Game Change_ Obama And The Clintons, McCain And Palin, And The Race Of A Lifetime Part 17

JOHN MCCAIN AND BARACK OBAMA entered the general election jointly holding out the hope of a different kind of fall campaign. For all of their intellectual, generational, and stylistic differences, McCain and Obama had much in common. Both candidates argued that Was.h.i.+ngton was broken, in need of root-and-branch reform, and ascribed its dysfunction to hyperpartisans.h.i.+p and the pernicious power of special interests. Both cast themselves as anti-politicians and post-ideological avatars. To gain their respective nominations, both relied on the support of centrist independents and even a handful of members of the other party. Neither had any inclination to turn the election into another bitterly polarized knife fight. Both boasted of being ready and able to lead a more civil and constructive conversation.

There was one minor hitch with this rosy scenario, however. McCain and Obama didn't like each other. Not even a little bit.

Their very first entanglement had ended in a fit of unusually public acrimony. It was in February 2006, when McCain asked Obama to collaborate with him on ethics reform. McCain always kept an eye peeled for young turks who shared his propensity for bucking the system, and he didn't care if they happened to be Democrats. As a freshman congressman in the early eighties, McCain had been taken under the wing of Democrat Mo Udall, the legendary Arizona representative who was the liberal conscience of the House and a ringing voice for reform. The Udall precedent was on McCain's mind when he reached out to Russ Feingold, the novice Wisconsin Democratic senator who became his partner on campaign-finance reform. And it was what drove McCain to approach Obama, the designated Democratic captain on ethics.

Obama indicated an interest in working with McCain on a bipartisan initiative. But after attending a meeting of a McCain-led splinter group, Obama backed away, neglecting to call the Arizonan to let him know, instead sending a formal letter on February 2 announcing that he intended to push the Democratic version of ethics legislation-a letter that was released to the press before it reached McCain.

McCain felt that he had extended his hand and Obama had slapped his face, and he directed Mark Salter to brush the whippersnapper back. Over his boss's signature, Salter fired off a letter to Obama (that wound up in the hands of reporters posthaste) bristling with scorn and oozing sarcasm. "I'm embarra.s.sed to admit that after all these years in politics I failed to interpret your previous a.s.surances as typical rhetorical gloss routinely used in politics to make self-interested partisan posturing appear more n.o.ble," it said. "I understand how important the opportunity to lead your party's effort to exploit this issue must seem to a freshman Senator, and I hold no hard feelings over your earlier disingenuousness."

Salter's chin music was the first time anyone in either party had tossed a high hard one at Obama-and it echoed through the Senate, where decorum made that kind of personal affront about as common as cut-off shorts at a confirmation hearing. The same day, Obama wrote back to McCain, expressing cool puzzlement and ostensible solicitude. But when he was asked about the exchange by the press, Obama didn't hesitate to throw a brushback of his own.

"The tone of [McCain's] letter, I think, was a little over the top," he said. "But John McCain's been an American hero and has served here in Was.h.i.+ngton for twenty years, so if he wants to get cranky once in a while, that's his prerogative."

Did you just call McCain "cranky"? a reporter asked.

"You got my quote the first time," Obama said tartly.

Back in his office, Obama was blunter with his aides about his sentiments. "I'm not interested in being b.i.t.c.h-slapped by John McCain," he said.

As far as McCain was concerned, the ethics kerfuffle was just the first in a series of incidents that revealed Obama's true colors. In 2007, when McCain was paying a brutal price politically for his work alongside Kennedy on immigration reform, Obama joined a bipartisan group of senators who'd agreed to band together and oppose amendments from the right and left that would scuttle the legislation. But then Obama promptly turned around and voted for several liberal provisions. A year later, he criticized McCain for coming out against a new GI Bill that would have guaranteed money for college to anyone who served three years in the military. "I can't believe [that] he believes it is too generous to our veterans," Obama tut-tutted.

McCain didn't believe any such thing; he worried that the bill would create retention problems in the armed forces. Having his commitment to veterans questioned set off McCain's first flare of genuine ire toward Obama. "I will not accept from Senator Obama, who did not feel it was his responsibility to serve our country in uniform, any lectures on my regard for those who did," McCain snapped.

