Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years Part 19

To my surprise, one of the breeding grounds of the fast- spreading radicalism is the Srinagar jail. A Kashmiri who was detained twice under the Public Security Act told me that the atmosphere of radicalism was so suffocating that you felt that you were in a jail inside a jail. So long as the likes of Masarat Alam and Qasim Fakhtoo are given free rein radicalism will grow.

While Pakistan remains a factor in Kashmir, the real danger is that radicalism will end up as the lasting political legacy of Kashmir.

18.

MAINSTREAMING THE FUTURE.

Agha Ashraf Ali, the nonagenarian who is one of the most extraordinary Kashmiris I have met, once told me: 'Sheikh (Abdullah) had a heart of gold, but no brains.' Agha Saheb felt that Sheikh Abdullah was unable to fathom the fallout of the Part.i.tion in north India; or what India's first prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, was trying to do in Kashmir in order to save Muslims in the rest of India. The fallout of Part.i.tion was an onslaught of political conservatives in the Congress party, against whom Nehru had to wage a series of continual battleswhich ended when he lost the 1962 war to Chinaand make a series of concessions. One of these concessions was the August 1953 dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah as prime minister of J&K and his immediate arrest in the Kashmir conspiracy case, for which he spent eleven years incarcerated.

Agha Saheb believed that the Sher-e-Kashmir also did not seem to understand that for Nehru, Kashmir was of prime importance because of the Muslims who did not leave for Pakistan; Kashmir was a demonstration that the Indian State could and would fairly treat its Muslim citizens. If Sheikh Saheb had grasped this, he could have helped Nehru; if not fight some of the battles being waged in Delhi then at least not add to the skirmishes in Kashmir.

After Sheikh Abdullah was arrested, IB Director B.N. Mullik happened to meet (then) Madras chief minister C.R. Rajagopalachari. Rajaji, as he was known, had taken over as India's home minister after Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's death in December 1950 and served for less than a year, as differences with Nehru forced him to quit on health grounds. (Like many others, Rajaji believed India's greatest threat came from the Communists, whereas Nehru believed the Hindu Mahasabha to be the main threat.) According to Mullik's memoir, My Years with Nehru: Kashmir, Rajaji asked the DIB: 'Why has it become necessary to arrest Sheikh Abdullah?'

Rajaji told Mullik that the Sher-e-Kashmir ought to have been given other options of autonomy in order to maintain a good relations.h.i.+p, and the door should never be shut on Sheikh Abdullah. The Madras CM prophetically apprehended that continued uncertainty and unrest would prevail in the Valley. In fact, Mullik in his memoir felt that if Rajaji had continued as home minister, then events like Sheikh Saheb's arrest would have been avoided.

The home minister at the time was Kailash Nath Katju (whose grandson, Markandey Katju, was a Supreme Court judge who in 2014 completed his term as the chairman of the Press Council of India); and Sheikh Abdullah pinned most of the blame for his arrest on Nehru. Unfortunately, the fact is that these two men were Kashmiri Pandits (even if their families had left the Valley and settled elsewhere in India), and contributed to the perception in Kashmir that the Pandits with their disproportionate clout adversely impacted Kashmir policy in New Delhi.

There is a school of thought that believed that Sheikh Abdullah was secretly pursuing independence, but the fact is that he was walking a fine line and could have been handled with more subtlety. For instance, in October 1948, the National Conference held a special convention in which it unanimously pa.s.sed a resolution affirming J&K's accession to India. While moving the resolution, Sheikh Abdullah said: 'So far as I'm concerned, the political, economic, social and cultural interests of Kashmir demand an immediate and final accession to India, and to India alone.' And speaking at an Eid gathering after the convention, he said, 'the pledge I gave to Pandit Nehru that Kashmir will be a part of India has now become an eternal bond . . . Our decision to accede to India is based on the fact that our programme and policy are more akin to those followed by India.'

