The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence Part 11

[Footnote 100: Hood himself.]

[Footnote 101: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 32. Navy Records Society. My italics. Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line of battle being kept flying continuously until 5.30 P.M., upon which there is a direct contradiction between Hood and the log of the _London_, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas White, who was present in the action in one of the rear s.h.i.+ps. "If the _London's_ log, or the log of any other individual s.h.i.+p in the fleet, confirm this statement," (that Hood was dilatory in obeying the order for close action), "I shall be induced to fancy that what I that day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what I believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an _ignis fatuus_ conjured up to mock me." White and Hood also agree that the signal for the line was rehoisted at 6.30. (White: "Naval Researches," London, 1830, p. 45.)]

[Footnote 102: "Letters of Lord Hood." Navy Records Society, p. 35.]

CHAPTER XI

NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK

In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar. The British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea forces of France and Spain in the waters of Europe; and the Dutch navy also was now hostile. The French government represented to its allies that by concentrating their squadrons near the entrance of the Channel they would control the situation in every point of view; but the Spaniards, intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their fleet from Cadiz until late in the summer, while the French persisted in keeping their own at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively superior to the latter, and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers only.

No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it in February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became pressing. For this purpose, twenty-eight s.h.i.+ps of the line, under Vice-Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th of March, 1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallers joined, and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied by five s.h.i.+ps of the line which were destined for the East Indies, as well as by the West India and American "trade." These several attachments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of April the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel, on the African coast.

No attempt to intercept it was made by the great Spanish fleet in Cadiz; and on the 12th of April, at noon, the convoy anch.o.r.ed in the Bay of Gibraltar. That night thirteen sail of the transports, under charge of two frigates, slipped out and made their way to Minorca, then a British possession. The British s.h.i.+ps of war continued under way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.

As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous cannonade, which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the stores.

More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially built for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one 26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the batteries of s.h.i.+ps of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails, these little vessels could choose their distance in light airs and calms, and were used so actively to hara.s.s the transports at anchor that Darby was obliged to cover them with three s.h.i.+ps of the line. These proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while the latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not hinder the unlading nor even greatly delay it. The experience ill.u.s.trates again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by petty means, or that ma.s.sed force, force concentrated, can be effectually counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by the cooperative exertions of many small independent units. "They were only capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were they from preventing the succours from being thrown into the garrison, or from burning the convoy, that the only damage of any consequence that they did to the s.h.i.+pping was the wounding of the mizzen-mast of the _Nonsuch_ so much that it required to be s.h.i.+fted."[103] On the 19th of April--in one week--the revictualling was completed, and the expedition started back for England. The fleet anch.o.r.ed again at Spithead on the 22d of May.

While Darby was returning, La Motte Picquet had gone to sea from Brest with six s.h.i.+ps of the line and some frigates to cruise in the approaches to the Channel. There, on the 2d of May, he fell in with the convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of St.

Eustatius. The s.h.i.+ps of war for the most part escaped, but La Motte Picquet carried twenty-two out of thirty merchant s.h.i.+ps into Brest before he could be intercepted, although a detachment of eight sail sent by Darby got close upon his heels.

After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of August, to cover the approach of the large convoys then expected to arrive.

Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further than the Lizard, when news was brought him that the Franco-Spanish grand fleet, of forty-nine s.h.i.+ps of the line, was cruising near the Scilly Isles.

Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into Tor Bay on the 24th of August, and moored his squadron across the entrance to the Bay.

This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the British authorities, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of the Channel made in 1779. Spain, mortified justly by her failure even to molest the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought to retrieve her honour by an attack upon Minorca, for which she asked the cooperation of France. De Guichen was sent in July with nineteen s.h.i.+ps of the line; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of the Spanish admiral, Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into the Mediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Returning thence into the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the Channel, keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But though thus successful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made no attempt to profit by the advantage gained. The question of attacking Darby at his anchors was discussed in a council of war, at which de Guichen strongly advocated the measure; but a majority of votes decided that Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her fleet than by intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the latter purpose, however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of September he informed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return to Brest; and he himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine s.h.i.+ps, nine of which were French. "This cruise of the combined fleet," says Chevalier, "diminished the consideration of France and Spain. These two powers had made a great display of force, without producing the slightest result." It may be mentioned here that Minorca, after a six months'

siege, capitulated in February, 1782.

