The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 10

'I prize his friends.h.i.+p as the best gift of my public life, and I rejoice unfeignedly that he will have a companion so well able to share his n.o.blest ambitions and to brighten his life.

'I know that you will forgive me this intrusion, which is justified by the fact that next to yourself I am more interested than anyone in the change which will bring so much happiness to my dear friend.

'Believe me always,

'Yours most sincerely,

'J. Chamberlain.'

CHAPTER x.x.xVIII

DIVIDED COUNSELS

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1885

At the close of 1884 Mr. Gladstone's colleagues expected that he would resign, and it appears that he had really thought of doing so, provided that a ministry could be formed under Lord Hartington's leaders.h.i.+p.

Franchise and Redistribution were virtually settled, and there was no legislative proposal before either the Cabinet or the country on which Lord Hartington was in marked disagreement with his colleagues. But they were still 'an Egyptian Government,' and here differences seemed to be irreconcilable.

'The Egyptian policy of the Government had now become thoroughly unpopular, and those of us who, although we had favoured intervention as necessary at the time, had deplored alike the engagements of our predecessors which had made it necessary, and the occupation which, unnecessarily in my opinion, followed it, were as unpopular as were those like Hartington, and the majority of the peers in the Cabinet, who had insisted not only on going, but on staying--at least in Cairo. It is curious to reflect how intervention in the East is judged by subsequent complications which do not affect the principle. The intervention of 1860-61 in Syria gave considerable popularity to the Government who agreed to it, and to Lord Dufferin who conducted it on the spot; and it was as popular in France which found the troops, as in England which found the man.

By that intervention Syria was pacified and war in the East prevented, and ultimately it was followed by evacuation and reversion to what diplomatists style in their jargon "an improved _status quo_."

'It is too often now (1891) forgotten that we actually proposed in 1884 to France (in connection with a Conference which took place, obtaining therefore to some extent, it might be contended, valuable consideration for our proposal) that we would, at or before the expiration of our occupation, propose to the Powers and to the Porte a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt on the basis of the principles applied to Belgium. A doc.u.ment which we printed at the beginning of 1885 gave our suggested wording for the neutralization treaty, declaring that Egypt should be an independent and perpetually neutral State under the guarantee of the contracting parties; limiting the strength of the Egyptian army, the claim of Turkey to military aid from Egypt, and so forth.'

The suggestion was not welcomed by the Powers.

'On New Year's Day I left Antibes for Paris, which I reached on Friday, the 2nd January, and quitted for London on Sat.u.r.day, the 3rd.

'Chamberlain wrote to me that Mr. Gladstone was threatened with a return of his illness, that he required rest, that Egypt had been for the moment tided over, though it might at any moment break up the Government. It had been decided to send a firm but courteous despatch to France demanding immediate consideration of our proposals, failing which we should "take our own course."

Chamberlain, however, added, "What that course is to be is the question on which agreement appears impossible. It is 'scuttle and bankruptcy' against 'protectorate and guarantee.' Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."'

Mr. Gladstone was with Dilke and Chamberlain in opposing protectorate or guarantee in any shape. But there were other questions of Imperial policy upon which the Imperialism of these two Ministers divided them from Mr. Gladstone.

'New Guinea had also been discussed, and Chamberlain was for demanding explanations from the Germans. Zululand had been mentioned. Chamberlain supported the annexation of the coast of Pondoland: Mr. Gladstone, with the support of Trevelyan, "opposing any attempt to antic.i.p.ate Germany."

'On Sunday, January 4th, Chamberlain wrote again from Birmingham.

His letter shows that I was anxious for resignation on the Egyptian question, and Chamberlain replied that he could not find a satisfactory boat to leave the s.h.i.+p in, and that he thought that the Government had more lives than a cat. Chamberlain added that he had to speak on January 5th, and should find it difficult to steer between Jingoism and peace-at-any-price.'

'He also was engaged in preparing a programme for the future to be set forth at Ipswich. This last was the memorable "Unauthorized Programme."'

A first instalment of this programme was given by Mr. Chamberlain in a speech at Birmingham, which advocated restriction of game-preserving, provision of land for agricultural labourers, and better housing. The accusations of Communism brought against Mr. Chamberlain began at this point; and they, of course, redoubled after he had proposed on January 10th at Ipswich to give local bodies power for compulsory acquisition of land.

At this juncture Mr. Chamberlain was absent from London, and communicating only by letter with Sir Charles, whom he had not seen since the middle of December, when Sir Charles crossed to Paris, on his way to Toulon; and before the unauthorized programme was launched Lord Hartington contemplated forming a Government which would have given the foremost positions to Dilke and Chamberlain.

'On the morning of January 5th Harcourt had told me that Mr.

