Known And Unknown_ A Memoir Part 8

It was an honor to be considered, but I did not take the suggestion that I was a vice presidential contender all that seriously. Given that Ford was from Michigan and I was from neighboring Illinois, selecting me didn't make much sense politically, and I was less well-known than Bush or Rockefeller. I had already informed Ford that I was eager to return to Brussels.

The President told me that he was determined to announce the selection in his own way.11 He felt rather embarra.s.sed about the way the Nixon team had handled his nomination, with a big production in the East Room and widespread speculation about who might emerge from behind the curtain with Nixon-speculation that the Nixon staff seemed to encourage. Ford did not indulge in such high drama. He felt rather embarra.s.sed about the way the Nixon team had handled his nomination, with a big production in the East Room and widespread speculation about who might emerge from behind the curtain with Nixon-speculation that the Nixon staff seemed to encourage. Ford did not indulge in such high drama.

Eleven days after taking office, President Ford announced his selection of Rockefeller at a small gathering in the Oval Office.12 He had gone with a well-known figure, again seeking to offer rea.s.surance to the American people. Rockefeller "showed his usual self-a.s.surance," as one reporter put it, and his remarks suggested that he expected to undertake more duties than other vice presidents had in the past. He had gone with a well-known figure, again seeking to offer rea.s.surance to the American people. Rockefeller "showed his usual self-a.s.surance," as one reporter put it, and his remarks suggested that he expected to undertake more duties than other vice presidents had in the past.13 That same morning Ford explained his selection of Rockefeller to me.14 At the time I thought Rockefeller was probably a reasonable choice. I expected Rocky to be an energetic and helpful addition to the administration. "[T]here was general agreement," one newspaper noted, "that the conservative new President from the Middle West had broadened his base of support and increased his chances for being elected in his own right in 1976, if he runs, by choosing a moderate Easterner with considerable influence and resources." At the time I thought Rockefeller was probably a reasonable choice. I expected Rocky to be an energetic and helpful addition to the administration. "[T]here was general agreement," one newspaper noted, "that the conservative new President from the Middle West had broadened his base of support and increased his chances for being elected in his own right in 1976, if he runs, by choosing a moderate Easterner with considerable influence and resources."15 The nomination of Rockefeller, another paper remarked, made for a ticket "that only an economic disaster can defeat in 1976." The nomination of Rockefeller, another paper remarked, made for a ticket "that only an economic disaster can defeat in 1976."16 Just before announcing his selection, Ford placed a call to San Clemente, California. He wanted to give Nixon the courtesy of hearing the news first.17 Reaching out to the former President was a typically gracious thing for Ford to do. But if I had known Ford was planning to call Nixon, for whom Ford repeatedly expressed sympathy and admiration, I would have advised against it. Reaching out to the former President was a typically gracious thing for Ford to do. But if I had known Ford was planning to call Nixon, for whom Ford repeatedly expressed sympathy and admiration, I would have advised against it.18 I didn't think it was in Ford's interest to put himself in the position of seeming to need Nixon's blessing on his choice. Though Ford's overture to Nixon did not get much attention, in retrospect it might have served as an early sign of the difficulties Ford was about to create in regard to his fallen predecessor. I didn't think it was in Ford's interest to put himself in the position of seeming to need Nixon's blessing on his choice. Though Ford's overture to Nixon did not get much attention, in retrospect it might have served as an early sign of the difficulties Ford was about to create in regard to his fallen predecessor.

As I prepared to return to my NATO post in Brussels, I was worried about the new administration. I was so concerned that I hand carried a memo the transition team prepared on the topic of personnel to the President. We urged Ford to build visibly what would be seen as his own team. Noting that the failure to do so was the very mistake that Lady Bird Johnson believed LBJ made after succeeding John F. Kennedy, we warned, "Without full attention by you to personnel matters, there will not be a true Ford presidency."19 My worry was that Ford's presidency would be seen not as his, but as a Nixon-Ford presidency. My worry was that Ford's presidency would be seen not as his, but as a Nixon-Ford presidency.

Ford did want to distance himself from what was seen as the imperial presidency of Richard Nixon, but instead of changing personnel, he attempted to change the White House's management structure. Ford attributed the misjudgments in Watergate to having everything filtered to the President through his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman. My view was different. I believed the problems that plagued Nixon's administration were not caused by how decisions were made but by the decisions themselves. The chief of staff system was reasonably efficient and had been developed in the Eisenhower administration, which did not come to the same unfortunate end as Nixon's. To change the perception of an insular White House and a rigid "Berlin Wall," Ford settled on what he called the "spokes-of-the-wheel" approach. To this day, I shudder at the phrase. The idea was that a large number of his staff and cabinet-the spokes-would report directly to him-the hub-instead of having a chief of staff coordinate the process.

However laudable the intent, the spokes-of-the-wheel approach was an unworkable way of managing the modern White House. Ford enjoyed interaction and give-and-take with a wide and varied group of people, and that was helpful, but this organization approach essentially allowed any senior staff or cabinet official to walk into the Oval Office at any time to discuss any subject. Many would end up leaving such a meeting with what they sincerely believed to be presidential authorization but without the necessary coordination with other White House staff or cabinet members who had responsibilities in the matters discussed with the President. An open door policy could work for a member of Congress, or even for a vice president whose staff is small, but a president has too many demands on his time to listen to every staff member's suggestions, wade through every disagreement, and then ensure that the relevant personnel are involved, or at least informed.

With Ford having done little to settle the differences that were already growing between the Ford and Nixon camps in the White House, I expected the difficulties to be plentiful. I knew that a dysfunctional White House such as the one that was evolving would be a dangerous place.

But this advice, like a number of the recommendations of our transition team, was too late. And at least for a while it seemed that there was no need for the President to do anything different from what he was doing. He was liked by the press, by members of Congress, and by the public. A headline in Newsweek Newsweek magazine summed up the prevailing conventional wisdom with the words: "the sun is s.h.i.+ning again." magazine summed up the prevailing conventional wisdom with the words: "the sun is s.h.i.+ning again."20 Ford became president on August 9, and his honeymoon reached its apex on September 1, 1974, when a Gallup poll gave him an approval rating of more than 70 percent. It was as if the country had taken a look at the honest, open Ford and breathed a sigh of relief. No more distrust, no more suspicions. That proved short-lived. Ford became president on August 9, and his honeymoon reached its apex on September 1, 1974, when a Gallup poll gave him an approval rating of more than 70 percent. It was as if the country had taken a look at the honest, open Ford and breathed a sigh of relief. No more distrust, no more suspicions. That proved short-lived.