Politics followed a different trajectory, and Sheikh was arrested. For Kashmiris, it was a big deal. As Hurriyat leader Prof. Ghani pointed out to me once, even Hindus came out to protest. This was an important turning point, the first of four 'what ifs' that mark out Kashmir's history since 1947.

1. 'What if' Sheikh Abdullah had not been arrested in 1953? One consequence of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest was that two years later his right-hand man Mirza Afzal Beg set up the Plebiscite Front (the National Conference cadres joined in droves); in effect, that was the 'mainstreaming' of separatism in Kashmir, something that has remained a fixture in Kashmir ever since.

The Plebiscite Front was in existence for twenty years, and was wound up only after the 1975 IndiraSheikh accord which the Sheikh agreed to once he saw, after Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh, that Pakistan was no match for India. For Kashmiris the 1971 war had a huge impact: according to Prof. Ghani, the break-up of Pakistan made Kashmiris more sullen towards India. 'Kashmiris even abused G.o.d and said there is no G.o.d, no hope, no justice,' Prof. Ghani told me. The Kashmiris felt further let down by the accord; when Sheikh Saheb returned to J&K after the accord and reached Jammu, the Valley observed a hartal in protest against him and his 'compromise'. Ironically, when Sheikh Saheb reached the Valley the next day, ma.s.sive crowds turned out to see him. That is the way of the Kashmiri.

If Sheikh Saheb had not been arrested, there would have been no mainstreaming of separatism in Kashmir. That does not necessarily mean there would not have existed a Kashmir problemafter all, a lot of other disputes in our neighbourhood still linger. But had there been no mainstreaming of separatism, then when the Plebiscite Front was withdrawn in 1975 there would have been no first wave of separatists that included Shabir Shah.

While Sheikh was in jail for his first stretch, China defeated India in the 1962 war and this left Nehru a broken man (besides bringing China and Pakistan close). He also began to regret what had happened with Sheikh Sahebthey had a correspondence which would prove a goldmine of history, but whose letters have not been made public by either man's descendants. Sheikh was released by 1964 and sent by Nehru to Pakistan to work out a solution, but while he was there Nehru pa.s.sed away.

After Nehru, there was no stopping Delhi in its desire to erode Kashmir's autonomy in stages. And in 2014, when Narendra Modi and the BJP came to power, ministers openly spoke about abrogating the Const.i.tution's Article 370, which gives Kashmir its special status. It forced Farooq, who was in London waiting for doctors to decide whether he ought to get a kidney transplant from his wife Mollie or whether he ought to go on dialysis like his brother Sheikh n.a.z.ir, to state that the BJP's stand on 370 was worrying. 'For Kashmiris it is a matter of life and death,' he said, warning that its revocation would weaken the integrity of the country and pose a threat to peace.

India and Kashmir have travelled a long distance since 1947, with important milestones in 1952, 1953, 1975, 1980, 1987, 2001 and now in 2014. By now, there is nothing great about Article 370; what is great about the special status that Kashmiris enjoy now? Article 370 is by now merely symbolic. It is a fig leaf for Kashmirisso why would anyone want to take that away from them? Perhaps if Sheikh Abdullah had not been arrested in 1953, we would not have be having this debate in 2014.

2. 'What if' Farooq Abdullah had not been dismissed in 1984 at the behest of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi? It was a terrible mistake, and the only reason Jagmohan came to J&K as governor was to dismiss Farooq. The way I see it, there would have been no need for Farooq to enter a political accord with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhiwhich President Giani Zail Singh immediately said was a bad ideaand there would have been no formation of the Muslim United Front (MUF). Remember that in 1984, Farooq and Abdul Ghani Lone and Mirwaiz Moulvi Farooq were all on one side. Suddenly Jagmohan was there, dismissing government employees he thought were separatists (like Prof. Ghani, who was among those who formed the bulk of the MUF).

