The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 3

'The Queen wrote to Mr. Gladstone at this time (April 5th) with regard to provision for the child and possible posthumous child of the Duke of Albany, and I wrote to Mr. Gladstone that I could not possibly agree to any provision for them, for which there was no exact precedent, without the Select Committee which I had previously been promised as regarded any new application.'

On April 22nd Mr. Gladstone alluded 'to a letter to the Queen, but he did not read it to us,' and Sir Charles again insisted 'upon inquiry before the proposal of any provision for which there was no direct precedent.'

'At the Cabinet of Monday, April 28th, we found that the Queen was indignant with us for our refusal to make further provision for the d.u.c.h.ess of Albany.... None of the precedents of the century warranted provision for children in infancy. It was agreed that Mr.

Gladstone was to write to the Queen again, but "our negative answer is only applicable to the case where the children are in infancy."

In other words, we did not wish to bind those who might come after us, but the phrase was not to commit us as to what we would do in five years' time.'

CHAPTER x.x.xV

EGYPT

1884

I.

At the close of 1883 the destruction of Hicks's army had made clear to all that the Soudan was, for the time at least, lost to Egypt; and close upon this disaster in the central region had followed defeats on the Red Sea coast. But Egyptian garrisons were holding out at Sinkat, some fifty miles from the port of Suakim, and at Tokar, only twenty miles from the coast. In October, 1883, a small force sent to relieve Sinkat was cut up by the Dervishes under Osman Digna; in November, a larger column of 500, accompanied by the British Consul, was utterly routed in an attempt to reach Tokar. General Baker, with his newly formed gendarmerie, was then ordered to Suakim. He desired to enlist the services of Zebehr Pasha, a famous leader of men, but a former dealer in slaves. To this the British authorities objected, and Zebehr was not sent. Baker went, attempted with 3,500 troops to reach Tokar, and on February 2nd, 1884, lost 2,000 of them near the wells of El Teb. Both Tokar and Sinkat soon after fell into the hands of the Dervishes.

Long before this event, the evacuation of the Soudan had been decreed. A peremptory mandate from the British Government was sent to Cherif Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, who, as he had intimated that he would do, resigned rather than be responsible for giving up so vast a possession.

On January 8th, Nubar took office to carry out the prescribed policy.

But the problem was how to get away the garrisons, and, since England had ordered evacuation, the Egyptian Government looked to England for a.s.sistance.

'On January 16th I noted: "Baring wants to make us send a British officer to conduct the retreat from Khartoum. I have written to Lord Granville to protest." Baring had been pressing for an answer to his suggestion named above. I had all along fought against the "Hicks Expedition," and this seemed a consequence. The Egyptian Government had resigned, and the sole supporter of the abandonment policy among the Egyptians in Egypt was the Khedive himself; but Nubar was sent for, and accepted office (with a number of cyphers) to carry it into effect. On January 10th Lord Granville had telegraphed to Baring, without my knowledge, "Would Gordon or Wilson be of use?" [Footnote: Colonel Sir Charles Wilson. See his _Life_, by Sir Charles Watson, p. 244.] On the 11th Baring replied, "I do not think that the services of Gordon or Wilson can be utilized at present"; and after a reply had been received I saw the telegrams. The earlier Gordon suggestions by Granville, now revealed by E. Fitzmaurice from the Granville Papers, and expounded in Cromer's (1908) book, were never before the Cabinet. [Footnote: Life of Lord Granville, vol. ii., pp.

381, 382.]

'On the 14th Lord Granville telegraphed to Baring: "Can you give further information as to prospects of retreat from (? for) army and residents at Khartoum, and measures taken? Can anything more be done?" Power, our Consular Agent at Khartoum, had also been told that he might leave. On January 16th Baring telegraphed: "The Egyptian Government would feel obliged if Her Majesty's Government would send out at once a qualified British officer to go to Khartoum with full powers, civil and military, to conduct the retreat." Lord Granville then telegraphed for Gordon, and on the 18th I was summoned suddenly to a meeting at the War Office in Hartington's room, at which were present, before I arrived, Hartington, Lord Granville and Lord Northbrook, and Colonel Gordon. Gordon said that he believed that the danger at Khartoum had been "grossly exaggerated," and that the two Englishmen there had "lost their heads"; he would be able to bring away the garrisons without difficulty. We decided that he should go to Suakim to collect information and report on the situation in the Soudan. This was the sole decision taken, but it was understood that if he found he could get across he should go on to Berber. Gordon started at night on the same day.