McCain never thought any of this would be of consequence in the presidential race. All along, he believed that he would be running against Clinton-and relished the prospect. He liked Hillary, respected her, had become friendly with her in the Senate. They had traveled to the far reaches of the globe together and enjoyed each other's company. (The vodka shots they'd shared once in Estonia had become the stuff of lore.) His disappointment when she lost was palpable.

By the start of the general election, McCain's view of Obama was firmly fixed and strikingly similar to the one that Hillary held: Obama was a lightweight, a line-cutter, a go-along-to-get-alonger who pretended to be a man of independence, and who bore none of the scars of political sacrifice that McCain wore as medals of honor. Honor was the core concept here, the soldier's highest virtue. McCain believed Obama lacked it, along with guts.

McCain was fortified in his dim opinion by the people closest to him. Graham and Salter were always tras.h.i.+ng Obama, and Cindy had been genuinely offended by Mich.e.l.le's "proud of my country" remark. In the past, she rarely said a word about John's opponents, let alone an opponent's spouse. But as a mother of two sons in the service, she couldn't restrain herself; after she took her shot at Mich.e.l.le on the stump, her husband gave her an approving thumbs-up.

The Obamas were a good deal less emotionally wound up in their opinions of the McCains. For all of Mich.e.l.le's angst about the fallout from "proud of my country" and becoming a target of the right, she was taken aback when Cindy joined the fray. Mich.e.l.le absorbed her counterpart's slam with private defiance. Oh, so it's gonna be like this? So this is how you want to play? Oh, so it's gonna be like this? So this is how you want to play? she thought. Barack, meanwhile, regarded his past run-ins with McCain as faintly ridiculous. McCain had behaved like an arrogant jacka.s.s, happy if he could pat Obama on the head and have him follow his lead, but then all self-righteous and indignant if Barack took a different path. she thought. Barack, meanwhile, regarded his past run-ins with McCain as faintly ridiculous. McCain had behaved like an arrogant jacka.s.s, happy if he could pat Obama on the head and have him follow his lead, but then all self-righteous and indignant if Barack took a different path. Whatever. Whatever.

Nothing Obama had seen had altered his conviction that the political environment was fertile for a Democratic victory. "If I lose the nomination to Hillary, I can hold my head up," he told his team on a conference call that spring. "But if I lose the general election to John McCain, I'll be run out of town on a rail."

ON JUNE 4, NOT LONG after the news broke that Clinton intended to concede, Obama received a congratulatory call from McCain. The two men pledged comity in the coming campaign and joked about how the pundits had written them both off a year earlier. But McCain also took the opportunity to press a proposal that he and Obama conduct ten joint town hall meetings, one each week between June 12 and the Democratic convention. For McCain, the upside was obvious: a chance to go toe-to-toe with Obama in a format he loved (and generate tons of free publicity to boot). For Obama, the payoff was less evident. In May, he'd declared that he would welcome debating McCain "anywhere, anytime." Now Obama said he was open to the idea but made no commitments.

The truth was Obama had an array of more pressing concerns to deal with. After waging a nomination fight of unprecedented length and strain, he and his exhausted team had no time to rest their heads. In the span of a few weeks, they had to plan two vast and vastly complicated events: an ambitious trip abroad in July, to help Obama buff up his foreign-affairs bona fides, and the convention in August. At the same time, the Obamans had to devise a state-by-state electoral strategy for the fall, and take the measure of their new adversary.

Obama's lead pollster, Joel Benenson, quickly slammed together a presentation on the state of play. The good news, he reported, was that Obama was leading McCain by 49 to 44 percent among likely voters. The unexpected news was that the economy was now by far the most important issue, especially to undecideds. The neutral news was that neither Obama nor McCain was strong on that issue. The most surprising (and most heartening) news was that the perception of McCain as a maverick change agent was confined to the Beltway; in the rest of America, voters viewed him as Bush redux. The implications for Team Obama's message were plain. Every effort they expended for the next four months should be devoted to shackling McCain to Bush on the economy.

The Obamans had grand aspirations for remaking the electoral map. Plouffe's plan was to target seventeen battleground states, including some-Indiana, North Carolina, North Dakota-that hadn't voted Democratic in decades.

That Plouffe was thinking so boldly owed much to the breadth of Obama's appeal. But it had as much to do with the resources at his disposal. On June 19 the campaign announced its decision to opt out of accepting public financing for the general election, making Obama the first candidate to do so since that system was implemented in the aftermath of Watergate. The decision was a reversal for Obama on two levels: he was a longtime champion of the public system, and had signed a commitment (on an interest group questionnaire) in November 2007 to stay in it. The U-turn undercut the reformist image that Benenson's data showed was a vital advantage for Obama against McCain. But the unholy amount of money being sucked in by the campaign's Web fund-raising machine represented an even greater edge.

