Ghost Wars Part 29

7. English video and Tomsen video.

8. All quotations are from the English video. The translation from Dari is by Ma.s.soud's aide Amarullah Saleh.

9. All of Ma.s.soud's quotations, ibid.

10. Interview with Otilie English, September 3, 2002, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. (GW).

11. Interview with Peter Tomsen, January 21, 2002, Omaha, Nebraska (SC), and subsequent written communications from Tomsen.

12. All quotations are from an English transcript of the Tomsen video. Abdul Haq's role in the meeting was a source of some tension. Haq did not want to meet with Ma.s.soud inside Northern Alliance territory. Haq and Hamid Karzai also disagreed somewhat about strategy toward the Taliban, according to Ma.s.soud and Karzai aides. Haq believed it was possible to negotiate with Taliban leaders and secure defections. Karzai favored talks but also was ready to partic.i.p.ate in military action. Ultimately, Haq died because he believed he could rally Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan to his cause in October 2001 simply by calling on their tribal and personal loyalties. The CIA also remained deeply skeptical about Haq. Even as the agency embraced Karzai, its officers dismissed Haq as someone who could not produce results.

13. Bart Gellman, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, January 20, 2002. January 20, 2002. Time, Time, August 12, 2002, dates the conversation to the first days of spring 2001. Also, interview with a White House official. August 12, 2002, dates the conversation to the first days of spring 2001. Also, interview with a White House official.

14. Gellman, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, January 20, 2002, and January 20, 2002, and Time, Time, August 12, 2002, have described the agenda and some of the discussion at this meeting. Armitage and Wolfowitz testified about aspects of the meeting before the Joint Inquiry Committee. Armitage quotations are from his testimony, Federal News Service, September 19, 2002. CIA slides from National Commission final report, p. 203. August 12, 2002, have described the agenda and some of the discussion at this meeting. Armitage and Wolfowitz testified about aspects of the meeting before the Joint Inquiry Committee. Armitage quotations are from his testimony, Federal News Service, September 19, 2002. CIA slides from National Commission final report, p. 203.

15. Testimony of Paul Wolfowitz before the Joint Inquiry Committee, September 19, 2002.Wolfowitz defended the deliberate pace of the deputies committee's work by arguing that since the September 11 hijackers had already entered the United States by July, even if the Bush administration had advanced its plans to support Ma.s.soud or attack al Qaeda, they probably would not have prevented the New York and Pentagon attacks. Of course, it could be argued equally that a robust disruption of bin Laden's Afghanistan sanctuary might have delayed or altered the course of the attacks. Both sides of the argument rest almost entirely on speculation.

16. Wolfowitz quotation, ibid. State officials' conclusions from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, p. 10.

17. State Department transcript, testimony of Colin Powell before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, May 15, 2001. Late May meeting is from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 7.

18. Testimony of George Tenet, Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. Testimony of Cofer Black, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. "What worries . . . more deadly" from the Committee's final report, Appendix, p. 43. Interviews with U.S. officials. Black's "7 . . . 8" is from National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 2.

19. Information about NSA intercepts is from Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002. FBI threat reports from the testimony of Michael Rolince, FBI special agent in charge, Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., Joint Inquiry Committee, September 24, 2002. State warnings are from the testimony of Richard Armitage, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 19, 2002. FAA warnings are from The New York Times, The New York Times, May 21, 2002. May 21, 2002.

20. Atiani quotations are from Pamela Constable, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, July 8, 2001. The June 26 demarche is from the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, p. 120. July 8, 2001. The June 26 demarche is from the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, p. 120.

21. Bin Laden quotations are from a.s.sociated Press, June 19, 2001.

22. "I want a way" from The New York The New York Times, Times, May 17, 2002. Rice, Clarke, and Bush letter from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, p. 16. May 17, 2002. Rice, Clarke, and Bush letter from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, p. 16.

23. All quotations are from Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002, except "98 percent certain" and "clear majority view," which are from the Joint Inquiry Committee's final report, p. 8. "Establish contact" is from the final report, p. 29.

24. Ibid.

25. Time, Time, August 12, 2002. National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 3. August 12, 2002. National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 3.

26. Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002.

27. Ibid., and testimony of George Tenet, Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. The Tenet quotations are from his testimony.

28. Testimony of unidentified CIA Counterterrorist Center officer, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 20, 2002. McLaughlin's view and CTC officer's fears from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 8. What Hadley said about Wolfowitz from the final report, p. 259.

