The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence Part 7

In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had become much more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same moment that d'Estaing with twenty-five s.h.i.+ps of the line had confronted Byron's twenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen gathering against it a host of sixty-six. Of this great number thirty-six were Spanish.

The open declaration of Spain had been preceded by a secret alliance with France, signed on the 12th of April. Fearing that the British government would take betimes the reasonable and proper step of blockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty, thus a.s.suming a central position with reference to its enemies and antic.i.p.ating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the French Ministry hurried its s.h.i.+ps to sea on the 4th of June; Admiral d'Orvilliers, Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise near the island of Cizarga, off the north-west coast of Spain, where the Spaniards were to join him. On the 11th of June he was at the rendezvous, but not till the 23d of July did the bulk of the Spanish force appear. During this time, the French, insufficiently equipped from the first, owing to the haste of their departure, were consuming provisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleasant summer weather.

Their s.h.i.+ps also were ravaged by an epidemic fever. Upon the junction, d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had not been furnished with the French system of signals, although by the treaty the French admiral was to be in chief command. The rectification of this oversight caused further delay, but on the 11th of August the combined fleet sighted Ushant, and on the 14th was off the Lizard. On the 16th it appeared before Plymouth, and there on the 17th captured the British 64-gun s.h.i.+p _Ardent_.

Thirty-five s.h.i.+ps of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the 16th of June, and now were cruising outside, under the command of Admiral Sir Charles Hardy. His station was from ten to twenty leagues south-west of Scilly; consequently he had not been seen by the enemy, who from Ushant had stood up the Channel. The allies, now nearly double the numbers of the British, were between them and their ports,--a serious situation doubtless, but by no means desperate; not so dangerous for sailing s.h.i.+ps as it probably will be for steamers to have an enemy between them and their coal.

The alarm in England was very great, especially in the south. On the 9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses and cattle to be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. Booms had been placed across the entrance to Plymouth Harbor, and orders were sent from the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harbour's mouth. Many who had the means withdrew into the interior, which increased the panic. Great merchant fleets were then on the sea, homeward bound.

If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the approaches to the Channel, instead of to the Spanish coast, these might be taken; and for some time his whereabouts were unknown. As it was, the Jamaica convoy, over two hundred sail, got in a few days before the allies appeared, and the Leeward Islands fleet had similar good fortune. Eight homeward bound East Indiamen were less lucky, but, being warned of their danger, took refuge in the Shannon, and there remained till the trouble blew over. On the other hand, the stock market stood firm.

Nevertheless, it was justly felt that such a state of things as a vastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel should not have been. Sir John Jervis, afterward Earl St. Vincent, who commanded a s.h.i.+p in the fleet, wrote to his sister: "What a humiliating state is our country reduced to!" but he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion.

The French had placed a force of fifty thousand men at Le Havre and St. Malo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport.

Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpired to cause reasonable anxiety; and the crisis, on its face, was very serious. Not their own preparations, but the inefficiency of their enemies, in counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islands from invasion. What the results of this would have been is another question,--a question of land warfare. The original scheme of the French Ministry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead as an anchorage for the fleet, and to prosecute their enterprise from this near and reasonably secure base. Referring to this first project, d'Orvilliers wrote: "We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's,[70] and then, if I find that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master of it, I will send word to Marshal De Vaux, at Le Havre, and inform him of the measures I will take to insure his pa.s.sage, which [measures]

will depend upon the position of the English main fleet [dependront des forces superieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself will lead the combined fleet on that side [against their main body], to contain the enemy, and I will send, on the other side [to convoy], a light squadron, with a sufficient number of s.h.i.+ps of the line and frigates; or I will propose to M. de Cordova to take this latter station, in order that the pa.s.sage of the army may be free and sure.

I a.s.sume that then, either by the engagement I shall have fought with the enemy, _or by their retreat into their ports_, I shall be certain of their situation and of the success of the operation."[71] It will be observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted then and now one of the best officers of his day in the French navy, takes here into full account the British "fleet in being." The main body of the allies, fifty s.h.i.+ps, was to hold this in check, while a smaller force--Cordova had command of a special "squadron of observation," of sixteen s.h.i.+ps of the line--was to convoy the crossing.

