The Civil War_ Fort Sumter To Perryville Part 19

For a time it had been otherwise. Through April and May he had occupied a vacuum, so to speak; Van Dorn and Price had crossed the Mississippi and left Arkansas to him. On the final day of May, however, this leisure season ended with the Confederate appointment of Major General Thomas C. Hindman, a Helena lawyer and congressman who had led a division at s.h.i.+loh, to command the area including Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana south to the Red, and Indian Territory. A dapper little man just over five feet tall, addicted to ruffled s.h.i.+rts and patent-leather boots, Hindman-like his predecessor, Earl Van Dorn-made up in activity for what he lacked in size. He had need of all his energy now. The situation on his arrival was about as bad as it could be, the scarcity of volunteers lending support to the postwar tall tale that the entire state of Montana was afterwards populated by rebel fugitives from Elkhorn Tavern; but he went immediately to work, issuing fiery proclamations and enforcing the new conscription law in his native state with troops brought from Texas. Lacking arms and munitions, he set up factories and chemical works to turn them out, operated lead mines and tan-yards, and even organized the women of his department into sewing circles to furnish uniforms for all the able-bodied men he could lay hands on. Word of his activity soon spread, and recruits began to trickle in from Missouri, some of whom he sent back home with orders to raise guerilla bands to hara.s.s the invader's rear. Before long, Curtis was receiving intelligence reports that put the Confederate strength in midland Arkansas at 25,000 men.

His plan had been to march on Little Rock as soon as his army had recovered from its exertions, thus adding to the southern list of fallen capitals, but the presence of Hindman's newborn army in that direction changed his mind. Instead, after much conferring back and forth with Was.h.i.+ngton, he moved toward Helena for a possible share in the amphibious descent of the Mississippi. Even that was hard enough. All through June, bridge-burners and irregular cavalrymen, instructed by Hindman to bushwhack Union pickets, destroy all food, and pollute the water "by killing cattle, ripping the carca.s.ses open and throwing them in," hara.s.sed his line of march and kept him in almost constant expectation of being swamped by overwhelming numbers. At last he reached the big river-only to find that the descent had been called off; Halleck was busy consolidating his gains. It was just as well, as far as Curtis was concerned. He began to fortify his Helena position, not knowing what all-out mischief Hindman might be plotting in the brush.

Even after the arrival of the division from Memphis and the ironclads from Vicksburg, together with siege guns brought downriver from Birds Point, Columbus, and Fort Pillow, he felt far from easy about his situation. Not only was there danger in front; he now learned of a new danger in his rear. The Missourians who had gone back home with instructions for making trouble were showing a good deal of talent for such work. Brigadier General John M. Schofield, the Federal commander there, reported that he had discovered "a well-devised scheme" for a monster guerilla outbreak involving thirty to fifty thousand men who were a.s.sembling now at designated places to await the appointed signal "and, by a sudden coup de main coup de main, seize the important points in the state, surprise and capture our small detachments guarding railroads, &c, thus securing arms and ammunition, and cooperate with an invading army from Arkansas." He called on Curtis to deal with this invasion force, which had moved into the vacated area around Pea Ridge, while he did his best to deal with the guerillas. "You are aware, General, that I have no force sufficient to drive them back without your a.s.sistance," he implored. "Let me ask you to act as quickly as possible."

Curtis could not help him. If it came to the worst, he wasn't even sure he could help himself. He had all sorts of troubles. As a result of trying to encourage trade in cotton, he said, his camp was "infested with Jews, secessionists, and spies." Then too, his health was failing; or, as he put it, "I am not exactly well." At any rate, whatever rebel hosts were gathering in Northwest Arkansas, the last thing he intended was a retracing of his steps on the harried march he had just completed. All he could do was hold what he had, probing occasionally at the country roundabout as the long hot summer wore on toward a close.

Schofield's fears for Missouri were soon fulfilled, though in a less concerted fas.h.i.+on than he had predicted. No less than eighty skirmishes were fought there during July and August, including one that resulted in the capture of Independence by guerillas under Charles Quantrill, who presently was commissioned a Confederate captain as a reward for this exploit. Kansas too was threatened. Jim Lane, the grim Jayhawk chieftain, was raising Negro troops; "Zouaves d'Afrique," they were called, for they drilled in baggy scarlet pantaloons Stanton had purchased, in the emergency, from France. North of there, in the absence of soldiers transferred south and east, the Minnesota Sioux went on the warpath, ma.s.sacring settlers by the hundreds.

Everywhere Curtis looked he saw trouble, though most of it was fortunately well beyond his reach at Helena. Remaining in the fine big house on a hill overlooking the river-it was Hindman's, or it had been; Curtis had taken it for his headquarters-he improved his fortifications, put his trust in the Mississippi as a supply line, and shook his head disapprovingly at the chaos all around him. "Society is terribly mutilated," he reported.

At the opposite end of the western line, Buell was moving eastward; or he had been, anyhow, until he encountered troubles he would gladly have swapped for those of Curtis and Grant combined, with Schofield's thrown in for good measure. As it turned out, he not only had supply and guerilla problems as acute as theirs; presently it became obvious, too, that his was the column that was to receive the main attention of the main Confederate army in the West-beginning with the twin thunderbolts, Morgan and Forrest, who were thrown at him soon after he got started.

In giving him instructions for the eastward move, ten days after the fall of Corinth, Halleck was heeding the repeated suggestion of Ormsby Mitchel, who for a month had been signaling frantically that he could see the end of the war from where he stood in Northeast Alabama. If he were reinforced, he said, he could march straight into Chattanooga, then turn south and take Atlanta. From there, he added, the way lay open to Richmond's back door, through a region that was "completely unprotected and very much alarmed." Old Brains could see merit in this-and he also saw a possible variation. Knoxville, too, lay beyond that mountain gateway: an objective he knew was dear to the heart of Lincoln, who was anxious to disenthrall the pro-Union citizens of East Tennessee and gain control of the railroad connecting Virginia and North Georgia. Accordingly, Halleck gave Buell his instructions on June 9 for a lateral offensive, the only one of any kind that he intended to launch in the West this summer, simultaneously notifying Was.h.i.+ngton of the intended movement, and two days later received the expected reply: Lincoln was "greatly delighted."

The extent of the President's delight was shown before the month was out. Alarmed by Lee's a.s.sault on McClellan, who was crying for reinforcements as he fell back, the War Department called on the western commander for 25,000 troops to be s.h.i.+fted to the East; but when Halleck replied that to send them would mean that the Chattanooga expedition would have to "be abandoned or at least be diminished," the reaction was immediate and negative, and it came in the form of a telegram from Lincoln himself. This must not be done on any account, he said. "To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond."

