The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 28

Mr. Robert Lowe is credited with having said that a metaphysician resembled a blind man groping in a dark room for a black hat that was not there. The comparison might almost have been applied to the Foreign Minister of the Dual Empire, vainly seeking for a coherent policy among the mists and cross-currents of rival nationalities. The charge to be made against the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was, in fact, not that she had got a policy--good or bad, ambitious or the reverse--but that it was almost impossible as a rule to ascertain whether she had any policy at all: the explanation being that her internal problems paralyzed her action abroad. 'It was difficult to be a patriot in Austria, for n.o.body exactly knew to the representatives of what race, tongue, or language, his allegiance was due.' 'Austria was indeed of all countries in the world by far the most difficult to govern, and as a necessity of her condition she must before all things long for peace....

Under her many difficulties caused by racial divisions she had become const.i.tutionally timid and naturally slow to move, and the outlook was far from promising ... nor had Prince Bismarck'--notwithstanding the terms of the Triple Alliance--'bound Germany to espouse all the quarrels of Austria, no matter where and with whom.' It had been said, and by Prince Bismarck himself, that the bones of not a single Pomeranian grenadier should be allowed to whiten in a Balkan quarrel. [Footnote: Speech in the Reichstag, December 16th, 1876.] 'The only real question worth asking was: Will Austria resist Russian pretensions, and will she, if in danger of conquest, be supported by allies, or will she yield and take her share of the spoils?' [Footnote: _The Present Position of European Politics_, pp. 185, 193, 194, 205, 206, 219, 221-224.]

The long-standing jealousies, also, of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Greece, in regard to the future of the Adriatic coast, Sir Charles Dilke felt were not sufficiently appreciated in England, where public opinion was too much inclined to see the Turk and the Slav only in every question concerned with the Balkan Peninsula. When Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1880-81, he had given a strong support to the proposals in regard to Albania of Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, which had the approval of Mr. Goschen, then Special Amba.s.sador to the Porte--proposals which were framed with a view to the ultimate autonomy of the country, and were not accepted by the European Commission of Reforms, mainly owing to the opposition of Austria-Hungary. [Footnote: See _Life of Lord Goschen_, vol. i, p. 215. These proposals were revived in 1912, and, which is remarkable, by Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, in a despatch in favour of 'progressive decentralization.' See an article in the _Edinburgh Review_, April, 1913: 'Austria and Italy have been rivals for influence in Albania, as Austria and Russia were rivals in Macedonia. It was because of this rivalry that the Treaty of Berlin, so far as it applied to the European provinces of Turkey, was never properly carried into effect. For the same reason the Fitzmaurice proposal of 1880 was defeated by the opposition of Vienna. The suggestion was that a greater Albania should be created, which would have been autonomous under a European guarantee.

It is among the ironies of history that this scheme, rejected by Austria when it came from a friendly and neutral source, should have been put forward by the Austrian Foreign Office itself thirty-two years later.

Count Berchtold's Circular Note of August 14th, 1912, revived the Fitzmaurice programme. The proposition came too late.'] But in _The Present Position of European Politics_ it is seen how the author's increasing confidence in the future of Greece led to a change of opinion on this, the most intricate, perhaps, of all diplomatic questions connected with the Near East. He now advocated as large an extension as possible of the existing northern boundary of Greece, and held that the rest of Albania should be joined to Greece by some form of personal union, which ultimately might grow into a closer tie, bearing in mind the friendly cooperation of Greeks and Albanians in the War of Independence against Turkey, and the fact that a strong Albanian element already existed in the Greek kingdom. [Footnote: _The Present Position of European Politics_, pp. 146, 148, 193, 206, 214-217, 232, 237, 238.]

A European Congress seemed to him the only method to avoid the ultimate arbitrament of war in this ma.s.s of tangled questions, but experience had shown that a Congress was useless unless the Great Powers had settled the main questions beforehand in agreement among themselves. Experience had unfortunately also shown the extreme difficulty of obtaining any such agreement.