These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August, before Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, but the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing.

The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage,--a resource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vessels aiming to remain in a position. As a point to begin sh.o.r.e operations, too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the country to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly represented all this, but could not stay where he was long enough to get a reply. An easterly gale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the allies out of the Channel. On the 25th of August word was received that the British fleet was near Scilly. A council of war was then held, which decided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in the s.h.i.+pping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not to reenter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle.

This was done. On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his return up Channel. With the disparity of force he could not but decline action, and the allies were unable to compel it. On the 3d of September he reached Spithead. D'Orvilliers soon afterwards received orders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anch.o.r.ed there.

The criticism to be pa.s.sed on the conduct of this summer campaign by the British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was not ready according to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognised in the probable coperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to Great Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had been foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore, it was essential to prevent a junction,--to take an interior position. The Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed.

After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contention of the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked, off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they waited there, they were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here must be made, however, for the inability of a representative government to disregard popular outcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports. This, indeed, does but magnify the error made in not watching Brest betimes; for in such case a fleet before Brest covered also the Channel.

With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one point,--the desirability of injuring Great Britain. Each had its own special aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduced divergence of effort; but, France having first embarked alone in the contest and then sought the aid of Spain, the particular objects of her ally naturally obtained from the beginning a certain precedence.

Until near the close of the war, it may be said that the chief ambitions of France were in the West Indies; those of Spain, in Europe,--to regain Minorca and Gibraltar.

In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, and affected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout the world, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preserving it. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalled her vessels from Brest. "The project of a descent upon England was abandoned provisionally. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in America and Asia force sufficient to hold the British in check, and to take the offensive in the West Indies,--such," wrote the French government to its amba.s.sador in Madrid, "was the plan of campaign adopted for 1780."

Immediately upon the declaration of war, intercourse between Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland was stopped. Soon afterwards a blockade by sea was inst.i.tuted; fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entrance of the Bay, where they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels, neutral or British, bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectively supported from Cadiz, but a Spanish force of some s.h.i.+ps of the line and many small vessels also maintained it more directly from Algeciras, on the Spanish side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The British Mediterranean squadron, then consisting only of one 60-gun s.h.i.+p, three frigates, and a sloop, was wholly unable to afford relief. At the close of the year 1779, flour in Gibraltar was fourteen guineas the barrel, and other provisions in proportion. It became therefore imminently necessary to throw in supplies of all kinds, as well as to reinforce the garrison. To this service Rodney was a.s.signed; and with it he began the brilliant career, the chief scene of which was to be in the West Indies.

Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station on the 1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there immediately by only four or five s.h.i.+ps of the line; but advantage was taken of his sailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his approved reputation a great force, composed of his small division and a large fraction of the Channel fleet, to convey supplies and reinforcements to Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December the whole body, after many delays in getting down Channel, put to sea from Plymouth: twenty-two s.h.i.+ps of the line, fourteen frigates and smaller vessels, besides a huge collection of stores.h.i.+ps, victuallers, ordnance vessels, troop-s.h.i.+ps, and merchantmen,--the last named being the "trade" for the West Indies and Portugal.

On the 7th of January, 1780, a hundred leagues west of Cape Finisterre, the West India s.h.i.+ps parted for their destination, under convoy of a s.h.i.+p of the line and three frigates. At daylight on the 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to the north-east, the squadron apparently having pa.s.sed them in the night. Chase was at once given, and the whole were taken in a few hours. Seven were s.h.i.+ps of war, one 64 and six frigates; the remainder merchant vessels, laden with naval stores and provisions for the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The provision s.h.i.+ps, twelve in number, were diverted at once to the relief of Gibraltar, under charge of the Spanish sixty-four, which had been one of their convoy before capture, and was now manned by a British crew.

Continuing on, intelligence was received from time to time by pa.s.sing vessels that a Spanish squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent.

