The Ayn Rand Lexicon - Objectivism From A To Z Part 37

Renaissance. The Renaissance was specifically the rebirth of reason, the liberation of man's mind, the triumph of rationality over mysticism -a faltering, incomplete, but impa.s.sioned triumph that led to the birth of science, of individualism, of freedom.

["The Left: Old and New," NL, 83.]

The Renaissance-the rebirth of man's mind-btasted the rule of the [mystics] sky-high, setting the earth free of [their] power. The liberation was not total, nor was it immediate: the convulsions lasted for centuries, but the cultural influence of mysticism-of avowed mysticism-was broken. Men could no longer be told to reject their mind as an impotent tool, when the proof of its potency was so magnificently evident that the lowest perceptual-level mentality was not able fully to evade it: men were seeing the achievements of science.

["For the New Intellectual," FNI, 21; pb 24.]

The Renaissance represented a rebirth of the Aristotelian spirit. The results of that spirit are written across the next two centuries, which men describe, properly, as the Age of Reason and the Age of Enlightenment. The results include the rise of modern science; the rise of an individualist political philosophy (the work of John Locke and others); the consequent spread of freedom across the civilized world; and the birth of the freest country in history, the United States of America. The great corollary of these results, the product of men who were armed with the knowledge of the scientists and who were free at last to act, was the Industrial Revolution, which turned poverty into abundance and transformed the face of the West. The Aristotelianism released by Aquinas and the Renaissance was sweeping away the dogmas and the shackles of the past. Reason, freedom, and production were replacing faith, force, and poverty. The age-old foundations of statisrn were being challenged and undercut.

[Leonard Peikoff, OP, 22; pb 31.]

The Renaissance was the great rebirth intellectually, but not politically. Still seeking order and unity, men attempted to solve the problem of feudal tyranny by replacing many small tyrants with a single big one. 'I'his was the birth of modern absolute monarchies.

["A Nation's Unity," ARL, 11, 2, 2.]

The Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a conscious rebellion against the anti-human, otherworldly values of medieval Christendom. In its metaphysics and epistemology, the Renaissance was essentially Aristotelian. Every aspect of the period, from science to literature to art, reflected the Aristotelian view that man is a worthy being, capable of understanding the universe, and that the universe is worthy of man's interest and study. Mysticism, which had saturated every aspect of medieval life and culture, lost its stranglehold on man's mind. A rebirth of reason and of concern with this earth, was the base of all the achievements of the Renaissance.

In terms of its morality, the Renaissance was split in two: it was part-Aristotelian, part-Christian. As Aristotelians, the men of the Renaissance displayed the virtues of intelligence and pride, and pursued the value of happiness on earth. As Christians, they upheld the virtues of humility, renunciation and self-sacrifice, and the value of rewards in Heaven. Thus the existentially brilliant era of the Renaissance was marred, spiritually, by a profound moral conflict.

That conflict appeared, in different degrees, in virtually all of the Renaissance art. For the most part, sculpture did reflect an affirmative view of man. Although the subject matter was largely Christian, scalp-tors abandoned the stylistic features of medieval art. They testored weight, three-dimensionality and natural proportions to the human body. They reintroduced free-standing figures. They were keenly aware of human anatomy, and created images of potentially active bodies, or of bodies engaged in energetic movement. And, equally significant, the naked body was featured in the representation of both Christian and pagan subjects.

The statues present men who have intelligence, courage. determination and strength of character; but they do not convey a sense of happiness. The moral conflict tinged the Renaissance view of life, and in the faces of the statues there is a touch of sadness or uncertainty of tragedy, an expression of longing for an ideal never fully reached.

[Mary Ann Sures, "Metaphysics in Marble," TO. March 1969. 11.]

See also ARISTOTLE; ART; DARK AGES; ENLIGHTENMENT, AGE of; FREEDOM; HISTORY; HUMILITY; MIDDLE AGES; MYSTICISM; REASON; RELIGION; TYRANNY.

