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He gripped my arm. "They are fools," said he. "We are looking forward as eagerly as the great Bishop Strossmayer to the union of the Southern Slavs. According to the spirit of his time he began at the top, with academies, picture galleries and so forth. We prefer to begin with elementary schools." And bubbling with enthusiasm he told me of the efforts his party was making. It was plain to see that what lies nearest to his heart is to improve their social and economic status. And those observers are probably in the right, who believe that he merely uses this republican cry as a weapon which he will conveniently drop when it has served its purpose.
"If only Yugoslavia had a great statesman," said I, "who would weld the new State together, so that the Croats remain with the Serbs not alone for the reasons that they are both Southern Slavs and that they are surrounded by not over-friendly neighbours. The great statesman--perhaps it will be Paic--will make you all happy to come together."
"From the bottom of my heart I hope he will succeed," said Radic, "and he will be remembered as our second and more fortunate Strossmayer."
We generally imagine that the statesmen of South-Eastern Europe are a collection of rather swarthy, frock-coated personages who, when not engaged in decrying each other, are very busily occupied in feathering their own nests. If any one of them, at the outset of his career, had a sense of humour we suppose that in this heated atmosphere it must have long ago evaporated. But strangely enough, the two most prominent politicians in Yugoslavia, the venerable Paic, the Prime Minister of this new State of Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, even as he used for years to be the autocrat of Serbia, and his opponent Stephen Radic are, both of them, by the grace of G.o.d, of a humorous disposition.
Outwardly, there is not much resemblance between them: Paic, the picture of a benevolent patriarch, letting fall in his deep voice a few casual words which bring down his critics' case, hopelessly down like a wounded aeroplane, and Radic the fervid little orator, the learned man, whose life has been devoted to the Croat peasants and who is said to find it difficult to make a speech that is under eight hours in length. Last year when the vigorous Pribicevic, then Minister of the Interior, who is determined to compel the Serbs and the Croats straightway to live in the closest companions.h.i.+p, whereas Radic, supported by most of the Croat _intelligentsia_, argues that in view of their very different culture, the Serbs having enjoyed a Byzantine and the Croats an Austrian education, it would be advisable for these two branches of the South Slav nation to come gradually and not violently together,--last year when Radic was lying in prison on account of his subversive ideas Pribicevic sent a message to say that he was prepared to adopt half his programme. And Radic sent back word regretting that the Minister could not adopt the whole of it and thus obtain for himself the Peasants' party. It is wrong to a.s.sert that this party is unpatriotic; the enemies of Yugoslavia, who welcome in Radic a disruptive element, are totally in error. Years ago he was working for the eventual union of Serbs and Croats--the Austrians imprisoned him because in 1903 he went to Belgrade at the accession of King Peter and made an admirable speech to this effect--and his present att.i.tude is due to the impatient manner in which Mr. Pribicevic and his friends are endeavouring to bring the union about. His peasants are a conservative people; they cannot instantly dispel the anti-Serb ideas which the Austrians for ever inculcated, nor the negative anti-Serb frame of mind which they learned from their own _intelligentsia_. It will take a little time before the Catholic peasant realizes that the Orthodox Serb is his brother and that now his military service will not be in an alien army, but in his own. "Let us go slowly," says Radic, "with our peasants"; and he knows them very well.... One is told that he changes his opinions from hour to hour; he is certainly very impetuous, very much under the influence of his emotions; but in one thing he has never varied--he has always struggled for the Croat peasant, and he has been rewarded by the unbounded devotion of that faithful, rather incoherent, creature.
Now the Serbs are a democratic people; they are by their nature in opposition to any force, civil or military, which might attempt to make the monarchy more absolute. The wisest Serbs do not forget that in the peasant lies their princ.i.p.al wealth, and although as yet the Serbian Peasants' party does not hold many const.i.tuencies in the old kingdom, nevertheless it appears to have a brighter prospect than any other Serbian party, for in that country the revolt against the lawyer-politician is likely to be more efficacious than in France or England. One may look forward to an understanding between Radic and this Serbian party, which is only two or three years old, although its founder, the excellent Avramovic--an elderly gentleman who sits behind vast barricades of books in various languages--has devoted himself for many years to agrarian co-operative societies, of which in Serbia there are more than 1500.
The most uncertain factors seem to be the moderating hold of Radic over his peasants and over himself. No one doubts but that he has the interests of the peasant very much at heart, and if he succeeds in improving the peasant's lot then that grateful giant will presumably not sink again into the sleep which he enjoyed when he was under the Habsburgs. The circulation of Radic's weekly paper _Dom_[62] ("The Home") has risen from 2000 before the elections and 9000 during the elections to 30,000. One enterprising vendor, a Serb from the Banat, takes 500 copies a week and tramps over the countryside, disposing of his wares either for cash or for eggs, the latter of which he sells at the end of the week to a Zagreb hotel. The peasant is making great efforts to raise himself--a case has recently been brought to light of a farmer in Zagorija who, as a hobby, has taught more than 700 persons to read and write. The peasant perceives that he has been a.s.sisted far less by the Catholic Church than by the work of Radic. It is not unfair to say that the Church desired, above all things, to keep the peasant under her control. If a parish priest was disliked by his flock, so a prominent Croatian priest tells me, that was all the more reason why the Bishop refused to remove him. And the clergy, except for an enlightened minority, have been very much opposed to Radic's policy of democratizing the Church.... In return for his unceasing labours he has now secured the peasant's love and confidence. He will retain them if he satisfies his client, and it seems to be within his power--gaining for him a better position and dissuading him from fantastic demands. He can be of immense a.s.sistance in the task of building up the State. But will the brilliant flame within him burn with steadiness? Has he got sufficient strength of will? With all his qualities of heart and brain he has not managed to discard his zig-zag impetuosity. The peasants, who recognize his talents, ask him to captain the s.h.i.+p; but he runs down too often into his cabin and leaves the unskilled sailors on the bridge.
