Battle Ready Part 22

"Don't worry, I will not attack the UN or interfere with the withdrawal," he promised. "But," he added, "I don't control all the militia or gangs; and the militia and gangs at the end of the airport will fight you. I will try to control things where I can."

It was good to know that Aideed had sense enough not to be thrown by the provocations. He knew he was getting what he wanted-the UN's departure; he'd have been nuts to jeopardize that success. His warning, meanwhile, proved accurate; but he also delivered on his promise to control whatever his forces were able to control.

I immediately left Somalia for wrap-up meetings back in Bahrain, then flew on to Pakistan to brief General Abdul Waheed, the chief of staff of the Pakistani military. Since his forces had suffered more casualties in Somalia than any other national force, he wanted to be sure the scheme for withdrawal was sound. His support meant we were now completely on track.

I then headed on to Kenya, to board the USS Belleau Wood, Belleau Wood, which would be my command s.h.i.+p. which would be my command s.h.i.+p.

In addition to our twenty-three s.h.i.+ps, the force we a.s.sembled for United s.h.i.+eld included and totaled 16,485 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines from seven nations. It also included the Pakistani Brigade and Banglades.h.i.+ Battalion that would be the last UNOSOM forces that would hold the airport and port and would be put under my command for the final withdrawal.

We sailed from Mombasa on the first of February; stopped off the coast of Malindi, Kenya, for rehearsals of our landing and withdrawal; then moved north to begin our third phase-setting the conditions for the withdrawal and a.s.suming control of the UN forces.

We arrived off the coast of Mogadishu on the seventh of February and began setting the stage for the final withdrawal. For the next three weeks, the UN drew down its presence until they controlled only the port and airfield. Meanwhile, United s.h.i.+eld forces prepared for the final withdrawal. This would take four days. During this period, I began taking increasing responsibility for functions like medical care and fire support, as we moved toward the moment when General Aboo pa.s.sed command of the UN forces to me.

In addition to our physical preparations (defensive positions, barriers, and the like), we conducted a series of sand table exercises, thoroughly rehearsing our plan with the UN forces, to ensure everyone knew his role cold. Again, we had time-the rarest commodity-and I intended to use every second to our advantage.

Mogadishu's airfield is located near the seash.o.r.e and south of the port. Just south of the airport is a wide expanse of beach. Our plan was to land our forces, take control of the port from the Banglades.h.i.+ Battalion, then hold it and move them out by s.h.i.+p. The Pakistani Brigade which held the airport would then withdraw through our lines to the port, where we would also move them by s.h.i.+p.

During these operations, United s.h.i.+eld forces would maintain control of the beach areas east and south of the airport. After the UN forces had departed, we would move out of the port, then off the high dunes overlooking the airport, and finally off the beach south of the airport. We would, in effect, pull back from north (the port) to south (the beach below the airport). This would be the most dangerous phase of the operation, since we expected militias, gangs, and mobs to close in rapidly behind us. Our physical preparations involved extensive engineer work; we erected barbed-wire obstacles and huge sand mounds to cover our withdrawal.

Though our headquarters for the Combined Task Force remained aboard the Belleau Wood, Belleau Wood, my Special Operations component established a forward command post ash.o.r.e (called "the Advanced Operating Base"). The special ops forces also provided Coalition Support Teams to each of the allied forces to ensure close coordination and communications. As soon as we arrived off Mogadishu, a s.h.i.+pboard heliborne Quick Reaction Force was activated as a reserve. Another critical component was the Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit, whose task was to destroy the considerable amount of ammunition and captured weapons that the UN forces had ama.s.sed over the years. Though the daily explosions from the EOD were necessary, they were often unnerving. my Special Operations component established a forward command post ash.o.r.e (called "the Advanced Operating Base"). The special ops forces also provided Coalition Support Teams to each of the allied forces to ensure close coordination and communications. As soon as we arrived off Mogadishu, a s.h.i.+pboard heliborne Quick Reaction Force was activated as a reserve. Another critical component was the Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit, whose task was to destroy the considerable amount of ammunition and captured weapons that the UN forces had ama.s.sed over the years. Though the daily explosions from the EOD were necessary, they were often unnerving.