On September 8, 1974, one month after he took office, with no advance notice to the country, Ford made a decision that left nearly everyone who heard it stunned. Those of us who knew Ford well-and who had heard his periodic expressions of sympathy for Nixon-probably should have at least suspected that he might consider the possibility of a pardon. Nonetheless, it had never occurred to me. In fact, at Ford's first cabinet meeting a few weeks earlier, he seemed to rule out the idea and said the subject should not even be discussed.21 As he announced the pardon, totally out of the blue on a Sunday morning, Ford referred to Nixon and his loyal family, saying, "Theirs is an American tragedy in which we all have played a part."22 The President spoke about Nixon's plight with obvious sincerity and sympathy-the charges against him being a "sword" over his head. But it was a sympathy that the public did not share at that moment. For myself, I still felt respect for Nixon and for the many accomplishments of his administration, but I also felt disappointment over how his presidency had ended. He had not been truthful with the nation, which had caused grave harm to our country. The President spoke about Nixon's plight with obvious sincerity and sympathy-the charges against him being a "sword" over his head. But it was a sympathy that the public did not share at that moment. For myself, I still felt respect for Nixon and for the many accomplishments of his administration, but I also felt disappointment over how his presidency had ended. He had not been truthful with the nation, which had caused grave harm to our country.

The stunning news shook Ford's inner circle. The press secretary he had just recruited and announced, Jerry terHorst, resigned in protest. Among the general public, the pardon provoked a vicious reaction. Many Americans at the time believed that Nixon had been involved in the cover-up and was getting away with it. Ford's own motives came under scrutiny, with the suggestion that the pardon might be the result of a secret deal. Al Haig's continuing presence as White House chief of staff seemed to give credence to the allegation, since Haig had been involved in persuading Nixon to step down. Suddenly a suspicious figure, Ford plummeted precipitously in the opinion polls.

Knowing Ford as well as I did, I was convinced he would not have been part of a deal with Nixon.23 Instead, I thought this had been a decision that Ford had made without consulting very many others and without carefully considering how and when it might best be done and what the impact might be on him personally. Accepting that the pardon was the right thing to do-and by now even many of Ford's harshest critics have since conceded that it was-there is little question but that it could have been handled in a better manner. Instead, I thought this had been a decision that Ford had made without consulting very many others and without carefully considering how and when it might best be done and what the impact might be on him personally. Accepting that the pardon was the right thing to do-and by now even many of Ford's harshest critics have since conceded that it was-there is little question but that it could have been handled in a better manner.* For one, Ford might have surfaced the notion with key leaders in the House and Senate, to keep them from being stunned. He might have talked it over with a trusted group of aides to ensure his announcement and tone were properly calibrated and supported by his staff. But he appeared to have done none of those things. For one, Ford might have surfaced the notion with key leaders in the House and Senate, to keep them from being stunned. He might have talked it over with a trusted group of aides to ensure his announcement and tone were properly calibrated and supported by his staff. But he appeared to have done none of those things.

Nixon did little to help. His six-paragraph statement accepting the pardon stopped short of admitting any guilt in the Watergate matter. "No words can describe the depths of my regret and pain at the anguish my mistakes over Watergate have caused the nation," he said. He might have tried harder to find some.

As those decisions were made, my focus was elsewhere. I had already returned to Brussels on August 22, 1974-the day after the transition team submitted our report and the day before our daughter Valerie departed for her first year of college. While I followed what was happening in Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C., I also had my hands full at NATO with the ongoing Cyprus crisis.

Then, on September 16, 1974, my father died at the age of sixty-nine. He was not only my father, but also a close friend. I sometimes called him George, as you would a pal. When I married Joyce, he was my immediate choice as my best man.25 His death was a blow, even though it was not altogether unexpected. Alzheimer's had started to set in when he was in his early sixties. The disease can be toughest on the spouse, and it was certainly hard for my mother. They had had a lifetime love affair. When Dad's condition deteriorated, my sister, Joan, and I encouraged Mom to make the difficult decision to move Dad to a nearby nursing home, for his safety. For the last year of his life, Mom spent most of every day there with him, even though he no longer recognized her.

When I traveled to the States from Belgium, I would stop in Was.h.i.+ngton to handle my NATO business and at the end of the day fly to Chicago to see my parents. My father's brain was working in ways that made him agitated. But sometimes while I was with him there would seem to be a small spark of recognition. He would smile and I would think, or at least hope, he might have had a moment of clarity and happiness as he recognized me or my mother. But just as quickly as that moment came, it was gone. When I left him I would wonder to myself if what I had taken to be recognition had been there at all.

I was at my parents' home outside Chicago preparing for my father's funeral service when I received a call from the White House operator, who then brought President Ford on the line. His voice was full of warmth and concern. The President said he wanted to express Betty's and his sympathies to me and to my family.

Then he went on to say, "I know this is not an ideal time," but if I was up to it he had some rather urgent business that required my attention. He said that he had decided he needed to replace Al Haig as chief of staff after all. He made it clear that he wanted me to take the post. Ford said he was having problems managing some of the staff, including his longtime aide Bob Hartmann.26 He was a seasoned newspaper man who had worked closely with Ford since 1968 and had become Ford's chief of staff when Ford became vice president. Hartmann's role had now changed drastically, and the President said Bob was having difficulty adjusting to it. I sensed that Ford was working hard to spare Hartmann's feelings. He was a seasoned newspaper man who had worked closely with Ford since 1968 and had become Ford's chief of staff when Ford became vice president. Hartmann's role had now changed drastically, and the President said Bob was having difficulty adjusting to it. I sensed that Ford was working hard to spare Hartmann's feelings.

Ford knew that I had a strong desire and intention to stay at NATO and, equally, to not work again in the White House, having been there for four years previously. But the President asked me to come to the White House to talk with him about it before I returned to Brussels.

On September 22, 1974, I found myself back in the Oval Office. President Ford said again how sorry he was about my father. He knew I had always looked up to him as a man of integrity, much as Ford had to the man who raised him. Ford's biological father had left his mother when he was a baby; his stepfather, Gerald Rudolph Ford, Sr., raised the boy as his own, even giving his stepson his name. For a moment it didn't matter that I was talking to the President of the United States in the Oval Office. We were two friends talking fondly about the men who shaped us.

