cent, of his papers were marked with additional preferences. The numbers were as follows:--

Briggs . . . . . 297 Foulkes . . . . 174 No preferences . . . 165 --- Total . . . 636

The final figures were as follows:--

Foulkes . . . . 1,601 Briggs . . . . 1,122

These figures doubtless show that even in West Australia, when the transferable vote is applied to single-member const.i.tuencies, a considerable number of the electors will not indicate a preference for any candidate other than for that of their own party, but similar abstentions occur at the second ballots in France, where it is found that a considerable percentage of the electors usually refrain from going to the poll on the second occasion. The Labour Party in Queensland has sometimes issued instructions to its supporters to abstain from marking preferences for the purpose of keeping the party solid and absolutely separate from other parties. Such action necessarily increases the percentage of abstentions. Nor can any remedy for action of this kind be found in making the marking of preferences compulsory.

Even in Belgium, where "compulsory voting" is in force, the compulsion only extends to an enforced attendance at the polling place. The act of voting is not compulsory, for a blank unmarked ballot paper may be dropped into the voting urn. The compulsory marking of preferences when the elector has none may still further vitiate the results of elections in a most undesirable way, whilst abstention from preference marking merely deprives those abstaining of a privilege which they might exercise if they chose. It is quite conceivable that an elector after voting for the candidate of his choice may be indifferent to the fate of the remaining candidates and, if so, an enforced expression of opinion on his part would not be of any real value, and should not be counted in determining the result of an election.

_Mr. Deakin's failure to carry the alternative vote._

Does then the alternative, or contingent vote, as used in West Australia, solve the problem of three-cornered fights--the problem of three distinct parties seeking representation in Parliament? When a single seat is being contested it is doubtless sufficient if the member elected represents the average views of his const.i.tuents, but a General Election based on such a system would yield results no more satisfactory than those of the second ballots. Neither the second ballot nor the contingent vote are acceptable after their true effects are understood, a fact which explains the failure of Mr. Deakin's Government to carry their Preferential Ballot Bill in 1906. Several of the seats held by the Australian Labour Party--as in the elections of Jarrow, Colne Valley, and Attercliffe--were won by a minority vote; the _Melbourne Age_ published the following list of seven const.i.tuencies in Victoria where Labour members represented only a minority of the voters:--

Non-Labour Labour Const.i.tuencies. Votes. Votes

Geelong . . . . 1,704 1,153 Ballarat West . . . 2,038 1,034 Jika Jika . . . . 1,366 1,183 Williamstown . . . 1,931 1,494 Bendigo West . . . 1,654 1,248 Grenville . . . . 1,457 1,268 Maryborough . . . 1,929 1,263

Totals . . . 12,079 8,643

Preferential voting would have placed these seats at the mercy of a combination of the other parties, and, somewhat alarmed by the too eager advocacy of the measure on the part of the _Age_, the Labour Party, which had voted for the second reading of the Bill, procured its defeat on the first division in committee. It is impossible to defend the present system by which the Labour Party, which numbered two-fifths of the voters in these seven const.i.tuencies, obtained all seven seats, but, on the other hand, it cannot be alleged that a system of preferential voting, which would have enabled the other parties to have deprived these electors of all representation, was a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. In neither case would justice be done to the claims of three parties to representation.

_Probable effect of the alternative vote in England._

A consideration of the possible results of the introduction into the English electoral system of second ballots or the transferable vote in single-member const.i.tuencies will show that neither reform will solve the problem presented by the rise of a new party. It is obvious that the Labour Party could by a combination of Conservative and Liberal voters be deprived of representation in all const.i.tuencies save those in which they had the support of an absolute majority of the electorate. Nor would the conditions remain the same as they are to-day. In many const.i.tuencies in which the Liberals have allowed a straight fight to take place between Tariff Reform and Labour candidates, the Liberal Party would intervene; and should combinations at the polls result in the defeat of Labour candidates, what would be the effect upon the temper and spirit of Labour voters who found themselves under an "improved" voting system less able than before to secure representation in Parliament? Would there not possibly arise a disposition on the part of the disfranchised minority to pursue on the next occasion a wrecking policy such as has distinguished the second ballots both in Belgium and in France? Even apart from precipitate action which might arise as the result of ill-feeling, the alternative vote would afford an opportunity for a predetermined policy on the part of a minority to create dissension between the opponents. The manipulation of the alternative vote would be easily understood. An angry minority of electors could be instructed beforehand to use it, as we know from experience they _have_ used the second ballot on the Continent. Would politicians, following an exclusive electoral policy, hesitate to avail themselves of the weapon which the alternative vote would place in their hands for the purpose of annihilating any section they especially disliked, in the same way as the Liberal Party in Belgium was destroyed by Catholic and Socialist combinations at the second ballots? We cannot escape the conclusion which all experience yields, that both these electoral methods place the representation of any party at the mercy of either temporary or permanent coalitions of other parties. To an even greater degree than under the existing regime, the result of a General Election would fail to reflect public opinion.