Thus forewarned, orders were given to all captains to be prepared for battle as the Cape was neared. On the 16th it was pa.s.sed, and at 1 P.M. sails in the south-east were signalled. These were a Spanish squadron of eleven s.h.i.+ps of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodney at once bore down for them under a press of canvas, making signal for the line abreast.[72] Seeing, however, that the enemy was trying to form line of battle ahead on the starboard tack, which with a westerly wind was with heads to the southward, towards Cadiz, a hundred miles to the south-east, he changed the orders to a "General Chase," the s.h.i.+ps to engage as they came up; "to leeward," so as to get between the enemy and his port, and "in rotation," by which probably was meant that the leading British vessel should attack the sternmost of the Spaniards, and that her followers should pa.s.s her to leeward, successively engaging from the enemy's rear towards the van.

At 4 P.M. the signal for battle was made, and a few minutes later the four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4.40 one of the Spanish s.h.i.+ps, the _Santo Domingo_, 80, blew up with all on board, and at 6 another struck. By this hour, it being January, darkness had set in. A night action therefore followed, which lasted until 2 A.M., when the headmost of the enemy surrendered, and all firing ceased. Of the eleven hostile s.h.i.+ps of the line, only four escaped. Besides the one blown up, six were taken. These were the _Fenix_, 80, flag of the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, the _Monarca_, 70, the _Princesa_, 70, the _Diligente_, 70, the _San Julian_, 70, and the _San Eugenio_, 70. The two latter drove ash.o.r.e and were lost.[73] The remaining four were brought into Gibraltar, and were ultimately added to the Navy. All retained their old names, save the _Fenix_, which was renamed _Gibraltar_. "The weather during the night," by Rodney's report, "was at times very tempestuous, with a great sea. It continued very bad weather the next day, when the _Royal George_, 100, _Prince George_, 90, _Sandwich_, 90 (Rodney's flags.h.i.+p), and several other s.h.i.+ps were in great danger, and under the necessity of making sail to avoid the shoals of San Lucar, nor did they get into deep water till the next morning."

It was in this danger from a lee sh.o.r.e, which was deliberately though promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of Rodney's consists. The enemy's squadron, being only eleven s.h.i.+ps of the line, was but half the force of the British, and it was taken by surprise; which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-s.h.i.+ps in war-time.

Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too late. It was Rodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions of weather and navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve their mistake.

His action left nothing to be desired in resolution or readiness. It is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his flag-captain, Walter Young, and that rumor attributed the merit of the decision to the latter; but this sort of detraction is of too common occurrence to affect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet, gives the following account: "When it was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should be continued. After some discussion between the Admiral and Captain, at which I was present, the Admiral being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same course, with the signal to engage to leeward." Rodney at that time was nearly sixty-two, and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and hands.

The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal character to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely in need of some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies from home was itself a matter of rejoicing; but it was more inspiriting still to see following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile s.h.i.+ps of the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-Chief, and to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or destroyed.

The exultation in England was even greater, and especially at the Admiralty, which was labouring under the just indignation of the people for the unpreparedness of the Navy. "You have taken more line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps," wrote the First Lord to Rodney, "than had been captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars."

It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that this advantage over an exposed detachment had been s.n.a.t.c.hed, as it were, in the teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney's own; for twenty Spanish and four French s.h.i.+ps of the line, under Admiral de Cordova, were lying then in Cadiz Bay. During the eighteen days when the British remained in and near the Straits, no attempt was made by Cordova to take revenge for the disaster, or to reap the benefit of superior force. The inaction was due, probably, to the poor condition of the Spanish s.h.i.+ps in point of efficiency and equipment, and largely to their having uncoppered bottoms. This element of inferiority in the Spanish navy should be kept in mind as a factor in the general war, although Spanish fleets did not come much into battle. A French Commodore, then with the Spanish fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows: "Their s.h.i.+ps all sail so badly that they can neither overtake an enemy nor escape from one. The _Glorieux_ is a bad sailer in the French navy, but better than the best among the Spaniards." He adds: "The vessels of Langara's squadron were surprised at immense distances one from the other. Thus they always sail, and their negligence and security on this point are incredible."