Down in the cabin he is feverishly and with great skill writing a contradiction of a p.r.o.nouncement he made yesterday.
Those who are openly sailing in Radic's boat are for the most part the hard-headed peasants. Yet a number of the _intelligentsia_ are coming on board--some of them, no doubt, with a view to their own advancement, but others on account of their convictions. And a still greater number of the Croat _intelligentsia_ look on him with sympathy--munic.i.p.al officials, barristers, doctors, merchants, schoolmasters and military officers. It is most foolish to pretend that all these people are thinking regretfully of the old Habsburg days--they are, in the vast majority, sincere and loyal Yugoslavs who have certain grievances. They do not believe that Croatia has fared very well since the inst.i.tution of the new State and it would seem wise to give them as much autonomy as is consonant with the interests of the whole country, for then they will only have themselves to blame if there is no improvement. Maybe they are unduly sensitive, but they were for many years in political warfare with the Magyars and this should be taken into consideration. Even if all the grievances are based on misconceptions, on the difficulties of the moment, on the circ.u.mstances of the fading past--the new generation of Croats, say their teachers, are growing up to be excellent Yugoslavs--yet an effort should be made to sweep them away.
When Belgrade makes a statesmanlike gesture then Radic will probably be able to persuade the peasants to abandon their republican slogan--both they and the _intelligentsia_ will abandon their reserved att.i.tude towards the Government which they were far from entertaining when the State was first established. It seems as if the role of conciliator may well be filled by that wise old man, Nicholas Paic, who is now no longer a mere Balkan Premier. When he was that he very properly used Balkan methods, despite the stern remarks of a few Western critics.
THE SERBS AND THE CROATS
We have alluded to the relations between Serbs and Croats. This is a subject of such importance that it will be well to consider it more fully. When Yugoslavia sprang into existence at the end of the War--70 per cent. of this State having previously been under the rule of the House of Habsburg--it was met in various quarters with a grudging welcome. Soon, we were told, it would dissolve again, and every symptom of internal discontent was treated as a proof of this. On the other hand there were those who told us that the Southern Slavs, having come together after all these hundreds of years, were tightly clasped in each others' arms and that all reports to the contrary came from very interested parties.
Little was said of the Slovenes; their language, as we have mentioned, is not the same as that spoken by Serbs and Croats, and--what is of still greater importance--they have Slovenia to themselves. If Croatia were equally immune from Serbs, then by this time the Southern Slavs would be a more united nation. Those people were wrong who fancied that the presence of the Serbs in Croatia--they form between one-fourth and one-third of the population--would be of service in welding together the new State. They forgot that for many years the Austro-Hungarian Government had in Croatia played off the Roman Catholic Croats against the Orthodox Serbs. The two Slav brothers were incited to mutual hatred, and though such a propaganda would naturally have more effect among the uneducated cla.s.ses, yet all too often the _intelligentsia_ responded to these machinations. More favour, of course, was shown to the Croats, whose obedience could largely be secured by means of the Church, whereas no similar pressure could be brought to bear upon the Orthodox Serbs.
Even if the Government approached the Orthodox clergy, these latter had only a very moderate control over their flock. A Serb is always ready to subscribe towards the erection of a new church, which he regards as most other nations regard their flag; but when it is built he rarely enters it. This being so, the Austro-Hungarian Government tyrannized over the Serbs in Croatia by measures taken against their schools, the Cyrillic alphabet and so forth. It was natural that the suffering Serbs were apt to compare these restrictions with those that were imposed upon the Croats. However, among the _intelligentsia_ an effort--a fairly successful effort--was made to nullify this dividing policy; the Serbo-Croat Coalition was formed, one of the protagonists being Svetozar Pribicevic, that very energetic Serb of Croatia, and in 1906 this party obtained no less than sixty-eight seats, while the power of the older Croat parties was correspondingly diminished and Radic had his very small following in the Zagreb Lantag. [Those who represented Croatia in the central Parliament at Buda-Pest were chosen by the Ban, Khuen-Hedervary. Those forty members had practically no acquaintance with the Magyar language, so that some of them drew their 8000 annual crowns and only went to Pest if an important division was expected, others who spent more time in the capital wasted their lives amid surroundings just as riotous as and more expensive than the Parliament, while only those did useful work who managed to confer, behind the scenes, with the authorities. To some extent this was done by Pribicevic and to a greater extent by another Serb, Dr. Duan Popovic, who surpa.s.sed him in capacity and geniality. It was he, by the way, who demonstrated in the Buda-Pest Parliament that if the average Croat deputy was ignorant of the Magyar language, there was a greater ignorance of Serbo-Croatian on the part of the Magyars. One day when he had started on a speech in his native tongue he was howled down after he had explained that he was talking Serbian. He promised to continue in Croatian, and did so without being interrupted.]
At Zagreb the fusion of the Croat and Serb _intelligentsia_ was still very incomplete at the outbreak of the War--the Croat Starcevist party and others going their own way. During the War the Austro-Hungarian Government ruled by means of the Coalition party; but the latter had no choice, and throughout Croatia they were never charged with infidelity to the Slav cause. They did whatever their delicate situation permitted; and in October 1918, when the Slavs of Croatia and Slovenia threw off the yoke of centuries and joined with the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro, one hoped that the simultaneous arrival in Belgrade of the Coalition and the Starcevist leaders heralded in Croatia a cessation of the ancient hostility. Pribicevic became Minister of the Interior in the new State, and very soon it was obvious that he meant to govern in a centralizing fas.h.i.+on, despite his earlier a.s.surance that no such steps would be taken without the sanction of the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly. No doubt his motives were unimpeachable; he feared lest the negative, anti-Serb mentality, which for so long had flourished among the Croats, would not, except by drastic methods, be removed. He was met with opposition. Now you see, he cried, there are still in Croatia a number of disloyal Slavs, great landowners, Catholic clergy and others whom the Habsburgs used to favour. And he continued, with hundreds of edicts, to try to weld the State together. Consumed with patriotism, his great black eyes on flame amid the pallor of his face--his luminous and martyred face, to use the expression of his friends--he never for a moment relaxed his efforts; if those who opposed him were numerous it was all the more reason why he must be resolute.