Eventually he turned to the business at hand. Things had not been going well for the President, and he knew it. It was not only the negative reaction to the pardon, although the immediate damage from that decision was difficult to overestimate. The economy was worsening. Relations with Congress had soured. The Rockefeller nomination as vice president was not well received by a large number of conservatives and was being delayed in the congressional confirmation process by an exhaustive investigation into his personal finances. On top of all that, the Republican Party's prospects in the upcoming 1974 midterm elections were at best gloomy, which did not bode well for Ford's agenda.

The President now conceded that his spokes-of-the-wheel approach was not working and would not work. The Hartmann faction was unfriendly with the Haig faction, and others in the White House seemed caught in between. Only a few weeks after informing the country that Nixon's White House chief of staff, Al Haig, would stay on indefinitely, Ford would have to do something he never liked to do-change his mind.

The President said that while he could not be seen as abandoning outright his very public decision to reject the Nixon-Haldeman staffing system in favor of his spokes-of-the-wheel approach, he agreed that he would move toward a proper staff system gradually. His solution was, at the outset, to call whoever replaced Haig the "chief coordinator." I was not impressed with that idea, because it would signal to others in the White House that the new chief of staff was not actually in charge of the staff. But I understood Ford's reasoning.

The President went on to say that if I took the post, it would be only temporary, perhaps six months or so. He added that if a cabinet position became open that I found interesting, that would be an option. After an hour and a half of going through the pros and cons, it was time to make a decision. In the end Ford made it an issue of patriotism. He was the President of the United States, and he insisted he needed me to do the job.27 Finally, as I continued to express reluctance, Ford smiled. "Come on, Rummy," he prodded. "Say yes. I have a golf game."

I smiled back at him. "Okay," I said, "I'll do it."28 Joyce, as usual, took the news in stride, though she was sad to leave her friends in Belgium. "This time," she jokingly said, "I'm not going to try to save the world." She was hoping to just get through the next few months, so I could help the President get settled in, and then we might go home to Illinois.*

CHAPTER 12

A Rocky Start.

On my first day back in the White House, I moved into the chief of staff's West Wing office, where Haldeman had presided during the height of the Nixon years and where Haig later, with Henry Kissinger, worked near miracles to hold the United States government together.

Many in the White House remained spooked by Watergate and its ghosts. In the months since Nixon's departure, listening devices were still being found in the Oval Office and elsewhere in the White House complex. As I started to get settled in my new office, my secretary opened a desk drawer and found a tape with a note attached, designating it as "Presidential Tape-March 8, 1971." I immediately delivered the tape to Phil Buchen, the new White House counsel, and even insisted that he sign a receipt as evidence that we had turned the tape over as soon as it had been discovered.1 Only the day before that, a safe had been discovered in the cupboard next to the fireplace in my new office. Only the day before that, a safe had been discovered in the cupboard next to the fireplace in my new office.2 An uninventoried safe in Haldeman's office could have had anything in it-papers relating to Watergate, more Nixon tapes, possibly evidence that could lead to new indictments. The mystery of the Haldeman safe was heightened when we discovered that no one knew how to open it. Wanting to make sure the safe was transferred from my office and properly handled, I asked my stalwart a.s.sistant, d.i.c.k Cheney, to accompany the safe and ensure that everything went by the book. An uninventoried safe in Haldeman's office could have had anything in it-papers relating to Watergate, more Nixon tapes, possibly evidence that could lead to new indictments. The mystery of the Haldeman safe was heightened when we discovered that no one knew how to open it. Wanting to make sure the safe was transferred from my office and properly handled, I asked my stalwart a.s.sistant, d.i.c.k Cheney, to accompany the safe and ensure that everything went by the book.

After all the drama, Cheney reported back that under the supervision of Secret Service agents, the safe had been blown open with explosives and was found to be empty. Still, the time and energy we wasted in taking the necessary precautions on this and many other matters were but an example of the ongoing costs of Watergate. It also helped me begin to realize that Ford's pardon of Nixon, irrespective of the unfortunate way it was handled, might have been the right decision. The President never would have been able to move his own agenda forward as long as Nixon's prosecution was in the offing.

In those early months, former President Nixon's difficult adjustment to his San Clemente exile came up on my radar screen repeatedly. After he left the presidency, Nixon was extremely ill and hospitalized on a number of occasions with near fatal blood clots. Frank Gannon, who was helping Nixon with his memoirs, confided in me his hope that Nixon would live long enough to bring the book to completion.3 One of Nixon's aides during the transition, his former press secretary, Ron Ziegler, called me several times to discuss Nixon's predicament. During one call he told me that children on the beach were throwing "dog dirt," to put it nicely, at Nixon's home. One of Nixon's aides during the transition, his former press secretary, Ron Ziegler, called me several times to discuss Nixon's predicament. During one call he told me that children on the beach were throwing "dog dirt," to put it nicely, at Nixon's home.4 One problem we encountered with regard to Nixon involved the growing number of people on the federal government payroll who had found their way to San Clemente. No one knew how to handle arrangements for a resigned president, but we had agreed in consultation with the Congress to allot the former president a small staff to ease his transition. We thought the number of staff hovered around twenty, but like all things involving the government, the numbers kept getting bigger. I learned during my first week on the job that Nixon's staff had ballooned to more than sixty, meaning that the number our staff had been giving the press was wildly inaccurate. If that became public, I feared it would look like Nixon was establis.h.i.+ng a mini-presidential operation. As I discussed the matter with Ford, who was as amazed as I was to hear of it, he said that we had to help Nixon figure out a different arrangement.5 I knew the "we" meant me. I had several difficult conversations with Ziegler, and we were able to persuade Nixon's senior staff to reduce the size of their payroll. I knew the "we" meant me. I had several difficult conversations with Ziegler, and we were able to persuade Nixon's senior staff to reduce the size of their payroll.6

As I settled into my office, I returned to my usual routine. Most of the day I worked at a stand-up desk. I found it an easier way to keep focused over my twelve-to fifteen-hour days. I had a Dictaphone at the ready, into which I would dictate memos that my staff transcribed and sent out. In the Nixon administration, these memos were typed on yellow paper-giving rise to their nickname: yellow perils. At the Ford White House my memos became known as snowflakes, presumably because they were now printed on white paper and fell on the staff like a blizzard. The memos were my way of reaching out to those in the organization, to keep work moving along, and to communicate the President's instructions. Oral comments can be forgotten or pushed down the priority list. With written memos I could a.s.sign a task, keep a copy, and track the progress.

