Under Four Administrations Part 21

CHAPTER X

THE TAFT CAMPAIGN OF 1908

Roosevelt favors Taft to succeed him--I visit Taft at Cincinnati--Roosevelt plans for his African trip--I take part in the Taft campaign--Roosevelt's method of preparedness--Election evening at the White House--Roosevelt rebukes a bigot; his letter on religious liberty--Taft tells Roosevelt he will retain Wright, Garfield, and me in his Cabinet--Roosevelt's speech at the dinner to Vice-President-elect Sherman--Looking toward the end of my term; the last Cabinet meeting--Closing the administration of Roosevelt and ushering in that of Taft.

Early in September, 1907, in a conversation with Roosevelt at Oyster Bay, we touched on matters political and the forthcoming national convention of the Republican Party for the nomination of a President.

Roosevelt had again publicly made the statement he gave out at the time of his election, that he would not accept a renomination, and had made known his desire that the party nominate Taft.

I had just returned from Hawaii, and told him that throughout my trip to and from the Pacific Coast I observed an almost universal determination to force the nomination upon him. I had met many people and addressed several merchants' organizations and other bodies, and again and again the sentiment of prominent Republicans was: "We know Roosevelt is sincere in his statement that he would decline the nomination, but what can he do if he is renominated? He is a patriotic man, and how can he refuse to obey the unanimous wish of his party and the people at large?"

The President knew of this strong sentiment for him, and that was one of the main reasons why he made the public and definite statement that he favored the nomination of Taft, whom he regarded as best qualified to carry forward the measures and policies of his Administration.

Some of Roosevelt's closest friends counseled him not in any way to interfere with the selection of his successor. He practically agreed to that, but in order to escape the nomination himself he felt compelled to throw his influence toward Taft. I think it was Secretary Root at the time who remarked that it would be impossible for Roosevelt to let the tail of the tiger go without some such plan. Notwithstanding his positive statements that he would not accept a renomination at the end of his term, and his constant reiteration of this determination, the pressure throughout the country was overwhelming.

The people naturally resent the selection of a candidate for them by the President in office, and in the past have shown their resentment by the defeat of such candidates. But the conditions surrounding the Taft campaign were somewhat different. Roosevelt was committed heart and soul to the moral principles for which his Administration had stood in face of the mighty opposition of the "interests." How the force and might of this opposition had grown until Roosevelt took up the "big stick" can perhaps hardly be measured except by those who were with him in the bitter fight. No one was more conversant with the principles and policies of the Administration than Taft, and, all things considered, perhaps none better qualified than he to carry them forward in a firm and constructive way.

The logic of the situation was, of course, that Roosevelt stand again for the Presidency, especially as that would not in reality have been a third term. But he would not under any circ.u.mstances recede from the decision announced on the night of his election. It required great firmness not to be swept off his feet by the tremendous pressure to induce him to consent to be renominated. In the face of these facts the people were less inclined to resent his indicating his preference for the successor whom he regarded as best qualified to carry forward the policies he had inaugurated by such reforms as the rebate law against railroads, the anti-trust laws, and child labor legislation, and other progressive measures.

At the Cabinet meeting just before the summer vacation Taft came in radiantly happy. He had been nominated the day before; it had been understood for some time that he would be nominated on the first ballot.

Reflecting at the time upon the qualifications of Mr. Taft as a successor to Roosevelt, I put down among my random notes that I thought he possessed the very qualifications for constructively carrying forward the principles Roosevelt had stood for, and which only Roosevelt could have so courageously vitalized. Taft always appeared to be jovial and kept, at least outwardly, a genially good-natured equilibrium. He possessed to a marked degree a fund of spontaneous laughter--a valuable a.s.set in the armor of a public man. The power to create a good laugh has at times not only the elements of argument, but of avoiding argument; with it a man can either accede to a proposition or avoid acceding; it can be committal or non-committal; it conceals as well as expresses feelings, and acts as a wonderful charm in avoiding sharp and rugged corners, in postponing issues and getting time for reflection. In the practice of the law I was once a.s.sociated with a very able man who had the ability to laugh his opponent out of court. And his was a jeering laugh where Taft's laugh was contagious and good-natured. Not that he lacked the ability at times to be fearless and outspoken; he had shown himself to be that in a number of speeches prior to his nomination.