On approaching Gibraltar, the continuance of bad weather, and the strong easterly current of the Straits, set many of Rodney's s.h.i.+ps and convoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was not till the 26th that the flags.h.i.+p herself anch.o.r.ed. The stores.h.i.+ps for Minorca were sent on at once, under charge of three coppered s.h.i.+ps of the line. The practice of coppering, though then fully adopted, had not yet been extended to all vessels. As an element of speed, it was an important factor on an occasion like this, when time pressed to get to the West Indies; as it also was in an engagement. The action on the 16th had been opened by the coppered s.h.i.+ps of the line, which first overtook the retreating enemy and brought his rear to battle. In the French navy at the time, Suffren was urging the adoption upon an apparently reluctant Minister. It would seem to have been more general among the British, going far to compensate for the otherwise inferior qualities of their s.h.i.+ps. "The Spanish men-of-war we have taken,"

wrote Rodney to his wife concerning these prizes, "are much superior to ours." It may be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, said the same of the Spanish vessels which came under his observation. "I never saw finer s.h.i.+ps." "I perceive you cry out loudly for coppered s.h.i.+ps," wrote the First Lord to Rodney after this action; "and I am therefore determined to stop your mouth. You shall have copper enough."

Upon the return of the Minorca s.h.i.+ps, Rodney put to sea again on the 13th of February, for the West Indies. The detachment from the Channel fleet accompanied him three days' sail on his way, and then parted for England with the prizes. On this return voyage it fell in with fifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two 64's, bound for the Ile de France,[74] in the Indian Ocean. One of the s.h.i.+ps of war, the _Protee_, and three of the stores.h.i.+ps were taken. Though trivial, the incident ill.u.s.trates the effect of operations in Europe upon war in India. It may be mentioned here as indicative of the government's dilemmas, that Rodney was censured for having left one s.h.i.+p of the line at the Rock. "It has given us the trouble _and risk_ of sending a frigate on purpose to order her home immediately; and if you will look into your original instructions, you will find that there was no point more strongly guarded against than that of your leaving any line-of-battle s.h.i.+p behind you." These words clearly show the exigency and peril of the general situation, owing to the inadequate development of the naval force as compared with its foes. Such isolated s.h.i.+ps ran the gantlet of the fleets in Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest flanking the routes.

[Footnote 70: An anchorage three miles to seaward of Spithead.]

[Footnote 71: Chevalier, "Marine Francaise," 1778, p. 165. Author's italics.]

[Footnote 72: In line "abreast," as the word indicates, the s.h.i.+ps are not in each other's wake, as in line "ahead," but abreast; that is, ranged on a line perpendicular to the course steered.]

[Footnote 73: Rodney's Report. Chevalier says that one of them was retaken by her crew and carried into Cadiz.]

[Footnote 74: Now the British Mauritius.]

CHAPTER VIII

RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN RETURNS TO EUROPE, AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS TO WEST INDIES

When Rodney arrived at Santa Lucia with his four s.h.i.+ps of the line, on March 27, 1780, he found there a force of sixteen others, composed in about equal proportions of s.h.i.+ps that had left England with Byron in the summer of 1778, and of a reinforcement brought by Rear-Admiral Rowley in the spring of 1779.

During the temporary command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker, between the departure of Byron and the arrival of Rodney, a smart affair had taken place between a detachment of the squadron and one from the French division, under La Motte-Picquet, then lying in Fort Royal, Martinique.

On the 18th of December, 1779, between 8 and 9 A.M., the British look-out s.h.i.+p, the _Preston_, 50, between Martinique and Santa Lucia made signal for a fleet to windward, which proved to be a body of French supply s.h.i.+ps, twenty-six in number, under convoy of a frigate.