The role fitted him very well, for he is the dourest politician in Yugoslavia--a perfectly honest, upright, injudicious patriot. His Democratic party had now taken the place of the Serbo-Croat Coalition and it saw the other parties in Croatia gradually drifting back again from it or rather from the dominating man; if his place had been occupied by his afore-mentioned colleague, the burly and beloved Duan Popovic, there would have been in Zagreb a very much suaver atmosphere. But unfortunately Popovic is a wealthy man, a highly successful lawyer who cares little for the tumult of politics.... It was a th.o.r.n.y problem, whether the State should be const.i.tuted on a federal or a centralized basis.[63] The federation of the United States depends on the centralization of political parties, whereas in Yugoslavia the parties have only just begun to combine. Feudalism in the German Empire rested on the predominance of Prussia, a position which the Serbs are, under present conditions, loth to occupy in Yugoslavia. In Germany, moreover, many of the States used to be independent, while in Yugoslavia this was only the case with Serbia and Montenegro. Centralism would tend to obliterate the tribal divisions, but on the other hand it brings in its train bureaucracy, which is slow, c.u.mbrous and often corrupt; it demands unusually good central inst.i.tutions and first-rate communications, neither of which are as yet in a satisfactory state. The const.i.tution has arrived at a compromise between the federal and the centralized systems. A writer in the _Contemporary Review_ (November 1921) said that the division of the whole of Yugoslavia into some twenty administrative areas [he should have said thirty-three] to replace the racial areas, was a very drastic proposal to put forward; and he added that when the historic provincial divisions of France were broken up into departments, the nation had been prepared by nearly 200 years of centralization under the monarchy. It is a flaw in his argument to say that the previously existing areas were racial, whereas populations of identical race were divided from one another by the course of events. And in the proposed obliteration of these divisions--to be effected in a less arbitrary fas.h.i.+on than in France, where no account was taken of the former provinces--it can scarcely be maintained that, of itself, this part of the centralizing programme in Yugoslavia is so very drastic.
Whatever one may think about the Balkan peoples it is a fact that the essential Serb, the Serb from umadia, is a pacific person, rather lazy perhaps, but certainly more devoted to dancing than to battle. And some of the wiser Serbs were dubious in 1919 and 1920 as to whether the most sagacious methods were being employed in Croatia. Radic was in prison, but they were told that this impetuous demagogue was insisting on a republic, and the Croat _intelligentsia_ were far from happy. It is true that in the elections of November 1920 the National party, as the Starcevists now called themselves, had no great success; but the Radic party had more than half the seats. Surely this had not been brought about merely by the chief's imprisonment? There seemed to be in that province some wider, some growing dissatisfaction. And in the spring of 1921 most of the Catholic Croats, those within and those without the Radic party, were nouris.h.i.+ng a score of grievances. No doubt a large proportion of these were unavoidable (in view of the state of Central Europe) or were rather trivial (the mayor of an important town told me that he, who was under the Minister of the Interior, had received an order from the Belgrade Minister of War, with respect to the detention of deserters--conditions, said he, were not so primitive in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy) and sometimes the grievances were against the Habsburgs (for not having made them more fit to a.s.sume these new responsibilities), and sometimes they were against the Serbs for being less civilized--though they might be more moral--than themselves, and sometimes the grievances were personal: now and then after the Austrian collapse a Serbian officer or his men, uncertain of the feelings of the population, had acted with unwise, or rather with inexpedient, vigour--instead of shooting those who in the general anarchy were laying waste and plundering, they merely flogged them, and this was for a long time remembered against them, although the Croat _intelligentsia_ who had taken service in the police flogged in a far more wholesale fas.h.i.+on.
But down at the bottom of all the grievances there is the fundamental fact that the Southern Slavs yearn to be comrades, to shake off the differences which in the course of ages have grown up between them.
These fraternal sentiments may be crudely expressed--it has happened that a Slav from Bosnia (whose ancestors adopted Islam some centuries ago) finds himself in a Serbian village. He strikes up acquaintance with some native. "What is your name?" asks the latter. "Muhammed." The Serb has never heard of such a name; he is puzzled. "Well, never mind," says he, and takes his new friend back to dinner. They sit down to the sucking pig. Muhammed refuses to partake of it, and informs the Serb that Allah would be angry. "Don't be afraid," says the Serb; "I'll tell him that it's my fault," and after a time he overcomes the Bosniak's scruples.... In more cultured circles the wonderful union of the Southern Slavs is manifested after a different fas.h.i.+on, and those neighbours who imagine that the afore-mentioned grievances are going to dissolve the new State will one day see how much they are mistaken. The Southern Slavs intend to quarrel with each other, to quarrel like brothers.
THE SAD CASE OF PRIBICEVIC
As between the Catholic and the Orthodox in Croatia the sole uncertainty is whether this fusion will shortly take place or after an interval. It is agreed by the most malcontent schoolmasters that their pupils are growing up to be excellent Yugoslavs who will have no more fear of what they call "Serb hegemony" than have the Scots of that of England. As for the present generation of Croats and Serbs, if they were Occidentals they would be old enough to laugh at each others' peculiarities and each others' statesmen. But South-Eastern Europe is still under the morning clouds, and they are inclined to take seriously what we in the West make fun of. However, there is one man whose presence in the Cabinet the Croats cannot be expected to regard with good-humour or with nonchalance. The reconciliation of Croatia will be much more easily effected if Mr. Pribicevic resigns. His merits as a demagogue and political writer are undeniable. He would make an excellent Whip. But he prefers to be a Minister, and most unfortunately he is not a statesman.