'On January 22nd the first subject mentioned was that of Egyptian finance, a Rothschild loan for six months being suggested, but nothing settled. The Cabinet approved our action in sending Gordon.

But they had before them a great deal more than what we had done--namely, what he had done himself. On his road between London and Brindisi he had prepared a series of decrees which he telegraphed to us and which we telegraphed to Baring. In these he announced the restoration to the various Sultans of the Soudan of their independence, and he made the Khedive say: "I have commissioned General Gordon, late Governor-General of the Soudan, to proceed there as my representative, and to arrange with you" (the peoples of the Soudan) "for the evacuation of the country and the withdrawal of my troops." He then made the Khedive appoint him "Governor-General for the time necessary to accomplish the evacuation." He also telegraphed to the Hadendowa and Bishareen Arabs of the desert between Suakim and Berber, directing them to meet him at Suakim, and saying that he should be there in fourteen days. In sending these we told Baring: "Suggestions made by Gordon.

We have no local knowledge sufficient to judge. You may settle terms, and act upon them at once, as time presses, or after consultation with him." Mr. Gladstone did not object, although strongly opposed to our undertaking responsibility in the Soudan, because Gordon still spoke in every sentence of conducting the evacuation; but reading his proclamations in the light of his subsequent change of mind, and desire to stay in Khartoum and be supported by force, it seems clear that he had deceived us and did not really mean evacuation. This, however, could not yet be seen from the words he used. I wrote to Lord Granville on January 22nd, to point out that in addition to the danger in the Soudan, which had been foreseen, there was a risk that Gordon might get himself carried off alive into the desert by some of the Arab chiefs that he was to meet, and that in that case we should have to send an expedition after him.

'On January 31st there was a meeting at the War Office about Egypt between Hartington, Lord Granville, Edmond Fitzmaurice and myself.

As the facts about Gordon were beginning to be misrepresented in the Press, Lord Granville set them down in writing. [Footnote: See _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., pp. 152-155; Life of Granville, vol. ii., pp. 381-385 and 512, where a letter from Lord Cromer on General Gordon's instructions is printed; and chap. xvi. ('Gordon, and the Soudan') in _The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900_, by Dr. J. Holland Rose.] It had been stated, and was afterwards repeated by Justin McCarthy in his history, that the mission on which we sent Gordon "was in direct opposition to his own ideas. He was not in favour of the abandonment of the Soudan or the evacuation of Khartoum." It had also been said that the whole mission had been forced upon us by the Press--i.e., by Stead, in the _Pall Mall Gazette_. Lord Granville gave me a memorandum saying that Gordon had acknowledged that the statements in the _Pall Mall_ were "not accurate." Lord Granville went on to say that he did not think that Gordon could be said to have "changed his mind. It appeared in his conversation with Wolseley on the Tuesday that he (Gordon) was not decided in his opinion, and that he was as likely to recommend one course as another.... I told him that we would not send him out to re-open the whole question, and he then declared himself ready to go out merely to help in the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan.

He is not remarkably precise in conversation, though I found him much more so than Wolseley had led me to expect."

'Lord Granville had previously written to me on this point: "The papers seem to think that Gordon is a new discovery by the Government under pressure of the Press. It happens that I consulted Malet on the subject months ago. But after communicating with Cherif he sent me an unfavourable reply. I subsequently consulted Baring, who agreed with Cherif that it was best not to do so. I consulted him again after the change of Ministry, with the same result. On the other hand Gordon was in Syria, having declared before leaving England that he would not enter the Egyptian service. It was only on his return to England that I heard indirectly that, although he had no wish to go, he would willingly obey the orders of Her Majesty's Government and act under the instructions of Sir Evelyn Baring and the orders of General Stephenson. Having got the full concurrence of Sir E. Baring by telegraph, the matter was arranged."

'The fact was that it was Wolseley, Gordon's friend, who suggested that he should be sent and who induced him to go; but Wolseley's account of the matter could not, I fear, be trusted, as he is more inclined to attack Gladstone than to let out anything which in the light of subsequent events might be unpleasant to himself.

