Marine_ A Guided Tour Of A Marine Expeditionary Unit - BestLightNovel.com
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Amphibious s.h.i.+pping/Landing Craft Development The fragile, lightweight oared wars.h.i.+ps of antiquity could be hauled up on a beach, but they were awkward platforms for amphibious a.s.sault. Alexander the Great's siege of the island fortress of Tyre on the Lebanese coast in 332 B.C. saw early examples of ingenious improvisation on both sides, with s.h.i.+ps lashed together to provide platforms for siege towers and battering rams. The Viking longs.h.i.+ps of the Dark Ages demonstrated amazing seaworthiness and adaptability--the amphibious raiding strategy of the Nors.e.m.e.n dominated Europe for centuries. During the age of wooden sailing s.h.i.+ps, various nations built landing barges with a.s.sorted fixtures (ramps, cranes, etc.) to load and unload troops, horses, and equipment. This is all well and good, but having a big navy and lots of troops does not guarantee a successful amphibious a.s.sault. The Spanish Armada in 1588 and Napoleon Bonaparte's aborted invasion of England in 1805 are cla.s.sic examples of failures. The land-oriented military doctrine of continental empires could never quite solve the problem of crossing even the 30 nm/55 km of English Channel. In 1940, German General Staff planners thought crossing the Channel would simply be a "river crossing along a wide front." Wrong!
Many factors go into the execution of a successful amphibious a.s.sault, including air supremacy and sea control. But crossing the interface of land and water, known to most of us as "the beach," is the most difficult part, technologically and militarily. The beach or littoral zone can be a dangerous place, even if you just want to swim and sun yourself. Now try to move thousands of troops, hundreds of vehicles, and thousands of tons of equipment and supplies across it. It takes a lot of horsepower and engineering to create machines that enable men to do the job, and more than a little political capital. That is where our story about landing craft and amphibious s.h.i.+ps starts. During the period between the World Wars, the problem of beach landing obsessed several groups of officers and engineers on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, Marines searching for a new mission to justify their continued existence saw amphibious a.s.sault as their future. During the 1930s they observed with interest a series of small operations by j.a.panese naval landing forces in China, utilizing specialized landing barges.
On the other side of the ocean, British officers, studying the failure of their 1915 invasion at Gallipoli, looked for ways to cross the beach rapidly to conduct mobile operations inland. The Gallipoli landing was the idea of the former First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Winston Churchill; and when it bogged down into a b.l.o.o.d.y stalemate, it nearly ended his political career. These problems became even more urgent for Churchill in World War II, after another disastrous landing in Norway and the n.a.z.i conquest of Europe in 1940. For all of his many shortcomings as a strategist, Churchill clearly saw the need to build s.h.i.+ps and landing craft in vast numbers if Europe was to be liberated from Hitler.
Even as the Battle of Britain was being fought in 1940 to fend off German invasion, the British were designing their first purpose-built landing craft, the Landing Craft, a.s.sault (LCA, the American designation when we built them from the British design). Just over 40 ft/12.2-m long and powered by a pair of 65-hp Ford V-8 gasoline engines, they could haul thirty-five troops and 800 lb/364 kg of equipment some 50 to 80 nm/91 to 146 km. The open-topped LCA had a long, flat bottom suitable for beaching, an armored front to protect the embarked troops, and a bow ramp for rapid off-loading. LCAs could hang on a transport s.h.i.+p's davits, like large lifeboats. a.s.sault troops boarded them by climbing down rope ladders and nets. The same features would appear on almost every landing craft, including the Landing Craft, Utility (LCUs), and Landing Craft, Medium (LCMs), still in use today. From the LCA design came literally dozens of specialized landing craft that would be used for the next half century. At the same time, American engineers were coming up with their own designs, such as the famous "Higgins" boat, which was based on a surf-rescue craft. Evolutionary improvements led to standard designs like the Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP), built in the thousands as the backbone of the landing craft fleet that helped win World War II.