McCainworld learned about the decision around the same time it was becoming clear that Obama had no intention of doing the joint town halls. McCain wasn't surprised by either outcome, but they bolstered his sense of Obama as a phony. What bothered him more was the failure of the press to challenge Obama on his hypocrisy. If I'd done that, they'd kill me If I'd done that, they'd kill me, he thought. McCain and his advisers had been astonished by how far in the tank the media had been for Obama during his race against Clinton. Now McCain, his relations with the press already strained, braced for a similar double standard.

Steve Schmidt agreed with all of that, but thought it was slightly beside the point. The McCain campaign would be limited to the $84 million provided by the public financing system (although the Republican National Committee would supplement that with spending of its own); the Obamans were likely to raise four or five times as much. Making matters worse, the lengthy Democratic nomination fight meant that the Obama forces had operations in nearly every state, firing on all cylinders-whereas McCainworld was sputtering along, forever on the verge of needing roadside a.s.sistance.

In mid-June, after the green backdrop debacle, Schmidt had a candid conversation with McCain about the state of the campaign.

"How do you think things are going?" he asked his boss.

"Not well," said McCain.

"I think that's about right," Schmidt said. The structure of the campaign was still a mess. There was no political operation. Basic things weren't getting done. We either need to fix this now, Schmidt said, or not only will we lose, but we're in danger of going down as the worst-run presidential campaign in the history of American politics.

For the first time in months, McCain seemed galvanized. He called a meeting of his senior advisers at his condo in Was.h.i.+ngton and elevated Schmidt to run the show alongside Davis.

Almost instantly, McCainworld was imbued with a new degree of discipline and order. Nicknamed Bullet by Bush uber-strategist Karl Rove and Sergeant Schmidt by McCain, the shaven-headed operative brought to his task two signal strengths: a relentless focus and zero tolerance for bulls.h.i.+t. He hired a top-flight political director. He inst.i.tuted a regular message call at eight o'clock every morning. He sought to limit McCain's cell phone use to keep him from terminal drift. He even took up the matter of housekeeping at the campaign's disheveled HQ. "This place looks like a f.u.c.king gypsy camp," Schmidt told the office manager over the July 4 weekend. "I want it painted and cleaned up by Monday."

Schmidt also took the draconian step of curtailing his boss's access to the media. The old days of reporters indulging McCain's freewheeling disquisitions-on everything from the caprices of his Senate colleagues to the temptations of Brazilian table dancers-and not writing about them were long gone. Now the coverage was constant, glaring, and driven by the quest to trip him up.

And so, in July, a barrier between McCain and the reporters covering him was installed on his jet. Press availabilities were cut back. Literally, figuratively, and symbolically, a curtain came down on the Straight Talk Express-just as one was rising on the Obamapalooza World Tour.

IT WAS, BY EVERY MEASURE, an extraordinary spectacle, with a sprawling itinerary that would have posed real challenges to a sitting president and his team. Eight countries in ten days, including two war zones: Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq on the first leg; Jordan, Israel, Germany, France, and England on the second. And yet the Obamans miraculously pulled it off without a hitch. The pictures beamed around the world were priceless: Obama visiting an army base and effortlessly sinking a three-point shot in front of hundreds of cheering soldiers; Obama in a helicopter with General Petraeus, both in sungla.s.ses and grinning like mad; the soaring speech in front of two hundred thousand at the Victory Column in Berlin; the interviews with each of the broadcast network anchors, who had tagged along for the trip.

The reaction of the McCain campaign was unambiguous. It went on the attack. It released an ad unveiling the campaign's slogan, "Country First," with its insinuation that Obama put something else (i.e., his ambition) above the nation. It aired another claiming that Obama, while he was in Germany, "made time to go to the gym, but canceled a visit with wounded troops-seems the Pentagon wouldn't allow him to bring cameras." On the trail, McCain spat venom over an interview from abroad in which Obama said that, although the surge appeared to have been effective, he still opposed it. "It seems to me that Obama would rather lose a war in order to win a political campaign," McCain said.

