Allende's Chile And The Inter-American Cold War Part 2

Santiago and Was.h.i.+ngton had good reason to be mutually suspicious about each other's policies in Latin America after Allende a.s.sumed the presidency. Both wanted to readjust the inter-American system to suit their own aims and were worried that, if they made the wrong moves or alienated potential allies, the other side might gain. As the Chilean Foreign Ministry acknowledged in June 1971, Allende's policy toward Latin America was likely to determine the United States' approach to Chile.78 For other states in the region, the months after Allende's election were also a moment of change. Although Was.h.i.+ngton and Santiago wanted to get these countries on their side, Southern American leaders had their own sovereign agendas and regional strategies to pursue. In early 1971, for example, Brazil launched a highly ambitious diplomatic regional offensive designed to boost its own position in Latin America, while upholding ideological frontiers against the likes of Chile and Cuba. Although U.S. policy makers appear to have been largely oblivious to the extent of Brasilia's new regional diplomacy, Latin American responses to it revealed a wary sense of upheaval in the Southern Cone. This was especially so amid rumors that the United States was using Brazil in inter-American affairs, and ironically these fears did a great deal to ensure Chile's ability to break down some of the ideological barriers it might otherwise have confronted. Be that as it may, in reality outsiders knew very little about the nature and scope of growing U.S.-Brazilian communication on regional affairs or the lead that Brazil was taking in this dialogue.

From November 1970 onward, the United States had combined its efforts to undermine Allende's presidency with the bigger goal of containing the Left and salvaging U.S. influence in the inter-American system. The news that Peru and Bolivia had been interested in emulating Chile's re-establishment of relations with Cuba and that Castro's "new maturity" in the hemisphere was beginning to bear fruit magnified Was.h.i.+ngton's sense of vulnerability.79 At the end of November, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) had noted that Chile's reestablishment of relations with Castro would become contagious unless Havana and Santiago increased their efforts to export revolution, a prospect that it judged to be "unlikely." As the INR observed, OAS members appeared "impressed" by Cuba's reduced support for revolutionaries in the region since Che Guevara's death.80 Although the Nixon administration had concluded it could do nothing to reverse Chile's decision, it moved quickly to contain it.81 When Latin American leaders took advantage of Mexican president Luis Echeverria's inauguration in December to discuss the possibility of reviewing their position toward Cuba in the light of Allende's move, for example, U.S. and Brazilian representatives had effectively resisted any serious debate.82 But in January 1971, Was.h.i.+ngton had remained uneasy. The State Department had thus instructed all U.S. amba.s.sadors in Latin America to contact host governments and reaffirm Was.h.i.+ngton's opposition to any change. Amba.s.sadors were also told to underline the dangers of not upholding collective security by "gratuitously" offering Castro "a badly needed and prestigious political and psychological victory over the OAS," or giving Cuba economic relief that would allow it to revive its continental subversion.83 Meanwhile, the Nixon administration had also begun collecting information to use against Chile in Latin America.84 In the months after Allende came to power, CIA station chiefs were instructed to pa.s.s on information to U.S. amba.s.sadors that could be disseminated to journalists and politicians. In particular, Was.h.i.+ngton wanted to undermine Allende's independence and democratic credentials and therefore sought to "play up" the notion that Chile was awash with subversive Cuban and Soviet agents.85 U.S. policy makers had little concrete information about Cuban involvement in Chile at this stage, relying instead on what NSC staffer Pete Vaky recalled as supposition rather than fact.86 Yet, by calling attention to Cuban involvement in Allende's Chile, U.S. officials were squarely able to attack two birds with one stone. And certainly, when Brazil's amba.s.sador in Santiago sent an alarmist telegram back home detailing stories of ominous Cuban intervention in Chile, he relied purely on spurious press reports.87 All the while, the Allende government was clearly aware of the United States' hostile reaction to the new Chilean-Cuban relations.h.i.+p. Chilean diplomats heard from the OAS secretary-general that the State Department had "paralyzed" a Colombian initiative to review Cuba's position within the inter-American system. Another source provided information about a private conversation Nixon had had with a Bolivian diplomat in which the president presented himself as being highly interested in working with regional countries in the context of Latin America's "new political configuration."88 As the Chilean Emba.s.sy in Was.h.i.+ngton had concluded in February 1971, there was a strong feeling that the Nixon administration was trying to isolate Chile "as the black sheep of the [inter-American] family."89 Henceforth, rumors about Was.h.i.+ngton's diplomacy within inter-American forums exacerbated Santiago's fears of being isolated.90 In early 1971 the Chilean Emba.s.sy in Lima warned that the Nixon administration was paying new attention to Chile's traditional rival, Peru.91 Numerous conjectures followed: Was the United States trying to drive a wedge between neighbors? Was Was.h.i.+ngton behind what was reported as being a resurgence of anti-Chilean feeling in Peru? Did rumors that the United States was supplying weapons to Peruvians hidden in earthquake aid have any substance? In reality, these fears actually exaggerated the United States attention to Peru in early 1971. But Allende's amba.s.sador in Lima, Luis Jerez Ramirez, was worried enough to keep asking. As he surmised, Peru would be a crucial part of any attempt by Was.h.i.+ngton to win back its "past hegemony" in South America.92 What the Chileans had to work out was whether this U.S. attempt to win back influence in Latin America was squarely aimed against Chile or not. When Chilean press articles falsely alleged that Allende possessed a U.S. doc.u.ment outlining Was.h.i.+ngton's plans to isolate it, the Chilean Foreign Ministry immediately issued denials and downplayed the "cloudy" possibility that Chile could be isolated in the first place.93 Privately, however, diplomats continued to speculate about "consultations to blockade Chile," especially after news of a meeting of U.S. diplomats working in Latin America in Panama in March.94 The Chilean Foreign Ministry also paid "special attention" to evidence of growing ties between Was.h.i.+ngton and Brasilia and the prospect that Brazil itself could be a serious and immediate threat to Chilean sovereignty in early 1971.95 As the Chilean amba.s.sador in Brasilia, Raul Rettig, noted, "It is not a mystery to anyone that the current Brazilian regime const.i.tutes a potential enemy for progressive and revolutionary governments in the continent. Chile is, in these moments, the object of attack that the military government and the dominant cla.s.ses that control nearly all mediums of ma.s.s communication use most frequently. This is perhaps the most important and combative front of reactionary forces that act at the international level. Behind the press, there exists a real sustained war [against Chile] that is expressed in repeated editorials and distorting information aimed at damaging the prestige of President Allende's government."96 Among the editorials Amba.s.sador Rettig referred to were repeated references to the "tragedy" that had befallen Chile, a traditionally friendly nation where, according to the Brazilian press, nothing very important ever happened.97 Like the Nixon administration, Brazil's military leaders had clearly not been prepared for Allende's victory, but in its aftermath news coverage of Chilean affairs had tripled. In one instance, a press report cited a Brazilian official warning that Russian flotillas were on their way to the Chilean port of Valparaiso.98 In another, the anticommunist Brazilian daily O Estado do So Paulo claimed that "socialist loyalty and submission to Fidel Castro's continental revolutionary leaders.h.i.+p were absolute priorities for Allende's Government."99 Of course, it is quite possible that the CIA planted these alarmist reports. But it would also be a historical error to attribute all ideologically driven hostility toward Allende's Chile to Was.h.i.+ngton. Certainly, the Chileans noticed a new and ominous att.i.tude toward their country growing within Brazil itself.