Farooq's dismissal suddenly woke up Kashmiri regional sentiment. A Kashmiri think tank came together with an idea from the Aftab editor-in-chief, Khwaja Sanaullah Bhat, that Kashmiris had to get together to resist the Delhi onslaught. That they had to build a counter to it. And when the MUF faced a rigged a.s.sembly election in 1987, then their boys went across the LoC and took part in Zia's war of 'a thousand cuts', the one that the ISI used to successfully drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Possibly you would have had one-off incidents of terrorism, like the hijacking by Has.h.i.+m Qures.h.i.+, but it would not have been on such a large scale.

In fact, when militancy erupted, then even the Pakistanis were surprised by its magnitude, a former militant once told me. They were as surprised as India as to how big it had grown. Yet for the Kashmiris, as former militant Firdous Syed once pointed out, the boys who went across thought of themselves as freedom fighters and took affront at being treated as agents of the ISI; this was probably why a lot of JKLF boys picked fights with the ISI at the time.

We in India wasted so many years in containing the Kashmir militancy. And once it was contained, we sat back and were happy with the status quo, instead of taking advantage of the situation to forge a political solution. The status quo has gone on a long time, with a lot of vested interests having been developed: the army, the police, the paramilitary, the bureaucracy, and politicians of every hue. Even separatists like Shabir Shah, whose career is over, are still well off; ones like Yasin obstinately cling on to the rebel ident.i.ty, because they are unable to grow.

Today, Kashmiris want peace, and they are very clear that 1990 cannot be repeated. War is not an option and neither is another arms struggle. As Firdous says, it would be disastrous. Also, there aren't many Kashmiri boys available; recruits are only available in Jamaat pockets, and those that get trained do so locally, without a need to go to Pakistan. Now that boys do stone-peltingthis caused a major crisis for Chief Minister Omar Abdullah in the summer of 2010, when nearly 120 youngsters were shot during stone-peltingyou don't need to use the gun. Stone-pelters can even enforce election boycotts in Srinagar.

3. 'What if' Shabir had contested the 1996 J&K a.s.sembly election? If he had then it would have provided an excuse for the other separatists to join in. As it were, had he known how to run the thing there were already a bunch of fellows ready to join up, like Nayeem Khan, our friend Firdous, and others on the periphery. A substantial separatist partic.i.p.ation would have changed the atmosphere.

But by Shabir not partic.i.p.ating, Pakistan only tightened its control on the separatist movement, particularly the Hurriyat. It has not loosened its grip after that; it has always been a carrot-and-stick, stick-and-carrot thing with the separatists. On the Hurriyat side, they are forever waiting for someone to 'bell the cat' as far as going mainstream is concerned. They are happy with the status quo; for instance, after the September 2014 floods, in the name of relief, several of them have received a lot of money, some from Saudi Arabia but most from Pakistan.

During my summer of 2014 visit to Kashmir, a local journalist called separatist politics a business, and he put it like this: there were three Hurriyats and three-four groups of the JKLF; the manufacturers are in Pakistan or in Delhi; the distributors are in Srinagar, particularly Hyderpora (where Syed Ali Shah Geelani resides); and the retailers and dealers are in the districts. It is a business without any conviction, the journalist said. It only depends on whatever sells during a particular season.

In Delhi, however, there is still this hang-up that the separatists are Pakistanis, but my point is that if Pakistan has influence on them or controls them, it is because Delhi won't talk to them.

And suppose they are the worst form of Pakistanis, then ask yourself: what is India's problem in Kashmir? It is Pakistan. So either you bomb and finish off Pakistana strategy that even the Americans could not successfully pull off in Afghanistan or Iraq, and which we certainly can't door you talk to Pakistan. And while you're deciding on whether or not to talk to Pakistan, it's easy to use that time to talk to the Kashmiri separatists. Again, when you mention separatism, there are people in Delhi who argue that Mufti Sayeed is soft on separatism, and that's 'theek hai', which is a whole lot of rubbish. Even if the Hurriyat's credibility hits rock-bottom in Delhi, a message has to be sent: that (a) we're always willing to talk, and to talk to anybody and everybody; and (b) we're always willing to listen, that we have the time to hear whatever your grievances are, which we will look into and rectify.