My landing force was composed of U.S. and Italian Marines. The U.S. Special Forces and U.S. SEAL units also provided valuable capabilities to the forces ash.o.r.e as well. Each of our four forces had sniper teams; these proved to be key a.s.sets when the withdrawal began.

On the ninth of February, Kofi Annan, then the head of the UN peacekeeping organization, arrived to review the plans for the withdrawal, and also to visit our forces and s.h.i.+ps. It was clear that Annan understood the complexity of the operation and appreciated what we were doing. To symbolically mark the entrusting of UNOSOM forces to our protection, he presented me with a UN beret.69 Several days later, a formal ceremony at the airport pa.s.sed control of the UN forces from General Aboo's command to mine.

By then, I was greatly impressed by the competence and professionalism of the Pakistani and Banglades.h.i.+ units. We had loaned armor and other equipment to the Pakistanis for their mission in Somalia. Now we had to recover and evacuate this equipment. When our U.S. maintenance personnel recovered the tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other equipment, they found the gear in terrific condition. "This stuff is like new," a maintenance guy told me. "Every single tool in every single kit is there." The pride of these coalition units gave me confidence that their parts in the operation would go without a hitch.

The media was not so easy to handle. They bristle at any form of control; convincing them to form a press pool proved to be particularly difficult; and loose media were running around Mogadishu unenc.u.mbered by pool restrictions. I was determined that the media who joined the pool would be rewarded: They were at all the significant locations during the operation and were denied access to commanders only when that could interfere with the mission. I spent a great deal of time briefing the pool and providing them background. By the end of our operation, the relations.h.i.+p that had developed with the pool was superb, benefiting both sides-the best cooperation between the media and the military I had ever experienced. This took a lot of effort and trust on both sides, but we made it work.

As the three weeks of the preparation phase came to a close, we could see the problems forming that we would face during withdrawal. The port and airfield were full of material soon to be abandoned by the UN; and these "prizes" were beginning to tempt the desperate Somalis. Soon they were gathering ominously in growing numbers around the reinforced gates and walls of the port and airfield. Militias were already jockeying for control of entry points, hoping to be the first to claim the facilities and spoils for their warlord. gathering ominously in growing numbers around the reinforced gates and walls of the port and airfield. Militias were already jockeying for control of entry points, hoping to be the first to claim the facilities and spoils for their warlord.

In the hope of heading off more trouble, I called a meeting with the heads of these militias and my old police commanders, to be held in the open, on a small hill overlooking the city just above the airfield. Everybody showed up, with the exception of the leaders of groups that were especially hostile to us, and everybody was eager to cooperate, quickly agreeing to our plan to set up a thousand-meter buffer, marked off with warning signs and barbed wire, to keep Somalis separated from our forces. Yet like Aideed, they warned that they could not control the more hostile groups (such as the gang at the southern end of the airport).

Because these guys threatened our last position on the beach as we withdrew (no other beach area would do), we were going to have to do something about them.

It was a successful meeting; but I was particularly glad to see my old policemen, who offered to take and defend the port for us as we pulled out, if we could give them ammunition, guaranteeing we'd have no problems there. Despite opposition from our political side, who shared the UN's distrust of the Somali police, I gave them the ammo. I knew they were anxious to prove once again that our faith in them had not been misplaced.

They lived up to their word; the port area was never a problem for us as we pulled out.