Representative Government. The theory of representative government rests on the principle that man is a rational being, i.e., that he is able to perceive the facts of reality, to evaluate them, to form rational judgments, to make his own choices, and to bear responsibility for the course of his life.

Politically, this principle is implemented by a man's right to choose his own agents, i.e., those whom he authorizes to represent him in the government of his country. To represent him, in this context, means to represent his views in terms of political principles. Thus the government of a free country derives its "just powers from the consent of the governed." (For the basis of this discussion, see "Man's Rights" and "The Nature of Government" in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.) As a corroboration of the link between man's rational faculty and a representative form of government, observe that those who are demonstrably (or physiologically) incapable of rational judgment cannot exercise the right to vote. (Voting is a derivative, not a fundamental, right; it is derived from the right to life, as a political implementation of the requirements of a rational being's survival.) Children do not vote, because they have not acquired the knowledge necessary to form a rational judgment on political issues; neither do the feeble-minded or the insane, who have lost or never developed their rational faculty. (The possession of a rational faculty does not guarantee that a man will use it, only that he is able to use it and is, therefore, responsible for his actions.) ["Representation Without Authorization," ARL, I, 21, 1.]

See also CONSt.i.tUTION; DEMOCRACY; GOVERNMENT; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; POLITICS; REPUBLIC; VOTING.

Republic. The American system is not a democracy. It is a const.i.tutional republic. A democracy, if you attach meaning to terms, is a system of unlimited majority rule ... a form of collectivism, which denies individual rights.... The American system is a const.i.tutionally limited republic, restricted to the protection of individual rights. In such a system, majority rule is applicable only to lesser details, such as the selection of certain personnel. But the majority has no say over the basic principles governing the government. It has no power to ask for or gain the infringement of individual rights.

[Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 9.]

See also AMERICA; COLLECTIVISM; CONSt.i.tUTION; DEMOCRACY; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; POLITICS; REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT; VOTING.

Responsibility/Obligation. In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as "duty." There is only choice and the full, clear recognition of a principle obscured by the notion of "duty": the Law of Causality.

The proper approach to ethics, the start from a metaphysically clean slate, untainted by any touch of Kantianism, can best be ill.u.s.trated by the following story. In answer to a man who was telling her that she's got to do something or other, a wise old Negro woman said: "Mister, there's nothing I've got to do except die."

Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course.

Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if-" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "-if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think-if you want to know what to do-if you want to know what goals to choose-if you want to know how to achieve them.

In order to make the choices required to achieve his goals, a man needs the constant, automatized awareness of the principle which the anti-concept "duty" has all but obliterated in his mind: the principle of causality-specifically, of Aristotelian final causation (which, in fact, applies only to a conscious being), i.e., the process by which an end determines the means, i.e., the process of choosing a goal and taking the actions necessary to achieve it.

In a rational ethics, it is causality-not "duty"-that serves as the guiding principle in considering, evaluating and choosing one's actions, particularly those necessary to achieve a long-range goal. Following this principle, a man does not act without knowing the purpose of his action. In choosing a goal, he considers the means required to achieve it, he weighs the value of the goal against the difficulties of the means and against the full, hierarchical context of all his other values and goals. He does not demand the impossible of himself, and he does not decide too easily which things are impossible. He never drops the context of the knowledge available to him, and never evades reality, realizing fully that his goal will not be granted to him by any power other than his own action, and, should he evade, it is not some Kantian authority that he would be cheating, but himself....

A disciple of causation is profoundly dedicated to his values, knowing that he is able to achieve them. He is incapable of desiring contradictions, of relying on a "somehow," of rebelling against reality. He knows that in all such cases, it is not some Kantian authority that he would be defying and injuring, but himsetf-and that the penalty would be not some mystic brand of "immorality," but the frustration of his own desires and the destruction of his values....

Accepting no mystic "duties" or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one's promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relations.h.i.+ps, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men....

The acceptance of full responsibility for one's own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of "duty." They learn better, often when it is too late.

