Rulers of India: Lord Clive Part 6

Up to that period the Dutch had endeavoured to pose as peaceful traders. But no sooner had their negotiations with Mir Jafar been completed, and they had received his permission to ascend to Chinsurah, than they threw off the mask, and sent an ultimatum to Clive threatening vengeance unless the English should renounce their claim of the right of search, and redress the other grievances they enumerated. Clive replied that in all his actions he had been guided by the authority vested in him by the Subahdar, the representative of the Great Mughal; that he was powerless in the matter; but that if they would refer their complaints to the Subahdar, he would gladly act the part of mediator. The Dutch commander, however, paid no heed to this somewhat vague reply, but acted as though it were a {129}declaration of war. For, on receipt of Clive's letter he attacked and captured seven small vessels lying off Falta, among them the despatch-boat above referred to, tore down the English colours, and transferred the guns and material to their own s.h.i.+ps. Then, having plundered the few houses on the riverbanks, he continued his upward course, with his s.h.i.+ps, although, from the want of pilots, their progress was necessarily slow.

Clive, on hearing of these demonstrations, prepared to act on the instant. First, he sent a despatch to the Subahdar, telling him that the quarrel between the two European nations must be fought out alone, adding, however, to test Mir Jafar, a paragraph to the effect that the Subahdar would convince him of his sincerity and attachment if he would directly surround their (the Dutch) subordinates, and distress them in 'the country to the utmost.' Then he ordered Forde to occupy Barnagar on the left bank of the Hugli, five miles from Calcutta; to cross thence with his troops and four field-pieces to s.h.i.+rirampur, nine miles distant; to be ready, either there or beyond it, to intercept the Dutch troops, in the event of their trying to reach Chinsurah by land. Then, learning that the Dutch s.h.i.+ps had progressed as far as the Sankral reach, just below the fire of the English batteries, and were landing their troops with directions to march directly on Chinsurah, he issued orders for immediate action.

Recognizing on the instant that, by landing, the {130}enemy's troops had severed themselves from their base--the s.h.i.+ps--he despatched Knox to join Forde, and sent information to the latter of the probable route the enemy's troops would take, leaving it to him to deal with them as he might consider advisable. Then he sent orders to Commodore Wilson, the senior of the captains of the Indiamen, to demand from the Commander of the Dutch squadron a full apology for the insults he and his subordinates had been guilty of, the return of the individuals and of the plunder he and they had taken, and their immediate departure from the Hugli. Failing prompt compliance with all these demands, Wilson was to attack the enemy's squadron.

The scene that followed deserves to rank with the most glorious achievements of English sailors. The three captains were all built in the heroic mould. Not one of them felt a doubt of victory when they were ordered to attack a squadron in all respects more than double in numbers and weight of metal to their own. It must suffice here to say[14] that, the proposal of the English Commodore having been refused by the Dutch, the English captains bore down upon the enemy; after a contest of little more than two hours, captured or sank six of their s.h.i.+ps; the seventh, hurrying out to sea, fell into the hands of two s.h.i.+ps of war, then entering the river. Well {131}might the victors exclaim, in the language of our great national poet:--

'O, such a day, So fought, so followed, and so fairly won, Came not till now to dignify the times, Since Caesar's fortunes.'

[Footnote 14: For a detailed account of this action see the author's _Decisive Battles of India_.]

This success left the Dutch soldiers, then on their way to Chinsurah, absolutely without a base. They could only find safety in success, and success was denied them. They were first repulsed by Forde in an attack they made on a position he had taken at Chandranagar, and the next day almost destroyed by the same gallant officer, joined by Knox, in a battle at the village of Biderra, nearly midway between Chandranagar and Chinsurah. Few victories have been more decisive. Of the 700 Europeans and 800 Malays landed from the s.h.i.+ps, 120 of the former and 200 of the latter were left dead on the field; 300, in about equal proportions, were wounded; and the remainder, with the exception of 60 Dutch and 250 Malays, were taken prisoners. Forde had under his command on this eventful day (November 25) 320 Europeans, 800 sipahis, and 50 European volunteer cavalry. The previous day, reckoning that he would have to fight the enemy with his inferior numbers, he had sent a note to Clive asking for implicit instructions. Clive, who was playing whist when the note reached him, knowing with whom he was dealing, wrote across it, in pencil: 'Dear Forde, Fight them immediately: I will send you the order {132}in Council to-morrow,' and sent back the messenger with it.