Another encouraging development at the meeting came from Aideed's onetime financier, Osman Atto. After his release from the UN's island prison, Atto had a falling-out with Aideed and then carved out his own faction and militia. Now, during the meeting, he offered to help with security. I took him up on his offer a few days later, when a particularly nasty armed gang outside the main gate of the airport started giving the Pakistanis trouble. They subsequently shot up an Italian news crew and killed the photographer. I called Osman, who rolled out his super-technicals (big, military-type trucks armed with heavy crew-served weapons such as quad fifty antiaircraft guns) and engaged the rogue militia. After a fierce fight, his troops defeated the bad guys and drove them from the area, and then took control of the gate area.

Later, I had to ask him to pull his super-technicals out of there, since they made our helo guys nervous. Osman gladly complied.

As the meeting was breaking up, an old militia leader remained seated, staring grief-stricken out over the devastated city and the piles of abandoned UN material around the port and airport. "A lot of resources and lives have been wasted," he told me, his face close to tears. "For what? We'll be abandoned by the world and left on our own to suffer more years of killing and devastation."

I didn't have much hope to offer him as he left.

ON THE twenty-eighth of February, we began the fourth phase-the final withdrawal. twenty-eighth of February, we began the fourth phase-the final withdrawal.

That morning, we took control of the port; and the UN contracted s.h.i.+ps which were to evacuate the Banglades.h.i.+ Battalion arrived. The condition of the s.h.i.+ps was appalling. Yet when I raised this issue back up the line, I was told that they were the best available. Still, I was bothered that these fine soldiers were subjected to such horrible conditions. The Pakistanis, it turned out, were going to get a worse deal.

Appalling conditions or no, the Banglades.h.i.+s began their move out.

As they were boarding the s.h.i.+ps, we began to receive sporadic firing at our positions guarding the port, and the crowds at the gate started to get more restless, hostile, and threatening.

We meanwhile evacuated the final group of 112 noncombatants to our s.h.i.+ps-UN contract employees, non-pool media requesting evacuation, and a few civilian relief workers-for transport to Kenya. Our normal procedure is to search such people before we bring them on board our s.h.i.+ps, but in this case I waived that requirement. After we dropped them off, however, I learned that a few of them were carrying drugs, illegal wildlife, and other contraband that had to be confiscated by Kenyan customs. This taught me a lesson about trust.

When these operations had been completed, the time had come for the pa.s.sage of lines of the Pakistani unit and their move from the airport to the port. Because this operation was sure to unleash the hordes into the airport, I wanted to get the s.h.i.+p carrying the Pakistanis loaded and gone as soon as possible. That way we could quickly leave the port and collapse our lines to the beach south of the airport for our pullout. If everything worked according to plan, we'd be on the beach by nightfall.

The Pakistanis executed a flawless pa.s.sage of lines and closed on the port in good order. We recovered their equipment and very quickly loaded it on our s.h.i.+p. We then waited for the s.h.i.+p, which the UN had contracted to carry them to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from where they would fly back to their country. The s.h.i.+p arrived late, having nearly run aground coming into port. When the s.h.i.+p finally pulled in and tied up pier side, it was clear it was too small for the number of troops it was to carry. Worse, the first officer was reporting that the master of the s.h.i.+p was drunk and there was no food or water aboard. It was to be a trip of several days.

It was easy enough to transfer pallets of MREs and water from our s.h.i.+ps to the UN s.h.i.+p, but the careless treatment of brave and highly professional troops by the UN was unforgivable.

We were now way behind schedule, and a flood of people, technicals, and looters was pouring onto the airport dangerously close to our lines. There was firing everywhere as friendly militias attempted to take control and chase off the looters. Though the police had taken effective control of the port, we were now taking fire all along our lines. Somali translators shouted warnings and our snipers fired warning shots. This got the attention of the militias, and they started to gain control.

Late that afternoon, Aideed suddenly showed up to claim the airport, breaking an agreement among the warlords to share control. He simply blew in with his people and grabbed it; and the other warlords could do nothing to stop him.

Meanwhile, my hopes to be on our exit beach by dark were fading. It looked like we wouldn't be moving there until later that night.

