Philip Dru: Administrator Part 19

(b) When a bill is sent to the Senate by the House, if approved, it shall become a law, if disapproved, it shall be returned to the House with the objections stated.

(c) If the House considers a measure of sufficient importance, it may dissolve immediately and let the people pa.s.s upon it, or they may wait until a regular election for popular action.

(d) If the people approve the measure, the House _must enact it in the same form as when disapproved by the Senate,_ and it shall then become a law.

III.

1. (a) The Governor shall be elected by a direct vote of all the people.

(b) His term of office shall be six years, and he shall be ineligible for re-election. He shall be subject to recall at the end of every two years by a majority vote of the State. [Footnote: The recall is used here, as in other instances, because of the lengthened term and the desirability of permitting the people to pa.s.s upon a Governor's usefulness at shorter periods.]

2. (a) He shall have no veto power or other control over legislation, and shall not make any suggestions or recommendations in regard thereto.

(b) His function shall be purely executive. He may select his own council or fellow commissioners for the different governmental departments, and they shall hold their positions at his pleasure.

(c) All the Governor's appointees shall be confirmed by the Senate before they may a.s.sume office.

(d) The Governor may be held strictly accountable by the people for the honest, efficient and economical conduct of the government, due allowance being made for the fact that he is in no way responsible for the laws under which he must work.

(e) It shall be his duty also to report to the legislature at each session, giving an account of his stewards.h.i.+p regarding the enforcement of the laws, the conduct of the different departments, etc., etc., and making an estimate for the financial budget required for the two years following.

3.(a) There shall be a Pardon Board of three members who shall pa.s.s upon all matters relating to the Penal Service.

(b) This Board shall be nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. After their confirmation, the Governor shall have no further jurisdiction over them.

(c) They shall hold office for six years and shall be ineligible for reappointment.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE RULE OF THE BOSSES

General Dru was ever fond of talking to Senator Selwyn. He found his virile mind a never-failing source of information. Busy as they both were they often met and exchanged opinions. In answer to a question from Dru, Selwyn said that while Pennsylvania and a few other States had been more completely under the domination of bosses than others, still the system permeated everywhere.

In some States a railroad held the power, but exercised it through an individual or individuals.

In another State, a single corporation held it, and yet again, it was often held by a corporate group acting together. In many States one individual dominated public affairs and more often for good than for evil.

The people simply would not take enough interest in their Government to exercise the right of control.

Those who took an active interest were used as a part of the boss'

tools, be he a benevolent one or otherwise.

"The delegates go to the conventions," said Selwyn, "and think they have something to do with the naming of the nominees, and the making of the platforms. But the astute boss has planned all that far in advance, the candidates are selected and the platform written and both are 'forced'

upon the unsuspecting delegate, much as the card shark forced his cards upon his victim. It is all seemingly in the open and above the boards, but as a matter of fact quite the reverse is true.

"At conventions it is usual to select some man who has always been honored and respected, and elect him chairman of the platform committee.

He is pleased with the honor and is ready to do the bidding of the man to whom he owes it.

"The platform has been read to him and he has been committed to it before his appointment as chairman. Then a careful selection is made of delegates from the different senatorial districts and a good working majority of trusted followers is obtained for places on the committee.

Someone nominates for chairman the 'honored and respected' and he is promptly elected.

"Another member suggests that the committee, as it stands, is too unwieldy to draft a platform, and makes a motion that the chairman be empowered to appoint a sub-committee of five to outline one and submit it to the committee as a whole.

"The motion is carried and the chairman appoints five of the 'tried and true.' There is then an adjournment until the sub-committee is ready to report.

"The five betake themselves to a room in some hotel and smoke, drink and swap stories until enough time has elapsed for a proper platform to be written.

"They then report to the committee as a whole and, after some wrangling by the uninitiated, the platform is pa.s.sed as the boss has written it without the addition of a single word.

"Sometimes it is necessary to place upon the sub-committee a recalcitrant or two. Then the method is somewhat different. The boss'

platform is cut into separate planks and first one and then another of the faithful offers a plank, and after some discussion a majority of the committee adopt it. So when the sub-committee reports back there stands the boss' handiwork just as he has constructed it.

"Oftentimes there is no subterfuge, but the convention, as a whole, recognizes the pre-eminent ability of one man amongst them, and by common consent he is a.s.signed the task."

Selwyn also told Dru that it was often the practice among corporations not to bother themselves about state politics further than to control the Senate.

This smaller body was seldom more than one-fourth as large as the House, and usually contained not more than twenty-five or thirty members.

Their method was to control a majority of the Senate and let the House pa.s.s such measures as it pleased, and the Governor recommend such laws as he thought proper. Then the Senate would promptly kill all legislation that in any way touched corporate interests.

Still another method which was used to advantage by the interests where they had not been vigilant in the protection of their "rights," and when they had no sure majority either in the House or Senate and no influence with the Governor, was to throw what strength they had to the stronger side in the factional fights that were always going on in every State and in every legislature.

Actual money, Selwyn said, was now seldom given in the relentless warfare which the selfish interests were ever waging against the people, but it was intrigue, the promise of place and power, and the ever effectual appeal to human vanity.

That part of the press which was under corporate control was often able to make or destroy a man's legislative and political career, and the weak and the vain and the men with s.h.i.+fty consciences, that the people in their fatuous indifference elect to make their laws, seldom fail to succ.u.mb to this subtle influence.

CHAPTER XLIV

ONE CAUSE OF THE HIGH COST OF LIVING

In one of their fireside talks, Selwyn told Dru that a potential weapon in the hands of those who had selfish purposes to subserve, was the long and confusing ballot.

"Whenever a change is suggested by which it can be shortened, and the candidates brought within easy review of the electorate, the objection is always raised," said Selwyn, "that the rights of the people are being invaded.

"'Let the people rule,' is the cry," he said, "and the unthinking many believing that democratic government is being threatened, demand that they be permitted to vote for every petty officer.

"Of course quite the reverse is true," continued Selwyn, "for when the ballot is filled with names of candidates running for general and local offices, there is, besides the confusion, the usual trading. As a rule, interest centers on the local man, and there is less scrutiny of those candidates seeking the more important offices."

"While I had already made up my mind," said Dru, "as to the short ballot and a direct accountability to the people, I am glad to have you confirm the correctness of my views."

"You may take my word for it, General Dru, that the interests also desire large bodies of law makers instead of few. You may perhaps recall how vigorously they opposed the commission form of government for cities.

"Under the old system when there was a large council, no one was responsible. If a citizen had a grievance, and complained to his councilman, he was perhaps truthfully told that he was not to blame. He was sent from one member of the city government to the other, and unable to obtain relief, in sheer desperation, he gave up hope and abandoned his effort for justice. But under the commission form of government, none of the officials can s.h.i.+rk responsibility. Each is in charge of a department, and if there is inefficiency, it is easy to place the blame where it properly belongs.