'Austria ought to have been the heir of Turkey; the protector of a Greece extended to include Albania, Macedonia, the Islands, and the coast to Constantinople and down to Asia Minor; the friend of Servia and Roumania, and what not.' But these things remained in the cla.s.s of visions, even if occasionally some Austrian or Hungarian statesman, like Herr von Kallay, seemed disposed to grasp them, and to renew the tradition of the forward policy attributed to Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Archduke Charles. Hungary also had made Roumania her antagonist by her illiberal policy in regard to the navigation of the Danube. Any permanent confederation of the Balkan States as distinct from a temporary alliance for some special and defined object, such as a possible attack on Turkey, seemed therefore no longer possible, especially after the recent events in Bulgaria. Meanwhile there was to be peace, because Prince Bismarck so willed it. [Footnote: See _Der Krimkrieg und die osterreichische Politik_, von Heinrich Friedjung, chap, ii., p. 16 (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1907); Louis Leger, _etudes Slaves: L'Autriche-Hongrie et la Question d'Orient_, p. 395.]

The overmastering sense of the importance of whatever happened at Vienna and Constantinople--of which every page of _The Present Position of European Politics_ is the evidence--will largely explain Sir Charles Dilke's views on another question. It has been seen that he was amongst the strongest advocates of an active policy in Egypt in 1882, agreeing in this with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington. But at an early period after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir he p.r.o.nounced himself, when the question arose, in favour of the earliest possible evacuation of the country, and contemplated it as a possibility of the immediate future.

[Footnote: Sir Charles wrote in the _Speaker_ of January 23rd, 1892, in reply to Admiral Maxse: 'Admiral Maxse appears to think that my views in favour of evacuation have been recently formed....' 'There was a time, _before_ the intervention of the condominium with France by Lord Derby, when I held a different view; but it was not only formed under circ.u.mstances very different from those which have now existed for fourteen years, but also at a time when I had not given special consideration to our probable naval and military position in the event of war.'] Egypt to him, considered from the point of view of British interests, was subsidiary to Constantinople. All that really signified was the right of pa.s.sage through the Suez Ca.n.a.l, which could, he believed, be secured by international arrangement and the neutralization of the country, a plan for which, as already seen, was being actually discussed by Mr. Gladstone's Government when it fell. Egypt, in fact, he regarded as part of Asia rather than of Africa, and he believed that time would make this more clear than ever, in proportion as railways were developed in Syria, Arabia, and Asia Minor. In this connection Constantinople, not Alexandria or Cairo, seemed to him the decisive factor: an opinion which brought him into opposition with those who held the view that since the occupation of Egypt by British troops events at Constantinople had become comparatively unimportant to this country. He also feared that if some great European crisis were to arise, in which Great Britain was involved, the occupation of Egypt might be a hindrance rather than a source of strength, and might hamper our exertions in other lands.

He had, however, no fear of allowing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to be opened under suitable conditions to the pa.s.sage of Russian s.h.i.+ps of war, but only on the condition laid down by Sir William White, that the right accorded to Russia must be accorded to the s.h.i.+ps of war of other nations; and this partly out of regard to the dignity of the British flag, and partly because any exclusive right accorded to Russia would be resisted by the States bordering on the Black Sea and by those interested in the trade and navigation of the Danube. But the opening of the Straits was one thing, the possession of Constantinople by Russia was another, and in his opinion would cause a European convulsion; for he saw in Constantinople what has since been termed 'the great strategic centre of the world': [Footnote: The expression was used by Mr. Winston Churchill in a speech on November 15th, 1915, in the House of Commons.]

the meeting-place and clearing-house of the trade and politics of three continents.

'Russia at Constantinople,' he wrote, 'would mean the destruction of Austria and the Russification of a large portion of her Slavs. When Austria had disappeared or had been transformed out of all knowledge, Germany, placed between France and Russia, would be still weaker in her military position than she is at present. It is no doubt impossible that Germany can really contemplate that contingency with complete satisfaction. And if she cannot get other people to help Austria to keep Russia away from Constantinople, it is probable that she would be forced to interfere to help to do so, however stoutly her rulers may make the opposite declaration. One of my most valued correspondents, whose criticisms have been of the highest use to me, admits that to place Turkey at the head of a Balkan Confederation would be "adding a badger to your three unfriendly cats and altogether hostile dog"; but, nevertheless, he thinks that such a combination would be possible on account of the overwhelming dread of the danger of absorption by Russia; and I think it right to state his view, although I am unable to modify that which I have said as to the difficulties which the dispute for Macedonia causes.' [Footnote: _The Present Position of European Politics_, pp. 372, 373.]

In the autumn of 1891 this note occurs in the Memoir: 'John Morley having made a speech in favour of the cessation of the Egyptian occupation, I wrote to tell him how pleased I was, and in his reply he asked why we should go on mechanically applauding Lord Salisbury's foreign policy, which left this danger standing.'