In early 1971, for example, the Chilean Emba.s.sy in Brasilia had begun receiving information that this hostility was being translated into action. When Chile's Consular Division moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia at the beginning of the year, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry had launched an investigation into its activities. More ominously, the Chileans learned that a Brazilian general had offered to help establish a resistance movement in Chile. Although this news appears to have been relayed to the emba.s.sy only once, it did not seem to be an isolated show of support for anti-Allende groups; in So Paulo, senior military officials were said to be recruiting Chileans living in Brazil for belligerent action against the Unidad Popular. At the beginning of March, a trusted emba.s.sy informant also pa.s.sed on news that Brazilian military leaders had gone so far as to establish situation rooms at the army's headquarters in Rio to study Chile's threat. According to this informant, these rooms were filled with scaled models of the Andes stretching along Chile's borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. During meetings between senior military officials, they were then used to determine which zones might become locations for future guerrilla struggles (anti-Allende Chileans and other Latin American civilians were mentioned as being the ones who would fight antiguerrilla battles). Furthermore, news that Brazilian secret agents had been sent to Chile to find out more about such zones coincided with other information reaching the Chileans that the Brazilian government had dispatched intelligence operatives along with seventy prisoners Santiago had reluctantly taken as part of a hostage exchange.100 Last but not least, the Chilean Emba.s.sy in Brasilia reported that the Brazilian army had staged military exercises specifically designed around the premise of fighting guerrilla forces residing in Chile.101 Unsurprisingly, this information sparked alarm in Chile, especially when coupled with indications that U.S.-Brazilian relations had suddenly improved and that Brasilia was launching a major new diplomatic offensive in Latin America. After U.S. a.s.sistant secretary Charles Meyer's visit to Brazil in March, Brazilian newspapers reported that he and Foreign Minister Mario Gibson Barbosa had discussed "Cuban infiltration in Chilean internal affairs" and the future "transformation of that country into a base of support for the export of terrorism and subversion."102 Only a year before, Brasilia's relations with Was.h.i.+ngton had suffered serious tensions on account of U.S. congressional investigations into allegations of torture in Brazil.103 Now, the two Latin American countries' situations seemed to have been reversed. Moreover, the Chileans feared that Brazil's new diplomatic offensive was aimed at isolating Chile and a.s.suming a dominant position in South America. As Almeyda would later explain to Polish leaders, not only was Brazil the United States' "most loyal collaborator," but there was evidence to suggest Brazil's foreign minister had gathered together all his friends from Latin America to organize an anti-Chilean campaign in early 1971.104 In view of these apparent maneuvers, Santiago had ordered its diplomats throughout Latin America to report on Brazilian activity in their host countries.105 Was the United States "distributing different geographic regions of the world?" Chile's amba.s.sador in Buenos Aires asked.106 Amba.s.sador Rettig echoed this possibility, concluding that because the United States wanted to rescue its faltering position in Latin America and was reluctant to be the one to intervene directly in regional affairs, it was taking advantage of Brazil's diplomatic offensive to prevent "another Cuba." He urged Santiago to build the best possible relations with Latin American countries as an "antidote."107 It was in this context that Chile launched its very own diplomatic offensive in Latin America in 1971. From the start of Allende's presidency, the UP had emphasized its attachment to the "Andean Pact," a group dedicated to subregional development and economic integration that was established in 1969 by Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. At the end of 1970, the UP had then signed the group's "Decision 24," an agreement to regulate foreign investment and decrease external control of the members' industrial production. Foreign Minister Almeyda later admitted that Chile's main purpose in doing so was political rather than economic and that Chile had "no illusions" about the prospects for economic collaboration. Member states did not have a history of commercial relations; in fact, when the pact was signed, their exports to and imports from each other amounted only to just under 3 percent and less than 5 percent of their total trade respectively. As Almeyda recalled, some in the UP believed that trying to transform this unfavorable balance of trade was economically unwise, but it was increasingly considered politically important to show "an active and visible Chilean loyalty to the process."108 Beyond the Andean Pact, Chilean diplomats campaigned widely in early 1971 to spread information about the democratic, peaceful, noninterventionist character of Allende's government and its commitment to "ideological pluralism" in foreign affairs. As Mexico's foreign minister told Santiago's amba.s.sador in Mexico City, this type of diplomacy was pivotal, given the way in which foreign news services had taken to attaching "political or ideological surnames" to all things Chilean. His advice was to launch an "open and extensive campaign" as the only means of defending the truth, which is exactly what the Chileans were already doing.109 Allende publicly challenged the idea that he planned to export La Via Chilena in the Southern Cone, noting that it was "difficult to conceive" how this would happen in countries with no political parties, workers organizations, or a parliament.110 In April, Almeyda then emphasized Chile's "sober" approach to foreign affairs and rejected the idea that Allende had any regional leaders.h.i.+p pretensions when he addressed the OAS General a.s.sembly. And with regard to Chile's decision to reestablish relations with Cuba, Almeyda not only defended his government's actions by pointing out that Chile was not the only one that had relations with the island-Mexico also had them-but argued that the nature of Cuba's isolation was becoming ever more "artificial."111 Yet, in practice, the UP's regional policies were far more ambiguous to outsiders than the Chilean Foreign Ministry and Allende proclaimed. Partly, this was the consequence of the heterogeneous nature of the UP. At the PS Congress in January 1971, the party's newly elected general secretary, Carlos Altamirano, publicly declared that Uruguayan and Brazilian revolutionaries would "always" receive asylum and support from "comrades in arms" in Chile.112 Allende's own position also raised doubts about conflicting allegiances abroad. When in mid-1971, the British amba.s.sador in Montevideo, Geoffrey Jackson, was kidnapped by the Uruguayan revolutionary movement, the Tupamaros, London discreetly asked Allende to appeal for his release, which he did. As Britain's amba.s.sador in Santiago, who was rather sympathetic to La Via Chilena, noted after he met the Chilean president, Allende was "very good at making those with whom he talks feel that he is fundamentally on their side."113 Moreover, in helping out on this occasion he surmised that Allende had wanted "the best of both worlds." "He has hoped for a great boost for himself as president of Chile and as leader of the Latin American left," the amba.s.sador noted; "he would not do anything to embarra.s.s the Tupamaros and he might indeed be able to help them both by facilitating a satisfactory arrangement over Jackson and by presenting them and the left wing in general in a relatively good light. He also wants to gain credit with us: he is anxious to be on good terms with the Europeans, and we are particularly important as Europeans and also as an influence on the US."114 Despite this rather ambiguous image, and while engaging in active diplomacy elsewhere, the Chileans began questioning officials in Was.h.i.