Withal I could not help feeling sad that Roosevelt's plan had so well succeeded, and in an intimate chat with the President after the Cabinet meeting I told him so. He would not have been human if, amid the satisfaction he felt in having his choice for the Presidency respected, there was not some feeling of regret in stepping down from the greatest office in the world, which he had administered with so much satisfaction and success, and the duties and responsibilities of which he had enjoyed more than perhaps any one of his predecessors. To use his own words as I so frequently heard them: "I have had a bully time and enjoyed every hour of my Presidency." Another four years in office would doubtless have prolonged that enjoyment.

Early in September I went to Cincinnati to meet Taft at his headquarters in the Hotel Sinton, and Terence V. Powderly, head of the Information Division of the Bureau of Immigration, formerly president of the Knights of Labor, accompanied me. I brought to Taft's attention some correspondence that had been conducted by Louis Marshall, of New York, with Charles P. Taft, his brother, and with the candidate for Vice-President on his ticket, Sherman, regarding some narrow and prejudiced editorials on Russian immigration appearing in the Cincinnati "Times-Star," owned by Charles P. Taft. I pointed out that not only were these editorials untrue and unjust, but they did not reflect his policy and yet were so interpreted. Secretary Taft then asked the editor of the paper, Mr. Joseph Garretson, and his nephew, Hulbert Taft, to call on me. With them I went over the whole subject, and upon my return to Was.h.i.+ngton young Mr. Taft sent me a double-column article from the front page of the "Times-Star," together with a double-column editorial, forcefully and clearly written, embracing the whole matter as we had covered it during my visit to Cincinnati.

Samuel Gompers had come out strongly in favor of Bryan, and no one could tell what effect that might have on the great labor element of the country. Mr. Powderly, who was very broad-minded and independent in his politics, said it would have little if any effect on the labor vote, as it is not a group vote, and no leader, however powerful, can make it so.

This statement later proved to be entirely correct. The Democrats among the labor men went their way, and the Republicans went theirs.

The Cabinet met again after the summer vacation on September 25th. The President wanted to talk with me afterward about several matters, so I waited and sat with him while he was being shaved. He spoke about the arrangements he had made for his African trip, and said several taxidermists of the Smithsonian Inst.i.tution were to accompany him. I told him that Dr. Adler of the Inst.i.tution had spoken to me of the matter, and my particular concern was that one of the men in his party on this African expedition should be a physician. He a.s.sented, saying that after all he was fifty years old and ought to be more careful about his health than when he was younger. He seemed to know that I had had something to do with enabling the Smithsonian Inst.i.tution to supply these men, but I did not let it appear that I knew much about it. When his book "African Game Trails" appeared he sent me a copy with the inscription:

To Oscar Straus from his friend

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Nov. 1^{st} 1910.

In the Appendix he makes acknowledgment to several of his friends including myself, "to all of whom lovers of natural history are therefore deeply indebted."

He mentioned that he had had an invitation to give a lecture at Oxford University upon his return, which he felt like accepting because it was a course in which some of the most prominent men of the past, including Gladstone, had lectured, and it appealed to him to speak at this ancient university. I encouraged him to do so. He said he did not intend, however, to accept invitations to other European countries, because he did not wish to be feted. This lecture would be more in line with his work.

At the request of Roosevelt and the urgent solicitation of Taft, I took an active part in the campaign, making scores of speeches in the leading cities of the East and Middle West. I made the first on September 26th, the day after the first Cabinet meeting of the season, under the auspices of the Interstate Republican League, in Was.h.i.+ngton. It was one of the largest political meetings ever held there. I addressed myself to a recent speech by ex-Secretary of State Olney, in which he had endorsed Bryan. I pointed out how much more had been done under the Roosevelt Administration than by the Democratic Administration with which Mr.