Both the British and the French squadrons were in disarray, sails unbent, s.h.i.+ps on the heel or partially disarmed, crews ash.o.r.e for wood and water. In both, signals flew at once for certain s.h.i.+ps to get under way, and in both the orders were executed with a rapidity gratifying to the two commanders, who also went out in person. The British, however, were outside first, with five sail of the line and a 50-gun s.h.i.+p. Nine of the supply vessels were captured by them, and four forced ash.o.r.e. The French Rear-Admiral had by this time got out of Fort Royal with three s.h.i.+ps of the line,--the _Annibal_, 74, _Vengeur_, 64, and _Reflechi_, 64,--and, being to windward, covered the entrance of the remainder of the convoy. As the two hostile divisions were now near each other, with a fine working breeze, the British tried to beat up to the enemy; the _Conqueror_, 74, Captain Walter Griffith, being ahead and to windward of her consorts. Coming within range at 5, firing began between her and the French flags.h.i.+p, _Annibal_, 74, and subsequently between her and all the three vessels of the enemy. Towards sunset, the _Albion_, 74, had got close up with the _Conqueror_, and the other s.h.i.+ps were within distant range; "but as they had worked not only well within the dangers of the shoals of the bay (Fort Royal), but within reach of the batteries, I called them off by night signal at a quarter before seven."[75] In this chivalrous skirmish,--for it was little more, although the injury to the French in the loss of the convoy was notable,--Parker was equally delighted with his own squadron and with his enemy. "The steadiness and coolness with which on every tack the _Conqueror_ received the fire of these three s.h.i.+ps, and returned her own, working his s.h.i.+p with as much exactness as if he had been turning into Spithead, and on every board gaining on the enemy, gave me infinite pleasure. It was with inexpressible concern," he added, "that I heard that Captain Walter Griffith, of the _Conqueror_, was killed by the last broadside."[76]

Having occasion, a few days later, to exchange a flag of truce with the French Rear-Admiral, he wrote to him; "The conduct of your Excellency in the affair of the 18th of this month fully justifies the reputation which you enjoy among us, and I a.s.sure you that I could not witness without envy the skill you showed on that occasion. Our enmity is transient, depending upon our masters; but your merit has stamped upon my heart the greatest admiration for yourself." This was the officer who was commonly known in his time as "Vinegar" Parker; but these letters show that the epithet fitted the rind rather than the kernel.

Shortly after de Guichen[77] took command, in March, 1780, he arranged with the Marquis de Bouille, Governor of Martinique, to make a combined attack upon some one of the British West India Islands. For this purpose three thousand troops were embarked in the fleet, which sailed on the night of the 13th of April, 1780, intending first to accompany a convoy for Santo Domingo, until it was safely out of reach of the British. Rodney, who was informed at once of the French departure, put to sea in chase with all his s.h.i.+ps, twenty of the line, two of which were of 90 guns, and on the 16th came in sight of the enemy to leeward (westward) of Martinique, beating up against the north-east trade-winds, and intending to pa.s.s through the channel between that island and Dominica. "A general chase to the north-west followed, and at five in the evening we plainly discovered that they consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, and one 50 gun s.h.i.+p."[78]

As it fell dark Rodney formed his line of battle, standing still to the north-west, therefore on the starboard tack; and he was attentive to keep to windward of the enemy, whom his frigates watched diligently during the night. "Their manoeuvres," he wrote, "indicated a wish to avoid battle," and he therefore was careful to counteract them. At daylight of April 17th, they were seen forming line of battle, on the port tack, four or five leagues to leeward,--that is, to the westward.

The wind being east, or east by north, the French would be heading south-south-east (Fig. 1, aa). The British order now was rectified by signal from the irregularities of darkness, the s.h.i.+ps being directed to keep two cables'[79] lengths apart, and steering as before to the northward and westward. At 7 A.M., considering this line too extended, the Admiral closed the intervals to one cable (aa). The two fleets thus were pa.s.sing on nearly parallel lines, but in opposite directions, which tended to bring the whole force of Rodney, whose line was better and more compact than the enemy's, abreast the latter's rear, upon which he intended to concentrate. At 8 A.M. he made general signal that this was his purpose; and at 8.30, to execute it, he signalled for the s.h.i.+ps to form line abreast, bearing from each other south by east and north by west, and stood down at once upon the enemy (Fig. 1, bb). The object of the British being evident, de Guichen made his fleet wear together to the starboard tack (bb).

The French rear thus became the van, and their former van, which was stretched too far for prompt a.s.sistance to the threatened rear, now headed to support it.