As dusk set in, Aideed was not yet in full control of the airport, and rogue gunmen with rifles and RPG launchers were taking up hiding places behind abandoned container boxes and other piled material scattered around, then popping up to take potshots at us. Though we called out warnings with loudspeakers, and close-aimed shots from our snipers were driving them back, my Marine commander, Colonel John Garrett, reminded me that we couldn't let them stay nearby into the night; it would be very tough to track them then.

He was right, and I had to order the snipers to take them all out. They did. Later, when the press got wind of the story, they wanted to know how many were killed. My response got a lot of coverage. "I don't count bodies," I told them. "This isn't Vietnam."

Meanwhile, the Marine units holding the last exit beach to our south reported increasingly heavy fire from the militia there. Though helo guns.h.i.+ps helped cover the beach area, the militia fighters were well hidden. Because it was growing ever more clear that the last troops off that beach would have a h.e.l.l of a time, I decided that I would have to leave that night with them.

During the move down to the beach, we put obstacles prepared by the engineers in place behind us. They had also created huge sand dunes that covered our large air-cus.h.i.+oned vehicles rapidly moving our forces and equipment out. At the beach, we evacuated all but the last two companies; these would pull out by amphibious tractor.

Around midnight, I joined Lieutenant Colonel Phil Tracey, the battalion commander of these troops and an old friend. The intensity of the firefight was picking up. The militia was now sending squad-sized units at our lines, but the Marines were instantly cutting them down. I listened on the company tactical nets as young lieutenants and captains directed their troops in the fight-taking me back to Vietnam. One of these voices on the radio net sounded familiar, and Phil confirmed that it was the son of a close friend, a fellow Marine general. Another generation had come to take our place and go through our pa.s.sage to manhood.

The plan for the final pullout called for the troops on signal to rapidly board the tractors, our AC-130 and helo guns.h.i.+ps would keep up their covering fire, and the armored amphibians would make a quick rush for the water before the bad guys could react. Though we had rehea.r.s.ed this maneuver many times, I worried that a lucky RPG shot could hit a tractor racing for the water. The close quarters fight that followed could be messy.

As the signal flare was fired, my aide, my chief of staff, and I jumped into the back of a nearby tractor. The hatches quickly closed, and the tractors raced in a line to the water. Soon the rumbling down the beach gave way to the gentle ride through the waves. Though the track seemed to jerk and shudder as we rumbled down the beach-as if the transmission had problems-I didn't worry about it once we hit the water.

I'd heard no explosions, but I told my chief of staff, Colonel John Moffett, to check on the tracks.

"They're all in the water," he reported, "and none have been hit by fire."

I sat back in relief.

By that time, we found ourselves in huge swells, and the swaying of the track and the water pouring through the overhead hatches started to make the Marines sick. A helmet they pa.s.sed around soon filled. I think I was the only one who did not silently "donate" to the pot. I guess the tremendous feeling of relief kept me straight.

Earlier, I hadn't worried much when the track hesitated and stuttered as it roared down the beach. But now we were losing power, and smoke was starting to fill our track. John poked his head up into the commander's cupola, then came down and reported that we had a transmission problem and were going to be taken under tow by another track. I put my hand down on the deck: if incoming water was kept no more than about a foot deep, the bilge pumps were working. . . . It wasn't and they were.

Soon we could feel the tow, and we all relaxed some. But then it stopped. John poked his head back into the cupola, soon reporting that the tow vehicle was now also dead in the water, and we were both drifting back to the beach.

I stuck my head out and could see the headlights of the technicals back there.

Just then, Corporal Deskins, the track commander, stuck his head down into the troop compartment. "Sir," he said to me, "here's the situation. We are on fire and drifting back to the beach. The track that's towing us is also on fire and drifting back with us. The other tracks have headed back to the s.h.i.+p and we can't raise anybody on the radio. We have fired flares but have not seen any safety boats. We can see the enemy on the beach." He then paused and smiled. "But don't worry, sir. Our machine guns work better on the beach."