Schmidt doubted that any of it was working. We're almost out of time, he said to Davis. Obama is up by double digits now. He could be up twelve or fifteen points heading into their convention. Bill Clinton's going to give a great speech. Hillary's going to give a great speech. Obama's definitely definitely going to give a great speech, and even if he doesn't, the press will say he did. So now we're down twenty heading into our convention. On the first night, we have Cheney and Bush; after that, we could be down twenty-five. If we don't figure out something immediately to arrest Obama's lead, we're done. going to give a great speech, and even if he doesn't, the press will say he did. So now we're down twenty heading into our convention. On the first night, we have Cheney and Bush; after that, we could be down twenty-five. If we don't figure out something immediately to arrest Obama's lead, we're done.

On July 27, the day after Obama returned stateside, Schmidt and a small group of McCain advisers met in a conference room at the Phoenix Ritz-Carlton to take up that task. "We're running against the biggest celebrity in the world," Schmidt said. Obama was flying at an alt.i.tude no politician had ever before attained. He was flying so high that there was no way to shoot him out of the sky or pull him down to earth. Their only hope, Schmidt went on, was to push Obama higher. Push him from twenty thousand to forty thousand feet, above the so-called death line on Mount Everest, where there's not enough oxygen to breathe.

You said he's a celebrity, noted Fred Davis, McCain's lead adman. "Well, let's turn that against him. Big celebrity? So's Britney Spears! So's Paris Hilton!"

The room exulted. Linking Obama with such famously insubstantial household names might shove him straight into the asphyxiation zone. Davis rushed off to produce some ads based on the concept. A version featuring Oprah was scuttled by Schmidt. ("Don't politicize Oprah. She's more powerful than you can comprehend, like Obi-Wan Ken.o.bi.") A version including Ellen DeGeneres was nixed as well. But the incarnation with Britney and Paris was good to go.

The ad, called "Celeb," hit the air on July 30. "He's the biggest celebrity in the world," a female voice intoned over soft-focus images of Spears, Hilton, and Obama in Berlin. "But is he ready to lead?" The ad's unveiling was accompanied by an email from Davis: "Only celebrities like Barack Obama go to the gym three times a day, demand 'MET-Rx chocolate roasted-peanut protein bars and bottles of a hard-to-find organic brew-Black Forest Berry Honest Tea' and worry about the price of arugula."

The message wasn't difficult to decode. Not only was Obama a celebrity, but he was precious, self-infatuated, effete, hoity-toity-a celebrelitist.

"Celeb" quickly became ubiquitous on cable. It went viral on the Web. Trivial and trivializing, the talking heads snorted. Pathetic. And some liberals discerned a subtext in the ad that was more insidious. They saw the juxtaposition of Obama with the comely white women as an attempt to stir up fears of miscegenation. They pointed to a shot of the Victory Column and called it phallic. They cited an earlier McCain negative spot that showed Obama draining his three-pointer and found a racial angle there as well: that McCainworld was trying to portray Obama as a blinged-up, camera-hogging NBA point guard, Allen Iverson with a Harvard Law degree.

Obama seemed to see something, too. On the day that "Celeb" went up, he was campaigning in Missouri. At his first stop, in Springfield, Obama said, "n.o.body really thinks that Bush or McCain have a real answer for the challenges we face, so what they're going to try to do is make you scared of me. 'You know, he's not patriotic enough. He's got a funny name. You know, he doesn't look like all those other presidents on those dollar bills, you know. He's too risky.'"

McCain was on a hair trigger over accusations or imputations of racism. He had warned his team to steer clear of anything that might open him up to that charge. He was emphatic that Reverend Wright was off-limits. McCainworld, however, feared that innocence wasn't a sufficient defense when it came to racial matters. John and Cindy had talked at length about the charges that had been leveled against the Clintons during the Democratic nomination fight. They believed that those accusations had been unfair, saw the Obama campaign's hand in the besmirching of Hillary's and Bill's reputations, and had vowed not to let the same thing happen to them. So when Obama let loose with his "other presidents" comment, McCain and his lieutenants were gripped with a sickening sense of deja vu.

"We gotta call bulls.h.i.+t on this," Schmidt said.

"Do whatever you have to do," McCain told Davis. "This is not right."

The next morning, Davis put out a press release that minced no words. "Barack Obama has played the race card, and he played it from the bottom of the deck," Davis's statement said. "It's divisive, negative, shameful, and wrong."