Once the landing craft had been developed, the next problem was getting the frail little boats across the oceans. Amphibious operations are fought against the elements of the ocean and the sh.o.r.e, as well as the enemy's defenses. The flat-bottomed a.s.sault boats, while handy in the shoal waters of beaches and atolls, needed larger "mother" vessels to move them close to their objectives. This requirement led to specialized attack transports, grouped into amphibious "tractor" groups. Early attack transports were converted freighters and pa.s.senger liners. They lacked cranes and other handling gear for hoisting out and loading embarked landing craft and troops. Later in the war, purpose-built s.h.i.+ps were significant improvements, but they still had to run in close to the beaches to unload; and they were vulnerable to enemy coastal artillery, mines, and aircraft.
An important development was the Landing s.h.i.+p, Tank (LST--their crews said it stood for "large, slow target"). This was an oceangoing vessel that could beach itself, open its bow doors, drop a ramp, and then off-load vehicles up to the size of heavy tanks directly onto the beach. The last U.S. Navy LSTs (built in the 1960s) only recently retired from active service. Another special-purpose amphibious s.h.i.+p was the Landing s.h.i.+p, Dock (LSD), equipped with ballast tanks and an interior well deck that allowed landing craft to load in relative safety. By flooding the well deck, the landing craft could easily float out, without the need for hoists or cargo nets to load the boats. The well deck was so successful that all thirty-six of the U.S. Navy's amphibious s.h.i.+ps in the 21st century will have one. Other specialized amphibious s.h.i.+ps built during World War 11 included amphibious command s.h.i.+ps and fire-support vessels carrying rockets and guns.
These bizarre craft provided the sealift to liberate North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. Soon after the victory they helped to win, virtually all of the landing craft and amphibious s.h.i.+ps were sold for sc.r.a.p or mothballed. The atomic bomb seemed to signal an end to amphibious warfare. This att.i.tude would not last. The Korean War marked the rebirth of amphibious operations. Recalled from the moth-ball fleets, World War II amphibious s.h.i.+ps provided General Douglas MacArthur with the lift for his brilliant landing at Inchon in the fall of 1950. Some of these same s.h.i.+ps served off Lebanon when that troubled land erupted in 1958. While the amphibious vessels of the Second World War held the line in the 1950s, the U.S. Navy began to design new amphibious s.h.i.+ps, suitable for the atomic age. The most important of these was the a.s.sault helicopter carrier (LPH), designed to carry a Marine battalion and land it by helicopter onto an enemy sh.o.r.e. The first LPHs were converted World War II aircraft carriers, but the purpose-built Iwo Jima Iwo Jima cla.s.s (LPH-3) was in production by the early 1960s. By the end of the decade, in addition to the LPHs, new cla.s.ses were in production--the cla.s.s (LPH-3) was in production by the early 1960s. By the end of the decade, in addition to the LPHs, new cla.s.ses were in production--the Newport Newport cla.s.s (LST-1179), the cla.s.s (LST-1179), the Charleston Charleston cla.s.s amphibious cargo s.h.i.+ps (LKA-113), and the cla.s.s amphibious cargo s.h.i.+ps (LKA-113), and the Anchorage Anchorage cla.s.s (LSD-36), as well as new designs like the cla.s.s (LSD-36), as well as new designs like the Austin Austin cla.s.s (LPD-4), which was equipped with a well deck. These s.h.i.+ps maintained a credible amphibious lift capability through the Cold War years. Despite all this building, the tactics of a.s.sault with landing craft through the surf-line from a few thousand yards offsh.o.r.e had changed little since World War II. Landing craft themselves had changed little, with conventional medium (LCMs) and utility landing craft (LCUs) constructed as late as the 1980s. cla.s.s (LPD-4), which was equipped with a well deck. These s.h.i.+ps maintained a credible amphibious lift capability through the Cold War years. Despite all this building, the tactics of a.s.sault with landing craft through the surf-line from a few thousand yards offsh.o.r.e had changed little since World War II. Landing craft themselves had changed little, with conventional medium (LCMs) and utility landing craft (LCUs) constructed as late as the 1980s.