Mr. Morley's satisfaction was, however, not shared by Mr. Chamberlain, who wrote in January, 1892, 'to implore me to have regard to the opinion of society about Egypt.'

'I do not mean fas.h.i.+onable society,' he added, 'but political society, and the great majority of cultivated politicians. I think you do go out of your way to offend them when you advocate evacuation of Egypt, and I ask you to consider if it is worth your while. It is not necessary for your const.i.tuents, and with regard to the others, there is no need to add to their causes of anger against you. My advice is, "Be as Radical as you like, be Home Ruler if you must, but be a little Jingo if you can."'

The correspondence had begun in the autumn of 1891, when Sir Charles wrote the following letter:

'Pyrford by Maybury, 'Near Woking, '_October_ 19_th_, 1891.

'My Dear Chamberlain,

'I have never said that there are not conceivable circ.u.mstances in which it would be better for us to be in Egypt. I'm going to try and discuss them in the book I am at work on. _Re_ command of the sea against France. We have not quite a sufficient force to blockade Brest and Toulon. Lefevre and most of our sailors contemplate only "masking" Toulon by a fleet at Gibraltar, and using the Cape route.

In this case we could not reinforce Egypt except from India, and not, of course, from India if we were at war with Russia too.

'I am in favour of a stronger navy, and attempting blockade, though it is not _certain_ that it can be made _for certain_ successful.

Still Colomb is a better authority than Beresford, etc. I mean "Admiral Colomb," not Sir John. The difficulty, even if blockades are possible, is that France keeps building after us so as always to be without the limits which would make it possible. Lefevre will support Mr. G. in cutting down the navy on this ground--i.e., will prove by figures that every time we lay down nine s.h.i.+ps the French lay down six or seven.

'I think that in the long-run France will beat Germany. She will fight her some day single-handed on a point in which Austria and Italy will not move, nor Russia either. Then, if Germany gets the best of it, the others will "mediate."

'Yours ever,

'Chs. W. D.'

'November, 1891, we spent in France.... While I was away I had a correspondence with Chamberlain about his speech on Egypt' (in reply to Morley), 'and pointed out to him,' says the Memoir,' that he had changed his mind so completely about evacuation that it was hardly prudent in him not frankly to admit the change of mind, as he had done in at least one speech previously.' He replied:

'"I have looked the matter up, and I think it is quite true that in 1884 we were all for evacuation as early as possible. But I did not then estimate properly the magnitude of the task we had undertaken, nor did I know how splendidly it would be performed by Baring and his colleagues. Baring himself began as a strong advocate for evacuation."

'In my answer, I said that Baring had only changed his mind in the way in which all people are apt to change their minds when they are employed as the agents of a policy, and I combated Chamberlain's military views, which were, in fact, for defending Egypt by the fleet--that fleet which is expected to do everything!'

Sir Charles set out in an article in the _Speaker_ all the pledges to evacuate which had been given by the Liberal Government and repeated by Lord Salisbury. Thereupon Mr. Morley, whose general views on foreign policy were not as a rule at all the same as those of Sir Charles, wrote from Biarritz, where he was in Mr. Gladstone's company, that he had read the _Speaker_ with enormous satisfaction. It would have a stimulating effect in quarters where a little stimulus was much needed, and had given much satisfaction to other people in Biarritz besides himself.

'"Quarters" of course meant Rosebery,' is Sir Charles's comment, and he adds:

'In order to meet the Rosebery objection to evacuation, I wrote an article for the January _Fortnightly_, of which the editor changed nothing but the t.i.tle. I had called it "Lords Salisbury and Rosebery," and he changed it to "Conservative Foreign Policy."'

At a later date, in a letter [Footnote: This letter was apparently written on April 14th, 1893:

'Those of us who bitterly dislike the occupation of Egypt by a British force have been both to add to your work before and during a session in which, not to speak of the ordinary demand on the time of a Prime Minister, your unprecedented relation to the chief measure makes it the duty of your supporters to confine themselves to helping clear the road. Naught else could have excused us from having hitherto refrained from pressing the state of Egypt on the consideration of yourself, or of the House of Commons. It is only because since the publication of a recent despatch we feel that the time has nearly come for making up one's mind to be for ever silent upon the question, and because I cannot do so, given the strong feeling that I have with regard to it, without one last attempt to cause some change in a "temporary" situation now crystallizing into permanency, that I venture to address you. I ask for no reply. I shall have to bring the question before the House of Commons. I have no illusions as to what is likely to be the result of so doing. Sir E. Grey will tell us that the occupation is still "temporary," but must last, "for the sake of Egypt," till we can "with safety" leave: and so it will continue, with all its dangers to ourselves, till the next great war. Whoever else may again raise the Egyptian question in the future, I shall not. Vote I must, whenever it comes before the House, but I need not do more.