THE OBAMANS HAD NEVER been so directly challenged on playing the race card-except by Bill Clinton in South Carolina, when his head was in the process of exploding. The campaign's reaction was furious backpedaling. "What Barack Obama was talking about was that he didn't get here after spending decades in Was.h.i.+ngton," Gibbs tepidly told the AP. "He was referring to the fact that he didn't come into the race with the history of others. It is not about race."

But, of course, it was. Obama himself had made the same point more explicitly six weeks earlier, when he said at a rally in Jacksonville, Florida, "We know what kind of campaign they're going to run. They're going to try and make you afraid of me. 'He's young and inexperienced and he's got a funny name. And did I mention he's black?' " But outside the context of the McCain negative-ad a.s.sault, that remark had gone unnoticed.

On his nightly call after the Davis broadside and the Gibbs retreat, Obama wasn't happy. The campaign had failed to defend him as well, as vigorously, or as forthrightly as he thought it should have. Obama understood the strategic imperative of maintaining a post-racial metier. And he grasped the tactical wisdom of sometimes playing possum, of not letting race swallow the campaign. But he also believed that his campaign tended to be too gun shy when the issue was forced upon them.

"You guys are trying to pretend I'm not black," Obama said urgently. "I'm black!"

You can't pretend this isn't an issue, he went on. Of course it's an issue. You know McCain is playing the race card by accusing me of playing the race card. They're making sure that race is injected into this campaign. They're going to keep doing it in a lot of ways, and when they do it we have to fight back.

Axelrod's head wasn't buried in the sand with respect to Obama's pigmentation or its political implications. He had no doubt that the McCain campaign would employ an a.s.sortment of race-freighted messages against Obama. In "Celeb," Axelrod saw a bid to paint Obama as a figure undeserving of his success-the affirmative-action nominee. From his experience with other African American candidates, he suspected that coming next would be volleys on a pair of issues that pushed racial hot b.u.t.tons: crime and taxes.

But the Obamans were preparing for far more nefarious a.s.sailments than that, if not directly from McCainworld, then from shadowy independent groups on the right. The degree of Chicago's readiness was a well-kept secret; there was no sense in admitting publicly how concerned they were about Obama's vulnerabilities surrounding his race and background. But their worries were considerable, especially about the consistent thread they picked up from voters that wove together the false rumors about Obama being a Muslim with the charge that he was insufficiently patriotic.

While the cash-poor McCain campaign was coming up with negative ads on the fly, scribbling scripts, in effect, on the backs of napkins, airing the spots without ever testing them, the well-heeled Obamans were running a stealthy high-tech lab to discover which attacks were most dangerous and to develop responses. Dozens of Obama-funded faux negative ads against Obama were produced and tested: about Wright, Ayers, Muslimism, the flag pin-the works. And some were devastatingly effective.

Obama had begun inoculating himself against the charges that his brain trust presumed were on the horizon. But some efforts he resisted as too ham-handed. At one point, he and his ad team were preparing to shoot a spot designed to deal with Muslimism and patriotism in one throw. "If I have the privilege of taking the oath of office, I would do so with my hand on the Bible and pride in my heart," the script read. Obama began to recite it, then stopped and grimaced. "Guys, I can't do this," he said. "There are limits."

Despite all the study and safeguarding, however, Obama and his campaign were caught off guard and knocked off balance by "Celeb" and its aftermath. Through the entire nomination fight, Clinton had never found a consistent negative frame in which to put her opponent. But McCainworld had conjured one almost by happenstance-and the whole of the rightward realm, from the Republican National Committee to the flying monkeys of conservative talk radio, was pounding away at Obama in a concerted fas.h.i.+on, just as it had done to Dukakis, Gore, and Kerry. The frame was dead simple: McCain equals country first; Obama equals Obama first.

After weeks of bombardment over the airwaves, Obama's negative ratings were inching upward, just as Hillary and Bill had predicted. Now he faced a trio of challenges in rapid succession: selecting his running mate, making peace with the Clintons, and delivering a dynamite convention speech. The last of these might have been a gimme (this was Obama, after all), but the first two would require the savvy of a Metternich and the patience of a saint. And there was no room for error. On August 1, the Gallup tracking poll made Obama versus McCain a dead heat.

Chapter Nineteen.

The Mile-High Club.