In fact, I have always felt that Delhi should engage Geelani. Even if nothing comes out of it, you lose nothing by engaging with him.

Further, it is strange that no Kashmiri separatist has ever been called for a national day function in Delhi, be it 15 August or 26 January. Not even the J&K governor invites them for a cup of tea. (At his own invest.i.ture he invites his relatives, etc., but never the Mirwaiz.) They may turn it down, but they have never been invited. I'm willing to vouch for it: if you work on it, they will come.

There is a fundamental point to this that Delhi overlooks. Kashmiris feel let down by Pakistan and the ISI because there is no consistency in the Pakistani or ISI position on Kashmir. India, on the other hand, whether it is the dovish Kuldip Nayar or the hawkish Ajit Doval, is consistent that we will never let go of Kashmir. Many Kashmiris I've spoken to believe that while the containment of militancy could be attributed to the good work by the armed forces and the intelligence agencies, they feel it is more because of the arrogance of the ISI. Whether it was creating more than a hundred tanzeems, or criminalising the movement, or creating-splitting-reunifying the Hurriyat, Kashmiris say that Pakistan has never understood or tried to understand Kashmir.

4. The last 'what if', and as big as the first, is what if Vajpayee had not lost power in 2004? He had visited Pakistan for the second time in January 2004, and President Musharraf began talking about out-of-the-box solutions and eventually came up with his four-point formula. The opportunity that Manmohan Singh squandered would have been seized without delay by Vajpayee, because by his second term he had already spent a lot of time checking Musharraf out. Just imaginea settlement acceptable to India, to the Pakistan army, and to the Hurriyat. That would have settled the Kashmir dispute for the foreseeable future.

(Additionally, if Vajpayee had returned as prime minister, he would not have had his stroke in early 2009. After we left office, I used to visit him twice a year: on Diwali and on New Year's. The last time I went to see him was 2008's Diwali; after the stroke he could not hold conversations, and his household discouraged visitors. So much for the 'what ifs'. But, so long as 'what is' dominates, we will remain where we are in Kashmir. Almost everyone connected with Kashmir has over a period of time developed a vested interest. So the 'shops' and 'businesses' that we are sensitive to also continue to flourish.

Whether you think Pakistan is moth-eaten or weakened and vulnerable, it remains a factor in Kashmir because of the anger and alienation against India, and it provides Kashmiris with a convenient fallback position. Pakistan has been in a mood to move forward, but as mentioned in the last chapter, the question Delhi bogs itself down with is of the reliability of those in control in Pakistan. The army is not against moving forward, and it is not weak; it is what counts in Pakistan. Pakistan's fall- back is its special relations.h.i.+p with China, so it can't be underestimated. Hence the track two dialogues ought to be encouraged and given proper direction; they ought to be inst.i.tutionalised and recognised.

As Prof. Ghani told me privately, it is impossible to conceive of another Vajpayee, but Kashmiris expect his policies to be followed by whoever is in power in Delhi. And the time, in 2014, was ripe for moving forward on Musharraf's four-point formula, but Vajpayee cannot be replicated. The BJP was blessed to have Vajpayee and Advani as prime minister and deputy prime minister together.

Finally, a solution to Kashmir has to be found between India and Pakistan, and because it will involve a compromise on the part of Pakistan, Pakistan will have no choice but to fall back on Kashmir and that's where the Hurriyat will come into play. This is why Delhi needs to talk to the Hurriyat. And it should let the Hurriyat talk to Pakistan. And then the real talking can be done between India and Pakistan.

As Prof. Ghani put it: 'Modi's rule can be epoch-making if he can carry everybody with him.'