By that time Buell was well on his way. He had by no means reached Cleveland-a junction thirty miles beyond his immediate objective, where the railroad, coming down from Knoxville, branched west to Chattanooga and south to Atlanta-but he had advanced his four divisions to Huntsville, having ferried the Tennessee River at Florence, and had repaired the Memphis & Charleston line as far east as Decatur. He had about 35,000 men in his present column, including cavalry and engineers, and Mitchel was waiting up ahead with 11,000 more. Off to the north, ready to cooperate as soon as Knoxville became the goal, George Morgan occupied c.u.mberland Gap with a division of 9000, which was also a component of Buell's Army of the Ohio. In addition to these 55,000 troops, Thomas was at Iuka, awaiting orders to march east with his own division of 8000, plus two from Grant, which had been promised in case they were required. Just now, however, Buell did not want them. He was having trouble enough feeding the men he had, and the problem got progressively worse as he moved eastward, lengthening his supply line.

The 300 tons of food and forage needed daily-3 pounds for a man, 26 for a horse, 23 for a mule-were more than the guerilla-harried railroads could supply. Besides a shortage of rolling stock, destruction of the Elk River bridge on the Nashville-Decatur line necessitated a forty-mile wagon haul around the break, and sniper fire was so frequent and effective that ironclad boxcars had to be provided for the protection of the train crews. Buell put his men and animals on half rations, much to the discomfort of both. "We are living from day to day on short supplies and our operations are completely crippled," he complained to the Louisville quartermaster. Ahead, he knew, lay additional problems: the river crossing at Bridgeport, for example. Retiring from in front of Chattanooga the month before, Mitchel had burned the mile-long span, and Buell had no material with which to build another. In an attempt to fill the shortage and make amends, Mitchel ordered all the sawmills between Huntsville and Stevenson put to work supplying lumber for pontoons and a bridge floor, but this too was an occasion for guerilla interference, causing the workers to run away for fear of being murdered on the job or in their beds.

All in all, the prospect was grim. Buell's chief solace was the knowledge that he was doing the best he could with what he had, and his chief hope was that his industry was appreciated by those above him. The latter was dispelled by an alarming and discouraging message from Halleck, July 8. The alarm came first: Bragg's army was reported to be in motion, either against Grant at Memphis or Corinth, or against Buell at Tusc.u.mbia or Chattanooga. "A few days more may reduce these doubts to a certainty, when our troops will operate accordingly," Halleck reported, unruffled. Then came the discouragement: "The President telegraphs that your progress is not satisfactory and that you should move more rapidly. The long time taken by you to reach Chattanooga will enable the enemy to antic.i.p.ate you by concentrating a large force to meet you. I communicate his views, hoping that your movements hereafter may be so rapid as to remove all cause of complaint, whether well founded or not."

Buell later declared, "I was so astonished at the message that I made no reply until three days afterward." What jogged him then was a six-word dispatch: "I want to hear from you. H. W. Halleck." In reply, Buell reviewed his difficulties, remarking as he did so: "I regret that it is necessary to explain the circ.u.mstances which must make my progress seem so slow." As he saw it, the object was not only to reach his goal quickly, but also to be in condition to fight when he got there. "The advance on Chattanooga must be made with the means of acting in force; otherwise it will either fail"-as Mitchel's had done-or else the city would "prove a profitless and transient prize." His arrangements, made in accordance with this, were "being pushed forward as rapidly as possible," and though he quite understood that "these are matters of fact that cannot be gratifying," he added: "The dissatisfaction of the President pains me exceedingly."

Next day Halleck responded with a.s.surances of personal good will. He could see both sides of the question, and he urged Buell to be more tolerant of the amateurs above them. "I can well understand the difficulties you have to encounter and also the impatience at Was.h.i.+ngton. In the first place they have no conception of the length of our lines of defense and of operations. In the second place the disasters before Richmond have worked them up to boiling heat." At any rate, he a.s.sured him, "I will see that your movements are properly explained to the President."

This was helpful in relieving the pain-lately added to by John Morgan, who had led his gray raiders up through Middle Tennessee and was capturing railroad guards, burning bridges, and smas.h.i.+ng culverts in Kentucky-but still more comforting to Buell was the fact that his advance was now past Stevenson, where the Nashville & Chattanooga, coming down through Murfreesboro and Tullahoma, joined the Memphis & Charleston, thus affording him an additional rail supply line. Antic.i.p.ating this, he had work gangs all along the road, repairing the damage done by retreating Confederates, and to make certain that it was not wrecked again, either by raiders or guerillas, he had stationed a brigade at Murfreesboro-two regiments of infantry, a cavalry detachment, and a four-gun battery-ready to move out in either direction at the first sign of trouble. On June 12, the date of Halleck's sympathetic message, Buell was informed that the repairs had been completed. The first trainload of supplies would leave Nashville tomorrow or the next days he would be able to take his soldiers off half rations and replace their worn-out shoes as soon as it got there.

What got there tomorrow, however, was not a trainload of supplies, but rather an announcement of disaster. In the gray dawn light, Bedford Forrest struck Murfreesboro with three regiments of cavalry, wrecking the railroad at that point and capturing the Federal commander, Brigadier General T. T. Crittenden, together with all his men, guns, and equipment. Stung, Buell reacted fast by hurrying William Nelson's whole division to the scene; but when it got there, the hard-riding Confederate and his captives had disappeared eastward, in the direction of the mountains. Nor was that all. The work gangs had barely completed their repairs when, eight days later, Forrest struck again-this time up near Nashville, where he celebrated the anniversary of Mana.s.sas by firing his captured guns within sight of the capitol tower and wrecking the three bridges across Mill Creek. When Nelson's division marched from Murfreesboro to intercept him, he took a side road, camped for the night within earshot of the bluecoats tramping northward on the pike, then once more made his escape into the mountains beyond McMinnville.

Nettled but not disheartened, Buell put his repair gangs back to work. Within a week, practice having increased their skill, they had the line in operation. July 29, the first train pulled into Stevenson from Nashville with 210,000 rations, followed next day by another with a comparable amount. The troops went back on full allowances of food, and Nelson's infantry replaced the shoes they had worn out chasing Forrest's cavalry. This was a help and was duly appreciated; but something more than footgear had been damaged in the process, and there were pains in other regions than the stomach. Morale and pride were involved here, too. Buell's men began to consider that, with the doubtful exception of s.h.i.+loh-which was not really their fight, since they only arrived on the second day and even then were only engaged in part-the Army of the Ohio was the only major Federal command that had never fought a pitched battle on its own. The blame for this, as they saw it, rested with Buell, whose military policy was referred to by one of his colonels as that of a dancing master: "By your leave, my dear sir, we will have a fight; that is, if you are sufficiently fortified. No hurry; take your time."