'Not one word of blame of anyone will fall from me when I raise the question on first going into Committee on Civil Estimates. It seems to me, I confess--but I shall try to keep the opinion to myself-- that it would have been, on the whole, the safest course to have done in 1892 that which Lord Granville, under your guidance, did in 1880, and to have ourselves proposed, on the very day of the accession to office of the new Government, the policy which we thought best in the interest of the country and had supported in Opposition. Lord Granville congratulated himself, and with justice, on the prompt.i.tude with which, before the Russians could say a word to him as to the complete fulfilment of the Treaty of Berlin, he had told the Amba.s.sador, in the first minute of their first interview, that the Government would insist on that fulfilment. Had the present Secretary of State, at his first interview with the French Amba.s.sador, made a similar communication with regard to Egypt (at least so far as to propose to resume the negotiations of 1887), we should, perhaps, have avoided many evils. I share to the full the belief, which you expressed in such admirable terms a couple of years ago, that the long-lasting occupation of Egypt by our forces is the cause of all the difficulties by which our foreign policy, and even our position in Europe, are oppressed. Our hands are not free, and never will be free, so long as the occupation continues.

But ills more direct are likely to fall upon us; and no one can look forward without the gravest dread to the prospect of our being drawn, step by step, into a situation in which we shall be driven to arrest the persons of the young Khedive and those of his advisers who possess the confidence of all that is intelligent among the Egyptian people; or (as seems hinted in Lord Bosebery's despatch) to insist upon a deposition.

'In the discussions as to the occupation of Egypt which occurred in the Cabinet, before I was a member of it, in 1882, even before the expedition (for the occupation was foreseen), I took a share, as Lord Granville was good enough to consult me on the papers circulated by his colleagues. As far as I am concerned, I have never budged from the principles of a memorandum which I wrote on July 4th, 1882; but those principles were far more excellently stated by you in a memorandum of the beginning of September, 1882--before Tel-el-Kebir--a memorandum which was approved by men now so hostile to your views as Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet. Sir E.

Baring, now, as Lord Cromer, so bitterly opposed to us, in a paper of September or October, 1882, and Chamberlain in his paper of about October 21st, 1882, both pointed out how essential it was that our occupation should be really temporary, and that our condition--that we should leave behind us a "stable" state of things--depended on and meant what Chamberlain called "the extension of Egyptian liberties": the convoking, if not of a truly representative a.s.sembly, at least of the Notables. Lord Dufferin, in December 1882, wrote to me that he would sooner run any risk than abandon the representative inst.i.tutions proposed for Egypt in his famous scheme.

Yet now the French are bidding the Khedive call together, against Lord Dufferin's virtual successor, this very a.s.sembly of Notables, which Lord Cromer, such is his present policy, dare not call. The conception of this a.s.sembly was the act of yourself, supported by Lord Granville and Sir William Harcourt and supported on paper by Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Baring, and opposed by Lord Hartington, by the then Chancellor, and by Lord Northbrook. This "extension of Egyptian liberties," which was our pride, which was our excuse for that "short prolongation" of the occupation, to which I was myself opposed--an extension of liberties which has not been carried into practical effect by us--is certain to result in a declaration by the Notables, when they meet, as within this year, through the French Agent's influence, they will, that they are rootedly opposed to our presence in their land.

'It may be said that neither the Turks nor the French have pressed us, directly, to come out. The Turks will never really press us. The Sultan is forced by Moslem public opinion to ask us to leave Egypt, but he is in fact personally anxious that we should stay there to keep Mahdism in the desert and representative inst.i.tutions in the shade. The French have also their inner policy--their Rothschilds to keep in good humour--and two currents, one political and one financial, with which to deal. M. Waddington expressed to you at Hawarden a mere desire for exchange of views between the Cabinets.

He was naturally anxious not to be refused in any direct request.

But French public opinion is exasperated against us; only one man in France believes a word we say, and our diplomatists and admirals behave as though they represented German instead of neutral interests. We are responsible for tempting Italy to stay in the alliance of the Central Powers, to her own hurt.