The two victories were in all respects decisive. Never again did the Dutch trouble the tranquillity of India. Mir Jafar was cowed. Three days after the victory of Biderra, his son, Miran, arrived from Murs.h.i.+dabad with 6,000 horse, for the purpose, he explained, of exterminating the Dutch. Clive, always merciful in victory, gave to these, against their baffled confederate, the protection which he considered due to a foe no longer to be dreaded.

Clive now regarded the British position in Bengal so secure that he might return to England to enjoy there the repose and the position he had acquired. He had compressed into three years achievements the most momentous, the most marvellous, the most enduring, recorded in the history of his country. Landing with a small force below Calcutta in the last days of 1756, he had compelled the Subahdar, who had been responsible for the Black Hole tragedy, though guiltless of designing it,[15] to evacuate Calcutta, to witness without interfering his capture of Chandranagar. Determined, then, in the interests of his country, to place matters in Bengal on such a footing that a repet.i.tion of the tragedy of 1756 should be impossible, he resolved to replace Siraj-ud-daula, himself the son of a usurper, by a native chieftain {133}who should owe everything to the English, and who would probably allow himself to be guided by them in his policy. To this end he formed a conspiracy among his n.o.bles, fomented discontent among his people, and finally forced him to appeal to arms. At Pla.s.sey Clive risked everything on the fidelity to himself of the conspirators with whom he had allied himself. They were faithful. He gained the battle, not gloriously but decisively, and became from the morrow of the victory the lord paramount of the n.o.ble whom he placed then on the _masnad_. Possibly it was partly policy which impelled him to give his nominee no chance from the beginning. Certain it is, that Mir Jafar was, from the moment of his accession, so handicapped by the compulsion to make to his allies enormous payments, that his life, from that moment to the hour of his deposition, presently to be related, was not worth living. The commercial concessions which Clive had forced from him gave the English an _imperium in imperio_. But the Subahdar was in the toils. When invasion came from the north he tried his utmost to avoid asking for the aid of Clive. But Clive, who had sent his best soldiers to conquer the Northern Sirkars, and to establish permanent relations with the Subahdar of the Deccan--relations which secured to England a permanent predominance in the most important districts of southern India--was indispensable.

His a.s.sistance, given in a manner which could not fail to impress the natives of India--for the enemy fled at his approach--riveted the {134}chains on the Subahdar. Then came the invasion of the Dutch. For the first time a superior hostile force of Europeans landed on the sh.o.r.es of British India. The Subahdar, anxious above all things to recover his freedom of action, promised them his a.s.sistance. Clive shone out here, more magnificently than he had shone before, as the undaunted hero. Disdaining to notice the action of the Subahdar, he gave all his attention to the European invaders; with far inferior means he baffled their schemes; and crushed them in a manner such as would make them, and did make them, remember and repent the audacity which had allowed them to imagine that they could impose their will on the victor of Kaveripak and Pla.s.sey. He had made the provinces he had conquered secure, if only the rule which was to follow his own should be based on justice, against the native rulers; secure for ever against European rivals a.s.sailing it from the sea.

[Footnote 15: Siraj-ud-daula had given instructions that the prisoners should be safely cared for, and had then gone to sleep. It was the brutality of his subordinate officers which caused the catastrophe.]

That, during this period, he had committed faults, is only to say that he was human. But, unfortunately, some of his faults were so grave as to cast a lasting stain on a career in many respects worthy of the highest admiration. The forging of the name of Admiral Watson, although the name was attached to the deed with, it is believed, his approval,[16] was a crime light in comparison with the purpose for which it {135}was done--the deceiving of the Bengali, Aminchand. It is true that Aminchand was a scoundrel, a blackmailer, a man who had said: 'Pay me well, or I will betray your secrets.' But that was no reason why Clive should fight him with his own weapons: should descend to the arena of deceit in which the countrymen of Aminchand were past-masters. Possibly the atmosphere he breathed in such society was answerable, to a great extent, for this deviation from the path of honour. But the stain remains. No was.h.i.+ng will remove it.