Distasteful as this was to the men, there was something else about their commander that irked them even more. When Ormsby Mitchel's division came through this region, back in May, one soldier wrote happily in his diary: "Our boys find Alabama hams better than Uncle Sam's side meat, and fresh bread better than hard crackers." Buell, on the other hand, not only put them on half rations, but issued and enforced stern orders against foraging, which he believed would discourage southern civilians from returning to their old allegiance. However true this was or wasn't, it seemed to the men that he was less concerned with their hunger pangs than he was with the comfort and welfare of the rebels, who after all were to blame for their being down here in the first place. Also, he was denying them the fun and profit enjoyed by comrades who had come this way before them. For example, in reprisal for guerilla activities, one of Mitchel's brigade commanders, Colonel John Basil Turchin-formerly Ivan Vasilevich Turchininov, of the Imperial Russian Army-had turned the town of Athens over to his three regiments, saying, "I shut mine eyes for one hour": whereupon the Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana boys took it completely apart, Cossack-style, raping Negro servant girls and stuffing their pockets and haversacks with $50,000 worth of watches, plate, and jewelry. Grudgingly, Buell's men complained that he would never turn them loose like that, despite the fact that, officially, it would apparently do his career far more good than harm. Turchin was court-martialed and dismissed for the Athens debauch, but before the summer was over he was reinstated and promoted to brigadier. Likewise Mitchel, though he was called to Was.h.i.+ngton in early July to explain illegal cotton transactions made in his department, was promoted to major general and transferred to the mild, sea-scented atmosphere of coastal South Carolina, where unfortunately he died of yellow fever in October.

Actually, though, the trouble with Buell lay deeper. It was not so much what he did as what he was. Other generals shared his views on the subject of foraging, and enforced them quite as sternly: notably McClellan and, at the present stage of the conflict, Sherman. "This demoralizing and disgraceful practice of pillage must cease," the West Tennessee commander admonished his troops in a general order, "else the country will rise on us and justly shoot us down like dogs or wild beasts." In fact, on the face of it, both were harder on offenders than Buell ever was or tried to be. In Sherman's command, for example, the punishment for molesting civilians or stealing was confinement on bread and water, and he sent out patrols with instructions to shoot if foragers tried to escape arrest. But they gave their men something instead. Better situated, they fed better, and they moved among their soldiers in a way that made the individual feel that, outside battle, his comfort and well-being were his general's main concern. Above all, in their different ways, they had a flair for the dramatic. McClellan's men would turn from their first hot meal in days for a chance to cheer him riding past, and Sherman could make a soldier proud for weeks by asking him for a light for his cigar. It was personal, a matter of personality.

Buell was seldom "personal," and never at all in public. In private, he had a parlor trick which he sometimes performed to amaze his guests with the strength of his rather stubby arms and his stocky, close-knit torso. Grasping his hundred-and-forty-pound wife by the waist, he would lift her straight out before him, hold her there with her feet dangling clear of the carpet, then perch her deftly on the mantelpiece. It was a good trick, and it won him the admiration of those who watched him do it. But the soldiers never saw this side of his nature. He was a headquarters general, anyhow. They saw him only briefly as he made his hurried, sour-mouthed inspections, peering at them with his beady eyes and poking his hawk-beak nose into unexpected corners. The good he took for granted; it was the less-good he was looking for, and he seldom failed to find it. As a result, there was an absence of warmth-and an absence, too, of incidents in which men let their food grow cold while they took time out to cheer him riding by or fished in their pockets for a light for his cigar. They were well drilled, beyond question. Three months ago, their professional tone had been such that when Grant's skulkers saw them march ash.o.r.e at s.h.i.+loh they had cried, "Here come the regulars!" Under fire next day, their confident demeanor as they rolled the rebels back had sustained the basic accuracy of this mistake. Since then, however, a great deal had happened, and all of it bad. The inchworm advance on Corinth, with empty earthworks at the end, had been followed by these two belt-tightening months in North Alabama, where they observed with disgust-as if, by a process of unnatural reversion, a b.u.t.terfly were to have its wings refolded and be stuffed unceremoniously back into its coc.o.o.n-their transformation from happy-go-lucky soldiers into ill-fed railroad workers. Out of this had come a loss of former gladness, and a suspicion that they had lost their fighting edge.

This might or might not be the case, but at any rate the signs had been increasing that a test was about to come. Bragg was not only on the move: both Grant and Rosecrans reported him moving eastward, in the direction of Chattanooga. Before Halleck left for Was.h.i.+ngton in mid-July he released Thomas to Buell's control, bringing his total strength to 46,000, exclusive of the force at c.u.mberland Gap. Of these, however, 15,000 were needed for guarding Nashville and the railroads, which left him no more than 31,000 for a forward move. For two weeks the advance had been stalled by the lack of a bridge across the Tennessee at Bridgeport; lumber for the pontoons had been cut by now, but there was still a shortage of nails, oak.u.m, and pitch. While waiting for them, Buell was doing his best to build up a forward supply depot from which to feed and equip his men when they crossed the river to close in on the city. He was still at it on the last day of July, when a message reached his Huntsville headquarters from the commander of his advance division, reporting that Bragg himself had arrived in Chattanooga two days ago-apparently in advance of his whole army. "On the same evening two trains came in with soldiers. Railroad agent says he has orders to furnish cars for 30,000 as fast as he can."

Informed of this, Halleck replied that Grant would furnish reinforcements "if you should find the enemy too strong." Six days later, learning that Bragg's troops had not yet come up, he prodded Buell again: "There is great dissatisfaction here [in Was.h.i.+ngton] at the slow movement of your army toward Chattanooga. It is feared that the enemy will have time to concentrate his entire army against you." Buell wired back: "It is difficult to satisfy impatience, and when it proceeds from anxiety, as I know it does in this case, I am not disposed to complain of it. My advance has not been rapid, but it could not be more rapid under the circ.u.mstances. I know I have not been idle nor indifferent." Next day, August 7, he got down to specifics. The Confederate force in East Tennessee was estimated at 60,000 men, he said; "yet I am prepared to find the reports much more exaggerated than I have supposed, and shall march upon Chattanooga at the earliest possible day, unless I ascertain certainly that the enemy's strength renders it imprudent. If, on the other hand, he should cross the river I shall attack him, and I do not doubt that we shall defeat him." Encouraged, Halleck replied that Grant had been ordered to transfer two divisions to the Army of the Ohio if they were needed; but he cautioned Buell, "Do not ask for them if you can avoid it with safety."