Olney was connected, in bringing suits against the trusts under the Sherman law; that in Mr. Olney's time nearly all such suits were brought against labor combinations, while in Roosevelt's time they were brought against the offending corporations.

I had been in close touch with Roosevelt during his own campaign four years before, but I must say he threw himself with greater energy into Taft's campaign, watching every phase of it with great care and circ.u.mspection to counteract every unfavorable tendency and to push promptly every tactical advantage. On Sunday afternoon, September 27th, I received a telephone message to come to the White House. When I arrived I found present Secretaries Cortelyou and Meyer, Lawrence F.

Abbott, of "The Outlook," and William Loeb. Roosevelt was dictating a letter to Bryan, in answer to the latter's attack upon the Administration's policies, and invited each of us to make suggestions.

Those that seemed good he immediately incorporated. I had brought with me some facts and figures that I prepared for campaign use, and all of this material he embodied. When the dictation was finished, he asked us to return at nine o'clock in the evening to go over the finished product, as it was important that the letter be given to the press for next morning's papers.

When we arrived in the evening, the President was already at his desk correcting the typewritten pages, of which there were about twenty. The duplicates were handed to us, and we pa.s.sed them from one to another for reading and suggestions. At one point I suggested changing an expression to a more dignified form, which the President vetoed with the characteristic remark: "You must remember this letter is not an etching, but a poster." That was an apt ill.u.s.tration of his purpose, namely, to attract and fix popular attention; and I withdrew my suggestion.

The published letter occupied three and a half newspaper columns. It was powerful and effective and nailed some of the main fallacies that Bryan had been expounding. This was the third such letter by Roosevelt, and some people were inclined to criticize them as having the appearance of overshadowing Taft and other campaign orators. This might have been true to an extent, but it was of little consequence in comparison with the tremendous effect of the letters in enlightening the people with regard to the greater national principles for which Taft stood.

The following week I started on a campaign tour. I made speeches at Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago. In accepting the pressing invitation of the National Republican Committee to make a series of speeches, I made one condition, which was that I would not speak at any meeting gotten up on sectarian or hyphenated political lines. It was, and I regret to say still is, customary, in political campaigns, especially among local managers in smaller cities with large foreign-born populations, to appeal to their former national sympathies.

I regarded this method as un-American and inimical to the solidarity of our Americanism. My letter to the chairman of the speakers' bureau, Senator Joseph M. Dixon, was by him given to the press and widely published. It had a very good effect, and through that campaign at least put an end to advertising and meetings based on race or creed appeal.

Upon my return to New York I spoke at a number of meetings in Brooklyn and New York with Mr. Taft, the last and largest of these being the one at Madison Square Garden, at which General Horace Porter presided.

Charles E. Hughes, who was candidate for Governor, also spoke on that occasion.

The President and Mrs. Roosevelt invited Mrs. Straus and me to return to Was.h.i.+ngton with them in their private car on election day, after we had voted in our respective districts. _En route_ the President again mentioned the arrangements for his African trip and told me he had also accepted an invitation to speak at the Sorbonne, Paris. He was already preparing his Oxford address, the draft of which when ready he wanted me to read. It is generally believed that Roosevelt did things hurriedly and impulsively. But those of us who were acquainted with his methods knew the contrary to be true. Preparedness was one of his outstanding characteristics. He was a most industrious worker, and as soon as he made up his mind to do something, whether it was to deliver an address or to bring forward some reform, he set to work at once making preparations, so as not to leave it until the time for the event was at hand. In the case of his Oxford and Sorbonne addresses, for instance, he prepared them long in advance and gave himself plenty of time to correct and polish them. He told me he pursued this method because it freed his mind and enabled him to be ready for the next thing to come before him.

That is certainly not the way an impulsive man works.

Election evening in Was.h.i.+ngton we were invited to the White House to receive the returns. The twenty-five or thirty other officials who were in the city were also there with their wives. The returns began to come in shortly after eight o'clock and were being tabulated by Secretary Loeb and his a.s.sistants. It was soon evident that Taft was elected, so that by eleven-thirty we were able to send congratulations to the successful candidate and Frank H. Hitchc.o.c.k, chairman of the National Committee.