A zealous patriot, he is as yet unable to conceive that the business of the State could be more successfully managed without him. The sweets of office appear, if anything, to have made him more bitter; and even among the Serbs of the old kingdom his withdrawal is considered advisable. A friend of his has told me that in the middle of a laughing conversation he threw out a hint of this, and like a cloud blown suddenly across a summer sky, Pribicevic's face grew black. Unhappily he is not even Fortinbras and yet imagines he is Hamlet. A good many people in Yugoslavia call him _un homme fatal_, most of the others _l'homme fatal_. It is said that in the Democratic party he is actively supported by not more than ten deputies, but that the others, to preserve the party, take no steps. He himself, however, would probably have not the least hesitation in choosing another party, if he could otherwise not stay in the Cabinet; for his permanence in office is the one idea that crushes every other from his mind. If he cannot be Minister of the Interior--a post from which he has been more than once, and happily for Yugoslavia, ejected--then he insists on being Minister of Education.
What are his qualifications? Years ago he gave instruction at a school for elementary teachers, and so faint a conception has he of the educational needs of his country that one day when a Professor of Belgrade University asked him if no steps could be taken to diminish the prohibitive cost of books, especially foreign books, the Minister simply stared at him as if he had been talking Chinese. And yet in a recent book of national verses, published by his brother Adam, we are told that:
"At the table also sat the sage Pribicevic, Who can converse with Emperors...."
There are some who, curiously, have compared Radic's party with the Sinn Feiners; Radic may have announced that he would approach the Serbs as the representative of an independent country, but he never proposed, even when his views were most extreme, to realize them with physical force. At a great open-air meeting of his adherents the speeches were so mild that only twice did the Chief of Police, who was next to me, raise a warning finger, and on each occasion to keep the orator from very innocent digressions. Nevertheless, there is no concealing the fact that even in these unsatisfactory times--"It seems to me," said a philosophic peasant recently at Valjevo, in the heart of Serbia, "it seems to me that if we had a plebiscite then Valjevo might not wish to remain with Serbia!"--even in a world that is so awry the Croats are more reserved towards the union than is good for the State.
Perhaps they would cherish fewer grievances if they had gained their freedom with greater difficulty; and surely they need have no more uneasiness than have the Scots that their name and nationality will be swamped, for what the Magyars were unable to do, that the Serbs do not wish to do. There are among the Serbs a few extremists, such as a pernicious editor or two, but their anti-Croat tirades find extremely little favour anywhere. Last autumn when the Prince-Regent (now King Alexander) visited the Croat capital his reception was most enthusiastic. "Let us keep him here!" cried the people, "and let King Peter stay in Belgrade!" The Prince by his tact brought the Croat out of his tent; he must not be allowed to go back again--let the Southern Slavs observe what each of their provinces can bring towards the common good. The Croats acknowledge that the military system of Serbia is more endurable--only one son is taken out of each family--and that whereas in Slovenia a lawsuit can be settled in fourteen days it has been wont in Croatia to take as many years. Unfortunately human nature, in Serbia, Croatia and everywhere else, finds that the bad points of other people are more worthy of comment than the good. When two brothers have been brought up in very different circ.u.mstances there will be so many points on which they differ; and when a Serb taking part in a technical discussion of scientists wishes to say that he differs from the previous speaker he will commonly observe that that person has made a fool of himself. When an editor alludes to a political opponent he may call him an a.s.sa.s.sin and be much astonished if this is resented. "Je suis un ours," said a Serbian savant of European repute; occasionally he behaves like one and is rather proud of it. The Serbs of Croatia have been imitating, nay exaggerating, the emphatic manners of their countrymen in the old kingdom. And Pribicevic, as Minister of Education, has not attempted to give the Croats a tactful course in courage, patriotism and morality, where they have much to learn from the less civilized Serbs, but scowling at them he has made up his mind that, in and out of school, they must straightway be the closest of companions.
However, the Serbs and Croats have a man whose counsel is more worthy of attention. Dr. Trumbic, formerly the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been elected at the head of four different lists in his native Dalmatia but had entered the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly without giving his allegiance to any party. And in April 1921 he made a speech as memorable as it was long, for it occupied the whole of one sitting and was continued the next day. Careless of the applause and the antagonism which he excited, the serene orator pointed out that the conflict between Serbs and Croats was based on their different psychology. Croatia had had her independent life and must be considered as a factor in Yugoslavia; but having come in, like Montenegro, of her own accord, she had not wished to be a separate factor. Traditions should not be so lightly set aside; and while there was perhaps no people more h.o.m.ogeneous than the Yugoslavs it should be remembered that none was more ready to resist the application of force.
LESSONS OF THE MONTENEGRIN ELECTIONS
Except at Kolain, where a few friends of Nikita tried their brigand tactics, there was perfect calm in Montenegro during the elections. As elsewhere in Yugoslavia, there was a general amnesty and a prohibition, for the three preceding days, to sell wine or rakia. The ten elected candidates, all of them for the Yugoslav union and against Nikita, were equally divided between Radicals and Democrats on the one hand and Communists and Republicans on the other. The authorities took not the slightest step to favour any candidate; various prominent deputies, such as Dr. Yoyic, the Minister of Food Supply, were beaten. And in a letter to the Press we were told by Mr. Ronald M'Neill, M.P., that these elections were certainly both "farcical and fraudulent." He is contradicted by Mr. Roland Bryce, who, after his excellent work on the Allied Plebiscite Commission in Carinthia, was sent by the Foreign Office with Major L. E. Ottley to report on the Montenegrin elections.
He says (in Command Paper I., 124) that "in actual practice the method of voting prescribed by the electoral law was found to ensure absolute secrecy (the system adopted being the only feasible one in a country where the proportion of illiterates is great), and the manner in which the ballot was supervised and carried out was unimpeachable and proof against the most exacting criticism." Mr. M'Neill is also contradicted by the Republican candidate, M. Gjonovic, who in a manifesto drawn up after the election declares that "none can say that the elections were not free, or that anyone who wished could not make up a list. At the elections only the lists and boxes of the Republicans, Democrats, Independents, Radicals and Communists were represented. All of these parties had in their programmes the motto 'The people and State union,'
with, of course, different points of view and different opinions as to the organization of our national and State forces, except the Communists, who go further and desire the union of all peoples."