+ngton directly about their Latin American policies. Unsurprisingly, Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of State Crimmins "absolutely, totally and categorically" denied the existence of a plan to isolate Chile.115 And Kissinger predictably told Amba.s.sador Letelier the idea was "absolutely absurd ... with no foundation."116 In fact, so persuasive was Kissinger that as a result of these conversations Letelier was once more taken in. Certainly, he advised the Chilean Foreign Ministry to avoid making the mistake of reading too much into U.S. visits to Latin American countries. And he also urged Almeyda again not to underestimate the value of the high-level personal a.s.surances he had been given.117 But of course, as in the case of U.S.-Chilean bilateral relations, the Chileans had every reason to be suspicious. Although there were differences in Was.h.i.+ngton regarding the extent to which the United States should rally Latin American counterrevolutionary forces against Chile, the whole administration wanted to curtail Allende's regional influence.118 As Crimmins told one Latin American diplomat, "U.S. policy toward Chile is to act with prudence and restraint, reacting to Chile rather than taking initiatives. We want to avoid any confrontation; if any untoward difficulties arise, they will be Chile's fault. We are not happy or optimistic; but we don't believe it is good to a.s.sume that all is lost."119 The Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Chile also recommended that although anti-Americanism in the region meant that the United States had to tread gently, it could still play a "behind-the-scenes" role, "encouraging Latin Americans to take the initiative but, if necessary, feeding suggested initiatives to them."120 In fact, U.S. leaders were once more heavily engaged in building up Latin America's military inst.i.tutions and antidemocratic strongmen. As Rettig had feared, the Nixon administration was making a concerted effort to improve Was.h.i.+ngton's relations with Brazil's military regime. And, already, by the beginning of 1971, Nixon's orders to pay special attention to the country as a response to Allende's election had significantly changed the results of a yearlong Program a.n.a.lysis at the eleventh hour. Before this, Nixon's and Kissinger's attention to Brazil as an emerging Third World power had been resisted by the State Department, which called for distance from General Emilio Garrastazu Medici's authoritarian regime.121 Moreover, those at the State Department who had been mainly responsible for compiling the Program a.n.a.lysis on Brazil (NSSM 67) had stressed Brazil's relatively unimportant strategic significance. Brazil's military use, they argued, was only in "UN and OAS peacekeeping operations" and did not justify substantive military a.s.sistance.122 However, when the NSC's Senior Review Group met to discuss NSSM 67 back in December 1970, these conclusions had effectively been thrown out the window. On the surface, the SRG had approved a "Selective Support" option.123 But discussion had inevitably drifted to the impact Allende's election had on the inter-American system. In this climate, those who argued that U.S.-Brazilian relations should not be determined by Allende's arrival on the scene lost out.124 For one, Kissinger had already preempted the SRG meeting's conclusions by asking Nachmanoff how U.S.-Brazilian relations could be improved.125 And echoing General Vernon Walters's advice to Kissinger a month earlier, Nachmanoff had suggested that although Was.h.i.+ngton would have to respond as favorably as possible to military equipment requests, and even address the problems of economic development "if necessary," it also had "to try to lift their sights to bigger concepts and historical problems." He recommended that a way to do this was to concentrate on improving "matters of style and consultation," and shortly afterward Nixon instructed Kissinger that he wanted President Medici invited to the United States by July 1971.126 Indeed, in late 1970 the White House effected a decisive priority s.h.i.+ft when it came to U.S.-Brazilian relations. By January 1971 the American Emba.s.sy in Brasilia had prepared a Country a.n.a.lysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) underlining what had changed: The fundamentally most important U.S. interest in Brazil is the protection of U.S. national security through the cooperation of Brazil as a hemispheric ally against the contingencies of: an intracontinental threat, such as a serious deterioration in the Chilean situation (example-Chile adopting a Cuba-style "export of revolution" policy) or the formation of an Andean bloc which turned anti-US; or an admittedly more remote extra-continental threat, such as Soviet penetration of the South Atlantic. The danger posed by recent events in Chile and Bolivia establishes a hemispheric security threat which did not exist at anywhere near the same level as this time last year. The maintenance, therefore, of Brazil as a potential ally in hemispheric security affairs could be of critical interest to the U.S.127 Nixon was especially insistent on improving and strengthening the U.S.-Brazilian alliance. As he later privately told Kissinger and Haldeman, he wanted the Brazilians to know that "we are just about the best friend Brazil has had in this office [the Oval office]." There may have been sectors of Congress and the State Department that were opposed to strengthening relations with the military regime, but, as Nixon instructed on this occasion, he wanted Brasilia to know they were being ignored.128 At the same time as the U.S. administration was reviewing policy toward Brazil, the Pentagon had also taken advantage of this priority s.h.i.+ft to stop scheduled reductions of Military Group personnel in Latin America.129 As Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary Crimmins noted, the Pentagon tended "to be uneasy with the restraints imposed by the risks of playing into Allende's hands through becoming too overt. Against these risks they set those of appearing to Latin America and the opposition to Allende in Chile to be weak and indecisive."130 Indeed, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had written directly to Nixon at the end of November, arguing that reductions were "inconsonant" with the president's instructions to improve ties with the region's military leaders. Instead, he called for a joint interagency plan to increase Military Groups "on a selective basis ... as quickly as possible."131 When Laird informed Kissinger of progress toward upgrading military a.s.sistance a month later, Kissinger welcomed the news. As far as the latter was concerned, it was essential that the Latin Americans understood they should go only to the United States in search of security and military supplies.132 By this point, Kissinger had also already ordered an interagency review of the U.S. military presence in Latin America.133 The conclusion he received in response was bold: aside from having security and military value, the Interdepartmental Group on Inter-American Affairs found that "military missions, attache staffs, training, and other programs" were highly effective for diplomatic and political purposes. To clear up any ambiguity, the Interdepartmental Group recommended sending "definitive guidance removing any doubts about the permissibility, propriety and desirability of utilizing mission personnel and attaches for purposes of influencing host governments' military leaders toward U.S. foreign policy objectives." In addition, it advised overcoming legislative restrictions on military sales and according Latin America a "high priority" over other regions.134 In April 1971 the president also took a direct interest in ensuring a strong U.S. military presence in Latin America when he intervened to stop plans to phase out the U.S. Armed Forces' Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).135 Brazil's military regime was either unaware of or unimpressed by this resurgent U.S. interest in hemispheric affairs. Indeed, throughout early 1971, the Brazilians believed the United States was not doing enough to combat the communist threat in the Southern Cone. Brazil's amba.s.sador in Santiago, Antonio Castro da Camara Canto, certainly doubted the United States' ability to counter Allende's impact in the hemisphere effectively. He regretted that, together with Was.h.i.