It affected him whilst he still lived, and will never disappear.

[Footnote 16: In his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons Clive said regarding the fict.i.tious treaty: 'It was sent to Admiral Watson, who objected to the signing of it; but, to the best of his remembrance, gave the gentleman who carried it (Mr.

Lus.h.i.+ngton) leave to sign his name upon it.']

Then again, as to his dealings with Siraj-ud-daula and Mir Jafar. The whole proceedings of Clive after his capture of Calcutta prove that he intended to direct all his policy to the removal of that young prince from the _masnad_. Some have thought that the Black Hole tragedy was the cause of this resolve. But this can hardly be so, for Mir Jafar, the commander-in-chief of the army which seized Calcutta in 1756, was equally implicated in that transaction. The suggestion that Siraj-ud-daula was intriguing with the French at Haidarabad is equally untenable, for Clive knew he had little cause to fear their hostility. Clive not only expelled that prince, but, by his policy, his extortions, his insistance to obtain control of the saltpetre traffic, rendered it impossible for his successor to govern. Success attended his policy so long as he remained on the spot to control his subordinates, but it was inevitable that, sooner or later, there would come {136}a revulsion. The warlike natives of Bihar had not been conquered, and they knew it. They had helped Clive, not that they should become subject to the foreigner from the sea, but that they might have a native ruler whom they trusted, in place of one whom they disliked. When they realized that the result of this change was not only subjection to the islanders, but impoverishment to themselves, they broke into what was called rebellion, and showed on many a b.l.o.o.d.y field that it was not they, only Siraj-ud-daula, who had been conquered at Pla.s.sey.

This was the most dangerous legacy of the policy and action of Clive.

He recognized its shadowy existence. He wrote to his successor, Mr.

Vansittart, when he transferred to him his own office, that the only danger he had to dread in Bengal was that which might arise from venality and corruption. He might have added that the spoils of Pla.s.sey had created a state of society in which those vices were prominent; that the saltpetre monopoly, with the duties and exemptions which had followed its acquisition, had confirmed them.

The Subahdar himself recognized the new danger which would follow the departure of Clive. In his mind he was the moderator who, satisfied himself, would have stayed the hands of others. To quiet the newcomers there would be fresh rapacity, more stringent despoilings.

He felt, to use the expression of the period when Clive quitted Bengal, that 'the soul was departing from the body.'

Clive made over charge to Mr. Holwell, of Black {137}Hole notoriety, pending the arrival of Mr. Vansittart, the 15th of February, 1760.

With the sanction of the Court he had nominated Major Calliaud to be Commander of the Forces. Four members of his Council retired about the same time as himself.

{138}

CHAPTER XI THE SECOND VISIT OF CLIVE TO ENGLAND

During his administration of four years in Bengal Clive had been greatly hampered by the contradictory orders he had received from the Court of Directors. In that Court there were four parties: the party of alarmists at the aggrandizement of the Company's possessions in India; the party of progressists; the middle party, composed of men who would retain all that had been conquered, but who, not understanding the necessity which often compels a conqueror to advance that he may retain, would on no account sanction the proceeding of a step further; a fourth party bent only on acquiring plunder. As one or other of these parties obtained preponderance in the Court, so did the orders transmitted to India take their colour.

In those days, it must be remembered, there was no Board of Control to regulate and, if necessary, to modify, even entirely to alter, the rulings of the General Court. Thus it was that the agent on the spot, finding the orders from England constantly changing, was driven to rely upon his own judgement, and to act on his own responsibility.

This did not signify so much so long as there was, on the spot, {139}holding supreme authority, a Clive or a Warren Hastings. But when the local chief authority was in the hands of men wanting alike in intellect, in high principle, and in nerve, the situation was likely to become dangerous in the extreme.

For the moment, when Clive quitted India, the situation was tranquil.

