Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh Part 14

The allied loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded, including three Europeans!

And this may be taken as a fair sample of all the succeeding battles with the British, French, and other disciplined and artillery-supplied forces. The Ti-pings have always done all that men of flesh and blood were capable of doing, but, without artillery to resist or reply to that overwhelming arm of the enemy (supplied freely from the British a.r.s.enals), their bravest and best fell to the iron storm, and the rest fled before it.

Very shortly after the above action, _General_ Burgevine became the victim of the scheming carried on between the mandarins and those British officials who desired to establish the Ward force as an English contingent. Having taken a large amount of specie from the house of Ta-kee (the banker to the force, and in the service of the Imperial Government), which he had been compelled to seize, _nolens volens_, in order to satisfy his men, who were in an open state of mutiny for their arrears of pay--pay, too, that seems to have been purposely kept lying idle at Ta-kee's house, probably with the cunning idea it would act (as in reality it did) upon the force, and produce some outbreak that could be taken advantage of to disgrace Burgevine and replace him by a British officer--he was dismissed from his command and a reward offered for his head by the Manchoo governor, or Fu-tai, of the province. The excuse given by the Mandarins for this transaction was that Burgevine had disobeyed orders, resisted lawful authority, and seized the money.

Some measure of this is very probably true; but whatever offence had been committed by him, the mandarins had themselves been the cause of it by their peculation, withholding the wages of the troops, and underhand intriguing. Probably the fact that Captain Holland, R.M., was installed as Burgevine's successor, may account for the events leading to the latter's dismissal.

The Imperialist Mandarins were only too eager to fall into the views of those who a.s.sisted them; the command of the once despised filibustiers'

force by Englishmen meant taking all the danger and responsibility of repelling the Ti-pings out of their own hands; consequently, availing themselves of the subserviency of British officers and authorities, they accepted Captain Holland as the commander of their disciplined troops, and the services of any others who were willing, and did not feel dishonoured by hiring themselves out to support such a cruel and corrupt cause. From this moment the active operations by British troops ceased, but Ward's old legion became a British contingent, and has continued one ever since. Backed up in all their operations against the Ti-pings by the presence of British troops to support them in case of reverse, and supplied with every munition of war, artillery, s.h.i.+ps, &c. they required, the various mercenary legions infesting the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo have managed (with the a.s.sistance of the ordinary Chinese and Manchoo soldiers, who alone outnumbered those of Ti-ping tien kwoh) to terminate the allied operations by driving the revolutionists from their once happy territory.

Soon after the command of the force had been a.s.sumed by Captain Holland, it met with the most severe defeat the Ti-pings have ever given it, and he resigned the appointment in disgust. The Order in Council permitting British officers to take military service with the Emperor of China having just reached Shanghae, Major Gordon, R.E., took command of the disciplined Chinese, and many other officers joined in the questionable service. From this time forth the British Government became committed to the success and responsibilities of the force; and for every atrocity perpetrated by the Imperialists, and for every life destroyed, are equally as much accountable as they were for the previous conduct of their own troops. Under such auspices, and with boundless supplies of all the material of war, similar necessaries being successfully prevented from reaching their antagonists, it is easy to appreciate the consequent course of events--continued triumph of the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries, and repeated defeat of the Ti-pings, already much weakened by the loss of many of their best troops, and diminished in their prestige from the result of the raids headed by Admiral Hope and General Staveley.

The worst feature attending the conversion of the mercenary legions into British auxiliaries, is the fact that Sir F. Bruce, the English Minister at Pekin, distinctly repudiated any such action; and yet his Government saw fit to sanction the arrangement when it was reported to them by Generals Staveley and Brown, who seem to have been foremost among the Shanghae local advocates of the system. _General_ Burgevine having proceeded to the Manchoo court at Pekin, stated his case, and was by them reinstated in his former command; receiving, also, the full approval of Sir F. Bruce. Upon his return to Shanghae, with an Imperial Commissioner to place him in position, the British generals and their colleagues in collusion with the Imperial authorities, disregarding the direct instructions of Sir F. Bruce, successfully opposed his reappointment, and managed to retain Major Gordon in command; by what means being best known to themselves.

We will conclude our notice of the establishment of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent with a few facts proving the singular, if not sinister, circ.u.mstance, that Sir F. Bruce, although a virulent enemy of the Ti-pings, has always carefully avoided authorizing the employment of British officers against the insurgents; and, in fact, has invariably disapproved such measures, as well as the movement of British troops to support and succour the contingents when in difficulty.