+ngton's difficulties in Vietnam and tensions with a number of Latin American countries, Chilean "able diplomacy" was limiting its impact. Not only did the UP's legal, const.i.tutional approach give the United States nothing to "protest," but the United States had been too wary of repeating the same mistakes it had made in 1959. By contrast, Camara Canto suggested that Santiago had absorbed the lessons of Castro's experience well.136 In view of these concerns, the Brazilians tried to persuade Was.h.i.+ngton to do more about Chile and, beyond that, about what they perceived to be threatening trends in South America. One Brazilian vice admiral spoke to the U.S. amba.s.sador in Brasilia, William Rountree, "at length and almost emotionally" about the prospects for U.S.-Brazilian military cooperation and "dangerous potentialities in Latin America" (he highlighted Chile, other Andean states, and Uruguay for particular attention).137 In November 1970 Brazilian foreign minister Gibson Barbosa had also told Rountree, that "he realized that [the] U.S. was far more important to Brazil than Brazil was to [the] U.S. Nevertheless he regarded Brazil's success as [a] large, dynamic, and successful country with [an] economy based on [a] free enterprise system, and serving as an important counter [weight] to trends in certain other Latin American countries, to be important to [the] U.S. and [the] free world."138 Then, in early February, Gibson Barbosa stressed the potential for U.S. cooperation when he raised further concerns about "trends" in the Southern Cone region directly with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in Was.h.i.+ngton. Specifically, he underlined Allende's impact on nationalist military governments in Peru and Bolivia and also on Uruguay, where Brazil was particularly concerned about "marked leftist gains." Although Gibson acknowledged that direct intervention in Chile would be "counterproductive," he urged the United States to work with Brazil "to meet the threats posed by these developments ... (1) to counter the Chilean situation; (2) to help rebuild friends.h.i.+p for the United States which has waned in certain sectors in Brazil and (3) to reinforce trends in Brazil toward a return to responsive political inst.i.tutions." (The latter was presumably for domestic U.S. consumption.)139 Overall, these efforts to attract Was.h.i.+ngton's attention would be highly effective. Yet in the short term they actually had a somewhat negative impact on Brazil's standing in the region. Immediately after Allende's election, Brazilian military leaders had made obvious attempts to work with their traditional regional rivals, the Argentines, to combat leftist threats in the Southern Cone.140 Yet in the months that followed, Argentina's leaders had increasingly become more worried about Brasilia than Santiago and were highly suspicious that, by reaching out to the United States, Brazil was seeking to bolster its position vis-a-vis its southern neighbor.141 Ultimately, Chile benefited. At first, Argentina's right-wing military leaders had been concerned about Allende's election due to their fears about left-wing insurgency at home. In view of potential hostility with the Argentines, Allende and the Chilean Foreign Ministry had consequently placed special emphasis on improving Chile's relations with Buenos Aires.142 Indeed, in a battle against isolation, Chile's long vulnerable border with Argentina and an annual trading relations.h.i.+p worth $200 million made establis.h.i.+ng amicable relations with Argentina's military leaders a key priority.143 After making contacts with leaders of the PCCh and diplomats from the Soviet bloc, the Polish Emba.s.sy in Santiago also reported home to Warsaw in May 1971 that there was a real possibility of Argentine intervention in Chilean affairs.144 And as Chile's amba.s.sador in Buenos Aires, Ramon Huidobro, later recalled, the Chileans were worried that Was.h.i.+ngton could exacerbate outstanding border disputes to provoke conflict.145 The Chilean Foreign Ministry therefore expended considerable effort to persuade Argentina that the new Chilean government posed no threat and that it wanted good relations with its neighbor. As Almeyda privately explained to leaders from the socialist bloc in May 1971, the Chileans were also exploring the idea of exchanges between certain sectors of both countries' military forces in the hope of isolating the pro-American right-wing members of Argentina's armed forces. Moreover, Almeyda noted that the Chileans were underlining to the Argentines that Chile was "not a rival and would not be a rival." Brazil was the rival that Buenos Aires had to look out for, the Chileans stressed.146 Allende's visit to Argentina in July 1971 and, before that, Buenos Aires's support for Santiago's candidacy to host UNCTAD III, were thus the combined outcome of Argentine fears regarding Brazil and intense Chilean diplomacy (Brazil and the United States had backed Santiago's rival Mexico City to host the conference).147 However, there is reason to suggest that the Argentines had been inclined to tactically appease Allende early on. As Argentina's amba.s.sador in Was.h.i.+ngton had told State Department officials back in December 1970, Allende should not "automatically [be] presumed to be a total loss. His att.i.tude toward other Latin American states and the United States will depend in part on how we act toward him. Closing all doors will surely drive him to other more hospitable arms."148 Subsequently, when Argentina's foreign minister, Pablo Pardo, had met with Allende in June, it seems that he had warmed to the president and pa.s.sed on his approval to President Alejandro La.n.u.sse Gelly.149 Then, when La.n.u.sse and Allende met at Salta on 24 July, they declared their agreement to principles of nonintervention, peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes, and the importance of "friends.h.i.+p and co-operation."150 As the Was.h.i.+ngton Post noted, the meeting was an "important blow to Latin Americans who [sought] to quarantine newly socializing states."151 Chile therefore avoided isolation. But as Brazil stepped up its diplomatic offensive, the Nixon administration was also getting up to speed on developments in the Southern Cone. In particular, with Brazil's prodding, Was.h.i.+ngton began to focus on the unstable situation in Bolivia and Uruguay. And it was this multisided combination of actors and fluid developments in the Southern Cone that would shape the inter-American Cold War struggle ahead. The Chileans understood that these regional dynamics made it imperative to win over friends. The suggestion that the Nixon administration was lacking a clear regional policy or that it had been contained in South America, as Chilean Emba.s.sy staff in Was.h.i.+ngton concluded, was also quite perceptive. However, the idea put forward by Chilean diplomats in Was.h.i.+ngton that economic difficulties or problems dealing with Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Vietnam had forced the United States toward a position of "wisdom and maturity" in the hemisphere was wrong insofar as this meant lessening levels of U.S. intervention in the hemisphere.152 This error reflected a more general misplaced understanding of the inter-American balance of forces. In July 1971 Fidel Castro proclaimed that the United States was "a lot more fragile, and ... much more limited, in its possibilities for intervention in and crus.h.i.+ng of revolutionary Latin American processes."153 Yet this a.n.a.lysis was clearly premature and overly simplistic. As later events proved, counterrevolutionary forces within Chile, the Southern Cone, and Latin America stood ready to resist radical transformation with or without the United States and were just as ideologically driven in their motives as Castro or Allende.