'Edmond Fitzmaurice had drawn up an elaborate memorandum for our meeting at the War Office, which I have, with my own corrections. He thought that the public was hostile to us on four grounds: our non-interference to stop Hicks; [Footnote: General Hicks advanced west of the Nile, contrary to the views of Lord Dufferin, who wished him to limit his advance to the province lying between the bifurcation of the Blue and White Nile. See the _Life of Dufferin_, by Alfred Lyall, vol. ii., pp. 56, 57.] our failure to withdraw the garrisons of Khartoum and of the Equatorial Provinces in time to avoid disaster; our failure to relieve Sinkat; and, on the other hand, our decision to force the Egyptians to evacuate the Soudan in the face of defeat, a decision which had overturned Cherif Pasha.

With regard to Hicks, we could only tell the truth, which was that our policy was to limit, not extend, the sphere of our responsibilities in Egypt; that we followed the advice we got, which was either for doing exactly what we did, or for a moderate support of Hicks, which latter we declined. Our opponents were prophesying after the event. We should have taken a great responsibility had we absolutely forbidden the Egyptian Government to make use of their own troops (not including any portion of the army officered by English officers under Sir Evelyn Wood for the defence of Lower Egypt) to crush the Mahdi. Hicks had at first defeated the Mahdi in every encounter and cleared him out of the whole country east of the Nile. [Footnote: Hicks Pasha complained that directly Lord Dufferin had left Cairo for Constantinople, he ceased to received adequate support from the Egyptian Government (_Life of Dufferin_. vol. ii., p. 55).] The main point, however, and that of present importance, was our forcing upon the Egyptians the policy of evacuating the Soudan after Hicks's defeat. Fitzmaurice wrote: "The Soudan could not be held without the a.s.sistance of England, and it is not a British interest to hold the Soudan.... The cost of the Soudan is one of the causes which ruin the Egyptian Treasury." Edmond Fitzmaurice then went on to explain in his memorandum the reasons which had forced us to wait until January 4th before we had told the Egyptian Government as to withdrawal from the interior of the Soudan, including Khartoum--"that the Ministers must carry out the advice offered them, or forfeit their places."

'On January 9th we had been told from Khartoum that, if a retreat was ordered at once, it could be safely effected; and it was on the next day, the 10th, that we offered the services of Colonels Gordon and Sir Charles Wilson, which were declined. It was not till January 16th that we were able to induce the Egyptians, even under their new withdrawal Government, to ask for a British officer, and on the 18th Gordon was sent. Gordon, however--who had left us to go to Suakim, and for whom we had drawn up a route from Suakim to Berber, in case he should go forward, and negotiated with the tribes for his free pa.s.sage, and of whom we had telegraphed to Baring, "He does not wish to go to Cairo"--went to Cairo, "at Baring's" suggestion. He did not even land at Alexandria, but he was stopped by Baring at Port Said when on his way to Suakim, Baring sending Sir Evelyn Wood to meet him. Baring had already given orders, through Nubar, to commence the evacuation. Gordon had telegraphed to us requesting us to send Zebehr Pasha to Cyprus--that is, arbitrarily to arrest him and deport him. Yet, when he reached Cairo, at his own wish he had had an interview with this very man, and shortly afterwards he telegraphed to us, asking leave to take him to Khartoum and to make him virtually Governor of the Soudan, which, indeed, would have been entirely outside our power; for Forster, supported by the Anti- Slavery Society and the Conservatives, would at once have upset us in the House of Commons and reversed the policy. Wolseley had already begun to press as early as the 23rd for the sending of an expedition via Suakim and Berber.

'On January 26th Gordon had left for Khartoum without any communication with us upon the question whether he should go, and the last thing we had from him before he started was a memorandum in which, among other things, he said of the Soudan: "Few men can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate." He insisted on absolute authority, and Stewart, who was with him, did the same for him, and, backing up his chief's arguments at this moment against Zebehr, said that Zebehr's return would undoubtedly be a misfortune to the Soudanese, and also a direct encouragement to the slave trade.

'On February 1st we received a telegram from Baring, telling us that Gordon had taken with him proclamations of evacuation, and other proclamations less direct, with authority to issue those which he thought best; but "he fully understands that he is to carry out the policy of evacuation, in which he expressed to me his entire agreement. I have sent home by last mail my instructions to him, which leave no doubt on this point, and which were drafted at his request and with his full approval.... There is no sort of difference between his views and those entertained by Nubar Pasha and myself." Here ended our responsibility, because it must be remembered that Gordon at Khartoum was entirely outside our reach, and openly told us that he should not obey our orders when he did not choose to do so. From this moment we had only to please ourselves as to whether we should disavow him and say that he was acting in defiance of instructions, and must be left to his fate, or whether we should send an expedition to get him out.