We then popped the overhead hatches and all the Marines climbed on top of the tracks. It was very tricky there, with the swells cras.h.i.+ng over the vehicles, but, eventually, a small Navy safety boat responded to the flares, spotted us, and came alongside. Moving troops in high seas from the track to the cramped boat was a sporty event. It was quickly overloaded, and a larger craft had to come to help. After the troops were safely transferred to the other boats, I turned back toward the beach looming against the dark horizon. There the lights of Mogadishu silhouetted the technicals, signaling each other with their headlights.

The four-man crew led by Corporal Deskins were the last troops aboard the track.

"We have to get them aboard so we can move out," the safety boat officer was telling me, "or else we might be swamped."

But when I asked Corporal Deskins to abandon the track and get into the boat, he scurried away from us. "Sir, we will never abandon our track," he said.

I looked at John. He smiled and shook his head. I turned to the boat officer. "We're just going to hang on," I said, "and hope a larger landing craft gets here before we hit the beach."

It did, and so did a number of tracks racing out to rescue us. We had managed to avoid an unplanned return to Somalia.

Earlier, the other tracks had gone on to the s.h.i.+p, thinking we were under tow; but when they were told of our situation, the entire track platoon raced to the well deck and splashed their tracks back out to the sea to come get us.

As I was climbing from the boat to the larger craft, I was handed a hot cup of coffee from the Navy chief in command of the craft. For the first time that night, I realized I was soaking wet and cold and bone-tired. I looked at my watch. We'd left the beach five hours ago; the intensity of the events afterward made that time seem like minutes.

The craft pulled into the well deck of the Belleau Wood Belleau Wood early in the morning. As the ramp went down, I realized I'd have to wade through waist-deep water up the ramp. At the top of the ramp was the ma.s.sed press pool, with cameras snapping. I smiled at the chief. "You're going to make me wade up to those cameras, aren't you?" early in the morning. As the ramp went down, I realized I'd have to wade through waist-deep water up the ramp. At the top of the ramp was the ma.s.sed press pool, with cameras snapping. I smiled at the chief. "You're going to make me wade up to those cameras, aren't you?"

He smiled back. "Just like MacArthur, sir."

LATER, up in the command center, a briefing confirmed that we were all accounted for. I then reported to Scott and General Peay, "Mission accomplished." up in the command center, a briefing confirmed that we were all accounted for. I then reported to Scott and General Peay, "Mission accomplished."

I went to my stateroom, showered, and collapsed in my rack. When I woke the next morning, the s.h.i.+p was gently rocking. We were on our way to Kenya. The fifth and final phase, redeployment, was under way. Remarkably, we had suffered no casualties in this operation. The exhaustive planning had paid off. I was proud of all my forces.

We docked in Mombasa on the sixth of March; and I flew off with my staff back to Camp Pendleton.

Two weeks later, Secretary of Defense William Perry spoke at an awards ceremony at the Pentagon. "We live in an imperfect world and we can never make it perfect," he said, "but we can attain moments of perfection. Operation United s.h.i.+eld was such a moment."

LEAVING SOMALIA was an emotional moment. We left a lot of sacrifices and dashed hopes on that beach . . . but learned significant lessons from the Somalia experience. I am convinced it could have been better had we run this complex undertaking with more skill and thoughtfulness. was an emotional moment. We left a lot of sacrifices and dashed hopes on that beach . . . but learned significant lessons from the Somalia experience. I am convinced it could have been better had we run this complex undertaking with more skill and thoughtfulness.

CHAPTER SIX.

CENTCOM.