With that, the roof fell in: quite literally. John Morgan had left Kentucky in late July, but now he suddenly reappeared in Middle Tennesee. On August 12 he captured the guard at Gallatin, above Nashville, and wrecked the L & N Railroad by pus.h.i.+ng blazing boxcars into the 800-foot tunnel, seven miles north of there, so that the timbers burned and let the dirt cave in. Unplugging it would be a long-term if not an impossible job, and with the c.u.mberland River too low for s.h.i.+pping, Buell was cut off from his main supply base at Louisville: which meant that his army would have to eat up the rations collected at Stevenson for the intended drive on Chattanooga. Learning next that a Confederate force estimated at 15,000 men had left Knoxville, bound for Nashville and other points in his rear, he called for the two divisions from Grant and on the 16th detached William Nelson to go to Kentucky with a cadre of experienced officers "to organize such troops as could be got together there to reestablish our communications and operate against Morgan's incursions." Nor was that all; for the pressure came from various directions, including Was.h.i.+ngton. Two days later, when Halleck threatened to fire him if he did not speed up his operations-"So great is the dissatisfaction here at the apparent want of energy and activity in your district, that I was this morning notified to have you removed. I got the matter delayed till we could hear further of your movements"-Buell replied forthrightly: "I beg that you will not interpose on my behalf. On the contrary, if the dissatisfaction cannot cease on grounds which I think might be supposed if not apparent, I respectfully request that I may be relieved. My position is far too important to be occupied by any officer on sufferance. I have no desire to stand in the way of what may be deemed necessary for the public good."

Either he was past caring or else he recognized a bluff when he saw one. At any rate, whatever satisfaction this gave him, he had only a short time to enjoy it. Next morning, August 19, he learned that Bragg's army was crossing the river in force at Chattanooga. This was the eventuality in which he had said, "I shall attack him"; but now that he was faced with the actual thing, it began to seem to him that his first responsibility was the protection of Nashville, lying exposed in his rear. Accordingly, he s.h.i.+fted his headquarters to Decherd, forty miles northeast on the railroad leading back to the capital. Four days later-by which time Bragg was reported to have crossed the Tennessee with fifty regiments, "well armed and [with] good artillery"-he had made up his mind. Orders went to the commanders of the two divisions on their way from Grant; they were to change direction and "move by forced marches on Nashville." Simultaneously, the officer in charge of the advance depot at Stevenson was told to "expedite the s.h.i.+pment of stores...in every possible way, and be ready to evacuate the place at a moment's notice." The work of nailing and caulking the floats for the 1400-yard-long span at Bridgeport had been completed two weeks before, and this too was remembered: "Let engineers quietly prepare the pontoons for burning, and when you leave destroy everything that cannot be brought away."

Presently, like the campaign itself, the unused bridge went up in smoke. "Don Carlos won't do; he won't do," one division commander muttered when he received the order to retire. Others protested likewise, but to no avail. Before the end of August the withdrawal was complete, and the Decherd provost marshal, describing himself as "weak, discouraged, and worn out," recorded in his diary: "The whole army is concentrated here, or near here; but n.o.body knows anything, except that the water is bad, whiskey scarce, dust abundant, and the air loaded with the scent and melody of a thousand mules."

3 Having accomplished Buell's repulse without the firing of a shot on either side-except in his rear, when Forrest and Morgan were on the rampage-Bragg now turned his mind to larger prospects, involving nothing less than the upset and reversal of the entire military situation in the enormous theater lying between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, the Ohio and the Gulf of Mexico.

The actual movement which placed him in a position to accomplish this design had been undertaken as the result of a decision reached on the spur of a moment in late July: specifically, the anniversary of Mana.s.sas. Before that, he had spent a month reorganizing and refitting the army he inherited when Beauregard left Tupelo for what he thought would be a ten-day convalescence. It had been no easy job. After the long retreat, the troops were badly in need of almost everything, including rest. What they needed most, however, was discipline; or so Bragg told "the brave men of s.h.i.+loh and of Elkhorn" in an address issued on June 27, the date of his official appointment to command the Army of the Mississippi.

"I enter hopefully on my duties," he declared. "But, soldiers, to secure the legitimate results of all your heavy sacrifices which have brought this army together, to infuse that unity and cohesion essential for a resolute resistance to the wicked invasion of our country, and to give to serried ranks force, impetus, and direction for driving the invader beyond our borders, be a.s.sured discipline at all times and obedience to the orders of your officers on all points, as a sacred duty, an act of patriotism, is an absolute necessity." Great events were impending. "A few more days of needful preparation and organization and I shall give your banners to the breeze...with the confident trust that you will gain additional honors to those you have already won on other fields." After much that was turgid, he ended grimly: "But be prepared to undergo privation and labor with cheerfulness and alacrity."

Cheerfulness was by no means a primary characteristic of this sixth among the Confederacy's full generals; dyspepsia and migraine had made him short-tempered and disputatious all his life. In the old army there was a story that in his younger days, as a lieutenant commanding one of several companies at a post where he was also serving as quartermaster, he had submitted a requisition for supplies, then as quartermaster had declined by indors.e.m.e.nt to fill it. As company commander he resubmitted the requisition, giving additional reasons for his needs, but as quartermaster he persisted in denial. Having reached this impa.s.se, he referred the matter to the post commandant, who took one look at the correspondence and threw up his hands: "My G.o.d, Mr Bragg, you have quarreled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarreling with yourself!" Other stories were less humorous: as for instance that one of his soldiers had attempted to a.s.sa.s.sinate him not long after the Mexican War by exploding a 12-pound sh.e.l.l under his cot. When the smoke cleared away, the cot was reduced to tatters and kindling, but Bragg himself emerged without a scratch.

He had left the army in 1856 for a civilian career, not in his native North Carolina but as a sugar planter and commissioner of swamp lands in Louisiana. With the coming of the present war-which he believed had been brought on by such ill-advised political measures as the extension of "universal suffrage"-he had sustained his former reputation as a disciplinarian and a fighter by whipping his Gulf Coast command rapidly into a state of efficiency and leading it aggressively at s.h.i.+loh. There, he said in his report immediately afterwards, the army had been given "a valuable lesson, by which we should profit-never on a battlefield to lose a moment's time, but leaving the killed, wounded, and spoils to those whose special business it is to care for them, to press on with every available man, giving a panic-stricken and retreating foe no time to rally, and reaping all the benefits of success never complete until every enemy is killed, wounded, or captured."