'Doubtless "we" wavered between these two opinions. Mr. Gladstone from the first moment that Gordon broke his orders was for the former view. Lord Hartington from the first moment was for the latter. Chamberlain and I supported Hartington, although we fully recognized Gordon's violations of his orders in much of his action at Khartoum, where he changed the policy agreed upon with Baring and with us to that expressed by him in the words, "Smash the Mahdi."

Many members of the Cabinet went backwards and forwards in their opinion, but the circ.u.mstances were of incredible difficulty, and it must be remembered that we were not sure of being allowed to carry out either policy; and not only was it difficult to decide which of the two was right, but it was also difficult to decide whether either policy was possible--that is to say, whether the one adopted would not be immediately upset by a Parliamentary vote. The Liberal party in the House of Commons was divided on the matter, the Whigs generally wis.h.i.+ng for an expedition, and the Radicals being hot for immediate abandonment of the Soudan, which meant abandonment of Gordon. The Conservatives were divided; most of them probably wished for an expedition, but they were afraid to say so; and Randolph Churchill, whose strength at this time was immense, was in full agreement with Labouchere and Wilfrid Lawson, and was denouncing the retention of the Soudan as a violation of the principles of freedom.

'Gordon on his way up and on his arrival at Khartoum issued extraordinary proclamations. Arriving there alone, but with incredible prestige, he was hailed as father of the people; he burned the taxation books and the whips upon the public place; he released the prisoners from the gaol; he sent away the commander of the garrison with the words, "Rest a.s.sured you leave this place as safe as Kensington Park." He declared the Mahdi "Sultan of Kordofan." Gordon, of all men in the world, sanctioned slavery by another written doc.u.ment; and he then asked us to send the arch slave-driver Zebehr to his help, which we thought on Baring's truthful opinion of the moment that we ought not to do, and which we certainly could not have done. I thought and still think that Gordon had lost his senses, as he had done on former critical occasions in his life; but the romantic element in his nature appealed to me, and, while I could not but admit that he had defied every instruction which had been given to him, I should have sent an expedition to bring him out, although thinking it probable that when Wolseley reached him he would have refused to come.'

While Gordon was on his way to Khartoum, which he reached on February 18th, the defeat at El Teb had occurred, and the question arose as to what should be done in the Eastern Soudan.

'On February 6th the Cabinet met twice, and at our second meeting it was decided to send marines to Suakim.

'On Thursday, February 7th, I visited the Admiralty with Pauncefote in order to take in hand the defence of the Red Sea coast against the Arabs, and then I went to the War Office, where I met Hartington, Northbrook, Wolseley, and Cooper Key, in order to concert steps. When I pa.s.sed through the Secretary's room after the meeting, and stayed for a moment to talk with Hobart and Fleetwood Wilson, the Duke of Cambridge (whose room opened into theirs, and who had evidently been lying in wait for me) rushed out and carried me off into his room, and made much of me, with an enthusiastic desire to help an expedition. At night, Hartington, Chamberlain, and I met in Hartington's room and decided to press for relief of Gordon.

'On February 8th Chamberlain wrote to me, "I should like to telegraph to Baring, 'If you think that employment of British troops could relieve beleaguered garrisons in Soudan without danger, you are authorized to concert measures with Evelyn Wood.'" A Cabinet was called at the wish of Hartington, Chamberlain, and myself, for this day upon this point. Hartington, Harcourt, Northbrook, Carlingford, Chamberlain, and I, were for asking Gordon if a demonstration at Suakim would help him. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, very strong the other way, broke up the meeting sooner than agree.'