WHICH ONE GENTLEMAN REFUSES TO TAKE
It will thus be seen that the friends of Nikita were altogether wrong in suggesting that those who voted for the Republicans or Communists were opposed to the union with Serbia in Yugoslavia. Both Republicans and (paradoxical though it sounds) the Communists resented this insinuation very bitterly; and considering that the leaders of both parties are p.r.o.nounced antagonists of the old regime, and were indeed severally condemned to death by Nikita, it would have been strange if they now supported him. Thus every single programme put forward by the different parties included, in some form or other, union with Serbia. The candidates themselves explicitly said so; but Mr. M'Neill knows better, and informs us how very hostile to the Serbs they really were. He is a wonderful man, Mr. M'Neill. Standing up in the House of Commons he directs his penetrating gaze upon the Black Mountain, and with such effect that he can see in the minds of Montenegrin politicians what they themselves had never dreamed of. Since we have such a man as Mr. M'Neill in the country, one would think that the Foreign Office might have saved itself the expense of sending out Mr. Bryce and Major Ottley.
But since we have it, let us look at Mr. Bryce's very interesting and detailed report. After explaining that both Republicans and Communists were in favour of union with Serbia, he tells us how it happened that so many people voted for these two lists instead of for the orthodox Radical and Democratic parties. The Communists, according to Mr. Bryce, were benefited by a party organization, a vigorous canva.s.s and a better discipline than that of any of their opponents. Their policy won the support of many ardent and very patriotic Nationalists, who voted in many cases for Communism on the ground that it was the Russian policy--out of grat.i.tude for what the Tzars had done for Montenegro in the past! Major Temperley, a.s.sistant military attache, in another report (Command Paper I., 123) observes that some local discontent had arisen in Montenegro because the native does not understand, and has never experienced before, a really efficient system of government, and because the introduction of conscription was not well adapted to the national tradition of lawless and untrained vigour. Major Temperley testifies that the Republican party gained the suffrages of numerous returned emigrants who admired the state of things in America. He shares Mr. Bryce's opinion as to the insignificance of the pro-Nikita party.
"Even making large allowances," says he, "there seemed to me to be no doubt that the pro-Nicholas party were the weakest in Montenegro."
Certain of his devotees were simply brigands who, like the Neapolitan miscreants after 1860, sought to cast a glamour over their depredations by affecting to be in arms on behalf of their former King. This personage himself was so well aware of his unpopularity that he was prudent enough to tell his supporters to abstain from voting. Those who did abstain were altogether only 3269 per cent. of the electors, though one would have been justified in expecting a much higher proportion, since the people have not yet fully grasped their rights and duties with respect to the franchise; the distances to the booths were often very great, and the peasants were often indifferent as to whether one candidate or another with a very similar programme should be elected.
The tribal or family system is still so prevalent in the villages that one member of a family would be sent to express the considered views of his fellows. The effect of the elections being held on a Sunday was to increase rather than diminish the number of abstainers, for although Sunday is a public holiday the Christian Montenegrin is under no obligation to hear Ma.s.s and for that reason travel to the village. The churches are practically deserted, for he is accustomed on that day to remain at home; while the Moslem voters largely declined to vote because there were no Moslem candidates. That is why it would appear that those of the 3269 per cent. who abstained because they were in favour of Nikita were extremely few. Their simple-mindedness has its limits, while that of good Mr. M'Neill believes that because France, Great Britain and America undertook to restore Montenegrin independence, they were still obliged to do so after they perceived at the conclusion of the War that an overwhelming majority of Montenegrins did not desire it. This majority dethroned its traitor-king; but Mr. M'Neill maintains that France and England have dethroned "a monarch who was a friend and an ally."[64] Because M. Poincare, in the days before the Montenegrins had rejected Nikita, addressed him as "Very Dear and Great Friend"--the ordinary form of words for a reigning monarch--Mr. M'Neill actually seems to think that France was for evermore compelled to clasp Nikita to her bosom. He clearly admires those who, since the end of the War, have risen in the cause of their old King; and I suppose that in consequence he disapproves of the Omladina, the voluntary a.s.sociation of men who banded themselves together to resist the terrorism of the pro-King komitadjis. If he had been in Montenegro during the years after the War he would possibly agree that komitadji is the proper name for the many lawless elements who have found the traditional fighting life more congenial than the thankless task of tilling their very barren land. The moral effect of opposing to these the Montenegrin Omladina instead of Serbian troops was to destroy all pretence of the movement being a national Montenegrin insurrection against the union, and the cessation of a.s.sistance from Italy resulted in the complete suppression of the movement. The few outlaws who still remain at large, said Mr. Bryce in December 1920, are in no sense political, but are merely bandits. And as the Omladina has now no _raison d'etre_ they have disbanded themselves.
Much now depends on the Const.i.tution. If it gives them equal rights--and naturally it will--with the other inhabitants of Yugoslavia the Montenegrins will be content.
In August 1921 the _Secolo_ of Milan sent a famous correspondent to Montenegro. He came to much the same conclusions as Messrs. Bryce and Temperley. Not a single political prisoner was to be found, and not one of the ex-soldiers who returned from Gaeta had been molested. The correspondent thought that the Serbs had been ill-advised at the beginning to employ forcible methods against the pro-Nikita partisans who were opposed to Yugoslavia; they should, said he, have let the pear ripen spontaneously and fall into their lap. But now their policy had become one of conciliation: during the last two and a half years Montenegro had received from Belgrade for public works, pensions and subsidies, 93 million dinars, and had paid in taxes only 5 millions.
Secondary education had been increased, and 700 Montenegrin students (of whom 500 are allotted a monthly grant) frequent Yugoslav universities.