Conclusion.

In many respects, Allende's first nine months as president were characterized by relative hope and optimism. Among the reasons that Santiago's leaders had to be cheerful were the resounding successes of Allende's visit to Argentina, the UP's impressive showing in Chile's munic.i.p.al elections, and repeated U.S. rea.s.surances that the United States wanted to avoid conflict. As Chilean foreign policy a.n.a.lysts surmised, their diplomatic campaigns had already strengthened Chile's position in the United States by improving the way the U.S. public viewed Allende, ensuring continued flows of military equipment, and nurturing bilateral relations with key Latin American states.

Indeed, Chile's international standing had risen dramatically, and the UP's nationalization projects, Santiago's appeal to ideological pluralism in international affairs, and Allende's message of wealth distribution and emanc.i.p.ation resonated especially well in the Third World. For the time being, in fact, La Via Chilena seemed to epitomize the possibility that an era of Cold War confrontation and hostility was over and that the global South was in ascendance. President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria was one of those to express his sincere support for both Chile's nationalization project and its proposal to hold UNCTAD III in Santiago.154 Chilean diplomats also increasingly found common cause with Peru's president, Juan Velasco Alvarado, when the latter publicly attacked the way international financial inst.i.tutions were used to put pressure on countries that pursued nationalization. As the Chilean amba.s.sador in Lima noted, Velasco Alvarado's anti-imperialism was "poorly defined," but it was "useful and positive" for Chile.155 The Cubans were also hopeful. As CIA a.n.a.lysts observed, "Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia and Guatemala, in that order" were now "the most important Latin American countries in Havana's foreign policy scheme.... Fidel Castro has issued instructions to maintain complete cooperation with Chile at all costs."156 In a handwritten letter to Allende at the end of May, Fidel Castro summed up his own exuberant optimism. "We're amazed at your extraordinary efforts and the limitless energies you've poured into maintaining and consolidating your victory," he wrote. "Here, we can appreciate that the people are gaining ground, in spite of the difficult and complex mission they shoulder.... The April 4 elections were a splendid and encouraging victory.... Your courage and resolve, your mental and physical energy and ability to carry the revolutionary process forward, have been of the essence.... Great and different challenges are surely in store for you, and you must face these in conditions which are not precisely ideal, but a just policy, with the support of the people and applied with determination, cannot be defeated."157 And yet, as Castro's letter implied, Chile's position had been readjusted rather than redefined. In conversation with his Polish counterpart during an official visit to Warsaw in June 1971, Cuba's foreign minister, Raul Roa, similarly described Allende as "intelligent ... experienced and measured" but stressed that the president's position was "extremely difficult." As Roa told his hosts, Chile's left-wing parties had a.s.sumed the government, but they did not yet hold power.158 Meanwhile, Allende emphasized that persuasion could still be used as a tool for transforming Chile's foreign relations. Looking ahead, the Chilean Foreign Ministry acknowledged that in the next phase of Chile's nationalization process, "the reactions of the forces of imperialism" would be "more aggressive." The ministry therefore underlined the imperative of a carefully coordinated international strategy, something that would prove increasingly difficult as Chile's external pressures escalated.159 Indeed, Allende's first nine months would turn out to be the calm before the storm. Although reason-rather than force-had worked for Allende when it came to gaining power, it would not be enough to achieve his goals and persuade Was.h.i.+ngton of the legitimacy of his cause. Partly, of course, this is because U.S. officials were simply not predisposed to sustain warm relations with dissenting Latin American leaders; Nixon did not believe he should have to negotiate his foreign policy with "ungrateful" "Latins." And Allende was not just any Latin American leader. Inescapably, Chile was first and foremost an ideological Cold War problem for the United States despite hopeful Chilean readings of world affairs, and skeptics in Was.h.i.+ngton (and Brasilia) viewed the UP's "healthy realism" with incredulity and fear.

After all, Allende's lifelong campaign against U.S. "imperialism" and the UP's manifesto pledge to rid Chile of capitalist exploitation, not to mention the new president's identification with Cuba, did not disappear overnight when Allende took office. Keeping Cuba at a distance or denouncing left-wing movements in Latin America would also have involved betraying his ideology and abandoning the past. Consequently, like the United States and Cuba, the UP tried to downplay its real intentions while members of the coalition and the MIR unhelpfully refused to be tied to prescriptions of "caution" in their support for armed revolutionaries. And, meanwhile, there were many who continued to think that Chile would ultimately come under Cuba's influence, especially when Allende invited Cubans to a.s.sist in matters of intelligence and security, thereby exacerbating these fears in the process.

For their part, Nixon and Kissinger hoped that regional allies could help defend against these threats and make up for self-perceived U.S. weakness. However, in mid-1971 the application of the "Nixon Doctrine" in Latin America was not yet fully developed. True, the United States had found a willing and impatient ally in Brazil, but at this stage Was.h.i.+ngton neither delegated responsibility to Brasilia nor informed it of its own aggressive covert operations and psychological warfare against Allende. To the contrary, it neglected to share information with Brazil to such an extent that in July 1971 U.S. diplomats had to rea.s.sure the Brazilians that the United States was in no way poised to accommodate Allende.160

4.

DISPUTES.

Copper, Companeros, and Counterrevolution, JulyDecember 1971.

On 17 November 1971 Fidel Castro visited the southern Chilean city of Concepcion and told crowds that a brilliant revolutionary future lay ahead. "The road that revolutionaries propose for humanity is rose colored!" he proclaimed. Yet, he also urged his audience to be realistic about the present. "In a revolution not everything is rose colored," he warned. "We revolutionaries cannot speak of any rose-colored present ... we revolutionaries can speak of a present of self-denial, a present of work, a heroic, sacrificial and glorious present."1 Castro's visit to Concepcion was just one stop on a gargantuan tour that took him from Chile's arid deserts in the north to its frozen glaciers in the south. However, this twenty-five-day visit was monumental not only in its duration and diversity; it also coincided with-and contributed toward-mounting political tension in Chile. As Castro observed for himself, the optimism that had characterized Salvador Allende's first months as president was disappearing as nationalization disputes, complex political alliances, and counterrevolutionary forces began impeding his progress.