29. "Threat . . . to Continue Indefinitely" is from "Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9/11," House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 17, 2002. The Tenet quotation is from his Joint Inquiry testimony, October 17, 2002.

30. A copy of this section of the PDB was published by the National Commission. Tenet on delay is from staff statement no. 7, p. 8.

31. Testimony of Cofer Black, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002.

32. Tenet's Joint Inquiry testimony, October 17, 2002.

33. Hill, Joint Inquiry statement, September 18, 2002. Also, Joint Inquiry Committee final report, p. 15. National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 4. Final report, p. 267.

34. Statement of FBI director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. Backgrounds of the supporting hijackers and Tenet quotation from the Joint Inquiry Committee final report, p. 138.

35. Statement of Robert S. Mueller, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. National Commission staff statement no. 16, based on interrogation statements by Mohammed and Binals.h.i.+bh, pp. 5-19. Their statements describe debate among al Qaeda leaders about whether it was wise to attack the United States. By Mohammed's account, bin Laden argued that the attack should go forward to support anti-Israel insurgents and to protest American troops in Saudi Arabia.

36. All financial details and flight to Karachi, from Mueller's Joint Inquiry Committee statement, September 26, 2002.

37. Interviews with aides to Ma.s.soud and Karzai. "So disappointed" is from an interview with Daoud Yaqub, adviser to Karzai and former executive director of the Afghanistan Foundation, May 27, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

38. Quotation is from interview with Yaqub, ibid.

39. Abdullah quotations are from Los Angeles Los Angeles Times, Times, June 12, 2002. June 12, 2002.

40. Interview with Yaqub, May 27, 2002, and with several other aides to Karzai and Ma.s.soud.

41. Interview with Hamid Karzai, October 21, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (SC).

42. Ibid.

CHAPTER 32: "WHAT AN UNLUCKY COUNTRY".

1. That the Counterterrorist Center knew about the journalists as they crossed Ma.s.soud's lines is from interviews with U.S. officials.

2. These details about the a.s.sa.s.sins, as well as other aspects of the plot described in this chapter, draw on two comprehensive journalistic investigations of Ma.s.soud's death: Jon Anderson, The New Yorker, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002, and Pyes and Rempel, June 10, 2002, and Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002. June 12, 2002. Time, Time, August 12, 2002, also added fresh details to the record through interviews. In addition, this chapter's account is based on interviews in Kabul with seven aides to Ma.s.soud, several of them witnesses to the attack, and on interviews with U.S. officials who later debriefed Ma.s.soud's aides. August 12, 2002, also added fresh details to the record through interviews. In addition, this chapter's account is based on interviews in Kabul with seven aides to Ma.s.soud, several of them witnesses to the attack, and on interviews with U.S. officials who later debriefed Ma.s.soud's aides.

3. The Wall Street Journal, The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2001. The draft letter was discovered on a computer hard drive acquired by December 31, 2001. The draft letter was discovered on a computer hard drive acquired by Journal Journal reporters in Kabul during the autumn of 2001. reporters in Kabul during the autumn of 2001.

4. Anderson, The New Yorker, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002, raises the possibility that Sayyaf conspired with al Qaeda to kill Ma.s.soud. Witting or unwitting, Sayyaf was a key facilitator in the operation. June 10, 2002, raises the possibility that Sayyaf conspired with al Qaeda to kill Ma.s.soud. Witting or unwitting, Sayyaf was a key facilitator in the operation.

5. Interviews with aides to Ma.s.soud; Anderson, ibid.; Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Los Angeles Times, Times, June 12, 2002. June 12, 2002.