The fertile lands of Yugoslavia were open to Montenegrin emigration. In fact an isolated, independent Montenegro was no longer needed. With the disappearance of the Turk from all Serbian territory in 1913 a return to the union of the Serbs, as in the days of Stephen Duan, was only hindered by historical, sentimental and, above all, by dynastic reasons.
It was sad, quoth the correspondent, that the glorious history of Montenegro should have come to such a tame end, but her historic mission was closed in 1913, even as that of Scotland in 1707, to the benefit of both parties. Now the Serbs were leaving them to manage their own affairs; many ex-Nikita officials had been confirmed in their posts, while officers were given their old rank in the Yugoslav army. It is unfortunate for itself that the "Near East" (of London) does not employ so discerning a correspondent. We should then hear no more of such folly as that which--to select one occasion out of many--caused it in November 1921 to speak about "the forcible absorption of Montenegro." And the world may be pardoned if it is more ready to accept the observations made on the spot by an expert Italian correspondent rather than the futile remarks sent by the Hon. Aubrey Herbert from the House of Commons, also in November 1921, to the _Morning Post_. This gentleman informs us that "it was probably because the Yugoslav Government was allowed to annex the ancient princ.i.p.ality of Montenegro, exile its King, and subjugate its people, without any interference from the Great Powers, that M. Pasitch thought that he could do as he liked in Albania." That is the sort of statement which one may treat with Matthew Arnold's "patient, deep disdain."
MEDIaeVAL DOINGS AT RIEKA
On July 14, 1920, a letter marked "urgent" (No. 2047) was written by Colonel Sani, the Chief of d'Annunzio's Cabinet, in which he confirmed the orders which he had already given verbally, to the effect that all the foreign elements, especially the Serbs and Croats, who "exercise an obnoxious political influence," should be expelled from Rieka at the earliest possible date; he mentions that this is the command of d'Annunzio, who is in full accord with the President of the Consiglio n.a.z.ionale. This was the continuation of a practice which the Italian authorities had carried on in a wholesale manner. Father J. N.
Macdonald, in his unimpeachable little book, _A Political Escapade_ (London, 1921), gives us numerous examples of persons who in the most wanton fas.h.i.+on were expelled from the town. Thus a merchant called Pliskovac was arrested by the carabinieri, while talking to some English soldiers. After three days, spent under arrest, he was told that he would have to depart "from Italy" (_sic_). He was given a _f.a.glio di via obligatorio_ by the carabinieri, according to which he was banished on the ground of being "unemployed." Yet this man had had a fixed residence in Rieka for thirty-six years, was employed as a merchant, and furnished with a regular industrial certificate.... His name had been found on one of the lists in favour of annexation to Yugoslavia. When the world in general turned its attention away from Rieka, very much relieved to think that there would be an end to all the turmoil now that an agreement had at last been reached and the poor hara.s.sed place was to be neutral, it presumed that those among her citizens who had been openly in arms against the other party would as soon as possible resign. They would have been astonished to be told that the notorious self-elected Consiglio n.a.z.ionale Italiano, under the selfsame President, Mr.
Grossich, cheerfully remained in office. It is true that they now called themselves the "Provisional Government"; in Paris and London this change of t.i.tle made a good deal more impression than upon the local Yugoslavs, whose treatment did not vary. A decree was printed on January 21, 1921, in the _Vedetta_, which laid it down that the expulsions ordered by the previous Government retained their force, but that appeals might be addressed to the Rector of the Interior. A deputation was received by this gentleman, and was told that the procedure would be so complicated and so lengthy that it would not permit any one to return until after the elections. These elections had been fixed for the end of April, and it seemed as if France and England were so blinded by the blessed words "Provisional Government" that they could see nothing else. That over 2000 arditi, clothed in mufti, had either stayed from the d'Annunzian era or been since introduced was surely gossip, and how could anyone believe that those men had been granted citizens.h.i.+p on the simple declaration of a Rieka shopkeeper, or some such person, that the applicant worked under him? These declarations, by the way, must have refrained from going into details, for there was an almost total lack of work--except in the political department of the police. Rieka was to all intents in the possession of Italy, and she was learning what that meant. The town was like a dead place, shops were only open in the morning, and if the shopkeepers had not been compelled by the authorities to remove their shutters they would have strolled down to the quays where the gra.s.s was growing--"but, thank Heaven," cried Grossich, "thank Heaven, it is Italian gra.s.s!" (If he ever recalls that long-distant day, when, as a student, he fought for his fellow-Croats, and when, as a young doctor, he was an enthusiastic official of the Croat Club at Castua near Rieka, perhaps this gentleman thanks his G.o.d for having led him to Rieka and turned him into an Italian.) Cut off from its Yugoslav hinterland the population of Rieka, which consisted more and more of arditi and fascisti, less and less of Yugoslavs, the population had nothing to do save to speculate in the rate of exchange (but not in the local notes which no one wanted) and to prepare for the elections. Thus, with time very heavy on their hands, there was a great deal of corruption; cocaine could be obtained at nearly all the cafes.