Vajpayee is over. Brajesh Mishra is gone. Advani is sidelined. Jaswant Singh is lying in a coma. Farooq has been in poor health since 2012. Mufti will now have his final innings, or a benefit match, if you like. Shabir has wasted his chances. Geelani has credibility but he's an old man who has swung from one side to the other; during an escalating spat in April 2014, the Mirwaiz bravely asked a press conference: 'Who the h.e.l.l is Geelani?'

The Pakistani high commissioner once asked me, 'What do we do with Geelani?'

'Take him to Pakistan and give him a farm in Raiwind or something,' I said. 'That's his ultimate desire, so bury him with a green flag or something.'

The four likely players for the future in Kashmir are Omar Abdullah, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Mehb.o.o.ba Mufti, and Sajad Lone. With the exception of the former chief minister, the rest are untested.

Omar started off with great hope. He made a huge impact in Kashmir and in Delhi with a statement he made in Parliament during the July 2008 debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal, when he declared that it had been a mistake not to resign from the NDA after the 2002 Gujarat riots, and when he declared that Kashmiris would never let any harm come to the Amarnath Yatra pilgrims (in May 2008, the state government transferred 100 acres of forest land to the Amarnath Yatra board but had to reverse its decision following widespread protests in the Valley). During the 2008 a.s.sembly election, even the Pakistanis let their supporters know that they wanted to see him as chief minister (remember, he greatly impressed Musharraf during his visit to Pakistan in 2006). And when he became chief minister, he began by writing letters to people interested in Kashmir, asking them to come to Kashmir as his guests. It enthused many.

But Omar had this hang-up about his father. He felt Farooq was gullible, that Farooq was misled by bad advisors, and that he was going to do things his own way. From what he said it sounded as if Farooq was bad news, and Dadaji (Sheikh Saheb) was everything. Which was fine, except that he forgot that if it hadn't been for his father, he would not have become chief minister. Ultimately, his repeated reference to Sheikh Saheb, while ignoring his own father, did not go down well in Kashmir.

Rubbis.h.i.+ng Farooq ultimately became counterproductive because Omar's biggest problem became that he was not like his father in the matter of reaching out to his fellow Kashmiris. You cannot reach out to Kashmiris via the smartphone, iPad or Twitter. This made Omar look more like an Englishman than a Kashmiri. On top of which, Omar dealt with everything through the security paradigm. You don't need to be a genius to know that unemployment and development are not dealt with through the security paradigm.

Then came the two big disasters of Omar's tenure: the stone-pelting of 2010, and the failure of his government to provide visible relief during the 2014 floods. Those people who were enthused by Omar's youth and freshness and energy were deeply disappointed.

Yet I would not write off Omar, because of the great legacy he has. He has plus points, and as he has said during the 2014 a.s.sembly election campaign, time is on his side. There's a huge legacy on his side, so long as he doesn't squander it. The way Kashmir is, the way Kashmir functions and the way Kashmir politics is, even in the long run Omar is the most likely to succeed. This is simply because politics in Kashmir is so bogged down. Mehb.o.o.ba will have a head start at the moment because after the 2014 election she will be a key player in the ruling combination. As I was concluding this book the election results in J&K which satisfied no party in particular were announced. The obvious coalition staring one in the face was a PDPBJP alliance. But when I asked a Kashmiri who understands politics what he thought, he felt they would get together but it would always be a rocky relations.h.i.+p'Shaadi to hogi lekin nikaah nahin.'

Omar is honest, he's straight, he's transparent: he's different. But he needs to learn politics a little more, and he needs to become a little more Kashmiri. He's willing to wait it out and he's reconciled to sitting in the opposition; in a way he's looking forward to that because it'll be a different experience. Omar definitely needs another chance.

The Mirwaiz has to make up his mind, as mentioned earlier, whether he wants to be pope for life or whether he wants to be chief minister. I've told the Pakistanis that they're doing him a great disservice by holding him back, because as a politician he remains untested. As a human being he has all the qualities. But you have to be tested in the field; you have to be tested in power and you have to be tested out of power.