Gladstone intended to resign, and that Lord Granville would follow Mr. Gladstone, in which case Hartington intended to make him, Harcourt, Chancellor, to move Lord Derby and Childers, to put in Rosebery, [Footnote: As Secretary for the Colonies.] to offer Chamberlain the Chancellors.h.i.+p of the Exchequer, and me the Secretarys.h.i.+p of State for Foreign Affairs. But, great as were the offices proposed, Chamberlain and I could not have consented to remain in if Mr. Gladstone had gone out notoriously dissatisfied. If he had gone out on grounds of health alone, it would, of course, have been another matter.'

In a letter,

'probably of Monday morning, January 5th, Chamberlain said that Mr.

Gladstone's retirement was possible, and might be necessary; that Hartington and Harcourt could bring it about; but that we must be most careful not to allow them to say that we had been engaged in an intrigue with them against Mr. Gladstone. He thought that we ought to tell them frankly that we could enter into no negotiations with them, and to put this in a Memorandum to which we could afterwards appeal. On the other hand, he was willing to state his views as to policy, provided all reference to personal questions was avoided. As his Egyptian policy, he stated "immediate bankruptcy, communication to the Powers of our fixed intention to leave, declaration that we would not allow intervention by other Powers in our place, and Conference to settle details of neutralization." As to domestic policy, he agreed in my suggestion that we should insist upon an immediate Civil List Committee, and proposed an inquiry into labour.

He gave me leave to discuss his letter with Harcourt ("the latter has always been a most loyal friend, though he can not be expected to agree with us in everything"), and I did so before the Cabinet of January 7th.'

By this time Mr. Chamberlain had come to London, and there is no indication that his speech at Birmingham had created friction. But the party which wished to offer resistance to Germany's high-handed policy had been strengthened by a new instance of usurpation.

'Mr. Gladstone was absent from this Cabinet. The first matter discussed was that of Samoa raised by me. There had been received on the night of the 6th from the Governor of New Zealand a telegram saying that the Germans had made a treaty giving the whole authority of Government to the German Consul. While Munster had been telling Lord Granville that Germany would take no step hostile to Samoan independence, the Germans had sent wars.h.i.+ps there with secret orders, and had hoisted their flag in various parts of the islands.

The next subject mentioned was that of Zanzibar, and it was decided that we should warn Germany that we would not brook interference there. At the same time I had much doubt whether Lord Granville would act upon the instructions of the Cabinet in this matter, and my doubts were justified. The third matter was that of the Pondo coast, and also the coast of Zululand. Mr. Gladstone alone objecting to a protectorate and being absent, it was decided to have one.'

'Then came the old question of sending troops to Suakim; [Footnote: Colonial troops were offered about this time, and the Diary contains the entry, February 20th: "The sending of a Colonial force to Suakim. Hartington and Derby had snubbed the Colonists, and were snubbed by the Cabinet in consequence."] then that of Egyptian Finance, on which Harcourt broached his scheme by which the United Kingdom was to pay the difference caused by a reduction of the rate of interest, to which scheme Chamberlain and I were opposed. We were informed that the Queen "most strongly protested against our binding ourselves to leave Egypt."'

Meanwhile the Radicals in the Cabinet considered their concerted action in view of a change of leaders.h.i.+p.

'We settled during the Cabinet that Trevelyan, Chamberlain, and I should meet at my room at the Local Government Board, directly the Cabinet was over, to discuss the terms on which we would join a Hartington administration; and we did so, finding Egypt and my proposed inquiry into the Civil List the only real difficulties. The Civil List could be got over, as it was certain that the Whigs would give in to pressure from us upon this point. But Harcourt had informed us that our Egyptian policy made the formation of a Government impossible, as Hartington would not consent to accept office on our Egyptian policy.'

It was very difficult to come to an agreement about Egypt. Lord Derby had declared that the only alternatives were guaranteed neutrality or annexation. Dilke and Chamberlain stood for the former, considering their duty done if they prevented occupation by any other European Power, and took steps to establish internal order--which meant completing the organization of an Egyptian army. There was a third policy; for Lord Hartington, who repeatedly in public repudiated the idea of annexation, insisted upon the retention of a single control during a prolonged occupation. In this he had the strongest backing from the Queen.

'Chamberlain at our meeting added a fresh proviso--namely, that Parnell or some other Irishman should be Chief Secretary. I afterwards informed Harcourt of Chamberlain's views, adding that Chamberlain was willing to avoid all personal questions, although he much wished that John Morley should be in the Cabinet, [Footnote: Sir Charles had noted his own strong wish to this effect in the previous year.] that he wholly rejected Harcourt's plan for Egypt as being a bribe to buy off the Powers, forced on us by unworthy fears.

Chamberlain wished, if his own Egyptian policy was not adopted, to simply evacuate the country.