The elections drew nearer, and one wondered whether the Entente was going to look at the lists of voters and to inquire how it came that many natives of the town were not inscribed. What was likely to happen if the place was delivered altogether to the C.N.I. could be seen when the harbour of Baro, given by the Rapallo Treaty to Yugoslavia, was demanded, simply demanded, by the Italian Nationalists; those ultra-patriots the fascisti, in Italy and in Rieka, when they saw that in the "holocaust city" everything was going just as well for them as in the brave days of d'Annunzio, persisted loudly in claiming Baro as an integral part of Rieka. The Yugoslavs must be prevented, wherever possible, from approaching the Adriatic--this being the furious policy of the Italian capitalists who had succeeded in sweeping most of the Italian people off their feet. With Baro, a port of limited possibilities, in the hands of the Yugoslavs, it would mean that the adjacent Rieka through its Yugoslav commerce would prosper; but anything that savoured of a Yugoslav Rieka was obnoxious to the capitalists and their wild followers, since they feared that in the first place it would raise a grievous obstacle to their penetration of the Balkans, and secondly it would involve the ruin of Triest, where German capital still plays a predominant part. So in their folly they strenuously fought for the Germans, spurred on by the terrible thought that Rieka might become predominantly Yugoslav. They refused to listen to their wiser men, who pointed out that the possession of an odd town or island was to Italy of not so much importance as friends.h.i.+p with their Slav neighbours. When, at the beginning of April 1921 a large sailing boat, the _Rad_ (Captain Vlaho Grubiic) came into Baro, the first s.h.i.+p to bring the Yugoslav flag to that port, there was intense commotion among the fascisti. Forty of them with weapons ran down to the harbour, but Grubiic told them that he saw no reason why he should not fly the flag of his State. A number of workmen, Italians and Yugoslavs, then appeared and made common cause against the fascisti, so that the latter withdrew. And the captain of the Italian wars.h.i.+p _Carlo Mirabello_ sent to ask Grubiic if he had removed the flag. On hearing that he had not done so the captain said that he had acted perfectly correctly. It seems to be too much to hope that such honourable Italians as this captain and these workmen will be able, without certain measures on the part of France and England, to prevail over those elements who have dragged Rieka down to death and to dishonour.
At last, on April 25, the elections were held. There were two parties, that of the C.N.I., swollen with arditi and fascisti, who would have nothing to do with the Treaty of Rapallo--their programme consisted in annexation to Italy--and the other party, whose object was to carry out the provisions of the Treaty. Professor Zanella was its chief. There did not seem to be much hope that it would be successful, although it contained what was left of the Autonomists, who in 1919 were the largest party--desiring that the town should be neither Yugoslav nor Italian--and these Autonomists were now reinforced by the Yugoslavs. But so numerous had been the expulsions that many of the survivors feared that it would be futile to vote, and on the other hand the Annexionist party was quite confident that it would win. During the afternoon of the election day, however, they perceived that the impossible was happening, and that Zanella was marching to victory. Thereupon the enraged fascisti had recourse to violence. "Zanella's victory was intolerable to these patriots," said _La n.a.z.ione_,[65] "because they remembered the two years of tenacity and of splendid Italian spirit and of suffering which the town had lived through." Most of the electors remembered the suffering.
The fascisti seized a number of urns and made a bonfire of them; there was presented the spectacle of Signor Gigante, d'Annunzio's obedient mayor, bursting with armed companions into that room of the Palace of Justice where the votes were being scrutinized. "I yield to violence,"
said the presiding official; and twenty minutes afterwards the contents of the urns were burning merrily. But these measures did not help the cause of the fascisti, no more than did their screams that they had been betrayed. And if Zanella had to fly from Rieka because, as the Nationalist paper put it, he could not stand up against the vehement indignation of so many of the citizens, yet he and his party have triumphed. "Fiume or Death," used to be the device dear to d'Annunzio.
He placarded the long-suffering walls with it, and it was on the lapels of the coats of his adherents. "Fiume must belong to Italy or be blown up," cried the poet. But, strange to say, a majority of the inhabitants prefer that their town should continue to exist, and this it can only do if, in accordance with the Treaty of Rapallo, it becomes a neutral State on friendly terms with both its neighbours, Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian Government desires, of course, to execute its Treaty obligations,[66] and if it finds too painful the task of moderating the ardours of its own super-patriots, it will no doubt be glad to have this done by an International force. That method, which was only prevented by d'Annunzio's arrival in 1919, offers the speediest and most efficacious solution of Rieka's troubles.
THE STRICKEN TOWN
If anyone imagined that they would be ended with the installation of Zanella he was wrong. At the munic.i.p.al elections 90 per cent. voted for the Autonomist party, the Yugoslavs having had the good sense to join them. But the Italian Nationalists were not going to yield to moderation, and immediately after the elections Zanella was obliged to flee for his life, so that he was not installed in office until October 5. He struggled manfully to clear away the chaos and to make such economic arrangements as would eventually convert Rieka into a prosperous port. This the fascisti of Triest and Venice could by no means tolerate, and on January 31 an unsuccessful attempt was made by them on his life as he was leaving the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly. On February 16 the Anai (a.s.soziazione n.a.z.ionale fra gli Arditi d'Italia) sent out a very urgent message from their headquarters in the Via Macchiavelli in Triest. They informed the subsections that not only was Zanella preparing to deliver Rieka to the Croats, but that the army of the "globe-trotter" Wrangel was waiting in Suak to seize the wretched town. Therefore Gabriele d'Annunzio had commanded that every loyal servant of the cause was to be mobilized. And after a few rhetorical sentences it continued, "I will give the marching orders by telegram as follows: 'Send the doc.u.ments. Farina.' If only a small number of people are needed I will telegraph, 'Send ... Quintal. Farina.'" The men were to a.s.semble at the Italian Labour Bureau, 9 Via Pozza Bianca in Triest.
They were to be clad in mufti, to be armed so far as it was possible and to have with them three days' provender.... The subsections are asked to telegraph the approximate number of those on whom they can rely. And this memorandum should be acknowledged. It is signed, "With brotherly greetings. Farina Salvatore." About ten days later--between February 26 and 28--there was a meeting at the Hotel Imperial in Vienna, under the presidency of Vilim Stipetic, formerly a major of the Austrian General Staff. Some dissident Croats--among them Dr. Emanuel Gagliardi, Captains Cankl and Petricevic, Gjuro Kliuric, Josip Boldin and Major-General Itvanovic--two dissident Montenegrins, Jovo Plamenac and Marko Petrovic, together with two Italian officers, adherents of d'Annunzio, Colonel Finzi of Triest and Major Ventura of Rome, ... a.s.sembled for the purpose of stirring up trouble for the Yugoslavs in the spring. They referred with pleasure to the presence of sundry Bulgarian komitadjis in Albania, Finzi declared that the Italian Government would satisfy the Croats and give them Rieka as soon as Croatia had achieved her independence and a less visionary promise was made of disturbances in Rieka. On March 1 the two Italian officers left for Triest and on March 3 Rieka was confronted with another _coup d'etat_. The fascisti of Triest and of Gulia Venetia descended on the town in two special trains of the Italian State Railway. They had not the slightest confidence in Zanella, who was an honest man, working on the basis of the Treaty of Rapallo, whereby Italy and Yugoslavia recognized the Free State of Rieka. In their eyes it was a monstrous thing that Italy should be expected to observe this instrument. So let the town be freed, let Zanella be expelled. And as he only had at his disposal a force of about three hundred local gendarmes, with rifles but without munition, it was not particularly difficult for the fascisti heroes to accomplish their task. Zanella had to fly once more.