The stakes at play in implementing La Via Chilena had been rising long before Castro's plane touched down in Santiago in November 1971. In June, the murder of Chile's former interior minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by a small extremist group had intensified fear of radicalism in the country, leading more than one foreign observer to warn that "sharp conflict" was on the horizon.2 Meanwhile, as the Unidad Popular pushed ahead with redistributing Chile's wealth and nationalizing the country's copper industry, it ran up against domestic and international hostility. At home, parliamentary opposition, paramilitary violence, rumors about military intervention in politics, and divisions within Allende's own cabinet considerably undermined the chances of a peaceful democratic road to socialism. Abroad, Santiago's relations with Was.h.i.+ngton also deteriorated, and left-wing hopes for revolutionary change in Latin America were eclipsed by right-wing counterrevolutionary victories in the Southern Cone.

Overall, in fact, it seemed as if Allende's domestic and international fortunes were increasingly intertwined. On the one hand, Allende's external relations had a significant bearing on internal politics, most obviously in the shape of Fidel Castro's extended visit to Chile and Was.h.i.+ngton's reaction to the expropriation of private U.S. copper companies. On the other hand, domestic developments affected Chile's international standing and foreign policy priorities more and more. Pivotally, by late 1971, the UP was keenly looking abroad to solve mounting economic difficulties. With dwindling foreign exchange reserves and a crippling external debt, Santiago's leaders publicized their objectives and challenges worldwide in the hope of changing their enemies' behavior and expanding their own trade relations. Privately, this meant reaching out-rather unsuccessfully-to the socialist bloc. Publicly, Chilean leaders sought moral support in the global South, arguing that what was occurring in their country was relevant to all Third World nations seeking independence and development, either by reflecting their aspirations or as a direct example. To this end, Allende personally traveled to Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru in August and September 1971, while his foreign minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, spoke at the United Nations General a.s.sembly and a G77 summit in Lima, visited European capitals from East to West, and journeyed to Was.h.i.+ngton, Moscow, Algiers, and Havana.

The ideological scope of these journeys seemed to match the times. In July 1971 President Nixon sent shock waves around the world by announcing that he planned to visit Beijing the following year. Indeed, crossing ideological divides through summit diplomacy would be such a part of the United States' pursuit of detente that two historians have described "the frequency with which he negotiated with communists" as Nixon's "signature achievement."3 But, of course, the way that Nixon and Kissinger dealt with their enemies (and their allies) depended on who they were and where they were. True, they were preparing to initiate "triangular diplomacy" through high-level summit meetings in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. But when it came to smaller, less powerful countries in the Third World, the White House was unprepared to put ideology aside, focusing instead on fighting the Cold War rather than negotiating a modus vivendi with governments it considered to be ideologically repellent.

In an ever more interconnected world, the manner in which nations confronted each other nonetheless continued to be highly important. As far as Kissinger was concerned, image, prestige, and reputation were not only adjuncts to balance-of-power politics but also integral components of a country's efforts to protect its national interests. His interlocutors and enemies agreed. Nixon, Allende, and Castro all certainly operated on a world stage, for domestic and world audiences and in search of approval. Fidel Castro would state that he hoped Nixon was watching the impressive welcome he received in Chile, that the United States seized on Chile's nationalization program as a convenient pretext for the deterioration of U.S.-Chilean relations, and that the Chileans accused the United States of pursuing precisely the type of outdated ideological hostility toward Allende that U.S. officials professed to have abandoned.4 Indeed, while Was.h.i.+ngton and Santiago tried to project a fas.h.i.+onable nonideological image of themselves-emphasizing international law, economic imperatives, and pragmatism as the determinants of foreign relations-they pointed the finger at each other as being the one that threatened stability and mutual understanding.

It was for this reason that the Nixon administration was on the defensive in late 1971. U.S. officials were particularly worried that the UP might be able to blame its domestic difficulties on "U.S. imperialism" and undermine Was.h.i.+ngton's already diminis.h.i.+ng influence throughout Latin America and the Third World. At the same time, a.n.a.lysts were concerned that the Soviet Union might come to Allende's aid, as it had for Castro a decade before. For the Nixon administration, then, Chile appeared to embody the fusion of s...o...b..lling Third World nationalism and falling Cold War dominoes. The big question was how the United States could undermine Allende's presidency without doing so too obviously and alienating world opinion. As evidence of U.S. intervention in Chile surfaced and circ.u.mscribed Was.h.i.+ngton's room for maneuver, the U.S. government therefore opted for tempering a more instinctual desire for confrontation, and Kissinger engaged in ever more skillful dialogue with the Chileans to distract them from the continuing U.S. destabilization measures against Allende. However, these tactics evolved gradually, responding as they did to the changing character of Chilean diplomacy and domestic politics, U.S. foreign policy priorities, inter-American affairs, global superpower relations, and the North-South divide in international politics.

Reasoned Rebellion.