While the technology of amphibious a.s.saults had not changed much by the close of the 1960s, the soldiers they carried would. After the experience of Vietnam, with its conscripted combat troops, military leaders were forced to accept an all-volunteer force as the basis for a new, professional military in the 1970s. This change had many consequences. One not often noted affected the U.S. Navy: Realizing that it would have to take better care of all-volunteer crews, the Navy began to improve the habitability of wars.h.i.+ps. In the 18th century, Samuel Johnson observed that serving on a wars.h.i.+p was like being in jail, with an added chance of drowning. This was not quite true on the World War II-vintage s.h.i.+ps of the Vietnam era, but they were hardly designed for comfort. Naval architects try to pack as many men as possible into a wars.h.i.+p. Personnel are needed to operate a maximum of weapons, sensors, and other systems. The emergence of the all-volunteer Navy in the 1970s meant that future wars.h.i.+p designs would need improved habitability standards.
Another Navy goal in those days was to make wars.h.i.+ps capable of accomplis.h.i.+ng more various missions. The results were seen in the Spruance-cla.s.s Spruance-cla.s.s (DD-963) destroyers and the (DD-963) destroyers and the Tarawa-cla.s.s Tarawa-cla.s.s (LHA-1) helicopter a.s.sault s.h.i.+ps. The LHAs were revolutionary; they were capable of operating both landing craft and helicopters, plus the new AV-8 Harrier V/STOL fighter bombers. Lessons learned from the (LHA-1) helicopter a.s.sault s.h.i.+ps. The LHAs were revolutionary; they were capable of operating both landing craft and helicopters, plus the new AV-8 Harrier V/STOL fighter bombers. Lessons learned from the Spruances Spruances and the and the Tarawas Tarawas were applied to every future cla.s.s of U.S. wars.h.i.+p. Unfortunately, both types suffered rapid procurement-cost growth. The were applied to every future cla.s.s of U.S. wars.h.i.+p. Unfortunately, both types suffered rapid procurement-cost growth. The Tarawas Tarawas were originally priced as a cla.s.s of nine, but only five could be bought during the double digit inflation of the 1970s. The late 1970s were a bad time for the Navy in general, and amphibious forces in particular. The Administration of President Jimmy Carter took an axe to the Navy budget, particularly in s.h.i.+pbuilding, operations, and maintenance. And by 1979, when a series of crises broke out in Southwest Asia, the U.S. had only a minimal amphibious capability. Amphibious forces are expensive to build and tough to maintain. They are often among the first items cut in times of austerity. were originally priced as a cla.s.s of nine, but only five could be bought during the double digit inflation of the 1970s. The late 1970s were a bad time for the Navy in general, and amphibious forces in particular. The Administration of President Jimmy Carter took an axe to the Navy budget, particularly in s.h.i.+pbuilding, operations, and maintenance. And by 1979, when a series of crises broke out in Southwest Asia, the U.S. had only a minimal amphibious capability. Amphibious forces are expensive to build and tough to maintain. They are often among the first items cut in times of austerity.
As a result of the Carter austerity, planners reconsidered the capabilities of merchant s.h.i.+pping to supplement the specialized 'Gator s.h.i.+ps. The first use of containerized merchant s.h.i.+ps for amphibious forces was to be seen in the creation of Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons to provide a mobile, floating base for Marine task forces. Three such squadrons would be created, with additional units for the U.S. Army and Air Force. During the 1982 South Atlantic War, the British employed "s.h.i.+ps Taken Up From Trade" (STUFT) to transport the bulk of their landing force and supplies. Both programs showed the limitations of civilian s.h.i.+ps to support military operations.
The inauguration of President Reagan in 1981 led to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's ambitious plans for a six-hundred-s.h.i.+p Navy. This included a follow-on cla.s.s of LHAs, the Wasp Wasp (LHD-1) cla.s.s, and a new cla.s.s of LSDs, the (LHD-1) cla.s.s, and a new cla.s.s of LSDs, the Whidbey Island Whidbey Island (LSD-41) cla.s.s. And procurement of a radical new landing craft began, the LCAC (Landing Craft, Air Cus.h.i.+oned). LCAC was the first new technology for amphibious warfare since the helicopter; its introduction allowed the big s.h.i.+ps for the first time to stand away from coastal landing zones. Meanwhile, amphibious warfare capabilities that had been lost after Vietnam were slowly rebuilt. Unfortunately, building s.h.i.+ps takes time. The Reagan Administration was history, and the Bush Administration was well along before the new s.h.i.+ps began to join the fleet. In fact, the LHD and the LSD-41 building programs continue, more than fifteen years after they were started. (LSD-41) cla.s.s. And procurement of a radical new landing craft began, the LCAC (Landing Craft, Air Cus.h.i.+oned). LCAC was the first new technology for amphibious warfare since the helicopter; its introduction allowed the big s.h.i.+ps for the first time to stand away from coastal landing zones. Meanwhile, amphibious warfare capabilities that had been lost after Vietnam were slowly rebuilt. Unfortunately, building s.h.i.+ps takes time. The Reagan Administration was history, and the Bush Administration was well along before the new s.h.i.+ps began to join the fleet. In fact, the LHD and the LSD-41 building programs continue, more than fifteen years after they were started.