'None of these things shall I be able to say when I bring the question before the House of Commons. To do so would involve statements based on private letters and statements as to Cabinet differences of 1882, which I cannot make. We shall be compelled to rely chiefly upon the declarations of Lord Salisbury, which were summed up in his words of May, 1887, to the effect that the occupation entails on us "heavy sacrifices, without adequate return either in peace or in war."

'Having given attention for some years past to our general position as a nation, feeling as I do, with you, how adversely it is affected by the prolongation of the "temporary" occupation, which, as matters stand, seems likely to endure till the next war, even should it be postponed till half a century hence, I cannot but feel miserable at the situation of this affair, and I once more ask your pardon for in this way liberating my mind, or, I fear, rather discharging upon you, regardless of your prodigious avocations, this last expression of a regret deeper than that which I have previously entertained on any public question.

'Through the mischiefs of the occupation there now seems to come no single ray of light. The present year will not pa.s.s over without a change in the local situation at Cairo, from which a conference is likely to result. A pa.s.sage near the end of Lord Rosebery's despatch shows that he is prepared to have a conference forced upon him. Had we invited it, such a conference would be to us the blessing that it will be to others. Would it not at least be best that we should call that conference on the first opportunity rather than have it thrust down our throats?

'This letter has not been shown to anyone, and needs, as I said, no reply, but I should be glad if it were not handed to anyone outside of your own circle. It has not been mentioned to anyone except Mr.

Herbert Gladstone.']

to Mr. Gladstone during his last Premiers.h.i.+p, Dilke summed up his views when a debate was about to take place in the House of Commons, and four days later he notes: 'On April 18th I had a long interview with Mr.

Gladstone, who sent for me, on my letter. The only thing he said worth remembering was, "Jingoism is stronger than ever. It is no longer war fever, but earth hunger."'

In 1887 the possibility of a German attempt to violate the neutrality of Belgian territory, notwithstanding the treaty of guarantee of 1839, which Prussia herself had signed, was again attracting attention owing to a sudden renewal of warlike apprehensions on the Continent. The position of Luxemburg was a kindred question, though the international guarantee was of a far more uncertain character than in the case of Belgium. Sir Charles, as already related, had returned from his work in France during the war of 1870 with a profound conviction that a spirit of reckless violence was abroad in Germany, which would stop at nothing if favourable circ.u.mstances offered a temptation to action; and in his opinion the absence of any fortifications at Liege and Namur afforded such a temptation. The point had been till then little discussed in England, though General Brialmont had written in the _Revue de Belgique_ on the subject. Sir Charles's view having been questioned, that the danger to Belgium's neutrality for military and other reasons was from Germany alone, he drew attention to the enormous acc.u.mulation of supplies of every kind in the entrenched camp of Cologne as of itself sufficient in military eyes to prove the truth of what he said. He considered also that the reduction of our horse artillery greatly impaired the possibility of Great Britain affording really effectual military a.s.sistance to Belgium, and that the recent utterances of the princ.i.p.al organ of the Conservative party, the _Standard_, and of the writers in the _National Review_, that intervention in support of Belgium 'would be not only insane but impossible,' showed that the public opinion of Great Britain was no longer unanimous as it had been in 1870-71. [Footnote: The questions connected with the Belgian and Luxemburg guarantees are very fully discussed in a recent work, _England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg_, by C. P. Sanger and H.

T. J. Norton. See also chapter i. of _War: Its Conduct and Legal Results_, by Dr. Baty and Prof. J. H. Morgan; _The Present Position of European Politics_, pp. 42-48, 73, 321-323.] This dispa.s.sionate consideration of the chances of England's intervening single-handed and without allies, in the case of a European war, to protect the neutrality of an unfortified Belgium, led to statements that he was opposed to such a step, and he had to point out in reply that for years he had consistently expressed the contrary view, but that he was now dealing with facts and tendencies, not with his own wishes. [Footnote: _British Army_, chap. ii., p. 55.] Shortly after the appearance of this article, discussion in Belgium led to the introduction of a Government Bill for the fortification of the towns upon the Meuse, and it was afterwards decided to fortify Namur and Liege.

Estimating the probabilities of a Continental war, he thought that Russia came next to England in staying power, because her enormous army formed a smaller proportion of her working cla.s.s than in the case of any other great Continental Power. Notwithstanding his suspicions of her policy, he spoke of Russia with a deep and discriminating interest born of numerous visits to all parts of her dominions, and deprecated the att.i.tude of those Englishmen whose dislike of Russia had done harm to the cause of sense and truth by exaggeration, and had led them to ignore 'her power and the marvellous patriotism of her people.' 'In the union of patriotism with religion I know no nation which can approach them.'