Sajad is a wild card. He has many qualities, but he's a little unpredictable. As mentioned he had been offered a senior ministers.h.i.+p by Mufti Sayeed in 2002, so he had by the 2014 a.s.sembly election wasted a dozen years, when he could have used the time to mature into a seasoned politician. During the 2014 election I spoke to him and advised him that when the results came in, despite his having gone and met Modi, he should not jump into anything. 'Maybe you've made some commitments, fine, but see what happens,' I said. 'If you want to be a player, then you have to come on to the board. There's no point in being in the fringe or on the outside.'

Though Sajad was a borderline separatistremember, he learned from his father that this separatism wasn't going to last very longhe was Delhi's favoured separatist. But he has looked for extraordinary favours from Delhi, and because of his temperament, Delhi has not been able to handle him properly. Thus the desperation in November 2014, when he went and met Modi; Sajad was thinking that he had to get on Delhi's right side. Like every other Kashmiri, Sajad believes that what Delhi wants is what will happen. Now that he's arrived on centre court it is up to him to prove that he has the mettle to get to the top.

The Mirwaiz could be a big player if Pakistan gave him freer rein. Mehb.o.o.ba is a bit quirky. But I have felt that a government with these, Omar, Umar and Sajadand they could accommodate Mehb.o.o.ba as well, why notwould be the best combination for Kashmir. It would take care of every shade of opinion: the pro-Pakistan, the pro-Indian, the pro-regional, etc. It would automatically take care of the problems of engagement. As Omar used to say whenever there were talks about the Hurriyat, 'Why are you asking me about talking to Delhi, I'm talking to Delhi all the time. Delhi should be talking to these guys.'

Modi is in a position to do what neither Vajpayee nor Manmohan Singh could do, because he can't blame anyone. The welcome Modi got from Kashmiris when he became prime minister was unprecedented: a BJP-RSS guy was being welcomed by the Mirwaiz. If Modi wants to waste the opportunity, then fine. He has no excuses after this 2014 a.s.sembly election.

Some would say that to find a solution to Kashmir one must understand the Kashmiris' collective psychological personality. Kashmiris are said to have descended from the Nagas but are basically Saraswat Brahmins who were converted. And after suffering at the hands of the Mughals, the Pathans, the Afghans, the Sikhs, the Dogras, and currently, India, they fight with their brains. Their brains make up for whatever they might not have.

Neither Pakistan nor India understands the Kashmiri's remarkable adjustability. An old Kashmiri woman will tell you whom she voted for, but she will not give up on azaadi. The Kashmiri will not accept defeat in a hurry.

Even in the worst of times the Kashmiri has never lost his sense of humour. When Rubaiya Sayeed was released from captivity on 13 December 1989, a popular saying was: 'Mufti Saeben gab, panch duh lab,' meaning Mufti's lamb found in five days. And when they began to tire of Mufti's rule in 2004, they said about Farooq: 'Uss fetir (lovable fool) ko wapas lao'. Mirza Afzal Beg was said to be the wittiest of his contemporaries and his jokes are a legion.

But times have changed: as Modi said during the 2014 parliamentary election, India has changed, and the corollary to that is that Kashmir has also changed. Many of today's youth don't know Sheikh Abdullah, and some don't even know Farooq.

Another ill.u.s.tration of the change before my eyes is in two flights that I took to Srinagar from Delhi: one in 1990, the other in 2012.

In 1990, all h.e.l.l had broken loose: central government employees deserted Srinagar, the Pandits made an exodus, our officers were getting b.u.mped off, anti-India crowds were on the streets every day, and you never know whether you would make it home that evening. I was transferred out in March and I left in a hurry, leaving my baggage behind.