In a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin, March 12, 1863,"[36]

Sir F. Bruce, referring to the liberty granted to officers to enter the Chinese Imperial service, states:--"I should prefer that the military men employed by the Chinese Government should _not_ belong to the great treaty Powers;" and, with regard to British officers choosing to enter what the Press in China has termed "the disgusting service," he expresses the opinion that "they will then bear a Chinese, and not a British character." How _literally_ this belief has been fulfilled, the torture of Ti-ping prisoners captured by the Imperialists, the treacherous ma.s.sacre of the prisoners at Soo-chow, and the great loss of life which occurred, after cities were captured, sufficiently prove.

In a despatch dated "April 10,"[37] Sir F. Bruce expresses his wish to the same officer that Burgevine should be reinstated to the command of the Ward force, and, speaking "of the charges brought against him,"

states: "I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor towards the Chinese drilled force." If the Minister had added the names of a few foreigners as being privy to the "intrigue," he would have hit upon the whole truth. The Governor was jealous of the force as a Chinese one managed by foreigners, and successfully plotted, with no little ingenuity and shrewdness, to make it a foreign force officered by Englishmen, and countenanced by British authorities, who accepted all the responsibility entailed.

Upon the subject of Major Gordon's appointment to the coveted generals.h.i.+p of mercenaries, Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch to General Brown, dated "June 11," states:[38] "It is not expedient that British officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the security of the ports where they are stationed.... I am further of opinion that, unless the force be properly const.i.tuted, and relieved from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Government, it will do no real and permanent good; and that the officer who commands it will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible with his professional reputation, nor what is due to the character of a British officer. Under these circ.u.mstances, I must _decline_ accepting the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers beyond Shanghae.... I have informed the Chinese Government of my objections to the employment of British officers in the field."

Singularly enough, every word prophesied by Sir F. Bruce came to pa.s.s; the force became an instrument of evil in the hands of local Mandarins, to be used for their individual purposes, and then got rid of; the officers found their honour tarnished by complicity in deeds of blood and treachery; some were disgusted, but the Commander retained his position until he was _compelled_ to break up the force by orders from his Government. In a despatch to Earl Russell, dated "October 13," Sir F. Bruce declares:[39] "It was reluctantly, and in deference to the naval and military authorities, that I consented to our a.s.suming the responsibility of defending the thirty-mile radius round Shanghae, and I spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute, so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius." Yet members of Lord Palmerston's Government have had the hardihood to declare that the operations against the Ti-pings _were approved_ by Sir F. Bruce.

When Major Gordon's force was in danger, General Brown moved detachments of British troops to support him, and to garrison the captured towns and hold them against the Ti-pings. Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch upon the subject, dated "October 6,"[40] clearly condemns his conduct in these words:--"If officers go into the Chinese service, we are not ent.i.tled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further than we should be if the corps a.s.sisted were commanded by a Chinese general. We are _not_ ent.i.tled to lend them artillery, or men to work their guns _on any pretext_!" In the very teeth of these distinct instructions, General Brown persisted in every measure they condemn. It was the favourite _modus operandi_ over again--the military or naval authorities acting in direct violation of orders, the disobedience being ultimately endorsed by the Government, and the apparently disobedient receiving praise and C.B.'s by way of punishment.

FOOTNOTES:

[29] With the schemes of the Bruce, Wade, Lay, &c., politicians.

[30] This is a startling contrast to what Mr. Bruce declared would be the "worst" course to pursue.

[31] To completely prove the error of Lord Russell's a.s.sumption, and the slightness of its foundation, we will read the following extract from "A Memorandum, dated October 15, 1862, addressed to Rear-Admiral Kuper, by Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, on resigning the Command of the Station."

[Blue Book, June, 1862, to February, 1863, p. 111.]

"_The only question of real importance on which we are at variance with the rebels_, arose from their desire to possess themselves of Shanghae, and their capture of Ningpo, since retaken.

"On my first visit to Nanking, ... I effected an agreement with them, _but limited to the year_, that they should not approach it within 100 _li_ (thirty miles), _on the whole tolerably_ WELL KEPT _during that time_, but which they refused to renew on the occasion of my last visit."

[32] Mr. Roberts, an American Baptist missionary already referred to in this work, joined the Ti-pings at Nankin about the end of October, 1860.