He was now in a position, with the approval of the authorities in Richmond, to give this precept large-scale application. After informing him on June 29 that his department had been "extended so as to embrace that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi, the entire states of Mississippi and Alabama, and the portion of Georgia and Florida west of the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola Rivers," Secretary Randolph not only authorized an offensive, but urged him to "Strike the moment an opportunity offers." That was what Bragg had already told his soldiers he intended to do, as soon as he had completed the reorganization-in-progress. However, this was attended by many difficulties. One problem, beyond the need for restoring (or, Bragg would say, injecting) discipline, was the army's health. The troops had brought their Corinth ailments with them; including the men from the Transmississippi, the July 1 "aggregate present" of 61,561 was reduced to 45,393 by deduction of those who were sick or in arrest or on extra duty. Healthier conditions at Tupelo, plus the absence of strain-the nearest bluecoat was two days off-would restore a good part of these 16,000 soldiers to the ranks. More serious, as Bragg saw it, was the shortage of competent high-ranking officers. Van Dorn was gone, transferred to Vicksburg in mid-June when Davis and Farragut threatened the city from above and below; Breckinridge went with him, taking 6000 troops to oppose a landing by the men from Butler, and Hindman was detached at the same time to raise an army in Arkansas. Polk having been relieved of his corps and named second in command of the whole, Hardee and Price were the only experienced major generals left in direct charge of troops. The rest, Bragg told Richmond, including most of the brigadiers in the sweeping indictment, were "in my judgment unsuited for their responsible positions"; were, in fact, "only inc.u.mbrances, and would be better out of the way."

Despite these shortcomings-and despite the fact that the War Department increased his difficulties by not allowing him to consolidate under-strength regiments bled white at s.h.i.+loh, then further reduced to skeletons by pestilence at Corinth-he kept his army hard at work, convinced that this was the sovereign remedy for injured health as well as for injured discipline. In compensation for long hours of drill he issued new uniforms and better rations, both of which had an additional salutary effect. New problems were dealt with as they arose, including an upsurge of desertion. He met it harshly. "Almost every day we would hear a discharge of musketry, and knew that some poor trembling wretch had bid farewell to mortal things here below," one soldier afterwards recalled. The effectiveness of such executions was increased, Bragg believed, by lining up the condemned man's former comrades to watch him pay for his crime. It worked; desertion decreased; but at a price. "We were crushed," the same observer added bitterly. "Bragg, so the soldiers thought, was the machine that did it.... He loved to crush the spirit of his men. The more of a hangdog look they had about them the better was General Bragg pleased. Not a single soldier in the whole army ever loved or respected him."

True or false, all this was rather beside the point as far as Bragg was concerned. He was not out after love or respect; he was after results, and he got them. On July 12 he informed the Adjutant General that the time since his last report, forwarded to Richmond when he a.s.sumed official command two weeks before, "has been diligently applied to organization, discipline, and instruction, with a very marked improvement. The health and general tone of the troops, too, exhibits results no less gratifying. Our condition for service is good and has reached a culminating point under the defective skeleton organization."

He was ready to strike. The question was, where? In what direction? Grant's army, considerably larger than his own and occupying strong positions under Sherman and Rosecrans at Memphis and Corinth, seemed practically una.s.sailable; besides which, Bragg told Richmond, "A long and disastrous drouth, threatening destruction to the grain crop, continues here and renders any move [into North Mississippi] impracticable for want of water." As for Buell, his lateral advance had been so slow and apparently so uncertain that for a long time the Confederates had found it impossible to determine his objective. It might be Chattanooga-in that case, Bragg had already sent a 3000-man brigade of infantry to reinforce the troops in East Tennessee-or it might be Atlanta, depending on what direction he took after crossing the river at Bridgeport. Whichever it was, Bragg decided in mid-July to give him all the trouble he could by sending two brigades of cavalry, under Colonel Joseph Wheeler and Brigadier General Frank Armstrong, to hara.s.s his lines of supply and communication in West Tennessee and North Alabama.

They had excellent models for their work, commanders who had already given cavalry operations-and, indeed the war itself-a new dimension, based on their proof that sizeable bodies of hard-riding men could not only strike and create havoc deep in the enemy's rear, Jeb Stuart-style, but could stay there to strike again and again, spreading the havoc over hundreds of miles and wearing out their would-be pursuers by causing them to converge repeatedly on thin air. By now the whole Confederate West was ringing with praise for Morgan and Forrest: particularly the former, whose exploits had surrounded him with the aura of a legend. A tall, white-faced, handsome, cold-eyed man, soft-spoken and always neatly dressed in conservative but obviously expensive clothes-fine gray broadcloth, fire-gilt b.u.t.tons, richly polished boots, and spotless linen-he knew the effectiveness of reticence, yet he could be flamboyant on occasion. "Kentuckians!" he exhorted in a broadside struck off at Glasgow and distributed on his sweep through the Bluegra.s.s, "I have come to liberate you from the hands of your oppressors." Calling for volunteer recruits, "fifty thousand of Kentucky's bravest sons," and implying thereby that he would take only the bravest, he broke into verse: "Strike-for your altars and your fires; Strike for the green graves of your sires, G.o.d, and your native land!"

He was seldom flamboyant, however, except for a purpose. For example, he carried with him a telegrapher, a wire-tap expert who, though he would sometimes chat waggishly with enemy operators-once he even went so far as to complain directly to Was.h.i.+ngton, in Morgan's name, about the inferior grade of mules being furnished Buell's army-not only intercepted messages that kept his chief informed of the Federal efforts to surround him, but also sent out false instructions that turned the converging blue columns off his trail. Such devices yielded profits. Leaving Knoxville on July 4 with fewer than 900 men, he made a thousand-mile swing through Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, in the course of which he captured seventeen towns, together with tons of Union supplies, paroled nearly 1200 regular army prisoners, and dispersed about 1500 home-guarders, all at a cost of less than 90 casualties, and returned before the end of the month with an additional 300 volunteers picked up along the way. Two weeks later he was back again. Lest it be thought that he was merely a hit-and-run sort of soldier, after wrecking the Gallatin tunnel he turned on his pursuer-Brigadier General R. W. Johnson, a West Pointer and fellow-Kentuckian, whom Buell had a.s.signed the task of intercepting the raiders with an equal force-and whipped him soundly, breaking up his command and capturing the general and his staff.