While Darby was beating down Channel in the early days of August, 1781, Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker, lately Rodney's second in command in the West Indies, was returning to England convoying a large merchant fleet from the Baltic. On the 5th of August, at daylight, a Dutch squadron, also with a convoy, but outward bound, from the Texel to the Baltic, was discovered in the south-west, near the Doggersbank.

Heading as the two enemies then were, their courses must shortly intersect. Parker, therefore, ordered his convoy to steer to the westward for England, while he himself bore down for the enemy. The Dutch Rear-Admiral, Johan Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept the merchant vessels with him, under his lee, but drew out the s.h.i.+ps of war from among them, to form his order on the side towards the enemy.

Each opponent put seven sail into the line. The British vessels, besides being of different rates, were chiefly very old s.h.i.+ps, dragged out from Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by the greatly superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain.

Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries had been lightened, to the detriment of their fighting power. Two of them, however, were good and new seventy-fours. It is probable that the Dutch vessels, after a long peace, were not much better than their antagonists. In fact, each squadron was a scratch lot, in the worst sense of the phrase. The conduct of the affair by the two admirals, even to the very intensity of their pugnaciousness, contributes a tinge of the comic to the history of a desperately fought action. The breeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The Dutch, being to leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port tack, heading south-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails and foresails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt that an adversary who thus holds his ground means to make a stand-up fight, but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day had scarcely risen, thought advisable to order a general chase. Of course, no s.h.i.+p spared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had to set their studdingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails took the men off from the preparations for battle. Parker, who doubtless was still sore over Rodney's censure of the year before, and who moreover had incurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesitation to attack the enemy's islands while temporarily in command in the West Indies, was determined now to show the fight that was in him. "It is related that, upon being informed of the force of the Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches), 'It matters little what their force is; we must fight them if they are double the number.'" At 6.10 A.M. the signal was made for line abreast, the s.h.i.+ps running down nearly before the wind. This of course introduced more regularity, the leading s.h.i.+ps taking in their lighter sails to permit the others to reach their places; but the pace still was rapid. At 6.45 the order was closed to one cable, and at 7.56 the signal for battle was hoisted. It is said that at that moment the 80-gun s.h.i.+p was still securing a studding-sail-boom, which indicates how closely action trod on the heels of preparation.

The Dutch admiral was as deliberate as Parker was headlong. An English witness writes:--

"They appeared to be in great order; and their hammocks, quarter-cloths, etc., were spread in as nice order as if for show in harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be remembered by every man in our line; for, as if certain of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon their broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at the _Fort.i.tude's_ masthead, and her shot finding their way into his s.h.i.+p. This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not be warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had it in his power to have done infinite mischief to our fleet, coming down in that unofficer-like manner. Having suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly waited till the signal was hoisted on board the _Fort.i.tude_, and at the same time we saw the signal going up on board Admiral Zutman's s.h.i.+p."

The British, thus unmolested, rounded-to just to windward of the enemy. A pilot who was on board their leading s.h.i.+p was for some reason told to a.s.sist in laying her close to her opponent. "By close," he asked, "do you mean about a s.h.i.+p's breadth?" "Not a gun was fired on either side," says the official British report, "until within the distance of half musket-shot." Parker, whom an on-looker describes as full of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine character, which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of tradition for flags.h.i.+p to seek flags.h.i.+p, just as it was to signal a general chase, and to bear down together, each s.h.i.+p for its opposite, well extended with the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in the centre of his line, the fourth s.h.i.+p; but Zoutman was for some reason in the fifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's fifth. In consequence, the rear British s.h.i.+p overlapped the enemy, and for a time had no opponent; while the second and third found themselves engaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 A.M. the signal for the line was hauled down, and that for close action hoisted,--thus avoiding a mistake often made.

All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and the action continued with varying phases till 11.35 A.M. The leading two s.h.i.+ps in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, the British two having to tack to regain their places to windward. Towards the middle of the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away, back to the Texel, as the British had steered for England before it began; the difference being that the voyage was abandoned by the Dutch and completed by the British. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and pa.s.sed with the flags.h.i.+p between the enemy and the _Buffalo_, his next ahead and third in the British order; the three rear s.h.i.+ps following close in his wake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had been rehoisted at 10.43.[104] A heavy cannonade attended this evolution, the Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, the British fleet wore and the action ceased. "I made an effort to form the line, in order to renew the action," wrote Parker in his report, "but found it impracticable. The enemy appeared to be in as bad a condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other, when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away for the Texel. We were not in a condition to follow them."