The disciple of causation faces life without inexplicable chains, unchosen burdens, impossible demands or supernatural threats. His metaphysical att.i.tude and guiding moral principle can best be summed up by an old Spanish proverb: "G.o.d said: 'Take what you want and pay for it.' " But to know one's own desires, their meaning and their costs requires the highest human virtue: rationality.

["Causality Versus Duty," PWNI, 118; pb 98.]

See also CONTRACTS; "DUTY"; FREE WILL; KANT, IMMANUEL; LIFE; MORALITY; RATIONALITY; SELFISHNESS; VALUES.

Retaliatory Force. The basic political principle of the Objectivist ethics is: no man may initiate the use of physical force against others. No man-or group or society or government-has the right to a.s.sume the role of a criminal and initiate the use of physical compulsion against any man. Men have the right to use physical force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use. The ethical principle involved is simple and clear-cut: it is the difference between murder and self-defense. A holdup man seeks to gain a value, wealth, by killing his victim; the victim does not grow richer by killing a holdup man. The principle is: no man may obtain any values from others by resorting to physical force.

["The Objectivist Ethics," VOS, 31; pb 32.]

It is only as retaliation that force may be used and only against the man who starts its use. No, I do not share his evil or sink to his concept of morality: I merely grant him his choice, destruction, the only destruction he had the right to choose: his own. He uses force to seize a value; I use it only to destroy destruction.

[GS, FNI, 166; pb 135.]

The principle of using force only in retaliation against those who initiate its use, is the principle of subordinating might to right.

["Philosophy: Who Needs It," PWNI, 13; pb 10.]

See also ANARCHISM; CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE; GOVERNMENT; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; JUSTICE; PACIFISM; PEACE MOVEMENTS; PHYSICAL FORCE; SELF-DEFENSE; WAR.

Retroactive Law. Retroactive (or ex post facto) law-i.e., a law that punishes a man for an action which was not legally defined as a crime at the time he committed it-is rejected by and contrary to the entire tradition of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. It is a form of persecution practiced only in dictators.h.i.+ps and forbidden by every civilized code of law. It is specifically forbidden by the United States Const.i.tution. It is not supposed to exist in the United States and it is not applied to anyone -except to businessmen. A case in which a man cannot know until he is convicted whether the action he took in the past was legal or illegal, is certainly a case of retroactive law.

["America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business," CUl, 50.]

See also ANt.i.tRUST LAWS; BUSINESSMEN; CONSt.i.tUTION; GOVERNMENT; LAW, OBJECTIVE AND NON-OBJECTIVE.

Revolution vs. Putsch. The New Left does not portend a revolution, as its press agents claim, but a Putsch. A revolution is the climax of a long philosophical development and expresses a nation's profound discontent; a Putsch is a minority's seizure of power. The goal of a revolution is to overthrow tyranny; the goal of a Putsch is to establish it.

Tyranny is any political system (whether absolute monarchy or fascism or communism) that does not recognize individual rights (which necessarily include property rights). The overthrow of a political system by force is justified only when it is directed against tyranny: it is an act of self-defense against those who rule by force. For example, the American Revolution. The resort to force, not in defense, but in violation, of individual rights, can have no moral justification; it is not a revolution, but gang warfare.

["From a Symposium," NL, 96.]

See also AMERICA; DICTATORs.h.i.+P; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; NEW LEFT; PHYSICAL FORCE; STATISM.

"Rewriting Reality." Unable to determine what they can or cannot change, some men attempt to "rewrite reality," i.e., to alter the nature of the metaphysically given. Some dream of a universe in which man experiences nothing but happiness-no pain, no frustration, no illness-and wonder why they lose the desire to improve their life on earth. Some feel that they would be brave, honest, ambitious in a world where everyone automatically shared these virtues-but not in the world as it is. Some dread the thought of eventual death-and never undertake the task of living.

["The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made," PWNI, 36; pb 30.]