IN AUGUST 1996, the new commandant of the Marine Corps, General Chuck Krulak, nominated Tony Zinni as deputy commander in chief (DCINC) of U.S. Central Command, the new commandant of the Marine Corps, General Chuck Krulak, nominated Tony Zinni as deputy commander in chief (DCINC) of U.S. Central Command,70 located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

Leaving command of I MEF was hard, yet Zinni welcomed the opportunity to continue to serve. At the higher levels of the military hierarchy, it's either move to a new position or retire. CENTCOM was in fact a particularly welcome a.s.signment. . . . "It's where the action is," he thought. "It's operationally oriented; and I'm already familiar with the command from my Somalia experiences and I MEF," which was a.s.signed to CENTCOM as a responding unit when required. He quickly supplemented his initial store of knowledge by plowing through more than fifty books on the history and culture of the region.

When Zinni arrived at CENTCOM headquarters early in September, he did not find a happy place. The command had just suffered the worst terrorist attack on U.S. facilities since the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut. A suicide truck bomb had killed nearly twenty Americans at Khobar Towers, an Air Force barracks in eastern Saudi Arabia (CENTCOM had also suffered a bombing of one of its security a.s.sistance facilities in Riyadh). The tragedy weighed heavily on the command, cast a dark cloud over the remainder of General Binnie Peay's tour as commander in chief of CENTCOM . . . and directly affected Zinni as DCINC when General Peay tasked him to oversee the implementation of the hundred-plus recommendations put forward by a fact-finding commission chaired by retired Army General Wayne Downing. It was clear that the terrorist threat was growing ever more dangerous and that force protection was becoming a dominant theme for America's military leaders.

The Downing Commission recommendations ranged from the relocation of units to the establishment of more stringent security; and there was a lot of pressure to get them implemented. Some of the recommendations were straightforward, such as adding security forces, putting up barriers, and other forms of physical security. Some took more time. For example, the commission recommended reducing the number of "accompanied tours" in the region, which are tours of duty for which military personnel can bring their families. This recommendation was not well received, especially for those in a.s.signments such as security a.s.sistance billets, which require people to stay in one place for at least two or three years to be effective. Nevertheless, a blanket decision was made to drastically reduce the number of accompanied tours. Most people would now be rotating out after a year . . . which was about the time it took to get up to speed. (This policy was eventually partially reversed.) Downing had also recommended moving CENTCOM headquarters out to the region. But when the command looked hard at setting up a major headquarters in that part of the world-at all that it would take to make the move; to set up the security; to take care of the military construction, the politics, the families and schools-the expenses were so great that the issue was deferred.

Instead, CENTCOM settled on setting up a rapidly deployable forward headquarters, with forward elements of the headquarters of its subordinate commands-ground, air, naval, and special operations-in place. (For the invasion of Iraq in 2003, General Tommy Franks set up his forward headquarters in Qatar, which was one of the locations that had previously been designated for a CENTCOM forward headquarters.) Good or bad, the Downing Commission recommendations could be dealt with in a straightforward, professional way. But the commission report went further than that; it a.s.signed blame, which took the fact-finding process into more questionable territory. There is a fine line between a.s.sessing responsibility, a.s.sessing blame, and scapegoating. When the report was issued, blame for the "failures" that had allowed the attack to succeed was dumped primarily on CENTCOM and the commander at Khobar Towers.

This was not a completely irrational judgment: The commander has to carry ultimate responsibility for what goes on in his command. The buck has to stop somewhere.

On the other hand, the military exists to handle situations that are by definition high-risk. You want to reduce those risks as much as possible, but there is a point at which reducing risks also greatly reduces the effectiveness of the military. Total safety and total security are not conditions of the military life.

You can reduce risk to the point of absurdity: "Don't cross streets. You've got lousy drivers out there." And you can build-and cower in-impregnable bunkers.

Tony Zinni:

During the Downing Commission's investigations, the commission's approach to the command was open and nonjudgmental. But the Downing report was another thing. The tone of the report was much more fault and blame a.s.signing than was warranted. And worse, many of the security steps that we were forced to implement impacted negatively on our mission.

What bothered me about the report (but the problem goes far beyond that, as I have made clear in later testimony to Congress) is its failure to understand that we live in a risky world. We have been stalked by terrorists. And they're still after us. Yet in order to do our mission, we have to take risks. The only one hundred percent safe way to avoid them is not to go there. But if we're going to be in the region, and we're going to do our job, there is risk involved. We're going to expose troops.

