John Dewey's logical theory Part 9

A practical, workable conception of the relations between generic ideas and their objects must be based on considerations less obscure. Why not be content to verify, by criticism, the truth that experience and thoughts about experience develop together, with the result that each theory, hypothesis, or method is applicable within the sphere where it was born? Why wait upon psychology for confirmation of a truth so obvious and important?

Bosanquet remarks: "Either one may speak as if reality were relative to the individual mind, a ridiculous idea ..., or one may become interested in tracing the germination and growth of ideas in the individual mind as typical facts indeed, but only as one animal's habits are typical of those of others, and we may slur over the primary basis of logic, which is its relation to reality. For mental facts unrelated to reality are no knowledge, and therefore have no place in logic."[210] Bosanquet emphasizes an important truth neglected by Dewey. Logic is not concerned with ideas as things existing in individuals, nor with conceptions as individual modes of response. Truth has little to do with the individual as such, though the individual might well concern himself about truth.

Truth is objective, super-individual, and logic is the study of the objective verity of thought. The proposition, 'All life is from the living,' finds no premises in the nerve tissues of the scientist who accepts it. How does the proposition square up with reality or experience? That is the question, and it can only be answered by turning away from psychology to empirical verification, involving a critical test of the applicability of the thought to reality.

In the strictly ethical part of the essay, Dewey tries to show that moral judgments, at least, involve the character of the agent and his specific acts as data. Intellectual judgments, on the other hand, may disregard the acts of the individual; they are left out of account, "when they are so uniform in their exercise that they make no difference with respect to the _particular_ object or content judged."[211] It will be seen that the distinction between moral and intellectual judgments is made on the basis of their content. But Dewey is committed to the doctrine that judgments are to be differentiated as acts, on a psychological basis. In any case, if the character and acts of a man are to be judged, they must be treated objectively, and the relevance of the judge's ideas to the man's actual character cannot be decided by a psychological a.n.a.lysis of the judge's mind. Right and wrong, whether moral or intellectual, are not attributes of the individual nervous system.

FOOTNOTES:

[173] _The Philosophical Radicals_, "Dewey's Studies in Logical Theory,"

p. 179. The essay was originally printed as a critical notice in the _Philosophical Review_, November, 1904.

[174] Since this was written (1915-16), Dewey's chapters have been reprinted in a volume ent.i.tled _Essays in Experimental Logic_, published by the University of Chicago Press (June, 1916). They are preceded, in this new setting, by a special introductory chapter, and numerous alterations have been made which do not, however, affect the fundamental standpoint.

[175] See James's review, "The Chicago School," _Psychological Bulletin_, Vol. I, 1904, pp. 1-5.

[176] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 2.

[177] Compare Dewey, _How We Think_ (1910), Chapter II, "The Need for Training Thought."

[178] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 1.

[179] _Ibid._, p. 2.

[180] _Op. cit._, p. 3 f.

[181] _Ibid._, p. 16.

[182] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. II, p. 270.

[183] _Studies in Logical Theory_, p. x.

[184] "Thinking or rationality is not limited to the process of abstract cognition, but it includes feeling and will, and in the course of its development carries these along with it. There is, of course, such a thing as what we have called abstract cognition; but the different moments are all united in the concrete experience which we may name the life of thought." Creighton, "Experience and Thought," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. XV, 1906, p. 487 f.

[185] _Op. cit._, p. 15.

[186] _Ibid._, p. 8.

[187] _Op. cit._, pp. 18-19.

[188] _Ibid._, p. 23.

[189] _Ibid._, p. 17.

[190] _Op. cit._, p. 23.

[191] _Op. cit._, p. 39 f. Bradley suggests a similar idea of the 'tensional situation.' See, for instance, _Ethical Studies_, p. 65, where he remarks: "We have conflicting desires, say A and B; we feel two tensions, two drawings (so to speak) but we can not actually affirm ourselves in both." A more complete statement of the 'tensional situation' will be found on page 239 of the same work and in various other pa.s.sages.

[192] _Ibid._, pp. 43-44.

[193] _Op. cit._, p. 45.

[194] _Ibid._, p. 50.

[195] _Ibid._, p. 52.

[196] _Op. cit._

[197] _Ibid._, p. 47.

[198] _Ibid._, p. 53.

[199] _Op. cit._, p. 61 f.

[200] _Ibid._, p. 80.

[201] _Op. cit._, p. 85.

[202] _Ibid._

[203] _Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago_, First Series, Vol. III, pp. 115-139.

[204] _Ibid._, p. 115.

[205] _Ibid._, p. 116.

[206] _Op. cit._, p. 120.

[207] _Ibid._, p. 121.

[208] _Ibid._, p. 122.

[209] _Op. cit._

[210] _Logic_, second ed., Vol. I, p. 232.

[211] _Decennial Publication of the University of Chicago_, First Series, Vol. III, p. 127.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLEMICAL PERIOD

After the publication of the _Studies in Logical Theory_, Dewey entered upon what may be called the polemical period of his career. He joined forces with James and Schiller in the promotion of the new movement called 'Pragmatism.' The _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, inst.i.tuted at Columbia University in 1904, the same year in which Dewey accepted a professors.h.i.+p in that inst.i.tution, became a convenient medium for the expression of his views, and every volume of this periodical will be found to contain notes, discussions, and articles by Dewey and his followers, bearing on current controversy. He also published many articles in other journals, technical and popular.

In 1910, the most important of these essays were collected into a volume, published under the t.i.tle, _The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays_. For purposes of discussion, these essays may be divided into two cla.s.ses: those of a more constructive character, setting forth Dewey's own standpoint, and those which are mainly polemical, directed against opposing standpoints, chiefly the idealistic. The constructive writings will be given first consideration.

The essay on "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," first published in the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_, in July, 1905, and later reprinted in the volume of collected essays, offers a convenient point of departure. Dewey observes that many of the difficulties in current controversy can be traced to presuppositions tacitly held by thinkers as to what experience means. Dewey attempts to make his own presuppositions explicit, with the object of clearing up this confusion.