'Chamberlain, I was empowered to say, had also mentioned the English land question, and was opposed to allowing Lord Salisbury to come in,' as this, he said to Sir Charles, 'would surely be a hopeless confession of weakness, and give him a chance with the new electors.

'I argued against Chamberlain's Egyptian policy, not on the merits, but on the chances of our getting our own way.

'"I doubt our getting our way as to bankruptcy, and am not sure that we ought to put that forward as sole or chief cause for not joining Hartington." To this Chamberlain replied: "True. But how can we join another Government without any settled policy about Egypt?

Harcourt's alternative is impossible; then what is there? I should refuse to join Hartington unless we can agree as to Egypt policy, and if we do agree, there can in that case be no reason for letting Salisbury in."'

Egypt was in Sir Charles's view the main, but not the only, difficulty.

The Government policy of 'lying down to Germany' was another. At the same date:

'January 7th, Chamberlain and I had a conference with regard to Samoa, in which I pointed out that if we quarrelled with France about Egypt she would have all Europe behind her, whereas in our dealings with Germany about Samoa, Zanzibar, and other matters, Germany would stand alone.' [Footnote: A letter to Lord Hartington from his secretary, Mr. Brett, which is quoted by Mr. Bernard Holland (_Life of Duke of Devons.h.i.+re_, vol. ii, pp. 38, 39), suggests that the Hartington section had difficulty in reconciling Sir Charles's att.i.tude on other Imperial matters with his Egyptian policy: "It would indeed be a farce, after all the fuss about the Cameroons and Angra Pequena, to allow Suakim, which is the port of Khartoum, and the Nile to pa.s.s into the hands of foreigners." The answer is, first, that Sir Charles would certainly never have consented to let any port in Egypt or the Soudan pa.s.s into the hands of any European Power: his proposal was neutralization of Egypt under international guarantee; and, secondly, that the questions were governed by different conditions, which he set out in conference with Mr. Chamberlain about Samoa.]

January 9th, 'I had decided that if I resigned, or if I refused to join a Hartington administration, I should mention four subjects--Egypt, Samoa, Zanzibar, and (probably) the Civil List inquiry (if I were not completely satisfied). On the same day I was at work on our draft despatch to Sir Edward Malet as to Zanzibar, which had been settled on the 8th after the Cabinet of the 7th, but which did not go off until the 14th. On January 14th I noted in my Diary, "The Zanzibar despatch went.

Seven days' delay. I know that two days' delay was caused by the necessity of sending to Osborne and to the Prime Minister, but why seven days?"

'On January 21st the first matter discussed was that of New Guinea, in which we found ourselves in difficulties caused by absence of jurisdiction over foreigners, and we agreed in consequence to annexation.'

The situation with Germany was undoubtedly grave, but ought not, Sir Charles maintained, to entail the sacrifice of Zanzibar. On February 24th Count Munster, the German Amba.s.sador, told Mr. Alfred de Rothschild that he expected to be withdrawn, but that New Guinea was the only serious matter in dispute.

'On Tuesday, February 24th, I breakfasted at Alfred de Rothschild's house, to meet the German Amba.s.sador, Count Munster, at the latter's wish. Alfred de Rothschild did not sit down with us, and we were _tete-a-tete_. Munster was very free in his remarks about Bismarck.

"No one ever contradicts him." "He sees none but flatterers." "His life is a period to be got through."'

Two March entries are apposite here:

'On Wednesday, March 4th, Rosebery wrote to me to ask me to dine with him to meet "Herbert Bismarck," who had suddenly arrived, but I was engaged to the Speaker's dinner, and had to put off seeing young Bismarck till Thursday, the 5th. He had come over to try to force us to dismiss Lord Granville and Lord Derby. I noted in my Diary: [Footnote: Sir Charles's Diaries, to portions of which certain biographers had access, are at this point quoted by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice in his _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 430. The pa.s.sage runs: "Negotiations with Germany on the vexed colonial questions were meanwhile proceeding, more particularly with regard to New Guinea. Sir Julian Pauncefote proposed a plan which it was hoped might satisfy the German Chancellor, and Count Herbert Bismarck reappeared as co-negotiator with Count Munster in London.

Lord Rosebery, who had just joined the Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal, also took part in the negotiations. 'Herbert Bismarck came over again,' Sir Charles Dilke noted; 'if at his former visit he had only tried to get us to dismiss Lord Derby, on this occasion he wanted us to dismiss Lord Granville and Lord Derby.'"] "He puts us in a difficult position as individuals, for how can we say to this personally friendly fellow that we do not think Lord Granville's speech in the Lords on Friday foolish, or how say that we think that the allusion to old Bismarck's dislike of Munster in a recent despatch from Malet ought to have been published."