But it might become at any moment the reverse. Therefore it was that Clive had recommended as his successor a man whom he believed he had sounded to the core, and in whom he had found one after his own heart. But there is no proverb more true than that contained in the criticism pa.s.sed by Tacitus on Galba, 'Omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi impera.s.set.' We shall see presently how the conduct of Vansittart corresponded to this aphorism.

A little more than a year before quitting the sh.o.r.es of Bengal, Clive had addressed to Mr. Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham, then Secretary of State, a letter (January 7, 1759) in which he had represented the difficulties of the actual situation, and had suggested a mode of dealing with them. He had described the actual Subahdar as a man attached to the English, and as likely to continue that attachment 'while he has no other support,' but totally uninfluenced by feelings of grat.i.tude, feelings not common to his race. On the other hand, he was advanced in years; his son, Miran, was utterly unworthy, so unworthy 'that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the succession.' He added immediately, as though prescient of the events {140}which were to follow, 'In case of their,' the native princes, 'daring to be troublesome,' they--a body of 2000 English soldiers-- would 'enable the Company to take the sovereignty upon themselves.'

After detailing how the transfer would be easy, and palatable, rather than otherwise, to the natives generally, Clive proceeded to represent that so large a sovereignty might possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company, and to suggest that it might be worthy of consideration whether the Crown should not take the matter in hand. The points he urged were the following: First, the ease with which the English 'could take absolute possession of these rich kingdoms, and that with the Mughal's own consent, on condition of paying him less than a fifth of the revenues thereof.' There would remain a surplus of two millions, besides most valuable productions of nature and art. He dwelt, secondly, on the influence in Europe which would thereby accrue to England, and the enormous increase of prestige and of the advantages which prestige conveys, on the spot.

He added that a small force of European troops would be sufficient, as he could enlist any number of sipahis, who 'will very readily enter our service.' This letter he transmitted by the hands of Mr.

Walsh, his secretary during the campaign of Pla.s.sey and the year following, and whom he describes as 'a thorough master of the subject,' 'able to explain to you the whole design and the facility with which it may be executed.'

Mr. Pitt received the letter, but was deterred from {141}acting upon it by difficulties which arose in his mind from his want of knowledge of India and of matters connected with that country. To the son of a man whose father had been Governor of Madras in the days when the English were the humble lessees of the lords of the soil, the proposition to become masters of territories far larger and richer than their island home, seemed beset with difficulties which, if it may be said without disrespect to his ill.u.s.trious memory, existed solely in his own imagination--for they have since been very easily overcome.

The letter served to make Clive personally known to the great statesman when he landed in England in September or October, 1760. He had returned a very rich man; he was full of ambition; his fame as a soldier had spread all over the kingdom. Pitt, shortly before his arrival (1758), had spoken of him in the House of Commons as a 'Heaven-born General,' as the only officer, by land or sea, who had sustained the reputation of the country and added to its glory. The King himself, George II, when the Commander-in-chief had proposed to him to send the young Lord Dunmore to learn the art of war under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, had replied, 'What can he get by attending the Duke of Brunswick? If he want to learn the art of war, let him go to Clive.' These expressions show at least the temper of the times, the feelings which would inspire the welcome which England would give to her latest hero. And yet the welcome itself fell far short of that which Clive had {142}antic.i.p.ated. From the Crown there was no immediate recognition; from the Court of Directors, a hostile section of which held the supremacy, he received worse than neglect.

Almost their first act was to dispute his right to the jagir which Mir Jafar had bestowed upon him.[1] From the general public there was no demonstration. Clive felt that in England as in India he would have to fight his way upwards.

[Footnote 1: See Chapter X, footnote 12.]

His health was not very good. He suffered from rheumatism, which had a.s.sailed him in Bengal, and which bore a strong resemblance to rheumatic gout. Scarcely had he recovered from this malady when he was a.s.sailed by the insidious disease which, afterwards, but rarely left him. This caused a depression of spirits which gradually wore out his body. As a boy he had suffered at intervals from similar attacks. They increased now in intensity, baffling the physicians who attended him. He bore up bravely, however, and pushed forward with his wonted energy the ambitious plans he had formed in the intervals of quiet and repose.