By the "metaphysically given," we mean any fact inherent in reality as such, apart from human action (whether mental or physical)-as against "man-made facts," i.e., objects, inst.i.tutions, practices, or rules of conduct that are of human origin....

As soon as you say about a metaphysically given fact: "it is"-just that much-the whole Objectivist metaphysics is implicit. If the fact is, it is what it is (the law of ident.i.ty); it is what it is independent of consciousness, of anyone's or everyone's desires, hopes, fears (the primacy of existence); and it is lawful, inherent in the ident.i.ties of the relevant ent.i.ties (the law of causality). Given the circ.u.mstances involved, such a fact is necessary; it had to be; any alternative would have entailed a contradiction. In short, once you say about a metaphysical fact: "it is," that means that, within the relevant circ.u.mstances, it is immutable, inexorable, inescapable, absolute. "Absolute" in this context means necessitated by the nature of existence and, therefore, unchangeable by human (or any other) agency....

The attempt to alter the nature of the metaphysically given is described by Ayn Rand as the fallacy of "rewriting reality." Those who commit it regard metaphysical facts as non-absolute and, therefore, feel free to imagine an alternative to them. In effect, they regard the universe as though it were merely a first draft of reality, which anyone may decide at will to rewrite.

A common example is provided by those who condemn life on earth because man is capable of failure, frustration, pain, and who yearn instead for a world in which man knows nothing but happiness. But if the possibility of failure exists, it necessarily exists (it is inherent in the fact that achieving a value depends on a specific course of action, and that man is neither omniscient nor omnipotent in regard to such action). Anyone who holds the full context-who keeps in mind the ident.i.ty of all the relevant ent.i.ties-would be unable even to imagine an alternative to the facts as they are; the contradictions involved in such a projection would obliterate it. The rewriters, however, do not keep ident.i.ty in mind; they specialize in out-of-context pining for a "heaven" that is the antonym of the metaphysically given.

[Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 6.]

See also ABSOLUTES; AXIOMS; CAUSALITY; EXISTENCE; IDENt.i.tY; METAPHYSICAL vs. MAN-MADE.

Right to Life. See Life, Right to.

Rightists vs. Leftists. Since, today, there are no clear definitions of political terms, I use the word "rightist" to denote the views of those who are predominantly in favor of individual freedom and capitalism -and the word "leftist" to denote the views of those who are predominantly in favor of government controls and socialism. As to the middle or "center," I take it to mean "zero," i.e., no dominant position, i.e., a pendulum swinging from side to side, moment by moment.

["The Disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of the Right," ARL., I, 6, 1.]

See also CAPITALISM; COLLECTIVISM; "CONSERVATIVES" vs. "LIBERALS"; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; INDIVIDUALISM; POLITICS; SOCIALISM; STATISM.

Rights. See Individual Rights.

Rights of the Accused. The rights of the accused are not a primary-they are a consequence derived from a man's inalienable, individual rights. A consequence cannot survive the destruction of its cause. What good will it do you to be protected in the rare emergency of a false arrest, if you are treated as the rightless subject of an unlimited government in your daily life?

["Moral Inflation," ARL, 111, 13, 4.]

See also CRIME; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; STATISM.

Romanticism. Romanticism is a category of art based on the recognition of the principle that man possesses the faculty of volition.

["What Is Romanticism?" RM, 81; pb 99.]

Romanticism is the conceptual school of art. It deals, not with the random trivia of the day, but with the timeless, fundamental, universal problems and values of human existence. It does not record or photograph; it creates and projects. It is concerned-in the words of Aristotle -not with things as they are, but with things as they might be and ought to be.

["Introduction to The Fountainhead," TO, March 1968, 1.]

What the Romanticists brought to art was the primacy of values, an element that had been missing in the stale, arid, third- and fourth-hand (and rate) repet.i.tions of the Cla.s.sicists' formula-copying. Values (and value-judgments) are the source of emotions; a great deal of emotional intensity was projected in the work of the Romanticists and in the reactions of their audiences, as well as a great deal of color, imagination, originality, excitement and all the other consequences of a value-oriented view of life. This emotional element was the most easily perceivable characteristic of the new movement and it was taken as its defining characteristic, without deeper inquiry.