The mood back in the United States has been deeply frustrating, and that is: We have to make our force presence in the world one hundred percent safe for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. And if one soldier, sailor, air-man, or Marine is injured or lost to a terrorist activity, then we have to find somebody on our side to blame for it.

I can't think of a more dysfunctional way to run military operations.

The job of implementing Downing Commission findings consumed much of Zinni's time during the next year-and after.

IN THE MEANTIME, CENTCOM was a beehive of activity. CENTCOM was a beehive of activity.

Containing Iraq was always a primary order of business; several flare-ups with Saddam after the Gulf War had required military responses. Usually these occurred while enforcing the no-fly and no-drive zones in Iraq. Iraqi tankers, however, were also smuggling sanction-busting oil down the gulf. U.S. Maritime Intercept Operations had grabbed a number of smugglers; but most had proved very hard to stop; they avoided American naval patrols by using Iranian territorial waters (and paying tolls to the Iranians).

The command had continued the longtime U.S. containment policy toward Iran (the other regional hegemon); and tensions there remained high. U.S. naval forces in the Gulf daily confronted hostile and aggressive Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard naval forces; their hara.s.sments and provocations could easily have sparked major confrontations.

The Gulf was not the only hot spot. There were others in East Africa and Southwest Asia. And the forever-crisis between Israelis and Palestinians impacted every country in the region, though it was not itself in CENTCOM's AOR. The command constantly had to reevaluate and adapt itself to ever-changing realities and challenges.

After the Gulf War, Marine General Joe h.o.a.r, the CENTCOM CINC who followed General Norman Schwarzkopf, launched a major effort to create strong relations.h.i.+ps between the U.S. and friendly nations in the region; and built a solid foundation for military cooperation.

General Peay added to this foundation by enhancing America's force presence in the region. This had to be done carefully; basing U.S. military forces there jarred local sensitivities. He skirted that problem by structuring a force that combined prepositioned equipment and rotational units,71 spreading the forces throughout the Gulf area, using joint facilities to conduct operations, spreading the forces throughout the Gulf area, using joint facilities to conduct operations,72 and placing a select few headquarters of subordinate commands in the region to run day-to-day operations. These actions demonstrated America's intent to share the military burden and gain local cooperation and support for its military missions . . . while and placing a select few headquarters of subordinate commands in the region to run day-to-day operations. These actions demonstrated America's intent to share the military burden and gain local cooperation and support for its military missions . . . while not not building U.S. bases in the region or basing dedicated forces there. As an added benefit, they allowed flexibility in the size and composition of U.S. forces. building U.S. bases in the region or basing dedicated forces there. As an added benefit, they allowed flexibility in the size and composition of U.S. forces.

These new directions created far greater capabilities for meeting the emerging challenges in this vital area of the world. Tony Zinni was the beneficiary of the innovative and tireless work of Generals h.o.a.r and Peay.

FROM HIS first day on the job, Zinni got himself up to speed militarily by immersing himself in briefings, intelligence reports, and conversations with commanders who had experience in the region. But he knew this was not enough. There was nothing like being there. He already knew how important it was to see a place firsthand, and to spend enough time there to build critical relations.h.i.+ps. first day on the job, Zinni got himself up to speed militarily by immersing himself in briefings, intelligence reports, and conversations with commanders who had experience in the region. But he knew this was not enough. There was nothing like being there. He already knew how important it was to see a place firsthand, and to spend enough time there to build critical relations.h.i.+ps.

General Peay made frequent trips to the region. While he was away, Zinni stayed behind, keeping the home fires burning, as the nature of his job dictated (the CINC goes forward and the DCINC stays back). Yet each time Peay returned, his increased insight and wisdom amazed Zinni. You can't acquire such things from briefings and readings at headquarters.