THE SENATOR ARRIVED in Minneapolis in disguise, having shed his uniform of suit and tie, wearing a baseball cap pulled down low on his forehead and a pair of aviator shades. The Obama people told him they were worried he'd be recognized, so he was traveling incognito. When he climbed off the private jet from Was.h.i.+ngton on August 6, a young woman hustled him into a waiting car with tinted windows. As they set off for the Graves 601 Hotel, the site of the secret meeting, the senator couldn't stop talking. This is the first time in decades, he said to his escort, that I've been on a job interview.

Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., didn't want to be vice president-at least not at the start. He liked to trot out an old chestnut for his aides: A woman has two sons; one goes off to sea, the other becomes vice president; neither is heard from again. No, what Biden wanted was to be secretary of state. That was a real job. But then Obama began pus.h.i.+ng the VP thing, and Biden's compet.i.tive juices started flowing, especially when he thought about the other names supposedly on the short list. Tim Kaine? Evan Bayh? Kathleen Sebelius? Nothing against them Nothing against them, Biden thought, but if that's the group, I'm the guy. but if that's the group, I'm the guy.

It was that kind of cogitating that had gotten Biden into the 2008 race in the first place-that and a hunger for redemption. Twenty years had pa.s.sed since his first White House bid ended in ignominy, when he was caught lifting lines from a British politician's speech. He'd survived two brain aneurisms and turned himself from a gabby s...o...b..at into the (still-gabby, still-s...o...b..aty) chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and one of the party's leading voices on judicial matters, too. He'd abstained from running in 2004, although the political circ.u.mstances would have been better for him. This time, he was ready. His wife, Jill, was ready. At sixty-four, he saw it as his last chance.

Biden knew he was a long shot, but he was also convinced he was more qualified than his opponents. In 1988, he had believed he could do the job of getting elected. Looking at 2008, he believed he was up to the task of being president.

His campaign ended, in effect, on the day it started, cut down in its tracks by his mortal enemy: his own mouth. It was that first morning, January 31, 2007, when Biden was quoted in The New York Observer The New York Observer calling Obama "the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy." Biden spent the day of his announcement apologizing, to Obama among others, for having tiptoed into a racial minefield in concrete shoes. The gaffe resurrected every caricature of Biden as a victim of terminal logorrhea and instantly crippled his fund-raising. A year later, he snared 1 percent of the vote in Iowa, finished fifth, and dropped out that same night. calling Obama "the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy." Biden spent the day of his announcement apologizing, to Obama among others, for having tiptoed into a racial minefield in concrete shoes. The gaffe resurrected every caricature of Biden as a victim of terminal logorrhea and instantly crippled his fund-raising. A year later, he snared 1 percent of the vote in Iowa, finished fifth, and dropped out that same night.

A week later, Biden's inner circle a.s.sembled around the kitchen table at his home in Greenville, Delaware, just outside Wilmington. They spent five hours having lunch, gazing out the big kitchen windows at the frigid lake beside the house, speculating and scheming about what might come next for Joe.

Biden had acquitted himself with honor after his disastrous opening salvo. His debate performances were top-notch-funny, smart, and even disciplined. Somehow, despite his drubbing, Biden came out of the campaign standing taller than when he entered. "People agree," said his adviser John Marttila, "that your stature has been enhanced."

The question was whether to cash in that currency by supporting either Clinton or Obama. Joe was close to Hillary, extremely close, treating her with the warmth and protectiveness of an older brother. (He kept a picture in his Senate office of Hillary laughing as Biden whispered in one ear and her husband whispered in the other.) But while he'd started out, like all the veterans in the field, thinking Obama was too big for his britches, not ready to be president, Biden had revised his opinion. "He's the real deal," he told the table.

Biden was inclined not to endorse anyone. His inner circle agreed, arguing that it made no sense to foreclose any possibilities, of which they saw two. Secretary of state was the obvious one; they all a.s.sumed he'd be in the running, especially if Hillary won. But Biden might even have a chance at being on the ticket. With the Democrats headed toward choosing the first female or the first black nominee in history, a white male with gravitas could be tempting for either Clinton or Obama.

Although Biden made a show of scoffing at the running-mate talk, he was willing to proceed with the strategy his staff devised for a kind of soft campaign. There would be no lobbying. No phone calls. No talking up his name. Biden would go back to the Senate, try to build on the best aspects of his performance in 2007. He would hammer the GOP on foreign policy, offer advice to Clinton or Obama if they sought him out-and keep his yap shut about everything else.