Forrest was a different sort of man; different in method, that is, if not in results. Recuperating in Memphis from his Fallen Timbers wound-the ball had lodged against his spine and was removed in the field a week later, without the benefit of an anesthetic-he put a recruiting notice in the local paper, calling for "able-bodied men...with good horse and gun. I wish none but those who desire to be actively engaged.... Come on, boys, if you want a heap of fun and to kill some Yankees." When he returned to Corinth, shortly before the evacuation, Beauregard sent him to Chattanooga with orders to weld the scattered East Tennessee cavalry units into a brigade. He arrived in late June, a.s.sembled his men, and, believing active duty the best possible training for a green command, crossed the Tennessee River on July 9 to camp the following night atop c.u.mberland Mountain, deep in enemy territory. At dawn Sunday, three mornings later and ninety roundabout miles away, civilian hostages held in the Murfreesboro jail-several were under sentence of death, in retaliation for the bushwhacking of Union soldiers on or near their farms-heard what one of them later called "a Strange noise like the roar of an approaching storm." It was hoofbeats: Forrest's 1400 troopers were pounding up the turnpike. Two regiments of infantry, one from Michigan, one from Minnesota, each with a section of artillery and cavalry support-their combined strength was about the same as Forrest's, except that he had no guns-were camped on opposite sides of town, with detachments guarding the jail and the courthouse, in which the brigade supplies were stored. Quickly the town was taken, along with the Federal commanding general, and fire-fights broke out on the outskirts, where the blue infantry prepared to defend its camps. Once the hostages had been freed and the captured goods packed for removal along with the prisoners already taken, some of the raiders, believing the alarm had spread to other Union garrisons by now, suggested withdrawal. But Forrest would have none of that. "I didn't come here to make half a job of it," he said, influenced perhaps by the fact that today was his forty-first birthday; "I'm going to have them all."

He got them, too-though he hastened matters somewhat by sending notes to the two commanders in their barricaded camps, demanding "unconditional surrender...or I will have every man put to the sword." He added, by way of extenuation and persuasion: "This demand is made to prevent the effusion of blood," and though like Morgan he was still a colonel, in his signature he promoted himself to "Brigadier General of Cavalry, C.S. Army," doubtless to lend additional weight to the threat. It worked. The two blue colonels surrendered in sequence, and Forrest marched his 1200 prisoners back eastward to McMinnville, where he paroled them and forwarded the captured arms and supplies to Chattanooga-all but the guns; he kept them for use around Nashville the following week, where he gave Nelson the slip after re-wrecking Buell's vital railroad supply line.

"I am happy to see that my two lieutenants, Morgan and Forrest, are doing such good service in Kentucky and Tennessee," Beauregard wrote from Bladon Springs, where he was still in exile. "When I appointed them I thought they would leave their mark wherever they pa.s.sed." This was said in reply to a letter from Bragg, in which the present army commander told his former chief, "Our cavalry is paving the way for me in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky." The letter was dated July 22. By that time Bragg had decided not only on Buell's intentions, but also on his own. After a forty-day Federal head start, it was to be a race for Chattanooga: with further possibilities as the prize.

Kirby Smith, commanding in East Tennessee, had never had much doubt about Buell's intentions from the outset. Promoted to major general after recovering from being shot through the neck at Mana.s.sas, Smith had been given the th.o.r.n.y job of restoring order in the area around Knoxville, and in this he had succeeded remarkably well, considering the extent to which the region was torn by conflicting loyalties and ambitions. But since the fall of Corinth the military situation had grown increasingly ominous; George Morgan occupied c.u.mberland Gap, an immediate threat to Knoxville itself, and Buell began his eastward advance in the direction of Chattanooga, while Smith himself had less than 15,000 of all arms with which to resist the two-p.r.o.nged menace. The arrival of the 3000-man brigade from Bragg afforded some relief, but not for long. Learning from northern papers in mid-July that several of Grant's divisions had been released to Buell, he protested to Davis in Richmond: "This brings an overwhelming force that cannot be resisted except by Bragg's cooperation." Four days later, July 19, he reported to the Adjutant General that "Buell with his whole force" had reached Stevenson, thirty miles from Chattanooga, which he was "daily expected to attack." Fortunately, Smith added, Forrest had broken the Union supply line at Murfreesboro. "This may delay General Buell's movement and give General Bragg time to move on Middle Tennessee. The safety of Chattanooga depends upon his cooperation." Next day, not knowing of his opponent's difficulties in procuring pitch and oak.u.m, he made a telegraphic appeal to Bragg himself: "Buell has completed his preparations, is prepared to cross near Bridgeport, and his pa.s.sage there may be hourly expected. General Morgan's command moving on Knoxville from c.u.mberland Gap. Your cooperation is much needed. It is your time to strike at Middle Tennessee."

Bragg's reply, sent from Tupelo that same day, was not encouraging. "Confronted here by a largely superior force strongly intrenched" and threatened on the left by Curtis, who would "now be enabled to unite against us," he found it "impossible...to do more than menace and hara.s.s the enemy from this quarter." The land was parched; both armies, Grant's and his own, were living out of wells; so that whichever ventured far from its base in search of the other would die of thirst. "The fact is we are fearfully outnumbered in this department, the enemy having at least two to our one in the field, with a comparatively short line upon which he may concentrate." After this recital of obstacles and woes, he made it clear that Smith would have to s.h.i.+ft for himself in East Tennessee, without the hope of further reinforcements.

Then overnight he changed his mind. Next day was the anniversary of Mana.s.sas, and he saluted it with a telegram as abruptly brief as the discharge of a starting-gun in the race which it announced: Tupelo, Miss., July 21 President Jefferson Davis,Richmond, Va.:Will move immediately to Chattanooga in force and advance from there. Forward movement from here in force is not practicable. Will leave this line well defended.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

Next day, in the midst of large-scale preparations for the s.h.i.+ft-he was not waiting for specific governmental approval; "Strike the moment an opportunity offers," he had been told three weeks ago-he expanded this somewhat in a second wire to Davis, who he knew must have been startled at being told, without preamble, that the army which was the mainstay of his native Mississippi was being removed forthwith: "Obstacles in front connected with danger to Chattanooga induce a change of base. Fully impressed with great importance of that line, am moving to East Tennessee. Produce rapid offensive from there following the consternation now being produced by our cavalry. Leave this State amply protected by Van Dorn at Vicksburg and Price here."

In a letter to Beauregard that same day-the one in which he wrote, "Our cavalry is paving the way"-he gave a fuller explanation. "As I am changing entirely, under altered circ.u.mstances, the plan of operations here," he told his former chief, "I submit to you what I propose and beg your candid criticism, and in view of the cordial and sincere relations we have ever maintained, I trust to your compliance." With Smith "so weak as to give me great uneasiness for the safety of his line," Bragg had had to choose between four alternatives: 1) to remain idle at Tupelo, 2) to attack Grant, 3) to move into Middle Tennessee by crossing the river in Buell's rear and thus disrupt his and Grant's supply lines, or 4) to attack Buell. Of these, the first was unthinkable; the second was impracticable, considering the drouth in North Mississippi and the strength of the fortifications at Memphis and Corinth; the third was unwise and overrisky, since it would invite both Grant and Buell to a.s.sault him simultaneously from opposite directions. Therefore he had chosen the fourth, which would not only provide for a combination with Smith, but would also afford possibilities for maneuver and mystification. "By throwing my cavalry forward toward Grand Junction and Tusc.u.mbia"-this referred to Wheeler and Armstrong, who had left three days ago-"the impression is created that I am advancing on both places and [the Federals] are drawing in to meet me. The Memphis & Charleston road has been kept cut, so they have no use of it and have at length given it up. Before they can know my movement I shall be in front of Buell at Chattanooga, and by cutting off his transportation may have him in a tight place.... Thus you have my plan."