I also followed the advice I had given President Ford earlier, when he a.s.sumed the presidency, by promptly bringing in some new faces to work with the talent that was already there. One of them, of course, was not all that new to me. By this time, Cheney and I had worked together in three different a.s.signments-the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Cost of Living Council, and the Nixon White House. But our time in the Ford White House would prove to be our most challenging yet.

Echoing my practice with Cheney, I encouraged every senior staff member to find a deputy they could trust, who could help take some of the load off them, and, if possible, over time become interchangeable with them. This made some uncomfortable. Many in senior roles prefer to guard their access to the president and are reluctant to give authority to a deputy. I thought we all needed to remind ourselves that none of us were indispensable.

When I asked d.i.c.k to serve as my top a.s.sistant (he would later become deputy chief of staff ), he reminded me about a couple of arrests he had had for drinking and driving after he got out of college and was working on power lines in Wyoming. The arrests had come up in his FBI background check when he came to work for me in the Nixon administration in 1969, and after discussing them with him, I had hired him anyway. d.i.c.k pointed out that serving as my a.s.sistant in the Ford White House would be a far more visible position. He did not want the President or me to be surprised when the clearance process turned up his arrests again, and said he'd understand if either Ford or I thought it might prove an impediment to his being hired. Shortly thereafter I briefed the President on the issue.

"Do you think this is the guy you need for the job?" Ford asked.

"I do," I replied.

"Then bring him aboard," Ford said. That settled that.

Throughout the hectic months that followed, d.i.c.k helped to make a nearly impossible job often enjoyable. Our back-and-forth banter was our way of getting through the difficult and hectic times. No a.s.signment was too small if it eased the burden on the President. We weren't always saving the world. Indeed, one early problem that d.i.c.k and I were involved with was trying to find a way to keep the sun off Ford's neck when he was working in the Oval Office. It took days for the proper curtain to be found.7 On the first occasion that I scheduled Cheney to subst.i.tute for me on a trip with the President, I dictated a note to Cheney joking, "I perjured myself and told [the President] that Cheney was a tremendously able guy in whom I had complete confidence."8 Ford and Cheney had different personalities, and at first I was not sure how they would gel. The President was a gregarious sort who liked to smoke a pipe and tell stories. Cheney was cerebral; on trips he was perfectly happy reading a book or, more likely, a series of work-related memos. When the two of them returned I asked the President how the trip had gone. "d.i.c.k is great!" Ford replied. He admired Cheney's businesslike manner. "He comes in, he's got ten items to cover, he covers them and he leaves." Ford and Cheney had different personalities, and at first I was not sure how they would gel. The President was a gregarious sort who liked to smoke a pipe and tell stories. Cheney was cerebral; on trips he was perfectly happy reading a book or, more likely, a series of work-related memos. When the two of them returned I asked the President how the trip had gone. "d.i.c.k is great!" Ford replied. He admired Cheney's businesslike manner. "He comes in, he's got ten items to cover, he covers them and he leaves."9 I was pleased that the two seemed to get on so well, because I was hoping Cheney not only would be able to take more of the burden off of me, but also might eventually replace me. I was pleased that the two seemed to get on so well, because I was hoping Cheney not only would be able to take more of the burden off of me, but also might eventually replace me.

Cheney and I agreed that we needed to tighten the s.h.i.+p for the administration to be successful. We couldn't afford a sluggish bureaucracy or a string of independent operators. Naturally our approach tended to make the sluggish bureaucrats and independent operators less than pleased.

We decided to trim the size of the White House staff. By the time Nixon left, it had more than doubled, from about 220 people to 510, not counting the additional hundreds of so-called detailees who were theoretically on loan to the White House from the departments and agencies, most of them from the Department of Defense. Lyndon Johnson had also made extensive use of the practice. Whenever I visited the West Wing during Nixon's second term, while I was serving at NATO, I would see people in the hallways and meetings and wonder who they were-and what in the world they were supposed to be doing.

Always wary of comparisons to Nixon's imperial presidency, Ford endorsed my proposed belt tightening-at least, most of the time. It was a quite different story when I briefed him on my plans for a similar reduction of the First Lady's staff in the East Wing. He seemed fine with it-that is, until I suggested that he broach the subject with Betty that evening.

"Oh no, Don," Ford said with a chuckle. "This is your plan. You go up and settle it with her."10 I then suggested to Cheney that he might be the best one to raise the subject with the First Lady, but he knew exactly what I was up to. Despite our reputations as taskmasters, neither Cheney nor I had the persuasiveness to successfully turn the indomitable Betty Ford. "Predictably," President Ford later noted, "the size of the East Wing staff hardly changed at all."11 Other challenges were more nettlesome than staff size. One involved Henry Kissinger. As I feared from the day Ford announced Kissinger would stay on in both of his posts, Ford's approach to Kissinger was at times deferential. Kissinger often arrived late for Oval Office meetings with the President, sometimes by as much as twenty or thirty minutes. Perhaps tardiness had not been an issue in the waning days of the Nixon presidency, but things had to be different now.

After Kissinger failed to arrive at the scheduled time three days in a row, I raised the matter with Ford, who had also taken notice. The President suggested we change the meeting time to accommodate Kissinger. That was the wrong approach. Ford's tolerance of repeated late arrivals by his cabinet or staff sent a bad signal.12 I told Kissinger and his staff that things had to change, which they did, at least with respect to the President's schedule. I told Kissinger and his staff that things had to change, which they did, at least with respect to the President's schedule.