In his own rose-colored view of the world, Salvador Allende hoped reason and the power of Chile's democratic example would persuade outsiders to accept La Via Chilena. At the beginning of September 1971, he consequently wrote a three-page letter to Richard Nixon appealing for understanding. The timing of his letter was important, seeing as it was sent amid growing evidence of the United States' hostility toward his country and on the eve of Chile's ruling on the compensation it owed to recently expropriated U.S. copper companies. Essentially, the letter appealed to Nixon's moral conscience by underlining Chile's legalistic and const.i.tutional tradition and asking the president to stop interfering in Chilean affairs by means of "economic and financial coercion." Allende wrote that "the greatest defense of the legitimate rights and aspirations of small countries such as mine lies in the moral strength of their convictions and actions.... The harsh reality of our country-the hunger, the poverty, and the almost complete hopelessness-has convinced our people that we are in need of profound changes. We have chosen to carry these changes out by means of democracy, pluralism, and freedom; with friends.h.i.+p toward all peoples of the world. Such an internal process is only possible if its external aspects are based on the sound principles of non-intervention, self-determination, and an open dialogue among nations. We have adhered strictly to this line."5 No amount of democracy and "friends.h.i.+p toward all peoples," however, could hide the fact that the UP's nationalization of Chilean copper mines in July 1971 had been a direct attack on U.S. economic interests in Chile. Rather than shying away from or apologizing for such a move, Allende had called it a "definitive" moment in Chile's quest for "economic independence."6 Responding to U.S. calls for "just" compensation for expropriated U.S. companies, Chile's foreign minister also replied that it depended on what one understood to be "just."7 As one Cuban intelligence officer put it years later, Allende's nationalization of Chile's copper mines was "a kick in the United States' b.a.l.l.s."8 Even so, the Chileans were acutely aware that the prospect of deducting "excess profits" from the compensation it offered U.S. companies-the "Allende Doctrine" as it was later known-was an act of rebellion that carried substantial risks. The move was riskier still considering the Chileans' growing recognition that the Nixon administration was not adhering to its own promises of nonintervention and open dialogue. Santiago's leaders had begun to acknowledge that U.S. rea.s.surances masked a deeper hostility toward them in mid-1971. In May, the UP had applied for an Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) loan to purchase three Boeing airplanes for Chile's state airline, LAN-Chile, worth $21 million. When Santiago received no response to its application after two months, Santiago's leaders became suspicious. Allende was "personally preoccupied" about the issue from the start, instructing Chile's amba.s.sador in Was.h.i.+ngton, Orlando Letelier, to raise Chile's "restlessness" with U.S. government and Eximbank officials. Yet no progress was made, despite State Department rea.s.surances that this was not a "political issue."9 Then, on 7 July, four days before the Chilean Congress pa.s.sed Allende's copper nationalization bill, Eximbank's president, Henry Kearns, informed Chilean representatives that a decision depended on Chile's future nationalization program. As the Chileans noted, this tied the Nixon administration irrefutably to protecting business interests.10 What is more, Letelier had concluded there was "no doubt ... Eximbank was backed at a high political level" after his meetings with the bank's officials-Kearns was "evidently nervous, repeatedly consulting a doc.u.ment ... by his side."11 On the basis of these observations, Letelier warned Kissinger that if the U.S. government continued to hold its position on this issue, it would harm U.S.-Chilean relations.12 In private, the amba.s.sador was less a.s.sertive and more concerned that the UP's nationalization program had "clouded" Chile's position in Was.h.i.+ngton.13 Allende was also personally nervous about the repercussions a deterioration of relations with the United States could have on Chile's armed forces. Indeed, to counteract the possibility of a U.S. embargo on military a.s.sistance and equipment, he dispatched an ultrasecret military mission-one that was to have no contact with Chilean emba.s.sies abroad-to the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and France to reconnoiter the prospect of arms supplies from these countries in the form of either aid or purchases. The idea behind the mission was not to discuss details-that would be done later. Rather, as Allende told Poland's amba.s.sador when he summoned him to La Moneda to discuss the visit, Chile had to "take into account all eventualities" and plan for U.S. sources drying up despite doing everything possible to avoid this happening.14 In early August and September, the Chileans had also launched an impressive international campaign to clarify and justify the UP's nationalization program.15 As Letelier wrote to Foreign Minister Almeyda, Chile's strategy was to promote "the most support possible for Chile, not only in Latin America, but also among important sectors of this country [the United States], for the most difficult moment in our relations with the U.S., which will be without doubt President Allende's decision regarding ... excess profits."16 As Chilean diplomats in Was.h.i.+ngton reminded their superiors back home, their country was now receiving new attention in the United States-second only to Cuba in Latin America-and, as such, the Chilean Emba.s.sy was in a good position to publicize its cause. It had therefore begun holding press briefings and sending information to influential journalists and Democrats about underlying U.S.-Chilean tensions. And Letelier had proposed that by leaking information about Eximbank, in particular, the Chileans could prove the United States had thrown the "first stone" and could use it to "cus.h.i.+on" announcements regarding compensation.17 Would it not have been easier to abandon the "Allende Doctrine"? Perhaps, but only if the Chileans' goal was simply to get on with the United States, which, of course, it was not. Challenging "U.S. imperialism" and a.s.serting Chilean economic sovereignty were fundamental pillars of Allende's mandate. It was on this platform, rather than capitulation to U.S. pressure, that he had fought and won the presidential election. Being defiant was also politically useful as it ensured support from the far Left members of his ruling coalition whom he both needed and admired. Parts of the Socialist Party-and Allende's daughter Beatriz, in particular-had strongly encouraged him not to offer the U.S. companies compensation-so much so, that Beatriz and the president had made a deal whereby she promised Allende a painting of hers that he had often admired by the Cuban artist Rene Portocarrero on the condition he found a way to nationalize copper without paying "a centavo." When he announced his "excess profits" ruling, he happily collected the painting.18 Publicly, at least, "Decree 92," which created the UP's const.i.tutional amendment on excess profits, underlined Chile's right to "rebel" against an "unjust" system that benefited hegemonic powers and contributed to "underdevelopment and backwardness."19 Eventually enshrined on 28 September, this decree cla.s.sified "excess profits" as those above 12 percent of a company's book value between 1955 and 1970. And this obviously affected two U.S. mining companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, which had reaped average annual profits of 56.8 percent and 21.5 percent respectively.20 Then, on 11 October 1971, as widely expected, Chile's controller general confirmed that when "excess profits" were deducted from compensation deemed payable, these companies owed his country money rather than the other way round.21 By the time the "Allende Doctrine" came into force, Chile's diplomatic campaign outside the United States to attract support and sympathy in the Americas, the Third World, and the international communist movement was already well under way. The UP still lacked financial means to confront the United States and had not yet secured alternative sources of credits or supplies. Even so, it did have legalistic armor to legitimize its actions and was able to identify with a broader Third World struggle for economic justice. In fact, to many leaders in the global South, the Chileans were valiantly putting widespread demands for compensation of past exploitation into practice.