The advocates of the alternative vote a.s.sume, with but little justification, that this method will be free from the bargainings that have distinguished the second ballots on the Continent. The bargainings naturally take place between the first and second ballots, because that is the most suitable time for the striking of bargains, for the strength of parties is definitely known. With the alternative vote such transactions would take place before the election, upon the basis of the probable position of parties as ascertained by the party agents. Even if experience should show that the transferable vote did not lend itself so easily as the second ballot to the perpetration of those bargains which are detested by all Continental statesmen, yet it is probable that the successful candidate would, like the deputy elected under the system of second ballots, become "the prisoner of the minority." The figures of the election would disclose to what extent the member returned had owed his success to the smallest minority. This minority would be only too conscious that it held the key of the situation, and the member would doubtless be exposed to the same intolerable pressure as has been brought to bear upon members of the French Chamber of Deputies. In any case the position of the elected member would be most unsatisfactory.

Were a Labour member returned with the a.s.sistance of Tariff Reform votes, would not the parliamentary relations between the various parties become as embittered as when the Unified Socialist candidate at Uzes was enabled by Reactionary votes to capture a Radical seat? What recriminations would accompany the election of a Conservative candidate whose victory was due to Labour votes given to him as an expression of resentment at the action of Liberals in other const.i.tuencies? What would be the relations between the Liberal and Labour parties if in a const.i.tuency now represented by a Labour member, a Liberal candidate, with the aid of Conservative votes, displaced him? These strained relations would not only exist within the House of Commons itself, but also and perhaps in a more p.r.o.nounced form in the const.i.tuencies themselves. Such conditions would not only invite the sarcasm of all critics of democracy, they would produce the much more serious effect of crippling the successful working of parliamentary inst.i.tutions.

_The alternative vote not a solution of the problem of three-cornered contests_.]

Neither second ballots nor preferential voting can solve the problem of three parties seeking representation. They may preserve the outward form of the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic of the present system--that each successful candidate should secure the support of the majority of the electors voting--but this apparent conformity to the requirements of majority representation is only secured at the cost of destroying the sincerity of the parliamentary system and of rendering the composition of the House of Commons still more unstable than it is to-day. In England the compet.i.tion of the three parties is most p.r.o.nounced in the industrial areas, and Mr. Winston Churchill, apparently recognizing the futility of the alternative vote as a solution of the new difficulty, had good grounds for his suggestion that electoral reformers should concentrate their minds upon the proportional representation of the great cities.[7] For proportional representation attacks the new problem on entirely different lines. It provides for the realization of the essentially democratic principle, that the various sections of political' opinion are ent.i.tled to representation in proportion to their respective strengths, and that such representation should be independent of the action of other parties. Once this democratic principle is admitted we are in view of the only effective solution of the problem of three-cornered fights--a solution which not only solves this particular difficulty, but meets those serious defects of our electoral system to which attention has been directed in the two preceding chapters. "The theory of Government by party," says Professor Nanson of Melbourne, "is to find the popular mind by the issue of a number of contests between the 'ins' and the 'outs.' But owing to the multiplicity of political issues, this theory is now no more tenable than is the theory that every question can be answered by a plain 'yes' or 'no.' ... We require a system capable of finding the mind of the people on more than one issue.

With such a system all the difficulties caused at present by the existence of three parties disappear. Instead of being a hindrance three parties will be a help. For each will help to organize public opinion, and so enable the mind of the public on important issues to be more definitely and clearly ascertained."

[Footnote 1: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.]

[Footnote 2: Reports on the Second Ballot at Elections in Foreign Countries. Miscellaneous. No. 2. 1908. (Cd. 3875.)]

[Footnote 2: _La Representation Proportionnelle en Belgique_, p. 7.]

[Footnote 3: An illuminating pa.s.sage occurs in M. Guyot's article on "The French Senate and Chamber of Deputies," in _The Contemporary Review_, February 1910:--

"A deputy is only elected for four years, and almost on the morrow he becomes again a candidate. If he has been elected at the second ballot, with a rallying of the minority of electors, who have only voted for him as better than nothing, and who can desert him at the next elections, his position is very uncertain. Universal suffrage results in many const.i.tuencies in great instability, and it is threatening especially for the men who having had power have been obliged to act, and in acting have dispersed certain illusions which they had perhaps entertained when candidates, and have thus given offence.... Though one be an ex-Minister one is none the less a man. The greater number of men--not only ex-Ministers but men who have any reputation in Parliament--have sought to migrate from the Palais Bourbon to the Luxemburg. The result is that the Chamber of Deputies has not ceased to suffer from a species of inverse selection. No body could retain its vigour under such a system.

The most experienced men have left; the composition of the Chamber of Deputies has grown steadily weaker and weaker."]

[Footnote 4: In Australia the system is known as the contingent or preferentinal vote. In recent years the phrase "alternative vote" has been employed in England, and was adopted by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems as a means of distinguis.h.i.+ng the use of the transferable vote in single-member const.i.tuencies from its use in multi-member const.i.tuencies for the purpose of securing proportional representation.]

[Footnote 5: The regulations as to counting the votes contained in the Schedule to the Bill were based upon those in Lord Courtney's Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill (see Appendix VI.), the practical application of which is described in Chapter VII.]