Rodney, baulked in his first spring, hauled at once to the wind on the port tack (Fig. 1, _cc_), again contrary to the French, standing thus once more along their line, for their new rear. The intervals were opened out again to two cables. The fleets thus were pa.s.sing once more on parallel lines, each having reversed its order; but the British still retained the advantage, on whatever course and interval, that they were much more compact than the French, whose line, by Rodney's estimate, extended four leagues in length.[80] The wariness of the two combatants, both trained in the school of the eighteenth century with its reverence for the line of battle, will appear to the careful reader. Rodney, although struggling through this chrysalis stage to the later vigor, and seriously bent on a deadly blow, still was constrained by the traditions of watchful fencing. Nor was his caution extravagant; conditions did not justify yet the apparent recklessness of Nelson's tactics. "The different movements of the enemy," he wrote, "obliged me to be very attentive, and watch every opportunity that offered of attacking them to advantage."

[Ill.u.s.tration]

The two fleets continued to stand on opposite parallel courses--the French north by west, the British south by east--until the flags.h.i.+p _Sandwich_, 90, (Fig. 2, S^1) was abreast the _Couronne_, 80, (C), the flags.h.i.+p of de Guichen. Then, at 10.10 A.M., the signal was made to wear together, forming on the same tack as the enemy. There being some delay in execution, this had to be repeated, and further enforced by the pennant of the _Stirling Castle_, which, as the rear s.h.i.+p, should begin the evolution. At half-past ten, apparently, the fleet was about (Fig. 2, aa), for an order was then given for rectifying the line, still at two cables. At 11 A.M. the Admiral made the signal to prepare for battle, "to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring the enemy to an engagement,"[81] and to this succeeded shortly the order to alter the course to port (bb), towards the enemy.[82] Why he thought that any of the fleet should have required such a.s.surance cannot certainly be said. Possibly, although he had so recently joined, he had already detected the ill-will, or the slackness, of which he afterwards complained; possibly he feared that the wariness of his tactics might lead men to believe that he did not mean to exceed the lukewarm and indecisive action of days scarce yet pa.s.sed away, which had led Suffren to stigmatize tactics as a mere veil, behind which timidity thinks to hide its nakedness.

At 11.50 A.M. the decisive signal was made "for every s.h.i.+p to bear down, and steer for _her opposite in the enemy's line_, agreeable to the 21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Five minutes later, when the s.h.i.+ps, presumably, had altered their course for the enemy, the signal for battle was made, followed by the message that the Admiral's intention was to engage closely; he expecting, naturally, that every s.h.i.+p would follow the example he purposed to set. The captain of the s.h.i.+p which in the formation (aa) had been the leader, upon whose action depended that of those near her, unfortunately understood Rodney's signal to mean that he was to attack the enemy's leader, not the s.h.i.+p opposite to him at the moment of bearing away. This s.h.i.+p, therefore, diverged markedly from the Admiral's course, drawing after her many of the van. A few minutes before 1 P.M., one of the headmost s.h.i.+ps began to engage at long range; but it was not till some time after 1 P.M. that the _Sandwich_, having received several broadsides, came into close action (S^2) with the second vessel astern from the French Admiral, the _Actionnaire_, 64. The latter was soon beat out of the line by the superiority of the _Sandwich's_ battery, and the same lot befell the s.h.i.+p astern of her,--probably the _Intrepide_, 74,--which came up to close the gap.

Towards 2.30 P.M., the _Sandwich_, either by her own efforts to close, or by her immediate opponents' keeping away, was found to be to leeward (S^3) of the enemy's line; the _Couronne_ (C) being on her weather bow. The fact was pointed out by Rodney to the captain of the s.h.i.+p, Walter Young, who was then in the lee gangway. Young, going over to look for himself, saw that it was so, and that the _Yarmouth_, 64, had hauled off to windward, where she lay with her main and mizzen topsails aback. Signals were then made to her, and to the _Cornwall_, 74, to come to closer engagement, they both being on the weather bow of the flags.h.i.+p.