Going back to my time in the Nixon administration, I had noticed that the National Security Council was not well connected to the cabinet and the rest of the White House staff. But foreign policy decisions had consequences outside the State Department and NSC bureaucracies. They often involved Congress, the press, complicated legal issues, as well as other departments and agencies. Ford's economic advisers needed to have an opportunity to weigh in on international economic issues. Ford's press secretary needed to be able to communicate to the public the administration's foreign policy actions and decisions. Perhaps because foreign policy had become largely his sole domain during the tumultuous years of Watergate, Kissinger was not accustomed to coordinating with others. Further, with Kissinger holding two of the three national security posts, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was marginalized. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that Ford and Schlesinger did not work well together. On any number of occasions I made an effort to see that Schlesinger was included in major decisions, urging Ford to see him. I was only partially successful.*

The one-sided national security process led to at least one major embarra.s.sment for the Ford administration. In 1975, the prominent Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn came to Was.h.i.+ngton to attend a banquet put on by the labor federation, the AFL-CIO, in his honor. Solzhenitsyn was one of the most powerful voices of opposition in the Soviet Union. Because he told the truth about the Marxist system-his book The Gulag Archipelago Gulag Archipelago denounced the evils of totalitarianism in the sharpest terms-he was a constant irritant to the Soviet leaders. Key conservative senator Jesse Helms tried to arrange a meeting between Solzhenitsyn and President Ford as a sign of America's support for the dissident's efforts. denounced the evils of totalitarianism in the sharpest terms-he was a constant irritant to the Soviet leaders. Key conservative senator Jesse Helms tried to arrange a meeting between Solzhenitsyn and President Ford as a sign of America's support for the dissident's efforts.14 Kissinger vehemently opposed the meeting. He felt the symbolism of the President meeting with Solzhenitsyn could set back U.S.-Soviet relations, which he was trying to bolster in the lead-up to a meeting in Helsinki scheduled for the following month. Kissinger was even reported to have characterized Solzhenitsyn as a "threat to world peace."15 Cheney and I urged Ford to meet with the Soviet dissident.16 Cheney put together a memo stating the reasons. "[T]he decision not to see Solzhenitsyn is totally out of character for the President," Cheney pointed out. "More than any President in recent memory, he's the man who's willing to see anyone, talk to anyone and listen to anyone's views, no matter how much they may differ from his own." I was impressed with the memo. Up to that point Cheney had dealt mainly with domestic issues, but now he was engaged with foreign policy as well. Cheney put together a memo stating the reasons. "[T]he decision not to see Solzhenitsyn is totally out of character for the President," Cheney pointed out. "More than any President in recent memory, he's the man who's willing to see anyone, talk to anyone and listen to anyone's views, no matter how much they may differ from his own." I was impressed with the memo. Up to that point Cheney had dealt mainly with domestic issues, but now he was engaged with foreign policy as well.

At first Ford sided with his secretary of state, as was his tendency on foreign policy matters. Kissinger, of course, was not trying to hurt Ford. He was providing his advice as a secretary of state. He wasn't a politician. Nor was he as tough on the Soviets as some others in the administration. And because Ford only rarely consulted with the obvious counterpoint to Kissinger-Secretary of Defense Schlesinger-the President often heard only one set of views.

Ford's refusal to meet the most famous dissident in the world led to an outcry that extended well beyond the conservative movement. Realizing his mistake, Ford belatedly agreed to the meeting. But Solzhenitsyn at that point declined the invitation, embarra.s.sing the White House even further. Political columnists Rowland Evans and Bob Novak chronicled the damage in a column in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post t.i.tled, "Snubbing Solzhenitsyn." They blamed the public relations debacle on a "lack of informed political consultation, gross insensitivity, equivocal explanations, [and] just plain bad manners." t.i.tled, "Snubbing Solzhenitsyn." They blamed the public relations debacle on a "lack of informed political consultation, gross insensitivity, equivocal explanations, [and] just plain bad manners."17 It was hard to disagree with that a.s.sessment. It was hard to disagree with that a.s.sessment.

Another ongoing challenge to the proper functioning of the White House was Ford's chief speechwriter and former chief of staff, Bob Hartmann. The President knew Hartmann had not adjusted well to his new role-or, more important, to Ford's.18 As one of the few wholly Ford people on the White House staff, Hartmann had been a loyal friend to the President for a number of years. Ford didn't want to upset him. That gave Hartmann, still serving as Ford's chief speechwriter and political adviser, the s.p.a.ce to continue to operate pretty much how he wanted, leading to frustrations among the others on the staff. Hartmann, who had seen his influence diminished in nearly every other area, guarded most speeches as matters that were between only the President and him, even though they required meticulous coordination and review by relevant senior administration officials. As one of the few wholly Ford people on the White House staff, Hartmann had been a loyal friend to the President for a number of years. Ford didn't want to upset him. That gave Hartmann, still serving as Ford's chief speechwriter and political adviser, the s.p.a.ce to continue to operate pretty much how he wanted, leading to frustrations among the others on the staff. Hartmann, who had seen his influence diminished in nearly every other area, guarded most speeches as matters that were between only the President and him, even though they required meticulous coordination and review by relevant senior administration officials.

Working with Hartmann, the President embarked on a program called Whip inflation Now or WIN. inflation hovered at above 10 percent. The price of gas had jumped sharply, from thirty-nine cents a gallon in 1973 to fifty-three cents in 1974. The Dow Jones Industrial Average had lost a third of its value. The American people clearly wanted something to be done about the economy, and Ford decided to take action. The idea behind WIN was to treat the nation's economic woes like an enemy and to spark a public campaign to help defeat it, with b.u.mper stickers and lapel pins.

The President decided to introduce his new economic proposal to the public in a televised address to Congress in early October 1974. The final draft of the speech arrived in my office four hours before the President was to deliver it. As I skimmed the text, I found it unimpressive.19 The speech urged Americans to make up "a list of ten ways to fight inflation and save energy." Hartmann wanted the President to wear a big red WIN b.u.t.ton during the speech. I agreed with Ford's determination to do something about the economy, and to try to engage the public. But to deliver a speech that sought to address a severe economic downturn with gimmicky catchphrases and b.u.t.tons was not, in my view, presidential. The speech urged Americans to make up "a list of ten ways to fight inflation and save energy." Hartmann wanted the President to wear a big red WIN b.u.t.ton during the speech. I agreed with Ford's determination to do something about the economy, and to try to engage the public. But to deliver a speech that sought to address a severe economic downturn with gimmicky catchphrases and b.u.t.tons was not, in my view, presidential.

Knowing how the speech shop operated, I suspected that the draft of the speech sent so late to my office might not have been vetted properly by the President's economic advisers or experts in the Treasury Department.20 I called Alan Greenspan, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, to check if he had seen it. Greenspan said he had received a copy of the speech only a few hours earlier. He and his staff had worked hard to try to improve it in the brief time they had, but the speech still contained errors and misstatements. He could only vouch for the accuracy of about four fifths of it. Even with his last-minute edits, Greenspan felt the speech was high risk. I called Alan Greenspan, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, to check if he had seen it. Greenspan said he had received a copy of the speech only a few hours earlier. He and his staff had worked hard to try to improve it in the brief time they had, but the speech still contained errors and misstatements. He could only vouch for the accuracy of about four fifths of it. Even with his last-minute edits, Greenspan felt the speech was high risk.