I went back for my luggage in May and it was an unforgettable experience because there was so much tension in the aircraft. At that time there were only two flights to Srinagar, both operated by Indian Airlines. n.o.body spoke on the aircraft, not even a whisper. Kashmiris sat grimly throughout the flight. There were only two non-Kashmiris: myself and a Border Security Force (BSF) officer in uniform, who coincidentally sat next to me.

I was in no mood to talk to anybody; the atmosphere was so stifling. But the BSF officer said: 'Are you going to Srinagar on work?'

'No,' I said. 'Not really.'

He paused and then asked: 'Are you going on holiday?'

'Not really.' And the conversation ended there because I didn't want to carry it forward and explain why I was going there and tell the entire story.

When the plane landed, the BSF officer was first off and I followed him on to the tarmac. The IB has a presence at the airport so a couple of guys were there who received me. The BSF fellow was obviously posted in Srinagar and so recognised the two, and figured out who I was or where I was from. He looked back at me and smiled.

The other flight was at the end of April 2012. Now there were 26 to 30 flights to Srinagar, and when I boarded the aircraft I could have sworn it was a charter from Bangalore, because it was filled with south Indians going on holiday. I talked to a couple of fellow pa.s.sengers and they said they were from Bangalore. I sat in the back and there was only one Kashmiri man, with two women.

The Kashmiri was a little inquisitive; he thought I was a Kashmiri. 'Aap kahan se hain, kahan rehte hain?' he asked me. He wanted my Srinagar address.

'Main Delhi rehta hoon,' I said.

But he wouldn't believe I lived in Delhi. He asked me for my Delhi address.

'Nahin sir, aap toh Kashmiri lagte hain,' he said. 'Toh aap Delhi address bataye kyonki main nahin manta hoon ki aap Delhi rehte hain.'

I told him that I lived in Friends Colony and he was finally convinced.

The atmosphere was completely different: lively, a lot of tourists, relaxed. Everything had changed.

If you go to Kashmir now during season, which extends from April to October, Srinagar is full. You can't get a ticket, you can't get a hotel room. Hotels keep mushrooming. There are seven-star hotels now; in Gulmarg, which sees another tourist season in the winter, there's a new place that is said to be better than anything in Srinagar. If you walk down the Boulevard, it's packed with strollers. At the end of the high- security Gupkar Road, where the IB office is as well as Farooq's house, there are dhabas that have opened, some of them Punjabi dhabas. The most frequent visitor is the Gujarati, and during Puja it is the Bengali. But there is a continuous flow of tourists.

Irshad Malik, the Kashmiri militant now in London (who Firdous had wanted me to bring back to India when I was at R&AW), once said to me about PoK: 'Uss taraf kya hai? Pakistan mein kya hai? Aap kyon fiqar karte hain? Inko jaane dijiye, paar dekhne dijiye, udhar kuchh bhi nahin hain.' He said that Srinagar airportand he obviously hadn't been to Srinagar airport in at least twenty-four yearswas better than any Pakistani airport. Hotels in Kashmir are as good as any in the world. 'They have nothing there,' he said. You should publicise these facts, he said to me: 'Aapko toh film banani chahiye.'

Kashmir is as normal as normal can be. The crisis of 1989 90 has long blown over. Separatism has receded, or as one of their own kin put it, their lottery is over.

Kashmir and Kashmiris have moved on. Agha Shahid Ali, the Kashmiri-American poet, has inspired a whole generation of writers from South Asia including Basharat Peer and Mirza Waheed, who have made their mark in the West. S.A.S. Geelani's son-in-law, Iftikhar Geelani, who started as a small-time journalist, is heading the Delhi Bureau of the popular Mumbai- based daily DNA. More promising youngsters are making their mark in the national media. Kashmiris are regularly figuring in the All India Civil Services list. A couple of years ago a Kashmiri topped the list. Kashmiri doctors are travelling for jobs not only to the Gulf and the Middle East but the US as well. Cricket has picked up since Parvez Rasool was included in the national one day squad. For the first time J&K defeated Mumbai in the Ranji Trophy this season.