In the 1990s the amphibious forces of America and her allies have been busier than at any time since World War II. In addition to supporting the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, amphibious forces have been constantly engaged in crises and contingencies from Haiti to Somalia. The future of amphibious s.h.i.+pping is of interest to everyone from Marine privates to the President of the United States.
The 'Gator Navy The U.S. Navy is divided into three distinct communities. There is a submarine navy, with its nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. There is naval aviation, with its carriers and aircraft. And last, but not least, is the surface navy, with squadrons of cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, to escort carrier battle groups and vital supply s.h.i.+ps. Shoehorned into a corner of the surface navy are a few dozen s.h.i.+ps and few hundred small boats and landing craft called the 'Gator Navy. 'Gator refers to the alligator-like ferocity of the Marines when their combat power is combined with the mobility of the Navy. Like their reptilian namesakes, 'Gators can give you a nasty bite, in the water or out.
Command of amphibious s.h.i.+pping was once viewed as a second-cla.s.s a.s.signment, with less prestige than command of a real wars.h.i.+p like a cruiser or destroyer. No more. Today, officers who command amphibious s.h.i.+ps and ARGs hold some of the most coveted a.s.signments in the Navy. Wasp- Wasp-cla.s.s (LHD-1) helicopter a.s.sault s.h.i.+ps are the largest vessels that a non-aviator can command in the U.S. Navy (only aviators can command big-deck aircraft carriers). At over forty-thousand-tons displacement, with a crew of more than 1,100, carrying almost 1,900 Marines with all of their gear, as well as over forty aircraft and helicopters, an LHD is a major wars.h.i.+p! The other new amphibs, like the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry cla.s.s (LSD-41/99), are also very large vessels. For comparison, the biggest amphibious s.h.i.+ps built by the former Soviet Union were three eleven-thousand-ton cla.s.s (LSD-41/99), are also very large vessels. For comparison, the biggest amphibious s.h.i.+ps built by the former Soviet Union were three eleven-thousand-ton Ivan Rogov Ivan Rogov-cla.s.s LSDs.
Navy plans envision a force of thirty-six vessels of three different types (LHD/LHA, LSD, and LPD), organized into twelve amphibious ready groups (ARGs). These s.h.i.+ps could deliver twelve reinforced battalions, each about 1,600 Marines. This would represent about 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) if every s.h.i.+p could be deployed at one time. Unfortunately, s.h.i.+ps that stay in the fleet for thirty to forty years need periodic overhaul and maintenance. Large wars.h.i.+ps spend about one year in four out of service, "in dockyard hands." So, only about three quarters of our amphibious s.h.i.+pping will be available at any time. These s.h.i.+ps are split between the Pacific and Atlantic fleets. Not much strength for any particular crisis when you consider the thousands of miles/kilometers of hostile sh.o.r.eline the U.S. might have to face. For example, during Desert Storm, the Navy a.s.sembled four ARGs with a single afloat brigade from both fleets. The arithmetic demands that each and every amphibious s.h.i.+p constructed for the Navy must be highly mobile and sustainable. The "amphibs" are the high-value units in any naval task force-sometimes even more valuable than the big-deck carriers which often accompany the ARGs these days.