'Gordon had acted as Governor-General of the Soudan without having told us that he had accepted this appointment, and we had had to ask on February 4th a question which had been answered by Baring on the 5th, to the effect that Gordon had "at his own request" been appointed Governor-General. On February 6th Baring had telegraphed stating that Gordon had said that it was possible he might go to the Mahdi and not be heard of for two months, as the Mahdi might keep him as a hostage for Zebehr. On the same day we telegraphed to Baring approving his having told Gordon that there would be the strongest objections to his placing himself in the Mahdi's power. On February 7th we received a despatch by post from Baring in which he informed us that, while Gordon would probably ask for Zebehr, "it would certainly not be desirable to send him ... for he is manifestly animated by a feeling of deep resentment against General Gordon." At the same time Baring forwarded a shorthand report of the meeting between Gordon, Zebehr, Baring, Stewart, Colonel Watson, Sir Evelyn Wood, and Nubar, at which Zebehr had told Gordon that he had entrusted his son to him, "and told you he was thenceforth your son.

He was only sixteen years of age.... I entrusted my son to you....

But you killed my son whom I entrusted to you. He was as your own son." _Gordon_: "Well, well, I killed my own son. There is an end of it." _Zebehr_: "And then you brought my wives and women and children in chains to Khartoum, a thing which for my name in the Soudan was most degrading."

'By the same mail we received a despatch from Baring in which he made it clear that Gordon's instructions had Gordon's full approval.

"He expressed to me his entire concurrence in the instructions. The only suggestion he made was in connection with the pa.s.sage in which, speaking of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, I had said, 'I understand also that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy.' General Gordon wished that I should add the words 'and that you think it should on no account be changed.' These words were accordingly added."

'Between this Cabinet and the next we received, on February 9th, a telegram from Baring to the effect that he was sending home a letter from Gordon to the King of the Belgians in which he urged the king to appoint him Governor of the Equatorial Provinces, Gordon's idea being to go there from Khartoum; and Baring stated his own view that we should forbid Gordon to go south of Khartoum. In his letter, which was dated February 1st, Gordon said that the King of the Belgians had told him that he would take over the Provinces with the troops in them, when Gordon had been at Brussels immediately before we sent him out; but not one word had Gordon ever breathed of this; and when we first heard of it he was virtually beyond our reach, seated, when our answer arrived, at Khartoum, and little disposed to listen to us, although on some points, for a few days, he pretended to listen.

'On February 12th Baring telegraphed that he hoped that "H.M.G. will not change any of the main points of their policy"; but, as will be seen a little later, Baring soon changed his own, adopting the new policy of Gordon, and pressing it upon us.

'On February 12th it was decided, against Mr. Gladstone, to send an expedition to the Red Sea Coast.

'On February 13th we had before us a statement which had been made the previous day by Randolph Churchill, to the effect that in the summer of 1883 General Gordon had offered to go to the Soudan, and that the Government had telegraphed to him accepting his offer, and then written to him declining it. Lord Granville instructed me to say that the whole story was one gigantic concoction. I then asked Hartington if he knew anything about it; and Lord Wolseley ultimately discovered that Randolph Churchill had confused the Congo with the Nile, an amusing example of his harum-scarum recklessness.

Gordon had telegraphed from Syria in October for leave to accept service under the King of the Belgians on the Congo, and the Commander-in-Chief had replied by telegraph that the Secretary of State declined to sanction his employment. In transmission the word "declines" was changed into "decides," which exactly reversed its sense, so that Gordon had received a confirming letter consistent with the telegram as sent, but exactly reversing the sense of the telegram as received. He had told the story which Churchill had heard, but altered from one side of Africa to the other.'

On February 14th Sir Charles made effective use of this blunder in the debate upon the vote of censure concerning Egypt. It was a debating speech which, he himself notes, 'had extraordinary success.' Lord Randolph Churchill had been more than usually aggressive, and Sir Charles hammered him with detailed facts. [Footnote: He comments on the 20th on the opinions expressed to him as to his powers of debate: 'This is a curious position for a man who has no natural gift of speech. I can remember when I was the worst speaker that ever spoke at all.'] The debate on this vote of censure, occasioned by the fall of Sinkat, occupied the House for five days. The motion was defeated by forty-nine.

'On February 14th I found that Lord Granville had not answered an important question from Baring about Wood's Egyptians which had been received by us on the 13th, and that because he had not seen it. We had started a red label as a danger-signal for pressing notes; but Lord Granville's room was full of red-labelled notes not touched.'

He records his remonstrances with Lord Granville as to the non- employment of Sir Evelyn Wood's Egyptians. On February 18th there was a Cabinet 'partly upon this subject. It was decided to send reinforcements to Egypt.'