I went in to see Ford and urged him to cancel the speech. Because the networks had cleared airtime for the President, I suggested that he instead give a five-minute address discussing the economic problems facing the country, and then say he was not yet satisfied with the economic programs presented to him but was committed to finding the best possible policy. I reiterated my concerns about Hartmann's speechwriting operation.

Ford heard me out, but since he had already authorized Hartmann to go forward with the idea, he was reluctant to back down. "Don," he finally said, "I think it is a good program."

"Okay," I replied. "I wouldn't have felt right if I didn't at least give you this thought."21 The response to the speech was not what Ford had hoped. Wearing a pin to defeat inflation became a national punch line. Ford was disappointed by the negative reaction to his speech both in Congress and in the country. I felt sorry for him, but it was a self-inflicted wound and still another sign that the spokes-of-the-wheel approach the President had selected at the outset was not working.

As chief of staff I tried to keep my personal views on the substance of policy issues out of my advice to the President unless asked. I wanted to serve as an honest broker. But since my days in Congress, I had views on the economy and the limited role government should play. During my time in the Ford administration I came to know a young economist at the Department of Treasury named Arthur Laffer, who further focused my views. At one dinner I had with him and d.i.c.k Cheney, Laffer outlined his view that higher tax rates did not necessarily translate into higher tax revenues. On a c.o.c.ktail napkin he sketched out what later became famously known as the Laffer Curve to ill.u.s.trate his point.* Put simply, the theory that the higher the tax rate the greater the revenues to the government is disproved by the fact that if the tax rate were at the highest rate-100 percent of earnings-government revenues would drop precipitously. If everything one earned was to be confiscated by the government, people would have little if any incentive to work. Put simply, the theory that the higher the tax rate the greater the revenues to the government is disproved by the fact that if the tax rate were at the highest rate-100 percent of earnings-government revenues would drop precipitously. If everything one earned was to be confiscated by the government, people would have little if any incentive to work.

Laffer advised what seemed counterintuitive to many then (and even today) that the administration might need to reduce reduce taxes to achieve higher revenues, since that would leave more money in the hands of those who create the jobs and therefore expand the economy. That night gave quant.i.tative context and rationale for my inclination toward lower taxes coupled with fiscal responsibility. Laffer's approach would also appeal to one of the Republicans soon to be running for president-Ronald Reagan. taxes to achieve higher revenues, since that would leave more money in the hands of those who create the jobs and therefore expand the economy. That night gave quant.i.tative context and rationale for my inclination toward lower taxes coupled with fiscal responsibility. Laffer's approach would also appeal to one of the Republicans soon to be running for president-Ronald Reagan.

When Ford offered Rockefeller the vice presidency in August, he had indicated-or at least he had left Rockefeller with the impression-that Rockefeller would have broad responsibilities for domestic policy. I was concerned by any vagueness in such matters and convinced that the President needed to provide clarity, and fast. "It seems silly now," I conceded to Ford, "but mark my words, it will be a monstrous problem, and you will spend all your time trying to unsort it unless you address it now."23 If Vice President Rockefeller was in charge of domestic policy and Secretary of State Kissinger was in charge of national security policy, I thought, what exactly was President Ford's area of responsibility? I suggested that Ford even consider giving Rockefeller a cabinet department to run as part of his duties, so he would have a clear area of management responsibility. If Vice President Rockefeller was in charge of domestic policy and Secretary of State Kissinger was in charge of national security policy, I thought, what exactly was President Ford's area of responsibility? I suggested that Ford even consider giving Rockefeller a cabinet department to run as part of his duties, so he would have a clear area of management responsibility.24 The President considered the idea but decided against it. The President considered the idea but decided against it.

Ford was eager for Rockefeller to feel accepted in the White House as he, on occasion, had not in the Nixon administration. "I want us to embrace him, make him feel at home," he said.25 After Rockefeller was confirmed in December, the new Vice President met with Ford in the Oval Office. With his shock of gray hair and distinctive dark-framed gla.s.ses, Rockefeller was an energetic and powerful presence. The President said he wanted the two of them to work closely together. "Do you have anything else to add, Don?" he asked me.

"I do, Mr. President," I said. "I think it would be very bad if anyone had the understanding that I was acting as the doorkeeper between you and the Vice President." I suggested that the two of them agree that Rockefeller should have walk-in privileges with Ford, without including me in the meetings. They both agreed to this, although Rockefeller did say he wanted to stay in close touch with me.26 Additionally, I expressed the hope that Rockefeller and his staff, if they saw a problem, would act promptly to address it before another news cycle pa.s.sed. "I think we all ought to agree that we'll pick up the phone and get any problem that seems to be building sorted out immediately," I said. Additionally, I expressed the hope that Rockefeller and his staff, if they saw a problem, would act promptly to address it before another news cycle pa.s.sed. "I think we all ought to agree that we'll pick up the phone and get any problem that seems to be building sorted out immediately," I said.27 Shortly thereafter, I showed Rockefeller and his two sons around the White House, which was then decorated for the Christmas season. reflecting on the early interactions between Ford and Rockefeller, I told Cheney cheerfully, "They are off to a good start." Rockefeller, I added, "is such an enthusiastic and decent person." Shortly thereafter, I showed Rockefeller and his two sons around the White House, which was then decorated for the Christmas season. reflecting on the early interactions between Ford and Rockefeller, I told Cheney cheerfully, "They are off to a good start." Rockefeller, I added, "is such an enthusiastic and decent person."28 It was not long, however, before my relations.h.i.+p with the Vice President went south, somewhere below Chile, as a matter of fact. Ours turned out to be the most difficult personal relations.h.i.+p I experienced in all of my years in the executive branch of the federal government.

It didn't help our relations.h.i.+p that Rockefeller and I understood our respective roles quite differently. I saw my job as helping to make sure that the President received a full range of advice on policy questions, even when the advice contradicted the views and initiatives of others, including those of the Vice President. Rockefeller, by contrast, seemed convinced he was an autonomous factor, alongside the President, who had been delegated domestic responsibilities by Ford and, therefore, whose activities and advice should not be challenged by anyone.*

Looking back at how I had suggested Rockefeller as a possible vice presidential nominee to Richard Nixon in 1968, I realized how mistaken I had been. Though I have had to deal with many strong-willed people in government and managed to get along with them, Rockefeller was quite different. His chief of staff, Ann Whitman, once said that the Vice President "acted as if he were President. He'd come back from a meeting announcing that he was going to run the White House."29 More than one observer thought Rockefeller still had his mind set on the office he by then had sought three times. Bill Moyers, a onetime aide to Lyndon Johnson, memorably quipped. "I believe Rocky when he says he's lost his ambition. I also believe he remembers where he put it." More than one observer thought Rockefeller still had his mind set on the office he by then had sought three times. Bill Moyers, a onetime aide to Lyndon Johnson, memorably quipped. "I believe Rocky when he says he's lost his ambition. I also believe he remembers where he put it."30 A man of vast inherited wealth who was accustomed to getting his way, he would badger and pester subordinates until they said what he wanted to hear. A man of vast inherited wealth who was accustomed to getting his way, he would badger and pester subordinates until they said what he wanted to hear.