But sadly radicalism has moved apace and signals from the neighbourhood are ominous. Not only is Pakistan in turmoil and Afghanistan yet to unravel but which way the Taliban is headed and how Islamic jihad will finally play out is difficult to say. Al-Qaeda may no longer be the force it was but is still clearly inspiring. The ISIS is attracting more and more Muslim youth the world over. Kashmir can hardly remain immune from what is happening all over the Islamic world, more so because the violence it has witnessed in the last twenty-five years. Significantly, of late Kashmiri boys involved in militancy are more highly educated and from better stock. Not surprisingly, pro-ISIS graffiti has appeared in Srinagar city and its flags flown in the university. The proclamation of a caliphate is likely to be the most significant development in international jihadism since 9/11 which is beginning to impact worldwide. Nearer home, Taliban's terror factory is on auto pilot and all the more dangerous when there is no communication with Pakistan.

Nothing is constant; least of all Kashmir; it could change overnight. The Kashmiri has suffered for the last twenty-five years and though he largely blames himself, he is not internally at peace with the status quo. The peace with honour he bargained for still eludes him; he made a dignified exit. Why can a Kashmiri not be an Indian? We need to look deep into this question which disturbs us when a shopkeeper in Srinagar enquires, 'Aap India se aaye hain?' The Indian State is big enough to breach this psychological barrier. What Kashmir needs is not magnanimity but hard-nosed commonsense which Vajpayee displayed. Had he been around for a few more years or had Dr Manmohan Singh not missed the window of opportunity in 2006 or 2007, a solution around the Musharraf formula would have disposed of the problem for the foreseeable future. Now we need to engage with Kashmir (not just Mufti Saheb) and with Pakistan as well. The reason that people in Delhi have reservations about talking to separatists and Pakistanis are the very reasons we need to talk to them for. As Mufti says, there is no other way.

In closing, I must say this: if anyone who reads this book has any doubts about the path I tookof talking, talking, talking and how unbeatable dialogue is as both a tactic and a strategy, then I will tell them of what Agha Saheb said to me during a meeting in May 2014: 'You were sent to disrupt the (Kashmir) movement . . . in the friendliest possible manner.'

ABOUT THE AUTHOR.

AMARJIT SINGH DULAT served as the head of the Research and a.n.a.lysis Wing (R&AW), India's spy agency, under Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. He later joined Vajpayee's Prime Minister's Office (PMO), where his job was to 'monitor, manage and direct' the government of India's peace initiative in Kashmir. Dulat was born in Sialkot, Punjab, in December 1940. With India's Part.i.tion, his father Justice Shamsher Singh Dulat, ICS, was posted to Delhi. Dulat was educated in Bishop Cotton School, s.h.i.+mla and Punjab University, Chandigarh, after which he joined the Indian Police Service (IPS) in 1965, and then the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in 1969, where he served for almost thirty years. At IB he headed the Kashmir Group during the turbulent 1990s till he joined and headed R&AW.

Since leaving the government in 2004, Dulat has been active on the track two circuit, and has visited Pakistan. He has co-auth.o.r.ed a paper with former Pakistani intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani on the benefits of intelligence cooperation between India and Pakistan.

During service, Dulat acc.u.mulated a vast reservoir of goodwill with Kashmiris of all shades. As Jane's Intelligence Digest put it in 2001: 'Well known for his social skills, Dulat prefers dialogue to clandestine manoeuvres. He has built up an impressive network of personal contacts in Kashmir including militants.' A decade after retirement, that goodwill remains intact, with Kashmiris dropping in on him and his wife Paran at their Friends Colony house in Delhi, to share gossip, information, and advice.

ADITYA SINHA is a journalist since February 1987. He has been Editor-in-Chief of The New Indian Express and of Daily News and a.n.a.lysis (DNA). His published work includes the biographies Farooq Abdullah: Kashmir's Prodigal Son (1996) and Death of Dreams: A Terrorist's Tale (2000).

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