Amphibious s.h.i.+ps are evaluated by five different capacities or "footprints" as they are known. These include: * Troop Capacity Troop Capacity--The number of Marines the s.h.i.+p can comfortably berth, feed, and support.* Vehicle s.p.a.ce Vehicle s.p.a.ce--Called cargo,2 this is measured in square feet of vehicle storage, along with a little extra room for maneuvering vehicles in and out (called "turnout" s.p.a.ce). Total area can be converted to standard vehicle dimensions, based upon the footprint of an HMMWV. this is measured in square feet of vehicle storage, along with a little extra room for maneuvering vehicles in and out (called "turnout" s.p.a.ce). Total area can be converted to standard vehicle dimensions, based upon the footprint of an HMMWV.* Cargo s.p.a.ce-- Cargo s.p.a.ce--This is a measure of storage s.p.a.ce for packaged cargo, supplies, and equipment. Called cargo,3 it is measured in cubic feet (ft it is measured in cubic feet (ft3).* Landing Craft Capacity-- Landing Craft Capacity--This footprint indicates how many LCAC landing craft can be carried in the vessel's well deck.* Aircraft Capacity Aircraft Capacity--The number of aircraft that can be operated, stowed, and maintained on deck and in the hangar. The capacity is based on the CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter. An AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter only occupies about .5 units of deck s.p.a.ce, whereas the new MV-22B Osprey will have a 1.4 equivalent.
These five measures tell you how valuable a particular s.h.i.+p is to an ARG. For example, the new LPD-17 will replace four different s.h.i.+p cla.s.ses (the LST-1189, LPD-4, LSD-36, and LKA-113) in the ARG. You can see how critical this one s.h.i.+p must be to future ARG commanders.
Amphibious s.h.i.+ps are nothing without people. Life for the sailors in the amphibs is a mix of high technology (like satellite communications and navigation) and old-style seamans.h.i.+p (like small-boat handling and the ancient skills of knotting lines). It is also long, hard work. Marines love to practice their exciting tasks in the wee hours before and around dawn. So, whenever the ARG is conducting operations, the s.h.i.+ps' crews go on a fatiguing round-the-clock schedule. The work is hard; but when you talk to the sailors, they tell you that it's exactly what they joined the Navy to do. 'Gator sailors love their jobs. Senior chiefs tell you it's like the "old" Navy they grew up in. They frequently see the 'Gator Navy as a refuge from the "political correctness" that seems to infect today's U.S. Navy. For officers, life in the amphibs is a chance to truly test themselves in their chosen profession.
Navigation and warfighting in the littoral zones is demanding and dangerous. Insh.o.r.e operations present all kinds of natural and man-made hazards to the sailor. Consider the cruise of the a.s.sault carrier Tripoli Tripoli (LPH-10), which was mined while operating in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm. The s.h.i.+p survived, albeit with heavy damage. As we have seen, the British Royal Navy learned even harder lessons during the invasion of the Falkland Islands in May 1982. Also, nature is not kind to sailors working near sh.o.r.e. Everything from rogue waves to hurricanes can foil an amphibious a.s.sault. D-Day, originally planned for June 5th, 1944, had to be delayed twenty-four hours because of storms in the English Channel. Like flying, amphibious landings are unforgiving, and only a complex combination of planning, skill, experience, and equipment can make them successful. (LPH-10), which was mined while operating in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm. The s.h.i.+p survived, albeit with heavy damage. As we have seen, the British Royal Navy learned even harder lessons during the invasion of the Falkland Islands in May 1982. Also, nature is not kind to sailors working near sh.o.r.e. Everything from rogue waves to hurricanes can foil an amphibious a.s.sault. D-Day, originally planned for June 5th, 1944, had to be delayed twenty-four hours because of storms in the English Channel. Like flying, amphibious landings are unforgiving, and only a complex combination of planning, skill, experience, and equipment can make them successful.
One quick note before we begin. There are many different ways to interpret wars.h.i.+p specifications and statistics, and "official" sources often disagree. On matters of fact, I defer to A.D. Baker III's superb biannual work, Combat Fleets of the World Combat Fleets of the World (U.S. Naval Inst.i.tute Press). For over two decades, Dave Baker has made this book his life's work, and all of us who write about defense matters are in his debt. I ask your patience in my use of tables. Amphibious s.h.i.+ps are number-intensive! Now, let's go aboard! (U.S. Naval Inst.i.tute Press). For over two decades, Dave Baker has made this book his life's work, and all of us who write about defense matters are in his debt. I ask your patience in my use of tables. Amphibious s.h.i.+ps are number-intensive! Now, let's go aboard!