At the age of thirty-five, with an enormous fortune, great ambition, and sanguine hopes for the future, Clive trusted that the illness he suffered from would eventually yield to treatment, and he entered on his campaign in England with the confidence in himself which had been one secret of his success in India. He had hoped, on his arrival, to have been at once raised to the House of Peers. But the honours of the {143}Crown, long delayed, took the shape only of an Irish peerage. With this he was forced to be content, and, being debarred from the Upper House, made all his arrangements to become a member of the Lower. He speedily obtained a seat in that House.

Possibly he marred his prospects by the line which he took in politics. In October, 1760, George II had died. The new King, whose proudest boast was that he had been born an Englishman, made Lord Bute Secretary of State. Soon after Pitt resigned, because the rest of the Ministry refused to support him in his policy of going to war with Spain, the Duke of Newcastle still remaining nominal head of the Cabinet. In 1762 the Duke resigned, and Lord Bute became Prime Minister. Sir John Malcolm states that Lord Clive was offered his own terms if he would support the Bute Ministry. But Clive had given his mental adhesion in another quarter, and therefore refused his support, and was, it is stated, treated coldly in consequence.[2]

[Footnote 2: Vide Malcolm's _Clive_, vol. ii. p. 203: also Gleig, p.

134. There would seem to be some mistake as to the reason given by Mr. Gleig for his statement that Clive refused his support to the Bute Administration because of his devotion to George Grenville; for George Grenville held the post of one of the princ.i.p.al Secretaries of State in Lord Bute's Ministry.]

Though not a supporter of the Bute Administration, Clive did not refrain from volunteering to it his advice when the preliminaries of peace between France and England were under discussion. Both Powers were resolved that the peace should extend to their possessions in India. Clive wrote therefore to {144}Lord Bute suggesting the terms upon which, in his opinion, it was absolutely necessary for the safety of the East India Company he should insist. Prominent among these were (1) the absolute limitation of the number of troops the French might retain in Southern India, and (2) a prohibition to admit into Bengal Frenchmen other than those engaged in commercial enterprises. Lord Bute so far followed the advice as to induce the French to agree not to maintain troops either in Bengal or the Northern Sirkars. But when he would go further, and, on the suggestion of Mr. Lawrence Sulivan, Chairman of the Court of Directors, make the recognition of certain native princes a clause in the projected treaty between the two Powers, Clive, with his habitual prescience, denounced the clause as fraught with consequences most disastrous to the position of England in India, and persuaded the Minister to withdraw it.

The gentleman above referred to, Mr. Lawrence Sulivan, had become, from pure motives of jealousy, one of the bitterest enemies of Clive.

Sulivan had served in India without distinction, but had succeeded in ama.s.sing there a handsome fortune, and being a man of bold address and pus.h.i.+ng manners, had become a Director of the Company. Whilst Clive was still in India Sulivan had professed the most unbounded admiration for him and his achievements, and, by thus professing, had obtained the support of the followers of Clive when he made a bid for the Chairmans.h.i.+p of the Court. This he secured, and, being a man {145}of considerable self-a.s.sertion and determination, succeeded in becoming the dictator of the Council. Up to that time he had given his support to Clive, but no sooner did he hear of the departure of his hero for England, than, dreading the effect of his arrival upon his own influence, he had become his most bitter opponent. He it was who stimulated his colleagues to object to the donation of the jagir to Clive, mentioned in a previous page. The grounds to the objection were rather hinted at than expressed, for in those days the Court could not deny the right of the Subahdar to bestow, or of Clive to accept, so handsome a gift. The real motive was to exclude Clive from a seat in the India House, and for a time Sulivan succeeded.

The hostility of Sulivan found an outcome in the progress of political affairs. Clive had voted against the Peace of Paris (February 10, 1763). Lord Bute, indignant at the opposition his measure encountered, had made his power felt by dismissing three dukes from their lord-lieutenancies, and he was very angry with Clive. He then sought and obtained the alliance of Sulivan to crush him. Up to that point Clive had remained quiescent; but at this new outrage he turned. Very shortly afterwards Sulivan came before the Court of Proprietors for re-election. To defeat him Clive had purchased a large amount of India Stock and divided it amongst his friends. At the show of hands there was a large majority against Sulivan, but when the ballot-box was appealed to the position was reversed, and Sulivan and his majority were returned. {146}For the moment Clive's defeat was crus.h.i.+ng, and he prepared to meet the consequences of it. His opponents did not delay to show their hands.