6. National Commission final report, pp. 212-213.

7. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The The Age of Sacred Terror, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 345-46, provide the most detailed account of this meeting available to date. Barton Gellman, pp. 345-46, provide the most detailed account of this meeting available to date. Barton Gellman, The Was.h.i.+ngton The Was.h.i.+ngton Post, Post, January 20, 2002, also described the agenda, and some partic.i.p.ants made partial references to the discussion in Joint Inquiry Committee testimony. Benjamin and Simon raise doubts about the Cabinet's commitment to the covert aid for Ma.s.soud and his anti-Taliban allies. "The issue of funding the hundreds of millions of dollars to finance the effort was given to the OMB and CIA to figure out," they write, describing this as "the kind of decision that leaves much undecided, since a government agency that is told to finance a program 'out of hide,' out of the existing budget, frequently argues back that the issue is not a high enough priority." January 20, 2002, also described the agenda, and some partic.i.p.ants made partial references to the discussion in Joint Inquiry Committee testimony. Benjamin and Simon raise doubts about the Cabinet's commitment to the covert aid for Ma.s.soud and his anti-Taliban allies. "The issue of funding the hundreds of millions of dollars to finance the effort was given to the OMB and CIA to figure out," they write, describing this as "the kind of decision that leaves much undecided, since a government agency that is told to finance a program 'out of hide,' out of the existing budget, frequently argues back that the issue is not a high enough priority."

8. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 345-46. The authors say that Tenet "intervened forcefully" during the discussion and said it would be a "terrible mistake . . . for the director of Central Intelligence to fire a weapon like this." That would happen, he reportedly said, "over his dead body." Other officials deny that Tenet was so categorical. They describe him as trying to explain the risks, not argue for a particular outcome. Within weeks after September 11, the CIA did field and operate armed Predators, as did the Air Force, drawing on procedures developed in the summer of 2001. After September 11 the armed Predator was used successfully on the Afghan battlefield and later to shoot and kill a traveling party of accused terrorists in Yemen. pp. 345-46. The authors say that Tenet "intervened forcefully" during the discussion and said it would be a "terrible mistake . . . for the director of Central Intelligence to fire a weapon like this." That would happen, he reportedly said, "over his dead body." Other officials deny that Tenet was so categorical. They describe him as trying to explain the risks, not argue for a particular outcome. Within weeks after September 11, the CIA did field and operate armed Predators, as did the Air Force, drawing on procedures developed in the summer of 2001. After September 11 the armed Predator was used successfully on the Afghan battlefield and later to shoot and kill a traveling party of accused terrorists in Yemen.

9. Interviews with U.S. officials. The September 4 decision on the Predator is from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 7. Hadley formally tasked Tenet to draft a finding for covert aid to Ma.s.soud on September 10.

10. Interviews with aides to Ma.s.soud; Anderson, The New Yorker, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002; Pyes and Rempel, June 10, 2002; Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002. "Is he a wrestler" is from Pyes and Rempel. June 12, 2002. "Is he a wrestler" is from Pyes and Rempel.

11. How the a.s.sa.s.sination unfolded, from interviews with aides to Ma.s.soud; Anderson, The New Yorker, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002; Pyes and Rempel, June 10, 2002; Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002. "He's dying" from June 12, 2002. "He's dying" from Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times. The full quotation provided from Omar is "I saw my commander's face and thought to myself, 'He's dying and I'm dying.' " The full quotation provided from Omar is "I saw my commander's face and thought to myself, 'He's dying and I'm dying.' "

12. The exchange with Saleh is from interviews with U.S. officials.

13. Interviews with aides to Ma.s.soud and with U.S. officials.

14. Ibid.

15. Interviews with three aides and advisers to Ma.s.soud then in Was.h.i.+ngton. September 10 deputies meeting from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, pp. 15-16.

16. Interview with Qayum Karzai, May 19, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).

Bibliography This book is based primarily on about two hundred interviews conducted between the autumn of 2001 and the summer of 2003 with American, Afghan, Pakistani, and Saudi partic.i.p.ants in the events described. Many of these interviews were conducted entirely or partially on the record. Many others were held under ground rules designed to protect the ident.i.ty of the source interviewed.Where these "background" rules were used, they were necessary usually because the material under discussion was highly cla.s.sified or otherwise sensitive. All the interviews relied upon are indicated in the chapter notes. Where an interview was on the record, the chapter notes also indicate when and where it took place, and whether it was conducted by the author, Griff Witte, or both of us. The chapter notes also attempt to connect background interview sourcing with open material such as decla.s.sified doc.u.ments and congressional hearings, as well as with previously published work by journalists and scholars. That material is inventoried below. Most of the American government doc.u.ments describing the CIA's role in Afghanistan and its campaign against al Qaeda are likely to remain cla.s.sified for many years, however. Saudi and Pakistani doc.u.ments may never be available. In the chapter notes and here, my aim is to make as much material as possible transparently available to readers and researchers, given the constraints, in the hope that future writers will be able to correct and add to the preceding narrative.

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