As might have been expected-for, though it lacked the language, it had nearly the grandeur of one of the Creole's own-Beauregard gave the plan his fervent approval. "Action, action, and action is what we require," he replied, paraphrasing Danton's "De l'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours de l'audace," and added with a paternalistic glow: "I have no doubt that with anything like equal numbers you will meet with success." By the time these encouraging words reached him, however, Bragg was far from Tupelo. He left on July 24, after notifying the Adjutant General: "Major General Van Dorn, with about 16,000 effectives, will hold the line of the Mississippi. Major General Price, with a similar force, will face the enemy on this frontier, and a sufficient garrison will be left for Mobile and the Gulf. With the balance of the forces, some 35,000 effectives, I hope, in conjunction with Major General Smith, to strike an effective blow through Middle Tennessee, gaining the enemy's rear, cutting off his supplies and dividing his forces, so as to encounter him in detail. In any event much will be accomplished in simply preserving our line and preventing a descent into Georgia, than which no greater disaster could befall us."

His confidence that he would win the race, despite the handicap of a six-week lag-not to mention the sobering example of the hare-and-tortoise fable-was based on an appreciation of railroads as a strategic factor in this war. (For one thing, by bringing Joe Johnston's men down from the Valley, through Mana.s.sas Gap, to unload within earshot of the Union guns, they had won the battle whose anniversary had now come round.) Ever since his a.s.sumption of command Bragg had kept busy, doing not only all he could to wreck Buell's rail facilities, but also all he could to improve his own, especially in urging the completion of a line connecting Meridian and Selma. In the former effort, by grace of Morgan and Forrest, he had been successful, but in the latter he had failed; the Confederacy, it appeared, could afford neither the effort nor the iron. Consequently, with the Memphis & Charleston wrecked and in Federal hands, the only rail connection between Tupelo and Chattanooga was a roundabout, far-south route through Mobile and Atlanta, involving a journey of 776 miles over no less than half a dozen separate railroads, with through trains prohibited by the water gap across Mobile Bay and the narrow gauge of the Montgomery & West Point road. Nevertheless, the sending of the 3000-man brigade to Smith in late June, as a trial run over this route, had opened Bragg's eyes to the possibilities it afforded for a rapid, large-scale movement. The troops had left Tupelo on June 27, and despite congestion all along the line-conflicting orders from Richmond had put other units simultaneously on the rails-reached Chattanooga on July 3, within a week of the day the movement order had been issued.

Now he was out to repeat or better the performance with ten times as many soldiers, the "effective total" of his four divisions being 31,638 of all arms. Horse-drawn elements, including engineers and wagon trains, as well as cavalry and artillery, would move overland-due east to Rome, then north-but the bulk of the command would go by rail, dispatched from Tupelo a division at a time. For this, though they were made on quite short notice, the preparations were extensive, with the emphasis on discipline, as was always the case when Bragg was in charge. Each man was to be handed seven days' cooked rations as he stepped aboard, thus forestalling any excuse for foraging en route, and unit commanders were cautioned to be especially vigilant at junction points to prevent the more adventurous from disrupting the schedule by stealing away for a visit to the fleshpots. The first division left on July 23, the second and third immediately thereafter, and the fourth on July 29: by which time the units forwarded from Mobile and other scattered points to clear the line had been in Chattanooga for two full days. They were followed by a week-long procession of jam-packed cars whose engines came puffing around Missionary Ridge and into the city.

In all the bustle and hurry of preparation and departure, and in spite of the number of wires and letters flying back and forth, Bragg had neglected to mention his sudden volte-face to the one person most immediately concerned: Kirby Smith. While changing trains in Montgomery, however, he was handed an intercepted letter the East Tennessee commander had sent from Knoxville on the 24th-the day Bragg left Tupelo-proposing, with what amounted to clairvoyance if not downright telepathy, the very movement now in progress: "Buell's movements and preparations indicate a speedy attack.... Can you not leave a portion of your forces in observation in Mississippi, and, s.h.i.+fting the main body to this department, take command in person? There is yet time for a brilliant summer campaign; you will have a good and secure base, abundant supplies, the Tennessee can be crossed at any point by the aid of steam and ferry boats, and the campaign opened with every prospect of regaining possession of Middle Tennessee and possibly Kentucky." He added: "I will not only cooperate with you, but will cheerfully place my command under you subject to your orders."

With this in his pocket, a happy omen as well as an affirmation of his strategic judgment, Bragg continued his journey and reached Chattanooga early on the morning of July 30. Informed of his arrival, Smith came down from Knoxville the following day to confer with him on what Bragg called "measures for material support and effective cooperation." Smith had two divisions, one in front of c.u.mberland Gap, observing the Federals who occupied that point, the other at Chattanooga; their strength was about 9,000 men each, including the brigade that had arrived four weeks ago to thicken the ranks of the slim force confronting Buell. Bragg was reorganizing his still-arriving army into two "wings," one under Polk, the other under Hardee, each with two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade; their combined strength was 34,000, including the units forwarded in driblets from points along the railroad. His problem was how best to employ these 52,000 men-his and Smith's-against the larger but badly scattered Federal forces to his front and on his flank.

The solution, as communicated to the Adjutant General on August 1, was for Smith to "move at once against General Morgan in front of c.u.mberland Gap," while Bragg was collecting supplies and awaiting the arrival of his artillery and trains for an advance from Chattanooga. This would require ten days or two weeks, he said. At the end of that time, if Smith had been successful against Morgan, both armies would then combine for a march "into Middle Tennessee with the fairest prospect of cutting off General Buell, should that commander continue in his present position. Should he be reinforced from the west side of the Tennessee River, so as to cope with us, then Van Dorn and Price can strike and clear West Tennessee of any force that can be left to hold it." Furthermore, once Grant and Buell had been disposed of, either by destruction or by being maneuvered into retreat, he considered the time propitious for an invasion of the region to the north. "The feeling in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky is represented by Forrest and Morgan to have become intensely hostile to the enemy, and nothing is wanted but arms and support to bring the people into our ranks, for they have found that neutrality has afforded them no protection."