De Guichen, recognising this state of affairs, then or a little later, attributed it to the deliberate purpose of the British Admiral to break his line. It does not appear that Rodney so intended. His tactical idea was to concentrate his whole fleet on the French rear and centre, but there is no indication that he now aimed at breaking the line. De Guichen so construing it, however, gave the signal to wear together, away from the British line. The effect of this, in any event, would have been to carry his fleet somewhat to leeward; but with s.h.i.+ps more or less crippled, taking therefore greater room to manoeuvre, and with the exigency of re-forming the line upon them, the tendency was exaggerated. The movement which the French called wearing together was therefore differently interpreted by Rodney. "The action in the centre continued till 4.15 P.M., when M. de Guichen, in the _Couronne_, the _Triomphant_, and the _Fendant_, after engaging the _Sandwich_ for an hour and a half, bore away. The superiority of fire from the _Sandwich_, and the gallant behavior of the officers and men, enabled her to sustain so unequal a combat; though before attacked by them, she had beat three s.h.i.+ps out of their line of battle, had entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the French Admiral." Possibly the French accounts, if they were not so very meagre, might dispute this prowess of the flags.h.i.+p; but there can be no doubt that Rodney had set an example, which, had it been followed by all, would have made this engagement memorable, if not decisive. He reported that the captains, with very few exceptions, had placed their s.h.i.+ps improperly (cc). The _Sandwich_ had eighty shot in her hull, had lost her foremast and mainyard, and had fired 3288 rounds, an average of 73 to each gun of the broadside engaged. Three of her hits being below the water line, she was kept afloat with difficulty during the next twenty-four hours. With the wearing of the French the battle ceased.

In the advantage offered by the enemy, whose order was too greatly extended, and in his own plan of attack, Rodney always considered this action of April 17th, 1780, to have been the great opportunity of his life; and his wrath was bitter against those by whose misconduct he conceived it had been frustrated. "The French admiral, who appeared to me to be a brave and gallant officer, had the honour to be n.o.bly supported during the whole action. It is with concern inexpressible, mixed with indignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign and my country obliges me to acquaint your Lords.h.i.+ps that during the action between the French fleet, on the 17th inst, and his Majesty's, the British flag was not properly supported." Divided as the Navy was then into factions, with their hands at each other's throats or at the throat of the Admiralty, the latter thought it more discreet to suppress this paragraph, allowing to appear only the negative stigma of the encomium upon the French officers, unaccompanied by any upon his own. Rodney, however, in public and private letters did not conceal his feelings; and the censure found its way to the ears of those concerned. Subsequently, three months after the action, in a public letter, he bore testimony to the excellent conduct of five of the captains, Walter Young, of the flags.h.i.+p, George Bowyer of the _Albion_, John Douglas of the _Terrible_, John Houlton of the _Montagu_, and A.J.P. Molloy[83] of the _Trident_. "To them I have given certificates, under my hand," "free and unsolicited." Beyond these, "no consideration in life would induce" him to go; and the two junior flag-officers were implicitly condemned in the words, "to inattention to signals, both in the van and rear divisions, is to be attributed the loss of that glorious opportunity (perhaps never to be recovered) of terminating the naval contest in these seas." These junior admirals were Hyde Parker and Rowley; the latter the same who had behaved, not only so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative, in Byron's engagement. A singular incident in this case led him to a like independence of action, which displeased Rodney. The _Montagu_, of his division, when closing the French line, wore against the helm, and could only be brought into action on the wrong (port) tack.

Immediately upon this, part of the French rear also wore, and Rowley followed them of his own motion. Being called to account by Rodney, he stated the facts, justifying the act by the order that "the greatest impression was to be made on the enemy's rear." Both parties soon wore back.

Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few weeks later. The certificates to Bowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably to Molloy, all of Parker's division, bore the stinging words that these officers "meant well, and would have done their duty had they been permitted." It is stated that their s.h.i.+ps, which were the rear of the van division, were going down to engage close, following Rodney's example, when Parker made them a signal to keep the line. If this be so, as Parker's courage was beyond all doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old superst.i.tion of the line, aggravated by a misunderstanding of Rodney's later signals.