USS Wasp Wasp (LHD-1) (LHD-1) It is the largest and mightiest amphibious s.h.i.+p ever built. At over forty thousand tons, it is the largest man-made object to ever move across the land (so says the Guinness Book of World Records). Guinness Book of World Records). The landing helicopter docks.h.i.+p USS The landing helicopter docks.h.i.+p USS Wasp Wasp (LHD- 1) is the lead s.h.i.+p of a seven-s.h.i.+p cla.s.s that represents the best America's s.h.i.+pbuilding industry can produce. The largest combatant in the U.S. Navy aside from the supercarriers, it is a virtual one-s.h.i.+p task force that can probably take down a small nation by itself. The story of (LHD- 1) is the lead s.h.i.+p of a seven-s.h.i.+p cla.s.s that represents the best America's s.h.i.+pbuilding industry can produce. The largest combatant in the U.S. Navy aside from the supercarriers, it is a virtual one-s.h.i.+p task force that can probably take down a small nation by itself. The story of Wasp Wasp and her sisters is the story of the Navy's amphibious force after the blight of the Vietnam War and the move to an all-volunteer force. It is also the story of a contractor that saw the future and decided to remake itself. and her sisters is the story of the Navy's amphibious force after the blight of the Vietnam War and the move to an all-volunteer force. It is also the story of a contractor that saw the future and decided to remake itself.
At the end of World War II, the Marine Corps began to examine ways of avoiding amphibious frontal a.s.saults against fortified enemy sh.o.r.es. The losses suffered in taking j.a.panese island fortresses like Iwo Jima and Peleliu left a lasting impression on Marine and Navy leaders. Out of all this thinking came the concept of vertical envelopment using the new technology of the helicopter. The father of the current Commandant, Victor "Brute" Krulak, was quick to support the concept. And by the mid-1950s, several World War II aircraft carriers had been converted into experimental helicopter a.s.sault carriers. Designated LPH (for "Landing Platform, Helicopter"), they proved successful, though their size and large crews made them expensive to operate. The first conversion, USS Block Island Block Island (LPH-1, ex-CVE-106), was never completed. But several others, including USS (LPH-1, ex-CVE-106), was never completed. But several others, including USS Boxer Boxer (LPH-4, ex-CV-21), USS (LPH-4, ex-CV-21), USS Princeton Princeton (LPH-5, ex-CV-37), USS (LPH-5, ex-CV-37), USS Thetis Bay Thetis Bay (LPH-6, ex-CVE-90), and USS (LPH-6, ex-CVE-90), and USS Valley Forge Valley Forge (LPH-8, ex-CV-45), were converted from surplus aircraft carriers during the 1950s and 60s. Even before these conversions were completed, plans were underway for an LPH designed from the keel up. The idea was to pack a Marine battalion and a reinforced helicopter squadron into the smallest hull possible, so that the s.h.i.+p would be cheap to build and efficient to operate. Crew and pa.s.senger (i.e. Marine) comfort would be minimal. (LPH-8, ex-CV-45), were converted from surplus aircraft carriers during the 1950s and 60s. Even before these conversions were completed, plans were underway for an LPH designed from the keel up. The idea was to pack a Marine battalion and a reinforced helicopter squadron into the smallest hull possible, so that the s.h.i.+p would be cheap to build and efficient to operate. Crew and pa.s.senger (i.e. Marine) comfort would be minimal.