Returning to Knoxville much encouraged by these developments, Smith informed his wife that he had found his new partner "a grim old fellow" (he himself was thirty-eight; Bragg was forty-five) "but a true soldier." Presently he was further gladdened by the arrival of two brigades detached by Bragg to reinforce him for the offensive, one from Polk and one from Hardee, and being thus strengthened on the eve of his advance he began to see larger prospects looming out beyond the horizon-prospects based in part on a dispatch from John Morgan, who had reported from northern Kentucky in mid-July: "I am here with a force sufficient to hold all the country outside of Lexington and Frankfort. These places are garrisoned chiefly with Home Guards. The bridges between Cincinnati and Lexington have been destroyed. The whole country can be secured, and 25,000 or 30,000 men will join you at once. I have taken eleven cities and towns with very heavy army stores." If one small brigade of cavalry could accomplish all this, Smith reasoned, what might a whole army do? Accordingly, on August 9 he wrote to Bragg that he "understood" the Federals intrenched at c.u.mberland Gap had "nearly a month's supply of provisions. If this be true the reduction of the place would be a matter of more time than I presume you are willing I should take. As my move direct to Lexington, Ky. would effectually invest [the Gap] and would be attended with other most brilliant results in my judgment, I suggest my being allowed to take that course, if I find the speedy reduction of the Gap an impractical thing."

Bragg too was nurturing hopes in that direction, though not without reservations. He replied next day: "It will be a week yet before I can commence crossing the river, and information I hope to receive will determine which route I shall take, to Nashville or Lexington. My inclination is now for the latter." All the same, Smith's plan to by-pa.s.s c.u.mberland Gap and head straight for North Central Kentucky was more than his partner had bargained for, even though Smith reinforced his proposal by inclosing a letter from John Morgan's lieutenant-colonel, stressing the opinion that flocks of eager volunteers were waiting to double the size of his army as soon as it reached the Bluegra.s.s. Strategically, Bragg approved, but tactically he urged caution: "It would be unadvisable, I think, for you to move far into Kentucky, leaving [George] Morgan in your rear, until I am able to fully engage Buell and his forces on your left. But I do not credit the amount of Morgan's supplies [at c.u.mberland Gap] and have confidence in his timidity. When once well on the way to his rear you might safely leave but 5000 to his front, and by a flank movement draw the rest to your a.s.sistance. He will never advance to escape."

Smith's ebullience was contagious: as was shown in the final sentence of Bragg's letter. "Van Dorn and Price will advance simultaneously with us from Mississippi on West Tennessee, and I trust we may all unite in Ohio."

Just now, however, Van Dorn was looking south, not north; he had New Orleans on his mind, not Ohio. The grim determination he had brought to embattled Vicksburg in late June-"Let it be borne in mind by all that the army here is defending the place against occupation. This will be done at all hazards, even though this beautiful and devoted city should be laid in ruin and ashes"-gave way to elation in mid-July when the Arkansas Arkansas made her run through the Yankee sloops and gunboats. "Glorious for the navy, and glorious for her heroic commander, officers, and men," he wired Davis. The iron ram changed everything. "Smokestack riddled; otherwise not materially damaged," he exulted. "Soon be repaired and then, Ho! for New Orleans." Both enemy fleets were still on hand, and across the way the bluecoats were still digging their ca.n.a.l; but Van Dorn no longer saw them as much of a threat. A week later, after two all-out attempts to sink the made her run through the Yankee sloops and gunboats. "Glorious for the navy, and glorious for her heroic commander, officers, and men," he wired Davis. The iron ram changed everything. "Smokestack riddled; otherwise not materially damaged," he exulted. "Soon be repaired and then, Ho! for New Orleans." Both enemy fleets were still on hand, and across the way the bluecoats were still digging their ca.n.a.l; but Van Dorn no longer saw them as much of a threat. A week later, after two all-out attempts to sink the Arkansas Arkansas under the tall red bluff, he p.r.o.nounced "the failure so complete that it was almost ridiculous." The same went for the engineering project. "Nothing can be accomplished by the enemy," he told Richmond, "unless they bring overwhelming number of troops. This must be antic.i.p.ated." under the tall red bluff, he p.r.o.nounced "the failure so complete that it was almost ridiculous." The same went for the engineering project. "Nothing can be accomplished by the enemy," he told Richmond, "unless they bring overwhelming number of troops. This must be antic.i.p.ated."

His favorite method of antic.i.p.ation, now as always, was to seize the offensive; to s.n.a.t.c.h the ball from his opponent and start running. That was what he had done, or tried to do, in Arkansas back in the early spring, and that was what he decided to do now in his native Mississippi in midsummer. When Davis and Farragut gave up the game, turned their backs on each other and went their separate ways-the former to Helena, the latter to New Orleans after dropping the infantry off at Baton Rouge-Van Dorn ordered Breckinridge to pursue southward with 4000 men and knock the bluecoats off balance in the Louisiana capital before they could get set for a return. If possible, he was to take the city: after which, as Van Dorn saw it, would come much else. Five months ago the byword had been "St Louis, then huzza!" Now it was "Ho! for New Orleans."

Breckinridge wasted no time in getting started. On July 27, the day after the Yankee fleets took off in opposite directions, he put his troops aboard railroad cars and proceeded by way of Jackson to Ponchatoula, Louisiana, where they detrained the following afternoon to prepare for the overland advance on Baton Rouge, sixty miles to the west. On the 30th the march began, but was halted the following morning when reports came in "that the effective force of the enemy was not less than 5000 and that the ground was commanded by three gunboats lying in the river." Down to 3400 men as a result of sickness, Breckinridge wired Van Dorn that he would nonetheless "undertake to capture the garrison if the Arkansas Arkansas could be sent down to clear the river or divert the fire of the gunboats." Promptly the reply came back: The ram would be in front of Baton Rouge at dawn, August 5. Breckinridge made his plans accordingly. could be sent down to clear the river or divert the fire of the gunboats." Promptly the reply came back: The ram would be in front of Baton Rouge at dawn, August 5. Breckinridge made his plans accordingly.

Isaac Brown was not in Vicksburg at the time, having left his s.h.i.+pmates "to sustain without me the la.s.situde of inaction" while he took a four-day leave in Grenada. If rest and relaxation were what he was after (which was probable; he had had precious little of either in the past two months) he was disappointed in more ways than one. For one thing, he had no sooner arrived than he was taken violently ill and put to bed. For another, while he was in this condition, supposedly unable to lift his head off the pillow, he received a wire from his first lieutenant, informing him that the Arkansas Arkansas was under orders to proceed at once to Baton Rouge, despite the fact that her engines were under major repair and much of her rusty plating had still not been refastened to her battered sides. Brown replied with "a positive order to remain at Vicksburg until I could join him," and had himself carried to the depot, where he boarded the first southbound train. Collapsed on some mai