The situation worsened considerably when the Vice President came forward with his own energy proposal. It bore Rockefeller's unmistakable imprint: It was big, ambitious, complex, and as the Vice President modestly contended, billed to resolve America's energy woes for the foreseeable future. It did have some attractive aspects, such as an emphasis on conservation. But, after studying it, I was concerned that this kind of giant, amorphous proposal could become a "Christmas tree" in Congress-an opportunity for members to tack on amendments funding their pet projects.31 Rockefeller proposed a $100 billion "quasi-public corporation" called the Energy Independence Authority that would finance energy projects-the idea being that funds from the government would incentivize innovation in the private sector. With no guidelines, some of those loans could potentially go to people who were friends of people in the White House, and likely friends of Rockefeller's. In short, this looked to be a political, financial, legislative, and ethical time bomb. Rockefeller proposed a $100 billion "quasi-public corporation" called the Energy Independence Authority that would finance energy projects-the idea being that funds from the government would incentivize innovation in the private sector. With no guidelines, some of those loans could potentially go to people who were friends of people in the White House, and likely friends of Rockefeller's. In short, this looked to be a political, financial, legislative, and ethical time bomb.

I suggested to the President that he ask the relevant experts in his administration to review and comment on Rockefeller's proposal, such as the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of the Treasury, and others. When Rockefeller learned I had made the suggestion and was circulating his proposal in the White House staffing system, he became furious, convinced I was trying to scuttle his plan and sabotage him.

As it turned out, many in the administration had concerns about the proposal. Several people on the staff urged me to persuade the President not to introduce it.32 Alan Greenspan came out vocally against the plan, warning that it "creates a large potential for real or perceived corrupt practices.... There are realistically no limits to the types of projects it can a.s.sist, and virtually no limits as to the kind and amount of a.s.sistance it can offer." Alan Greenspan came out vocally against the plan, warning that it "creates a large potential for real or perceived corrupt practices.... There are realistically no limits to the types of projects it can a.s.sist, and virtually no limits as to the kind and amount of a.s.sistance it can offer."33 Rockefeller resorted to his usual responses when questioned by anyone: strong-arm tactics, bullying, and anger at any who disagreed. Rockefeller resorted to his usual responses when questioned by anyone: strong-arm tactics, bullying, and anger at any who disagreed.

Around the same time, Rockefeller's personal poll numbers were dropping, which he found inexplicable.34 Ford was differing with him on emergency funding to bail out New York City, then in a financial crisis caused by local mismanagement. This led to an unfortunate headline: "ford to city: drop dead." Ford was differing with him on emergency funding to bail out New York City, then in a financial crisis caused by local mismanagement. This led to an unfortunate headline: "ford to city: drop dead."35 Ford decided he did not want to oppose Rockefeller on the energy plan at the same time as he was opposing him on the New York City financial bailout. Ford decided he did not want to oppose Rockefeller on the energy plan at the same time as he was opposing him on the New York City financial bailout.* Rockefeller led Ford to believe he had support for his energy proposal within the administration, which was hardly the case, although he may well have believed it, since few in the administration were willing to incur his wrath by disagreeing with him. Rockefeller led Ford to believe he had support for his energy proposal within the administration, which was hardly the case, although he may well have believed it, since few in the administration were willing to incur his wrath by disagreeing with him.

The plan's arrival on Capitol Hill was at first heralded in the press as a triumph for the powerful Vice President against his imagined White House adversaries, a perspective undoubtedly promoted by Rockefeller.37 But support for his mammoth energy bill cooled once people read it. Not surprisingly, criticism of Ford, rather than Rockefeller, began appearing in the press, for his endors.e.m.e.nt of what was characterized as a "horrendous mistake" and a "stunningly bad idea." But support for his mammoth energy bill cooled once people read it. Not surprisingly, criticism of Ford, rather than Rockefeller, began appearing in the press, for his endors.e.m.e.nt of what was characterized as a "horrendous mistake" and a "stunningly bad idea."38 Congressional support evaporated steadily, until eventually a vote was held on a much-reduced version. Even that was resoundingly defeated in the House of Representatives. Congressional support evaporated steadily, until eventually a vote was held on a much-reduced version. Even that was resoundingly defeated in the House of Representatives.39 Gerald Ford, who allowed the avoidable political embarra.s.sment to happen, wound up taking the political blame for Rockefeller's unwillingness to work with others in the administration. Time and again over those months I would consult with Cheney about how we could deal with Rockefeller. It is amusing now to consider those who thirty years later would call d.i.c.k Cheney an "imperial vice president."40 Back in the Ford years, Cheney and I had to deal every day with the real thing. Back in the Ford years, Cheney and I had to deal every day with the real thing.

Not having expected to become president, Gerald Ford had to grapple repeatedly with tough questions without the tested support system most new presidents have already established over the course of their campaigns. Ford didn't have a tested policy team or a national platform. On the other hand, Ford was also unusually free of the constraints of special interest groups and political supporters who generally help a candidate get elected, and as a result have had a hand in shaping his policies.

I thought we might have something of an opportunity if we invited America's most innovative thinkers to meet with Ford to discuss major issues that were sometimes lost in the day-to-day details of being president. Dr. Robert Goldwin, a former dean of St. John's College in Annapolis, Maryland, who had served with me when I was at NATO, agreed to come back to the White House to serve as a special consultant to the President. Dubbed the administration's intellectual in residence, Goldwin arranged meetings for Ford with leaders from academia on topics ranging from welfare, unemployment, and crime to global hunger.*

The President engaged in the discussions Goldwin arranged with enthusiasm and insight. Ford's open and friendly manner, combined with the fact that he did not have a conniving bone in his body, caused him to suffer unfairly from suggestions that he was dumb. Or, as Lyndon Johnson once put it, "That's what happens when you play football too long without a helmet."41 But that most certainly was not the case. Ford was a graduate of the University of Michigan and Yale Law School. He had served on the House Appropriations Committee for twenty-three years and had an encyclopedic knowledge of the federal budget. But that most certainly was not the case. Ford was a graduate of the University of Michigan and Yale Law School. He had served on the House Appropriations Committee for twenty-three years and had an encyclopedic knowledge of the federal budget.