Of all missionaries in China he was the least qualified for such a position. Intolerant and bigoted to the Baptist dogmas, irritable, peevish, inconsistent, and vacillating--a man singularly illiterate, without stability of character or pleasantness of manner--his presence at Nankin did far more harm than good. His objections to every other Church, and to every other denomination of dissent except his own, went far to give the Ti-pings a dread of that diversity of doctrine among the British and Americans which they had always looked upon with surprise, thinking, as they did, that G.o.d could not be well served by those who were always quarrelling about it. The circ.u.mstances attending the advent and career of Mr. Roberts among the Ti-pings I have avoided as a worthless episode, but, as the facts of his indecorous flight from Nankin have been misrepresented, I think it necessary to notice the subject. Mr. Roberts accepted temporal rank under the Ti-pings, and by his unwise dogmatical obstinacy frequently provoked unpleasant discussion. During a dispute with the Kan-w.a.n.g, who had entertained him since his arrival, that chief had particular occasion to chastise a boy of the household. Mr. Roberts was so blinded by pa.s.sion, the idea that Europeans would never know the reverse of his statement, or some other reason, that, in a paroxysm of rage, he fled from the city, and sought refuge on board H.M. gunboat _Renard_, which happened to be lying in the port. By some obliquity of vision best known to himself, Mr. Roberts mistook the stick used by the Kan-w.a.n.g for a sword, and declared that his boy _had been_ brutally murdered. Not satisfied with this, although on the previous night he had retired to rest fully believing the surrounding people saints, the very next day, after his quarrel with the Kan-w.a.n.g, he awoke to find them howling sinners. The many years that he had praised the Ti-pings as holy men were, by a moment of pa.s.sion, forgotten, and within one day Mr. Roberts not only declared himself to have been deceived so long, but, for the act of one man, gave up the hundreds of thousands in the Ti-ping cause to fire and sword. We will just contrast the different statements of Mr. Roberts, one with the other, and then dismiss the subject.

This is an extract from the first, made on board the _Renard_:--

"Kan-w.a.n.g, moved by his coolie elder brother--literally a coolie at Hong-kong--and the devil, without fear of G.o.d before his eyes, did on Monday, the 13th instant (January, 1862), come into the house in which I was living, _and with malice aforethought murder one of my servants with a large sword in his own hand, in my presence_, without a moment's warning or any just cause. _And after having slain my poor, harmless, helpless boy, he jumped on his head most fiend-like, and stamped it with his foot._"

Now, at Canton, on the 3rd of April, 1862, when it was generally known that the above charge of murder was incorrect, Mr. Roberts retracted these words [Blue Book, 1862, p. 5], having reference to the Kan-w.a.n.g's form of baptism:--

"A miserable apostate, (?) polygamist, _and murderer, too_, to wish to administer an ordinance held sacred by those who practise it. What a sacrilege! But as to that boy, _I have since been told that he evinced indications of life after he was dragged out_, by one who saw him. But I think it would have been less cruel in Kan-w.a.n.g to have smoothly cut off his head than to send him out even half killed, dest.i.tute, and naked, to freeze and starve to death. _Whether the boy was killed directly or not, I cannot esteem Kan-w.a.n.g, and his elder brother, who prompted him to the wicked deed, less than murderers; and hence, in my judgment, they ought both to be treated as such._"

In the pamphlet, "A Letter to the Bishop of Victoria, regarding the Religion of the Ti-ping Rebels," the author states, "Of course you now know that the story of that person's boy being murdered by the Kan-w.a.n.g is a fabrication. 'The Kan-w.a.n.g called on me,' said Mr. Roberts, when I asked him about the matter, 'and desired me to punish the boy. I told him I would first remonstrate with him; and then he, the Kan-w.a.n.g's brother, dissatisfied with my answer, beat him, _as I thought_, to death.'"

[33] This affair happened on the 25th of August, was reported to the Shanghae _Daily s.h.i.+pping and Commercial News_ of the next day, and was widely known in China. A certain Mr. CHALONER ALABASTER, of the British consular service, is mentioned in connection with it.

[34] From the success of the Ti-pings.

[35] _China Overland Trade Report_, February 20, 1863.

[36] Blue Book, China, No. 3, 1864, p. 68.

[37] _Id._, p. 80.

[38] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 96.

[39] _Id._, p. 162.

[40] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 163.

CHAPTER XXI.