This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a most unsatisfactory battle; magnificent, but not war. The completion of their voyage by the British merchant s.h.i.+ps, while the Dutch were obliged to return to the port which they had just left, may be considered to award success, and therefore the essentials of victory, to Parker's fleet. With this exception the _status quo_ remained much as before, although one of the Dutch s.h.i.+ps sank next day; yet the British loss, 104 killed and 339 wounded, was nearly as great as in Keppel's action, where thirty s.h.i.+ps fought on each side, or in Rodney's of April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail; greater than with Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in proportion, fully equal to the sanguinary conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in the East Indies. The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded.

Both sides aimed at the hull, as is shown by the injuries; for though much harm was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The _Buffalo_, a small s.h.i.+p, had 39 shot through and through her, and a very great number pierced between wind and water; in the British van s.h.i.+p as many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low.

With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is not surprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by an enlightened tactician like Rodney. The Vice-Admiral, however, laid his unsuccess to the indifferent quality of his s.h.i.+ps. George III visited the squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to compliments.

"I wish your Majesty better s.h.i.+ps and younger officers," he said. "For myself, I am now too old for service." No rewards were given, and it is a.s.serted that Parker made no secret that none would be accepted, if offered, at the hands of the then Admiralty. He voiced the protest of the Navy and of the nation against the mal-administration of the peace days, which had left the country unprepared for war. The gallant veteran was ordered soon afterwards to command in the East Indies. He sailed for his station in the _Cato_, which was never heard of again.

Though unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action merits commemoration; for, after all, even where skill does its utmost, staunchness such as his shows the sound const.i.tution of a military body.

[Footnote 103: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs," v. 347.]

[Footnote 104: Sir John Ross, in his "Life of Saumarez," who was lieutenant in the flags.h.i.+p, says that the flags.h.i.+p only pa.s.sed ahead of the _Buffalo_, and that the rear s.h.i.+ps closed upon the latter.

The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circ.u.mstantial statements of another lieutenant of the squadron, in Ekins's "Naval Battles." As Ekins also was present as a mids.h.i.+pman, this gives, as it were, the confirmation of two witnesses.]

CHAPTER XII

THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRa.s.sE.

RODNEY AND DE GRa.s.sE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782

The year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character than most of the events that occurred in European waters during its course; one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition, again to the West Indies. The French government had felt throughout the summer the necessity of sending de Gra.s.se reinforcements both of s.h.i.+ps and of supplies, but the transports and material of war needed could not be collected before December. As the British probably would attempt to intercept a convoy upon which the next campaign so much depended, Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to accompany it clear of the Bay of Biscay, with twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line, and then to go to Cadiz.

Five s.h.i.+ps of the line destined to de Gra.s.se, and two going to the East Indies, raised to nineteen the total force with which de Guichen left Brest on the 10th of December. On the afternoon of the 12th, the French being then one hundred and fifty miles to the southward and westward of Ushant, with a south-east wind, the weather, which had been thick and squally, suddenly cleared and showed sails to windward.

These were twelve s.h.i.+ps of the line, one 50, and some frigates, under Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, who had left England on the 2d of the month, to cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers were amply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordinarily a careful officer, had allowed his s.h.i.+ps of war to be to leeward and ahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in every direction, as the British swooped down upon them, but all could not escape; and the French s.h.i.+ps of war remained helpless spectators, while the victims were hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on, some prizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen, laden with military and naval stores of great money value and greater military importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed and shattered the remainder of the French body. Two s.h.i.+ps of the line only, the _Triomphant_, 84, and _Brave_, 74, and five transports, could pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back to Brest. This event may be considered as opening the naval campaign of 1782 in the West Indies.

Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to Hood in the West Indies the fires.h.i.+p _Tisiphone_, 8, Commander James Saumarez,[105]--afterwards the distinguished admiral,--with news of the French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joined Hood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Ba.s.se Terre Roads, on the lee side of St. Kitts; a position from which Hood had dislodged de Gra.s.se six days before by a brilliant manoeuvre, resembling that which he had contemplated[106] as open to Graves the previous September at Chesapeake Bay for the relief of Cornwallis. The campaign for the year 1782 had opened already with an attack upon St. Kitts by the French army and navy; and the French fleet was even then cruising close at hand to leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis.