Such issues as the fact that the primacy of values in human life is not an irreducible primary, that it rests on man's faculty of volition, and, therefore, that the Romanticists, philosophically, were the champions of volition (which is the root of values) and not of emotions (which are merely the consequences)-were issues to be defined by philosophers, who defaulted in regard to esthetics as they did in regard to every other crucial aspect of the nineteenth century.

The still deeper issue, the fact that the faculty of reason is the faculty of volition, was not known at the time, and the various theories of free will were for the most part of an anti-rational character, thus reinforcing the a.s.sociation of volition with mysticism.

["What Is Romanticism?" RM, 88; pb 104.]

In recent times, some literary historians have discarded, as inadequate, the definition of Romanticism as an emotion-oriented school and have attempted to redefine it, but without success. Following the rule of fundamentality, it is as a volition-oriented school that Romanticism must be defined-and it is in terms of this essential characteristic that the nature and history of Romantic literature can be traced and understood.

[Ibid., 90; pb 106.) If man possesses volition, then the crucial aspect of his life is his choice of values-if he chooses values, then he must act to gain and/or keep them-if so, then he must set his goals and engage in purposeful action to achieve them. The literary form expressing the essence of such action is the plot. (A plot is a purposeful progression of logically connected events leading to the resolution of a climax.) The faculty of volition operates in regard to the two fundamental aspects of man's life: consciousness and existence, i.e., his psychological action and his existential action, i.e., the formation of his own character and the course of action he pursues in the physical world. Therefore, in a literary work, both the characterizations and the events are to be created by the author, according to his view of the role of values in human psychology and existence (and according to the code of values he holds to be right). His characters are abstract projections, not reproductions of concretes; they are invented conceptually, not copied reportorially from the particular individuals he might have observed. The specific characters of particular individuals are merely the evidence of their particular value-choices and have no wider metaphysical significance (except as material for the study of the general principles of human psychology); they do not exhaust man's characterological potential.

[Ibid., 82; pb 100.]

The Romanticists did not present a hero as a statistical average, but as an abstraction of man's best and highest potentiality, applicable to and achievable by all men, in various degrees, according to their individual choices.

["The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age," RM, 117; pb 126.]

Philosophically, Romanticism is a crusade to glorify man's existence; psychologically, it is experienced simply as the desire to make life interesting.

["What Is Romanticism?" RM, 95; pb 109.]

Romanticism demands mastery of the primary element of fiction: the art of storytelling-which requires three cardinal qualities: ingenuity, imagination, a sense of drama. All this (and more) goes into the construction of an original plot integrated to theme and characterization. Naturalism discards these elements and demands nothing but characterization, in as shapeless a narrative, as "uncontrived" (i.e., purposeless) a progression of events (if any) as a given author pleases.

The value of a Romanticist's work has to be created by its author; he owes no allegiance to men (only to man), only to the metaphysical nature of reality and to his own values. The value of a Naturalist's work depends on the specific characters, choices and actions of the men he reproduces-and he is judged by the fidelity with which he reproduces them.

The value of a Romanticist's story lies in what might happen; the value of a Naturalist's story lies in that it did happen.

[Ibid., 105; pb 117.]

The major source and demonstration of moral values available to a child is Romantic art (particularly Romantic literature). What Romantic art offers him is not moral rules, not an explicit didactic message, but the image of a moral person-i.e., the concretized abstraction of a moral ideal. It offers a concrete, directly perceivable answer to the very abstract question which a child senses, but cannot yet conceptualize: What kind of person is moral and what kind of life does he lead?

It is not abstract principles that a child learns from Romantic art, but the precondition and the incentive for the later understanding of such principles: the emotional experience of admiration for man's highest potential, the experience of looking up to a hero-a view of life motivated and dominated by values, a life in which man's choices are practicable, effective and crucially important-that is, a moral sense of life.