Biden informed Barack and Hillary that he wouldn't be endorsing them, but also pledged to each that he wouldn't endorse the other. "My word as a Biden" was one of his pet phrases. (The family name meant a lot to Joe.) And he was giving them his word now.

For the next five months, Biden talked incessantly to Clinton and Obama. They just kept calling him. At first it was mostly about policy, but later, as the race dragged on and Hillary's chances faded, Biden began to play honest broker, trying to engineer a peaceful end to the brawl. He counseled Clinton that she should ignore the pressure to drop out, make up her own mind, but delicately added that it made sense for her to stay in only if she believed she had a realistic shot of winning (say, one in three). To Obama, Biden said, Don't push her over the cliff; you've got to respect her; let her take her time; a graceful exit is in everyone's interest. After Obama's race speech in March, Biden had become an avid fan, telling aides it was the best oration he had heard since Dr. King. But his respect for Clinton was undiminished. In fact, he told Obama point blank that he should pick her as his running mate.

Biden's advisers were beside themselves when they heard that. What the h.e.l.l was Joe doing, they asked each other, boosting Hillary for his his job? But Biden didn't care. He thought Hillary had earned it, and doubted he'd be in the veepstakes running anyway. job? But Biden didn't care. He thought Hillary had earned it, and doubted he'd be in the veepstakes running anyway.

Anyone who knew the history between Obama and Biden would have shared that skepticism. In their first two years together in the Senate, Biden's behavior toward Obama was similar to McCain's, condescending and patronizing to the point where it rankled. "Can you believe this guy?" Obama said to his Senate staff. "Can you believe what Biden did today?"

In the course of 2007 and 2008, however, Obama had changed his mind about Biden just as Biden had flipped on Obama. He liked the way Joe had handled himself on the trail. Appreciated his working-cla.s.s appeal. (The unions loved Joe, and so did the cops, after his championing of the crime bill in the nineties.) That clean-mainstream-articulate thing? In public, Obama took a little potshot at Biden when it happened, to appease the African American groups. But in private, the comment rolled right off his back. When Biden called him to atone, Obama told him, Joe, you don't have to explain anything to me.

Not long after he clinched the nomination, Obama started hinting to his brain trust that he was leaning in Biden's direction. He mentioned it to Axelrod and Jarrett, and gave the same impression to Rahm Emanuel, whom Obama had asked to throw some ideas in the hopper about potential veeps.

One night on the phone, Barack complained to Emanuel, You haven't given me a single name. Emanuel flatly said that he wasn't going to. Why? asked Obama.

It's just like 1992, Emanuel replied, when he'd been involved with Bill Clinton's VP-selection process. They examined some forty names that year, but all along, Clinton kept bringing up Gore, singing the praises of his book Earth in the Balance. Earth in the Balance.

This is over, Emanuel told Obama. You've decided on Biden. We're just going through the process to make sure your gut's right.

PROCESS MATTERED TO OBAMA. Head overruled gut, as always. The screening system he implemented was rigorous and methodical. On June 4, not even twenty-four hours after the nomination fight ended, Obama announced that his selection committee would be run by Caroline Kennedy and former deputy attorney general Eric Holder. Two weeks later, the Obama campaign said that Patti Solis Doyle was joining Team Obama as the eventual VP nominee's chief of staff. (The move enraged Hillary's supporters, since it seemed to signal that Clinton was off the table for the number-two spot.) By July, Obama's pollsters were focus-group-testing potential running mates with voters in Cleveland and Milwaukee.

The first list the committee handed Obama had a dozen names. Many of those that appealed to him were problematic. He liked Tom Daschle, but Daschle had become a Was.h.i.+ngton influence peddler. Sebelius, the Kansas governor, had no national experience or foreign policy chops, and as Solis Doyle argued, her selection might offend Clinton's supporters on the grounds that if Obama was going to choose a woman, it should be Hillary. Virginia senator Jim Webb refused to be vetted. Obama's pollsters reported that voters strongly preferred that the nominee choose a gray-headed Was.h.i.+ngton insider, and that Chris Dodd tested well. But Dodd's connection, as chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, to the subprime mortgage debacle made him a nonstarter.

Obama was less than thrilled with the slimness of the pickings, and, despite his reverence for process, kept raising a name that wasn't on any ledger: Clinton.