The original intention of de Gra.s.se and de Bouille had been to capture Barbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still remaining to the British; but the heavy trade-winds, which in those days made a winter pa.s.sage to windward so long and dreary a beat, twice drove them back to port. "The whole French fleet," wrote Hood, "appeared off Santa Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavouring to get to windward, and having carried away many topmasts and yards in struggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort Royal Bay on the 23d, and on the 28th came out again with forty transports, manoeuvring as before." On the 2d of January it disappeared from Santa Lucia, and, after a short stay again at Martinique, proceeded on the 5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Ba.s.se Terre Roads on the 11th. The British garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a fortified position at the north-west of the island, while the inhabitants surrendered the government to the French, pledging themselves to neutrality. The adjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same terms on the 20th.

On the 14th of January, an express sent by General s.h.i.+rley, governor of St. Kitts, had informed Hood at Barbados that a great fleet approaching had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. Hood at once put to sea, though short of bread and flour, which could not be had, and with the material of his s.h.i.+ps in wretched condition.

"When the _President_[107] joins," he wrote the Admiralty, "I shall be twenty-two strong, with which I beg you will a.s.sure their Lords.h.i.+ps I will seek and give battle to the Count de Gra.s.se, be his numbers as they may." On the way a s.h.i.+p reached him with word that the French fleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st he anch.o.r.ed at Antigua for repairs and supplies, indispensable for keeping the sea in the operations which he contemplated, the duration of which could not be foreseen. About a thousand troops also were embarked, which, with the marines that could be spared from the squadron, would give a landing force of twenty-four hundred men.

St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubtless now got accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and could form a definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been carefully imparted to all his captains, as was the practice of Nelson, who was the pupil of Hood, if of any one. "At 9.15 A.M. the Admiral made the signal for all flag-officers," says the log of the _Canada_; "and at 4 P.M. the Admirals and Commodore made the signals for all captains of their divisions." At 5 P.M. of the same day, January 23d, the fleet weighed and stood over for Nevis, round the southern point of which Ba.s.se Terre must be approached; for, the channel between Nevis and St.

Kitts being impracticable for s.h.i.+ps of the line, the two islands were virtually one, and, their common axis lying north-west and south-east, the trade-wind is fair only when coming from the south.

Ba.s.se Terre, where de Gra.s.se then was, is about fifteen miles from the south point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the French fleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were anch.o.r.ed without attention to order, three or four deep; the eastern s.h.i.+ps so placed that an enemy coming from the southward could reach them with the prevailing trade-wind, against which the western s.h.i.+ps could not beat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are told that Hood, starting shortly before sunset with a fair, and probably fresh wind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come upon the French by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather s.h.i.+ps, and from them to sail along the hostile order so far as might seem expedient. His column, thus pa.s.sing in its entirety close to a certain exposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail by the concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the southward, would haul their wind, tack, and again stand up to the a.s.sault, if the enemy continued to await it.

This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted by a collision, during the night, between a frigate, the _Nymphe_, 36, and the leading s.h.i.+p of the line, the _Alfred_, 74. The repairs to the latter delayed the fleet, the approach of which was discovered by daylight. De Gra.s.se therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood's purpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover the position of the enemy now was between him and four s.h.i.+ps of the line momentarily expected from Martinique, one of which joined him on the same day. The French were all under way by sunset, standing to the southward under easy sail, towards the British, who had rounded the south point of Nevis at 1 P.M. Towards dark, Hood went about and stood also to the southward, seemingly in retreat.

During the following night the British tacked several times, to keep their position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the two fleets were to the westward of Nevis; the British near the island, the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in his first spring by an unexpected accident, Hood had not relinquished his enterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by the French, so establis.h.i.+ng himself there,--as he had proposed to Graves to do in the Chesapeake,--that he could not be dislodged. For such a defensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The anchorage was a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to very deep water; and it was possible so to place the s.h.i.+ps that the enemy could not easily anchor near them.

At 5.30 A.M. of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of battle on the starboard tack, at one cable interval.[108] It is mentioned in the log of the _Canada_, 74, Captain Cornwallis, that that s.h.i.+p brought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7 o'clock. By 10 o'clock the line was formed, and the s.h.i.+ps hove-to in it. At 10.45 the signal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van s.h.i.+ps to carry the same sail as the Admiral,--topsails and foresails,--followed, just before noon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with springs on the cables.