'On February 21st there was another Cabinet which again discussed the Egyptian question and decided to send Wood's Egyptians to a.s.souan. On the 15th Gordon had rea.s.sured us by telling us that all communication between Cairo and the Soudan would be finally at an end within three months' (that is, that evacuation would be easily carried out). 'On February 18th we had heard that on the 17th Gordon had issued a proclamation saying that the Government would not interfere with the buying and selling of slaves; and this telegram, having got out from Cairo, produced a storm in England. On the 19th there occurred another matter which was considered by the Cabinet at the same time--the absolute refusal of Admiral Hewett, and very proper refusal, to issue a proclamation calling on the chiefs from Suakim to go peacefully to meet Gordon at Khartoum, inasmuch as the Admiral knew "that English troops are about to be sent against the people in question." The issue of this proclamation had been recommended by Wolseley, who thinks that Governments exist for the purpose of deceiving enemies in war for the benefit of generals.

'On the same day, February 19th, we had received a telegram which had been sent off from Khartoum by Gordon on the 18th, asking that Zebehr should be sent to the Soudan, "be made K.C.M.G., and given presents." This was backed by Stewart, so far as that he said that someone should be sent, adding that he was not sure whether Zebehr was the best man. It was clear from Gordon's proposed conditions that Zebehr was to be free to prosecute the slave trade. In another memorandum on the same day Gordon said that we must "give a commission to some man and promise him the moral support of H.M.G.... It may be argued that H.M.G. would thus be giving ...

moral support to a man who will rule over a slave state.... This nomination of my successor must ... be direct from Her Majesty's Government.... As for the man, H.M.G. should select one above all others, namely Zebehr." Baring now backed this opinion up, so that we were face to face with an absolute change of front on the part of Gordon and Baring, and a partial change of front on the part of Stewart. On the other hand, Baring, at the same time when he told us to appoint Zebehr, added: "I am quite certain that Zebehr hates Gordon bitterly, and that he is very vindictive. I would not on any account risk putting Gordon in his power.... He is, to my personal knowledge, exceedingly untruthful.... I cannot recommend his being promised the moral support of Her Majesty's Government. He would scarcely understand the phrase, and, moreover, I do not think he would attach importance to any support which was not material.... I doubt the utility of making conditions. Zebehr would probably not observe them long." Baring further proposed that Zebehr should be given money, and he left us to judge of the effect of the whole scheme on public opinion in England. Colonel Watson, who had been present at the meeting between Zebehr and Gordon, informed us that to let Gordon and Zebehr be together in the Soudan "would entail the death of either one or other of them." On the 21st Gordon telegraphed to the newspapers explaining away his slave trade proclamation, but its terms were even worse than could have been gathered from the first summary, which was all that we had received.

'On February 21st we received the text of Gordon's proclamation, which contained the words, "I confer upon you these rights, that henceforth none shall interfere with your property," and spoke with apparent regret of "severe measures taken by Government for the suppression of slave traffic, and seizure and punishment of all concerned."

'On February 26th there was a meeting of Mr. Gladstone, Hartington, Childers, Chamberlain, Dodson, and myself, to approve a telegram from Hartington to General Graham; [Footnote: General Graham was in command of the expedition to Suakim.] and on the next day again, the 27th, a meeting of Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook, and myself, which decided to invite the Turk to show himself at the Red Sea ports. On the 29th there was a Cabinet at which it was decided that the Turk must approve our future ruler of the Soudan, and that British troops were to go as far as a.s.souan if Baring thought it necessary.

'On February 27th Gordon had frightened us out of our senses by telegraphing that, having put out his programme of peace, and allowed time to elapse, he was now sending out his troops to show his force; and another telegram from him said: "Expedition starts at once to attack rebels." On the same day he telegraphed that he had issued a proclamation "that British troops are now on their way, and in a few days will reach Khartoum." It was very difficult to know what to do with this amazing lie: solemnly to point out to him by telegraph that it was a lie was hardly of much use with a man of Gordon's stamp; and what was done was to send a strong private telegram to Baring to communicate with him about it, but the result was not encouraging, for it was the first ground for the desperate quarrel which Gordon afterwards picked with Baring, and for his charge against Baring of inciting the Government to drive him to his death.

'On the next day, February 28th, Gordon, having heard that Zebehr was refused, telegraphed his policy of smas.h.i.+ng up the Mahdi, which, however, he seemed inclined to attempt with a most inadequate force.