Let's just run through the Hillary option again, he would say to his brain trust. She's tough, she's smart, she's prepared to be president, she has a const.i.tuency-she got eighteen million votes. You can't just dismiss all that.

The brain trust shook its collective head, reminding Obama of all the ha.s.sles that Clinton would bring, not least of them Bill. They told Barack their research showed that swing voters had a hard time accepting him and Hillary suddenly holding hands and crooning "k.u.mbaya." Jarrett and Plouffe were dead set against putting Clinton on the ticket. And so was Mich.e.l.le, who had yet to forgive or forget Hillary's comment about RFK.

By the end of July, the Clinton option was finally buried and the list was whittled down to three: Virginia governor Tim Kaine, Indiana senator Evan Bayh, and Biden. Of the group, Kaine was the person with whom Obama felt the closest personal bond. Both were Harvard Law grads; both had spent time overseas as children; and, bizarrely, both their mothers and maternal grandparents hailed from the same tiny town of Eldorado, Kansas. Obama knew Bayh less well, but his political appeal was manifest. He was the young, handsome, former two-term governor of the Hoosier State, one of the red states that the Obamans hoped to capture, and the centrist scion of the state's most famous political family.

Kaine and Bayh submitted eagerly to the investigative cavity search that being short-listed entailed. After the first round of interviews, Kaine's wife said to him over dinner, "Tim, if there's anything you haven't told me, I think you should, because it's probably going to come out." They both cracked up. (Their teenage son was less mirthful when the vetters grilled him about his Facebook profile.) Bayh, self-conscious about a recent weight loss, explained in detail to the vetters about his apparent digestive trouble with dairy and gluten, then arranged for a $5,000 consultation with a specialist recommended to him by Hillary.

The phones rang for all three finalists in the first week of August, summoning them for interviews with Obama. Bayh was smuggled into St. Louis; Kaine, into small-town Indiana.

The Biden interview in Minneapolis came last. For ninety minutes they sat in the suite at Graves 601, feeling each other out. Obama ribbed Biden about the financial details his vetters had turned up. "All these years, and you still have no money," Obama teased.

The salient question for Obama was, did Biden really want the gig? He'd seemed hesitant throughout the vetting process. Did Biden think the job was too small? Did Biden think Biden was too big? Would he rather be secretary of state?

Biden replied that it all depended on how Obama envisioned the job of VP. The role he could embrace was that of counselor in chief; weighing in on every important decision, foreign and domestic; contributing his expertise on congressional relations, legislative strategy, judicial appointments, all of it. The key, Biden said, was building a relations.h.i.+p based on candor-at which point, Obama laughed.

"I know know you'll be candid," Obama said. "Are you prepared for me to be?" you'll be candid," Obama said. "Are you prepared for me to be?"

"Absolutely," Biden answered.

The next day, Russia invaded Georgia, markedly enhancing Biden's prospects as the short-lister with the most bombs-and-bullets cred. He talked the idea over with Jill and his family, who said they were all for it. After months of living with the concept, Biden had come around; he wanted the job, and bad.

A week or so later, Biden received a call: the Davids wanted to see him. Axelrod and Plouffe arranged to meet him in Wilmington, at the home of his sister, Valerie. Once again, the senator showed up in disguise. You could never be too careful, apparently, even in your hometown.

The Davids had their worries about Biden, and one above the rest. Could he manage to keep his gyrating gums under control for the duration of the fall campaign?

Sitting outside by the pool, Biden rea.s.sured them that he could keep his mouth in check, cited examples of how he'd done it before, promised he could do it again. In talking about how he could control his talking, Biden kept talking and talking-offering a soliloquy that, had it been a one-man play, might have been t.i.tled QED. QED.

The Davids silently noted the irony, then pressed Biden for a commitment: not a vow of silence, but a pledge to stick to the script he was handed, to keep a firm grip on his tongue. Biden told them that, if he got the nod, he would be a good, and tight-lipped, soldier. He gave them his word. As a Biden.

On August 22, three days before the start of the Democratic convention, Obama phoned Kaine and Bayh, delivering his verdict with the identical phrase: "I've decided to go in a different direction." He knew Biden was the right call. The working-cla.s.s thing. The gray-hair thing. The foreign-policy thing. Oh, and the attack-dog thing. Obama was convinced that he could count on Biden to maul McCain.