There could be no doubt in any reasonable mind of her real and lasting strength. But her unlimited power of self-deception; the necessary instability of a policy resting upon the will of a single man; her misgovernment of Poland and her alienation of Bulgaria, const.i.tuted dangers which it was idle to ignore. He, however, set against these weaknesses her popularity with all the Slav nations; her influence in the Baltic provinces of Germany, and even with the Poles, 'who, like everyone else of Slavonic race, seem born with a hatred of the Teutons.'

'The only foreigner who is known to the Russian peasantry is the German, and the name for German and for foreigner with the peasantry is the same, and the hatred of the "dumb men," as they call their German neighbours, is intense. The peasantry know little of the English, and if you listen to their sentiments you discover that it is their belief that one day there will be between _them_ and Germany a war compared with which, their soldiers say, that of 1870 will be child's play, and that if Germany wins this will not be the end, but that war after war will follow until Germany is destroyed.'

'Because Russia is very violent in her language and her acts, we often fail to see how a peasantry, which an aristocratic government or a government of political economists could never win, is won over by her to her rule. The Moscow men failed in Bulgaria, but in Poland they succeeded, and in the Baltic provinces, too, their methods and their policy have not been wanting, and the problems that have so long perplexed this country in her relations with Ireland would have been solved in a week by Samarin, or Miliutin, or Prince Teherkasky.' [Footnote: _Present Position of European Politics_, pp.

125, 134.]

The popular phrases which dubbed Sir Charles Dilke as 'anti-German' or 'anti-Russian' were never more curiously misapplied. The flaw to be found even in the mental const.i.tution of Gambetta's great personality, as shown by his antagonism to Russia, had no part in his friend's outlook; nor did Sir Charles's friends.h.i.+p for all things French make him an enemy to Germany, though the possibility of conjuring 'the German peril' was ever in his mind. But he doubted the wisdom of the wavering counsels which began with 'lying down to Germany,' and were to be marked by the cession of Heligoland. Strong men and strong Governments recognize and respect one another; and in dealing with Germany he believed that it was necessary never to forget this trite yet valuable warning.

If personal friends.h.i.+ps and political sympathy made Sir Charles, as the previous chapters have shown, look constantly to France as the natural ally of Great Britain, and also her most desirable ally, neither friends.h.i.+ps nor sympathies could blind him to the constant danger arising from the instability of French Administrations, and the consequent difficulty of relying on any certainty in arrangements projected for joint action. Of this the events connected with Egypt had been a most conspicuous ill.u.s.tration. Nor were these the only dangers: for the best friends of France were painfully aware of the immense influence exercised by powerful financial interests both in her domestic and in her foreign affairs, and by the growth of fierce antagonisms on home questions which seemed to tear the country asunder and paralyze her position abroad. Numerous questions, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere in Africa; the old quarrels about the Newfoundland fisheries, on which Sir Charles was constantly putting his finger as a possible cause of a serious quarrel; and increasing jealousies in the Pacific, contributed to produce a condition of permanent tension for many years in the relations of the two countries, until the Fashoda incident in 1898 brought a crisis which cleared the air. Two of the ablest men in France, M. Jules Ferry and M. Hanotaux, were, to say the least, not friendly to Great Britain, and a plan which Sir Julian Pauncefote [Footnote: Then Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and afterwards Lord Pauncefote and Amba.s.sador at Was.h.i.+ngton.] had suggested in 1884, of attempting to bring all outstanding questions with France into one great settlement, fell still-born, to be vivified, but twenty years later, by Lord Lansdowne in more favourable circ.u.mstances.

In all possible complications Sir Charles relied much on Italy's close friends.h.i.+p for England--notwithstanding her entry into the Triple Alliance--a friends.h.i.+p due to permanent grat.i.tude for the support which she had received from Lord Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Palmerston, at the crisis of her fate in 1859; and also to the offer to her of a joint occupation of Egypt in 1882--an offer rejected indeed, but fruitful of good feeling.

But more important even than any question of alliances was, he insisted, the necessity that Great Britain should know her own mind, and have a definite policy in regard to the future of Constantinople and of Egypt, and in regard to the Belgian guarantee. Army organization itself obviously depended on policy, and in this connection there was a danger at home greater, perhaps, than any originating abroad.