The French, who were steering south, on the port tack, while the British were hove-to, went about as soon as the latter filled, and stood towards them in bow and quarter line.[109]

[Ill.u.s.tration]

At noon the British fleet was running along close under the high land of Nevis; so close that the _Solebay_, 28, one of the frigates insh.o.r.e of the line, grounded and was wrecked. No signals were needed, except to correct irregularities in the order, for the captains knew what they were to do. The French were approaching steadily, but inevitably dropping astern with reference to the point of the enemy's line for which they were heading. At 2 P.M. de Gra.s.se's flags.h.i.+p, the _Ville de Paris_, fired several shot at the British rear, which alone she could reach, while his left wing was nearing the _Barfleur_, Hood's flags.h.i.+p, and the vessels astern of her, the centre of the column, which opened their fire at 2.30. Hood, trusting to his captains, disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flew for the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3.30 P.M. the leading s.h.i.+ps began to anchor in line ahead, (Fig. 1, a), covered as they did so by the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre (b).

Upon the latter the French were now keeping up a smart fire. Between the _Canada_ and her next astern, the _Prudent_, 64,--which was a dull sailer,--there was a considerable interval. Towards it the French admiral pressed, aiming to cut off the three rear vessels; but Cornwallis threw everything aback and closed down upon his consort,--a stirring deed in which he was imitated by the _Resolution_ and _Bedford_, 74's, immediately ahead of him. De Gra.s.se was thus foiled, but so narrowly, that an officer, looking from one of the s.h.i.+ps which had anch.o.r.ed, a.s.serted that for a moment he could perceive the _Ville de Paris's_ jib inside the British line. As the rear of the latter pushed on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anch.o.r.ed van and centre, (Fig. 2, a), and these opened upon the enemy, a great part of whom were strung out behind the British column, without opponents as yet, but hastening up to get their share of the action.

Hood's flags.h.i.+p, (f), which anch.o.r.ed at 4.03, opened fire again at 4.40 P.M. Thus, as the _Canada_ and her few companions, who bore the brunt of the day, were shortening sail and rounding-to, (b), still under a hot cannonade, the batteries of their predecessors were ringing out their welcome, and at the same time covering their movements by giving the enemy much else to think about. The _Canada_, fetching up near the tail of the column and letting go in a hurry, ran out two cables on end, and found upon sounding that she had dropped her anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms of water. The French column stood on, off soundings, though close to, firing as it pa.s.sed, and then, wearing to the southward in succession, stood out of action on the port tack, (c), its ineffectual broadsides adding to the grandeur and excitement of the scene, and swelling the glory of Hood's successful daring, of which it is difficult to speak too highly. Lord Robert Manners, the captain of the _Resolution_, which was fifth s.h.i.+p from the British rear, writing a week later, pa.s.sed upon this achievement a verdict, which posterity will confirm. "The taking possession of this road was well judged, well conducted, and well executed, though indeed the French had an opportunity--which they missed--of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van and centre divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear, which was engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then the centre, being at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while we anch.o.r.ed (Fig. 2), making, I think, the most masterly manoeuvre I ever saw." Whether regard be had to the thoughtful preparation, the crafty management of the fleet antecedent to the final push, the calculated audacity of the latter, or the firm and sagacious tactical handling from the first moment to the last, Nelson himself never did a more brilliant deed than this of Hood's.[110] All firing ceased at 5.30.

Naturally, an order taken up under such conditions needed some rectifying before further battle. As the proper stationing of the fleet depended in great measure upon the position of the van s.h.i.+p, Hood had put a local pilot on board her; but when the action ceased, he found that she was not as close to the sh.o.r.e as he had intended.

The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owing to the circ.u.mstances attending its anchorage. Three s.h.i.+ps from the rear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van, closing the interval, while others s.h.i.+fted their berths, according to specific directions. The order as finally a.s.sumed (Fig. 3) was as follows. The van s.h.i.+p was anch.o.r.ed so close to the sh.o.r.e that it was impossible to pa.s.s within her, or, with the prevailing wind, even to reach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position. From her the line extended in a west-north-west direction to the fifteenth s.h.i.+p,--the _Barfleur_, 98, Hood's flags.h.i.+p,--when it turned to north, the last six s.h.i.+ps being on a north and south line.

These six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented a column pa.s.sing from south to north, the only way one could pa.s.s, from enfilading the main line with impunity. The latter covered with its guns the approach from the south. All the s.h.i.+ps had springs on their cables, enabling them to turn their sides so as to cover a large arc of a circle with their batteries.