In light of the caricatures of Ford that were gaining traction in the press, I thought Ford needed to give the American people a sense of the direction he wanted to take the country.42 What did he want his presidency to be about? What were his policies and priorities? If Ford didn't seize the initiative to define his presidency, I feared that others were going to define it for him. What did he want his presidency to be about? What were his policies and priorities? If Ford didn't seize the initiative to define his presidency, I feared that others were going to define it for him.

Cornelius Crane Chase was the son of a Manhattan book editor and a concert pianist. When he was a youngster he was expelled from two private schools, and he worked odd jobs, such as cab driver, motorcycle messenger, busboy, and produce manager. But it was as a television performer that Cornelius Chase, better known by his nickname Chevy, found his calling. Chase became a nationwide celebrity for his humorous caricature of President Ford as a well-meaning but clumsy oaf who couldn't seem to get anything right. Chase's popular parody on Sat.u.r.day Night Live Sat.u.r.day Night Live did damage to the President's image throughout his presidency. Even though Ford and others on the staff tried to laugh it off, the attacks hurt politically. did damage to the President's image throughout his presidency. Even though Ford and others on the staff tried to laugh it off, the attacks hurt politically.

The episode that cemented that aspect of the President's image occurred when we were on a trip to Salzburg, Austria, in June 1975 to meet with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. As Air Force One arrived at the airport, it was raining. The mobile steps that had been wheeled up to aircraft's door had not been fitted with nonskid safety strips. As the President and Mrs. Ford exited the plane, a crew member handed the President an umbrella. Ford took the umbrella with one hand and thoughtfully took Betty's arm with his other. This, of course, meant Ford did not have a hand on a railing.

Joyce and I were exiting the same stairs behind them when I saw the President slip and fall down the last few steps. Ford bounced up quickly, but that hardly mattered. I knew the widely televised stumble was going to be a disaster. The picture of Ford's fall appeared on page one of what seemed like every newspaper in the world and was replayed on television over and over again. In the face of this embarra.s.sment, Ford could have blamed any number of people. But Ford, true to form, wasn't mad at anyone but himself. The Salzburg stumble was, of course, a gift to Chevy Chase. "He [Ford] had never been elected...so I never felt that he deserved to be there to begin with," Chase later said. "That was just the way I felt then as a young man and as a writer and a liberal."43 The truth was that Ford was very likely the best athlete to serve in the modern presidency. As president, he swam regularly, played golf, and was an accomplished skier and an aggressive tennis player. He had a bad knee from his football days, and like all of us, he stumbled from time to time. Unfortunately when he stumbled, it was for all the world to see.

The President had real strengths and one of Ford's most important a.s.sets was the First Lady. Betty Ford was a gracious, lively, and entertaining woman whom the President clearly adored. She helped set the standard for modern first ladies by talking openly about controversial public issues, a role that traditionally was not considered the province of a president's wife. Mrs. Ford expressed her support for the Equal Rights Amendment, for example, and for legalized abortion. She talked openly about her battle against breast cancer, as she did in later years about her struggle with alcoholism.44 All of this was unorthodox stuff for the mid-1970s. Not everyone who supported President Ford welcomed Betty's outspoken views. Some even thought it made the President look weak, because he couldn't seem to "control his wife," as was said back in those days. A few urged me to ask Ford to encourage Betty to withhold some of her opinions. All of this was unorthodox stuff for the mid-1970s. Not everyone who supported President Ford welcomed Betty's outspoken views. Some even thought it made the President look weak, because he couldn't seem to "control his wife," as was said back in those days. A few urged me to ask Ford to encourage Betty to withhold some of her opinions.

I had a different perspective as a husband of an independent woman and a father of two independent-minded daughters. It seemed to me you'd be yelling into the wind to suggest that somebody like Betty Ford ought not say what she believed. From a political standpoint, Mrs. Ford's remarks probably even helped the President. The First Lady's frankness about her personal struggles no doubt encouraged many Americans to seek treatment for similar problems and made them feel less alone. Years later, the treatment center for addiction that bears her name has been a lifeline to thousands and a living testament to her courage and candor. Further, her husband's obvious comfort with Betty's directness highlighted the Fords' respectful as well as devoted relations.h.i.+p. Mrs. Ford, in fact, proved so popular that Republicans printed up campaign b.u.t.tons that read "Betty's Husband for President!" Still, Ford's presidency would continue to be buffeted by Chevy Chase's parodies or some other extraneous factor. We were losing ground. Time was short, and Ford needed to make the presidency his own.

When Ford became Nixon's vice president, he had all but ruled out a run for the presidency.45 But by the spring of 1975, he had changed his mind. But by the spring of 1975, he had changed his mind.* Ford was growing more confident in the office. He was becoming a more skillful executive everyday. Ford was growing more confident in the office. He was becoming a more skillful executive everyday.

Several months later, I was with Ford in California when his presidency almost came to an abrupt end. On September 5, 1975, we were heading for a meeting with California's governor at the state capitol in Sacramento. As we were walking, a woman aimed a gun only a few feet from the President.46 A Secret Service agent spotted her, wrestled the gun from her hand, and forced her to the ground. "It didn't go off," she kept saying, as police swarmed in to arrest her. "It didn't go off. Can you believe it?" A Secret Service agent spotted her, wrestled the gun from her hand, and forced her to the ground. "It didn't go off," she kept saying, as police swarmed in to arrest her. "It didn't go off. Can you believe it?"47 The would-be a.s.sa.s.sin was Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme, a follower of the notorious ma.s.s murderer Charles Manson. The would-be a.s.sa.s.sin was Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme, a follower of the notorious ma.s.s murderer Charles Manson.

A few weeks later, on September 22, 1975, we were in San Francisco for a full day of events. After a speech at the AFL-CIO, we left the building by a freight elevator, which had doors that opened from the top and bottom. When we stepped out, the top door malfunctioned and came down hard. Ford, the tallest person among us, was struck on the head. He went down in a crouch, briefly stunned, then stood back up