Again was the question of the jagir mooted. The eminent counsel employed by Clive gave an opinion that the Court had no case.

However, the Sulivan party persevered. Just on the eve of the trial, however, there came news from India which produced a revolution of opinion in the Court. The reports from Calcutta showed that the combined avarice, greed, misgovernment, and tyranny of the civil authorities left by Clive in Calcutta had produced a general uprising; had almost undone the great work Clive had accomplished; that there was no one on the spot who could be trusted to restore order; but that unless such a task were committed to a competent man, the possessions of the Company in Bengal would be in the greatest danger. This intelligence caused a panic in the India House.

Instinctively the name of Clive came uppermost to every lip. The Proprietors were summoned to meet in full Court. Panic-stricken, they forced upon Clive the office, not merely of President, but of Governor-General, with very full powers. That their conduct regarding the jagir might not be pleaded by him as an objection to accept office, the Proprietors pa.s.sed a resolution that the proceedings regarding the jagir should be stopped, and that the right of Clive to it should be officially recognized.

This was indeed a triumph. The policy, _reculer pour mieux sauter_, had been eminently justified. {147}But Clive was as generous in victory as he had been great in defeat. He declined to profit by the enthusiasm of the Proprietors. Declaring that he had a proposal to make regarding the jagir, which he was confident the Court would accept, he proceeded to declare that it would be impossible for him to proceed to India leaving behind him a hostile Court and a hostile chairman; that at least the existing chairman must be changed. He carried the Proprietors with him, and measures were taken for a fresh election.

This election took place on the 25th of April, 1764. At it one-half of the candidates proposed by Sulivan were defeated, he himself being returned by a majority of one only. The chairman and deputy-chairman elected were both supporters of Clive. In the interval (March, 1764) Clive had been nominated Governor-General and Commander-in-chief of Bengal. To draw the fangs of the Council in Calcutta, four gentlemen were nominated to form with him a Select Committee authorized to act on their own authority, without reference to the Council.

One word, before the great man returns to the scenes of his triumphs, clothed with the fullest authority, regarding the instrument used by Mr. Sulivan and his friends to torture him. No sooner had the new Court been elected than Clive made to it his suggestion regarding the jagir. He proposed, and the Court agreed, that for a period of ten years, the company should pay to him the full amount of the jagir rents, unless he should die before, when the {148}payments would cease; the ultimate disposal of the jagir to be made when the occasion should arise.

These matters having been settled, the officers to serve under him having been selected by himself, Clive, attended by two of the four members who had been appointed by the Court to accompany him, Messrs.

Sumner and Sykes, embarked for Calcutta the 4th of June, 1764. Lady Clive did not go with him. She had to remain in England to superintend the education of her children.

{149}

CHAPTER XII THE REIGN OF MISRULE IN BENGAL

Clive had chosen Mr. Vansittart to succeed him as President of the Council in Bengal because he believed he had recognized in him a man who would do all in his power to put down the growing system of venality and corruption. I have already shown how he had written to him before he quitted India. The words he had used were: 'The expected reinforcements will, in my opinion, put Bengal out of all danger but that of venality and corruption.' But Clive had not sufficiently considered that the very fact that the new President had been selected from Madras instead of from amongst the men who had served under his immediate orders was likely to cause jealousy among the latter; that Vansittart, notwithstanding his estimated lofty moral nature,[1] had no strength of character; {150}no such persuasive powers as could win men to his side; no pre-eminent abilities; no force of will, such as Clive himself would have displayed, to dominate or, in case of great emergency, to suspend a refractory colleague. He was but one of the herd, well-meaning, opposed in principle to the venality and corruption then in vogue, but, in every sense of the term, ordinary. Even with respect to the two vices he denounced, he was an untried and untempted man.