The greatest strength of Taft proved to be what many supposed would be his weakness, namely, that he was the choice of Roosevelt and stood for his principles. The ma.s.ses had understood the President and appreciated his policies, though the big interests, the "ledger patriots," had been too blinded by their selfish objects to recognize the permanent value of the principles and policies of America's greatest reformer.

I felt convinced then, as I do now, that the Roosevelt Administration will go down in history as marking the beginning of a new era in our history--an era marking the end of aggression upon our political structure by corporate greed and the beginning of larger opportunities for the individual, in which the moral principles of our public life were rescued from the danger of domination by an unprecedented onrush of commercial power.

At the first Cabinet meeting after the election Roosevelt was buoyant as usual. He made a few preliminary remarks about the approaching end of the Administration: he and his Cabinet, especially the last one, had worked in perfect harmony, and he felt sure we had all had a "bully"

time of it; he would retire at the end of his term without any regrets, for he had the satisfaction of knowing that he and his Cabinet had done all in their power for the greatest good of the Nation. I think it is safe to say we all felt a little sad, I know I did, to think that in four months we should separate, and that we should lose the inspiring companions.h.i.+p and guidance of our leader, to whom each of us felt tied by bonds of warm friends.h.i.+p and a sense of profound esteem and highest respect, personally as well as officially.

It seemed to me then that it required no prophet's vision to see that, if Roosevelt kept his health, in four or eight years the people of the country would again demand, with unmistakable and overwhelming voice, that he become President. At the end of eight years, even, he would be only fifty-eight, younger than most Presidents at the time of a.s.suming office.

The President now brought up a question that he had been carrying over from the campaign period. He had received several letters regarding the religion of Mr. Taft. Some orthodox ministerial organizations had endeavored to use the fact that Mr. Taft was a Unitarian as a reason for prejudicing people against him. Roosevelt had been tempted to answer these letters, but when he presented the matter to the Cabinet it was the general consensus of opinion that he should not do so, that the issue intimately concerned Taft, and information regarding it had better be given out or withheld at Taft's discretion. To this the President agreed, but he was incensed at this un-American attempt to bring religion into politics, especially as Taft was every bit as good a Christian as Was.h.i.+ngton, and a better one than either Jefferson or Franklin; and his church was the same as that of Adams and Webster.

The election being over, Roosevelt was still desirous of expressing his views in this matter, and he brought with him to the Cabinet meeting the draft of a letter to be sent to one J. C. Martin, of Dayton, Ohio, who had asked for a public statement concerning the faith of Mr. Taft. As usual, he invited criticism and discussion. Several of us made suggestions, and Secretary Root made one which the President asked him to write out so that he might incorporate it. When the corrected version of the letter was read, we all agreed that it was a remarkable doc.u.ment for effectively rebuking the spirit of bigotry and upholding the basic principles of the American Government, and that it should therefore be published. It appeared in the papers of the country three days later.

I made bold to ask the President for the draft of this letter, which he gladly signed and gave to me, and Secretary Root also signed his penciled insert. As I consider this doc.u.ment worthy of a permanent place among American annals, I herewith set it forth from the original in my possession:

THE WHITE HOUSE WAs.h.i.+NGTON, _November 4, 1908_

MY DEAR SIR:

I have received your letter running in part as follows:

"While it is claimed almost universally that religion should not enter into politics, yet there is no denying that it does, and the ma.s.s of the voters that are not Catholics will not support a man for any office, especially for President of the United States, who is a Roman Catholic.

"Since Taft has been nominated for President by the Republican party, it is being circulated and is constantly urged as a reason for not voting for Taft that he is an infidel (Unitarian) and his wife and brother Roman Catholics.... If his feelings are in sympathy with the Roman Catholic church on account of his wife and brother being Catholics, that would be objectionable to a sufficient number of voters to defeat him. On the other hand if he is an infidel, that would be sure to mean defeat.... I am writing this letter for the sole purpose of giving Mr. Taft an opportunity to let the world know what his religious belief is."