["Art and Moral Treason," RM, 142; pb 146.]

Romantic art is the fuel and the spark plug of a man's soul; its task is to set a soul on fire and never let it go out.

[Ibid., 150; pb 152.]

It is only the superficiality of the Naturalists that cla.s.sifies Romanticism as "an escape"; this is true only in the very superficial sense of contemplating a glamorous vision as a relief from the gray burden of "real-life" problems. But in the deeper, metaphysical-moral-psychological sense, it is Naturalism that represents an escape-an escape from choice, from values, from moral responsibility-and it is Romanticism that trains and equips man for the battles he has to face in reality.

["Bootleg Romanticism," RM, 134; pb 139.]

The (implicit) standards of Romanticism are so demanding that in spite of the abundance of Romantic writers at the time of its dominance, this school has produced very few pure, consistent Romanticists of the top rank. Among novelists, the greatest are Victor Hugo and Dostoevsky, and, as single novels (whose authors were not always consistent in the rest of their works), I would name Henryk Sienkiewicz's Quo Vadis and Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter. Among playwrights, the greatest are Friedrich Schiller and Edmond Rostand.

The distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic of this top rank (apart from their purely literary genius) is their full commitment to the premise of volition in both of its fundamental areas: in regard to consciousness and to existence, in regard to man's character and to his actions in the physical world. Maintaining a perfect integration of these two aspects, unmatched in the brilliant ingenuity of their plot structures, these writers are enormously concerned with man's soul (i.e., his consciousness). They are moralists in the most profound sense of the word; their concern is not merely with values, but specifically with moral values and with the power of moral values in shaping human character. Their characters are "larger than life," i.e., they are abstract projections in terms of essentials (not always successful projections, as we shall discuss later). In their stories, one will never find action for action's sake, unrelated to moral values. The events of their plots are shaped, determined and motivated by the characters' values (or treason to values), by their struggle in pursuit of spiritual goals and by profound value-conflicts. Their themes are fundamental, universal, timeless issues of man's existence-and they are the only consistent creators of the rarest attribute of literature: the perfect integration of theme and plot, which they achieve with superlative virtuosity.

If philosophical significance is the criterion of what is to be taken seriously, then these are the most serious writers in world literature.

["What Is Romanticism?" RM, 91; ph 107.]

It must be noted that philosophers contributed to the confusion surrounding the term "Romanticism." They attached the name "Romantic" to certain philosophers (such as Sch.e.l.ling and Schopenhauer) who were avowed mystics advocating the supremacy of emotions, instincts or will over reason. This movement in philosophy had no significant relation to Romanticism in esthetics, and the two movements must not be confused.

["What Is Romanticism?" RM, 90; pb 106.]

The archenemy and destroyer of Romanticism was the altruist morality.

Since Romanticism's essential characteristic is the projection of values, particularly moral values, altruism introduced an insolvable conflict into Romantic literature from the start. The altruist morality cannot be practiced (except in the form of self-destruction) and, therefore, cannot be projected or dramatized convincingly in terms of man's life on earth (particularly in the realm of psychological motivation). With altruism as the criterion of value and virtue, it is impossible to create an image of man at his best-"as he might be and ought to be." The major flaw that runs through the history of Romantic literature is the failure to present a convincing hero, i.e., a convincing image of a virtuous man.

[lbid., 100; pb 113.]

With the resurgence of mysticism and collectivism, in the later part of the nineteenth century, the Romantic novel and the Romantic movement vanished gradually from the cultural scene.

["The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age," RM, 114; pb 124.]

See also ALTRUISM; ARISTOTLE; ART; CLa.s.sICISM; EMOTIONS; FREE WILL; FUNDAMENTALlTY, RULE of; LITERATURE; METAPHYSICAL VALUE JUDGMENTS: MORALITY; NATURALISM: PLOT; POPULAR LITERATURE; REASON: THRILLERS; VALUES.