When it came to attracting support, Santiago had focused first and foremost on the inter-American community. In August and September, Allende had toured Andean Pact countries, depicting Chile's struggle for "economic independence" as an example to follow. When he described his message as "rebellious but reasoned" in Ecuador, he received understanding from a government already at odds with Was.h.i.+ngton over the sovereignty of territorial waters.22 Foreign Minister Almeyda also recalled that Colombia's conservative foreign minister, Alfredo Vasquez Carrisoza, showed surprising comprehension, interest, and sympathy.23 Indeed, formal communiques at the end of all of Allende's visits also underlined every country's rightful sovereignty over its natural resources and included public denunciations of foreign intervention.24 Subsequently, days after Allende's return to Chile, Fidel Castro sent him enthusiastic praise. "We were very pleased with the extraordinary success you had in your trip," Castro wrote. As he observed, the Chilean president had encountered "heartfelt emotion and the warmth" in all three countries he visited.25 Beyond purely defensive aims, the trip had also been a good opportunity for Allende to advance his more ambitious goal of challenging U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Promoting the need for a "second Latin American independence," he had repeatedly called on Latin Americans to unite and speak with "one voice." In Quito, he had told the press he believed in socialism and that if others did not, Chile would "convince them" through its example.26 At a presidential banquet to welcome him to Colombia, Allende then urged Latin Americans to reject U.S. "diktats" on how to conduct their economic affairs. In his words, Latin America was "a dynamic reality," edging along a predetermined historical road of "liberation-social, political and economic."27 As the U.S. amba.s.sador in Bogota noted, even if Allende professed Chile's revolutionary road was "not exportable," his speeches suggested otherwise.28 Certainly, Allende was convinced that Chile's experience was highly significant for Latin America and the Third World. As he later explained to one Chilean journalist, "The exploited peoples of the world are conscious of their right to life. And this is why the confrontation [between revolution and counterrevolution] goes beyond our own frontiers and acquires universal meaning. Latin America will one day be free from subjugation and have its rightful voice, the voice of a free continent."29 Foreign Minister Almeyda echoed Allende's identification with this struggle against "exploitation" when he addressed the UN General a.s.sembly and a G77 conference in Lima in October.30 In response to the U.S. State Department's explicit warnings that Chilean policies could have "adverse effects" on other developing countries by affecting private investment, Almeyda contended that Third World aspirations were not threatened by Chilean moves but were rather "intimately linked and complemented" by separate countries' efforts to harness "natural, human, and financial resources" for developmental purposes.31 Chilean spokesmen also made abundant reference to their compliance with const.i.tutional procedures and internationally recognized principles such as those enshrined in the G77 "Charter of Algiers on the Economic Rights of the Third World" (1967) and promoted by the Non-Aligned Movement. Rather than being against international law, Almeyda insisted, Chilean actions were justified by it.32 And in this respect, the Unidad Popular pointed to UN resolution 1803 (December 1962), which recognized the "inalienable right of all states to dispose freely of their wealth and natural resources" and stipulated that expropriating countries should determine what compensation they offered.33 The UN General a.s.sembly and the G77 were logical forums in which for Chile to seek collective support by calling for systemic change of international economic and political relations. At least at this point, Santiago's timing also appeared advantageous. As Almeyda noted, there was already a "growing feeling of frustration and impotence" in Latin America and "grotesque evidence" of the difference "between words and deeds" in the battle against underdevelopment.34 Nixon's imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on all imports to the United States in August 1971 had added to the Third World's perception of a "crisis" and the likelihood that Chile would find a receptive audience. When leaders of the G77 met in Lima to formulate a united position to present at the forthcoming UNCTAD III conference in Santiago, Almeyda therefore used the occasion to call upon delegates to "define ... points of attack," emphasizing that the fundamental task of developing countries is to work to modify the international political and economic structure that has a.s.signed them the role of servitude.... If this structure does not change this could result in stagnation and violence. Nothing is obtained through postulating, or even by achieving partial solutions ... if we do not comprehend that it is the nature of the system of international relations itself that needs to be reformed ... the struggle of backward and dependent countries to reach their emanc.i.p.ation and full economic, political and social development ... [is] defined by the battle between the forces that sustain and defend the current social and international structure of the world, and those that strive to destroy it.35 However, Almeyda's call to action did not scare the United States into accepting Allende's "excess profits" ruling or unite the G77 as a vehicle for providing Santiago with meaningful support. To the contrary, Chile's senior diplomat, Hernan Santa Cruz, later reported on serious divisions within the G77 between Africans and Latin Americans. Ostensibly, these revolved around the Africans' desire to "catch up" with Latin American development and the question of how countries were ranked within the group. The Africans refused to accept that Uruguay, Paraguay, and Central American countries were as underdeveloped as sub-Saharan nations, for example, while Brazil, Central America, and Colombia were, in his words, "almost hysterical" in their refusal to grant African nations bigger quotas for producing coffee that had previously been agreed at UNCTAD II. While the Chileans worked hard to bridge the gap, with Algeria's help, the conference dragged on an extra two days and closed on what Santa Cruz reported to have been a "solemn" note. As he warned Foreign Minister Almeyda, the G77's platform at UNCTAD depended on "the unity of action and force within proposals," and he feared that as things stood, the United States and Western powers were in a position to "pulverize" them.36 Chile's role within the group also appears to have caused problems. Rather than uniting the G77 to "define points of attack," the tenor of Chilean (and Peruvian) demands seemed to widen Third World divisions regarding how to deal with the global North. When Almeyda demanded equal measures of "negotiation, confrontation, and denunciation," others therefore s.h.i.+ed away.37 As the British amba.s.sador in Lima observed, the meeting ill.u.s.trated the polarization between what he termed "extreme," "aggressive" countries such as Peru and Chile, and more cautious, conservative African and Asian nations. Consequently, in the amba.s.sador's words, "drawing up a 'shopping list'" for UNCTAD III had become "arduous and unexpectedly time-consuming." He also concluded that the "wild men" had been restrained-an outcome that did not bode well for Allende's chances of rallying the global South to join Chile and take a collective stance vis-a-vis the United States.38 As another British diplomat surmised around the same time, poorer African nations "[appreciated] the no nonsense mood of President Nixon's administration."39 Like Chile's efforts to mobilize the Third World, the results of its foreign policy outreach toward communist countries were mixed. Ideological pluralism-the cornerstone of Allende's foreign policy-had certainly taken off rapidly. Within a year, it had found expression in Chile's courts.h.i.+p of conservative regional powers such as Argentina and Colombia, its new commercial relations with North Korea and North Vietnam, and new diplomatic relations.h.i.+ps with countries as geographically diverse as China, East Germany, Libya, Tanzania, Guyana, Albania, Hungary, and Equatorial Guinea.40 Allende had also sent delegations to Europe, the Soviet Union, and China in search of trade and economic a.s.sistance; Almeyda had spent six weeks touring East and West European capitals in May and June; the Chilean Central Bank's president spent two and a half months in Eastern Europe; and Soviet, East German, and Romanian trade missions arrived in Santiago. As Almeyda had told Polish leaders when he met them at the end of May, Chile was seeking "dynamic development and diversification of trade" with socialist countries. This was by no means just rhetoric. During his trip, Almeyda explicitly raised the possibility of Chile joining the Soviet bloc's Council of Mutual Economic a.s.sistance (COMECON).41 Although much still remains to be known about the details of Chile's economic relations.h.i.+ps with the countries of the Soviet bloc, the Chileans clearly achieved far less than they had hoped for (and certainly never joined COMECON). The reason, in part, was that the Soviet bloc was wary about backing a project that had not yet proved itself as being viable. During consultations between representatives of COMECON countries in Santiago in April 1971, general "disquiet" had been voiced about the UP's record. To be sure, these diplomats recognized that Allende's government had been focusing on gaining political control and doing well in the April elections and that it had been in power for only five months when they met. But they also observed "o