"If Italy were to offend against the freedom and independence of the State of Rieka she would deprive herself," said Signor Schanzer, the Italian Foreign Secretary "she would deprive herself of the name of a Great Power and in the Society of Nations she would retain no authority." Thus did the successor of the relentless but unavailing della Torretta try, with eloquent and n.o.ble words, to wipe the blot from Italy's scutcheon. She could scarcely have the nations coming to the Congress of Genoa, there to debate with regard to the economic re-establishment of Europe, while her own conduct was so very much under suspicion. It would have been rather curious, so the _Zagreber Tagblatt_[67] pointed out, for a robber to invite you to his house with a view to taking steps against robbery. Something drastic had to be done, so that Europe would not look askance at the Italian Government.
Zanella, it was true, had been thrown out--but why should not the world be told that this had been effected by the people of the town? A very excellent idea! And so a certain Lieut. Cabruna of the _gendarmerie_ made a plan to get together the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly and then--well, there are always methods by which resolutions can be pa.s.sed. Perhaps it would not even be necessary for a single rifle to be fired at the deputies from the Distinguished Strangers' Gallery. But most of the deputies succeeded in escaping from the town, although frantic efforts were made to prevent them. Out of the threescore only thirteen poor devils were held fast and came to the futile meeting. The others, with Zanella, a.s.sembled on Yugoslav territory at a place called Saint Anna.
And Signor Schanzer went on talking. Officers and men of the Italian army and navy, said he, had shown perfect discipline. Signor Schanzer may not be an expert on discipline, but as a humorist he wins applause.
One's ordinary notions of discipline do not include the seizure of a wars.h.i.+p by a handful of bandits, the cannons of the vessel being afterwards directed against the Government palace of a neutral State.
The fascisti, with the help of Italian troops and accompanied by several Italian deputies, eject the legal Government of Rieka. One of these deputies, Giuratti, is chosen by his friends to be President of the Free State--Giuratti of the fascisti, Giuratti who most barbarically had ill-treated the Istrian Slavs, but--for we will be just--this was when he believed they were barbarians, savages, quite common, brutal men; well, he had learned, he wrote,[68] that this was not the case, they had adopted Western culture, they had raised the revolutionary flag against the dynasty of Karageorgevic and if Yugoslavia's dismemberment should ever come to pa.s.s, "then, as I confidently hope," said he, "the Croats with their righteous national aspirations will unite with their great neighbour Italy. We salute the Croat Revolution with sincerest sympathy..." and so on and so on. That was the kind of calm, impartial personage to have as Governor of the distracted Free State, where in one point anyhow most of the population think the same, and that is that their union with Italy would be an absolute disaster. Behold this Giuratti posing his candidature, Giuratti whose patriotism and idealism are, says the Italian Government, fully appreciated by them; nevertheless it has advised him to refuse the suggested honour. That he should be punished did not occur to them; but what would they have said if a Yugoslav--surely with more right than an Italian and certainly with a larger following of townsfolk--had been selected as President? "The proceedings of the Italian Government," said Schanzer, "are clear, speedy and determined." But did anything unpleasant happen to Commandant Castelli, an officer sent to make order, when he quite openly placed himself on the side of the fascisti? Would degradation be the lot of any officer or soldier who "mutinied" and joined the fascisti?... Apparently it was due to the unhappy political condition of Europe that the whole civilized world did not launch an indignant protest against the baseness and cynicism of the Italians. But how utterly they failed to persuade others that the wishes of Rieka were as they represented them! Rieka desires to remain independent and this desire the Italians will have to respect. And the later they make up their mind to keep their promises, so much the worse for them. The Yugoslavs can wait, for theirs is the future. A cartoonist in the Belgrade _Vreme_ depicted a rough old Serbian warrior holding on his open hand a very neat little Italian soldier. "Now listen to me," he was saying, "and I will tell you a story. Once upon a time there was a country called Austria...."
There was a characteristic little affair at Saint Anna on March 23. A few minutes after Zanella had left the Lubic Inn a suspicious-looking person appeared. He began observing the customers and their surroundings, when the Police-Commissary Peric came up to him and asked for his pa.s.sport. "Take yourself off!" shouted the intruder, as he pulled a bomb out of his trouser pocket. Peric grappled with him and soon overpowered him. And outside the house four other fascisti, Armano Viola, Carpinelli, Bellia and Murolo, were captured. They claimed to be journalists, and it is quite true that Viola is on the staff of the notorious _Vedetta Italiana_; but when he comes into a foreign country as a special correspondent and is teaching others how to go about that business--for until then they had been otherwise engaged, Murolo being charged with numerous thefts and attempted murders, while Bellia and Carpinelli were accused of breaking into the Abbazia Casino--if Viola was teaching them how to be journalists he would on this occasion have been better advised if he had restricted them to the conventional tools of the profession instead of bombs, revolvers and daggers. Little use did they get out of them, for a trio of these armed individuals were seized and disarmed by one Yugoslav gendarme, who was himself very meagrely equipped. With tears in their eyes they begged for mercy. "Pieta, Pieta!" they exclaimed. So long as their own lives were spared they were very willing to forgo the 60,000 lire which had been put on Zanella's head.