Personal Narrative continued.--Mr. Lobschied.--His Reception at Nankin.--Press Publications.--Mr. Lobschied leaves Nankin.--Operations before Tait-san.--The a.s.sault.--Act of Bravery.--Route of the Imperialists.--Gordon's Art of War.--Tait-san reinvested.--Siege of Tait-san.--Its Capture.--Manchoo Atrocities.--Treatment of Ti-ping Prisoners.--Mr. Sillar's Statement.--Quin-san captured.--Gordon's Report.--Gordon reinforced.--The Chung-w.a.n.g recalled.--Critical Position of the Ti-pings.--The Chung-w.a.n.g's Retreat.--Difficulties encountered.--Reinforcements.--The Scene of Battle.--Its Horrors.--Arrival at Nankin.--The Chung-w.a.n.g's Army.--General attack.--The Repulse.--The Surprise.--The Night Attack.--The Flight and Pursuit.--Death of Marie.

When at last I became convalescent and able to leave my house in Nankin, for several reasons I determined to take a trip to Shanghae. My wife wished to see her relations there; I was anxious to ascertain the political and practical position of affairs; and, besides, there were many things to be done toward a.s.sisting the Ti-ping cause. The princ.i.p.al inducement for the trip was, however, the fact that my friends, D. and Captain P., had, upon their last voyage, brought me some letters from Chin-kiang (to where they had been forwarded by my agent at Shanghae), stating that the Rev. W. Lobschied, a distinguished missionary, was anxious to visit the Ti-ping capital. I at once decided to proceed to Shanghae and afford him every a.s.sistance by placing one of our vessels at his service for the journey to and from Nankin.

During the last few months of my illness messengers had continually arrived from the head-quarters of the I- and Chung-w.a.n.g's armies, reporting the uninterrupted successes of both. But at the same time intelligence was received of the second capture of Kah-ding and Tsing-poo, the capture of Fu-shan by the allies, and the treachery of the chief in command at the city of Chang-zu, who had accepted the large bribes offered by the enemy, and surrendered the city. Orders were consequently despatched to the I-w.a.n.g's victorious army, already beyond the Po-yang lake, and that chief detached a considerable portion of it to return and protect the threatened districts. This force, at the time I left Nankin (early spring of 1863), was already besieging Chang-zu, having closely invested the city upon every side.

Having embarked with my wife on board our lorcha, the _Anglo-Ti-ping_, we proceeded under sail to Chin-kiang, and then took pa.s.sage in a steamer to Shanghae. A month after our arrival, every motive for the visit being accomplished, and the Rev. W. Lobschied having arranged to accompany me, we returned to Chin-kiang together, and then, getting on board the lorcha, made sail for Nankin. When half-way there I engaged a small steamer to tow us up to the forts, in order to oblige the missionary, who was averse to the delay the calm weather seemed likely to occasion.

In a couple of days we were cast off at our destination, and I proceeded on sh.o.r.e with Mr. Lobschied, introducing him to the Sz-w.a.n.g, who received him very kindly, and immediately sent word of his arrival to the Government inside the city. The next morning horses and attendants were in waiting to escort us to the Kan-w.a.n.g's presence. Upon reaching the palace, Mr. Lobschied met with so warm and friendly a reception from the Kan-w.a.n.g and many other chiefs, that I am quite sure he can never cease to remember it with pleasure, and at the same time with regret that he has not been more energetic or useful to what he knew full well was the cause of Christianity and righteousness. Many of the Ti-pings had known him at Canton in former days, when they had studied the wondrous truths of Scripture, and some, I believe, had been his own converts and pupils. These men were most anxious that he should stay among them, and earnestly entreated him to do so; but the Rev. W.

Lobschied, as he informed me, had to attend to some appointment at Canton, and the wishes or whims of a young wife. Thus the last opportunity for a teacher of the Gospel to support the cause of Christianity in China was thrown away; my trouble lost (not that I cared for ought but the fact that it was not used to advantage when every opportunity was offered); and the visit of the last missionary who came to the Ti-ping capital, rendered utterly fruitless. Something did result from the visit in the shape of the following letter:--

"THE TAEPINGS.

"_A Visit to Nanking, and an Interview with the Kan-Wong._ "(To the Editor of the _Daily Press_, Hong Kong.)

"SIR.--The dreadful accounts given of the condition and character of the rebels had long made me anxious to visit their capital, and see for myself how far all that has been said of them be true. There is a brisk trade carried on outside the city of Nanking. The fields within the ancient wall were well cultivated, as well as the country around; and wheat, barley, and large beans, appeared to be there in abundance. The people within the city _were certainly looking better than in any town along the Yang-tse-kiang_. New shops and fine buildings were in course of erection, and the people were in general well dressed.

The women moved about performing their daily work as they do here in the South; aged persons were playing with their grandchildren, and wheresoever I came I was treated with respect and kindness. The kings, and particularly Kan-Wong, received me with great kindness, and I felt that I was as safe in Nanking as in any Chinese town I have ever visited. They were anxious to know why England was so hostile against them. 'Have we ever broken faith with foreigners? Have we ever retaliated the enmity of England and France?' said Kan-Wong. 'If they force us to the conclusion that we are to be treated as outlaws, then the day of retribution will come! We are fighting in our own country, and to rid ourselves of a foreign power, and woe to the stranger who falls into our hands after the first shot has been fired against Nanking.[41] We need not then take cities and hold them, or allow foreigners to a.s.sist the Imperial imps in surrounding us; we shall then move in one compact body, ravaging the country and destroying trade.[42] We have not as yet sent men into the foreign settlements to burn and destroy, but have strictly prohibited such acts. Who can prevent us from committing such acts, if we choose? And why should we not make the sojourn of foreigners here intolerable, if they come to destroy us who _would_ and _have_ opened to them every port we hold, and tried to be friends with them? We will spare neither Hankow nor any other place held by foreigners, who will then see the difference between forbearance and determined hostility.' They told me that they had _repeatedly_ applied to the foreign consuls, in order to come to some arrangements, but all their communications had been returned _unopened_, and no reply given. I was present at their religious meetings, which are regularly held every morning and evening, but would not join them until I knew what they were doing. They sang a hymn; and having previously placed three cups of tea on the table,[43] they knelt down, one of them[44]

reading or saying an appropriate prayer. There was _no wors.h.i.+p of Taiping-Wong_. Whilst sitting in the palace, there came frequent orders for books on religious subjects, and, so far as the Chinese care for religion, _these men sang and prayed with a will and with apparent devotion_. As the Imperialists are going to _restrict_ the development of trade on the Yang-tze-Kiang as soon as _Osborn's_ fleet has come out, and as the rebels _are willing to open the whole country to foreigners_, if they will stretch out a friendly hand to them, everybody may judge for himself which party will serve him best. China was conquered by the help of Roman Catholic missionaries, and the Imperial House has for 150 years been under their influence. So long as the Emperors made use of them they prospered; and the moment they expelled them from Pekin, misrule and effeminacy became the order of the day. Sir Frederick Bruce will one day be recalled to give an account of the _ruinous course of policy he has advised his Government to adopt_, and foreign influence will at last prevail in the council of the rebels. But whether that will be upon the ruins of the silk and tea plantations, or upon the graveyards of thousands of British subjects, we shall soon have an opportunity of witnessing. As almost all the officers now in the service of the Imperialists are on half-pay, _and receive besides an enormous salary from the Chinese_, n.o.body need feel any surprise at the strange doings of men worthy a more honourable death.[45] And if _General_ Gordon does receive 1,200 taels per month from the Imperialists, and his half-pay as an officer of the British army, where then is British neutrality?

The proclamation of the Queen is dust thrown into the eyes of Europe and America. But more on this subject for the second mail of this month.

"Yours respectfully, "W. L.

"Hong Kong, 10th June, 1863."

The Rev. W. Lobschied, by his departure from Nankin and return to the south of China, sacrificed a glorious opportunity of serving the cause of the Master whose word he came abroad to teach. Had he installed himself at the Ti-ping capital and proclaimed that fact, and then reported the favourable points of their sincere Christianity, friendliness to foreigners, desire for unrestricted commerce and intercourse with Europeans, and general moral and physical superiority, in _all_ the particulars for which the Chinese are condemned, he would most likely have been the means of arresting the interference of England, and purifying the religious errors of the only voluntary native wors.h.i.+ppers of Jesus in Asia.

Had Mr. Lobschied so acted, every mission society and ordained member of the Church of England would necessarily have supported him; this would simply have been their duty to G.o.d. Popular opinion, when fixed by the voice of a well-known divine, speaking the _truth_ from Nankin, and with all the authority of his presence among the revolutionists, and undoubted personal knowledge of them, would almost certainly have compelled the British Government to remain neutral.