The result was the Iwo Jima- Iwo Jima-cla.s.s (LPH-2) a.s.sault carriers, of which seven were eventually built. Designed around the hull form and engineering plant of a World War II escort carrier, they were built for maximum storage density of aircraft, equipment, supplies, and Marines. Ingalls s.h.i.+pbuilding (now Litton Ingalls s.h.i.+pbuilding) of Pascagoula, Mississippi, and a pair of government s.h.i.+pyards built the LPHs, and they proved highly successful. Displacing only 18,300 tons (compared to almost 29,000 tons for the Ess.e.x Ess.e.x-cla.s.s LPH conversions) and powered by a pair of steam boilers driving a single screw, the LPHs were everything that their designers hoped. Over the thirty-five years since Iwo Jima Iwo Jima was commissioned, they have been in the front lines of almost every major American military action. They have also served as rescue vessels during the Apollo s.p.a.ce missions, trials s.h.i.+ps for the deployment of Harrier V/STOL fighter bombers, and as command s.h.i.+ps for minesweeping during Desert Storm. This was how USS was commissioned, they have been in the front lines of almost every major American military action. They have also served as rescue vessels during the Apollo s.p.a.ce missions, trials s.h.i.+ps for the deployment of Harrier V/STOL fighter bombers, and as command s.h.i.+ps for minesweeping during Desert Storm. This was how USS Tripoli Tripoli (LPH-10, now MCM-10) wound up being mined in the northern Persian Gulf in 1991. America has gotten its money's worth from the LPHs, several of which will serve for a few more years. By the early 21 st century these hard-working carriers will go to a well-earned retirement. (LPH-10, now MCM-10) wound up being mined in the northern Persian Gulf in 1991. America has gotten its money's worth from the LPHs, several of which will serve for a few more years. By the early 21 st century these hard-working carriers will go to a well-earned retirement.
The success of the LPH in the 1960s might have led to a follow-on cla.s.s but for the Vietnam War and the coming of an all-volunteer Navy. And then requirements for more capability and habitability caused a rewrite of the specifications for new wars.h.i.+ps that would be built in the 1970s. Whatever would replace the LPHs in production would be larger, more comfortable, and more capable. The downsizing of the Navy by the Nixon Administration in the late 1960s also meant that future s.h.i.+ps would have "doubled-up" functions. The ideal was a s.h.i.+p that could be both a helicopter carrier and an amphibious docks.h.i.+p, but the Navy only had to pay for one set of engines and a single crew to man it. Thus the stage was set for the Landing a.s.sault s.h.i.+p, known as the LHA.
There were a number of innovations planned for the LHAs. The entire cla.s.s was to be built by a single yard under a "fixed price" contract. By awarding the entire program to one s.h.i.+pyard at a "fixed" price, the Government would get a better deal, because of a.s.sumed economies of scale. This was a good idea at the time, but problems emerged that neither the Government nor contractors foresaw. Meanwhile, the planned cla.s.s of nine LHAs represented a huge pool of work for a s.h.i.+pbuilding industry that was already feeling the pinch of declining military orders and compet.i.tion from overseas. This meant that every major construction yard on both coasts was prepared to fight like h.e.l.l to win a contract that would be worth over a billion dollars in the 1970s. Down at Pascagoula, Mississippi, Ingalls s.h.i.+pbuilding (which merged with Litton in 1961 to form Litton Ingalls s.h.i.+pbuilding) had come to a startling conclusion: The traditional manner of building s.h.i.+ps on slipways was both inefficient and overpriced. If a s.h.i.+p could be built in modules, like the sub-a.s.semblies of an automobile, and then put together on an a.s.sembly line, cost and building time could be slashed. Now, you have to remember that they were doing all this thinking in the 1960s when gasoline was $.20 a gallon, love was still "free," and a "throwaway" society devalued "quality."
Ingalls has always been a forward-thinking, innovative place, having built the first all-electrically-welded s.h.i.+p, the C3 cargo s.h.i.+p SS Exchequer Exchequer in the 1930s. They worked hard to stay compet.i.tive in a business dominated by overseas yards operating with government subsidies (as in Europe), or with incredibly cheap labor (as in Asia). In 1967, they made the decision to construct a new kind of s.h.i.+pyard, across the river from their existing yard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. The new facility would use modular construction techniques and would take advantage of the newest technology for computer-aided design and automated inventory tracking. The idea was that Ingalls could build the same wars.h.i.+p as any other yard, but with a compet.i.tive price advantage that n.o.body would be able to touch without making the same investment. At the time, their compet.i.tors made fun of the millions of dollars poured into the new facility on the Gulf Coast. But Litton Ingalls stayed the course, and submitted bids for both the LHA and in the 1930s. They worked hard to stay compet.i.tive in a business dominated by overseas yards operating with government subsidies (as in Europe), or with incredibly cheap labor (as in Asia). In 1967, they made the decision to construct a new kind of s.h.i.+pyard, across the river from their existing yard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. The new facility would use modular construction techniques and would take advantage of the newest technology for computer-aided design and automated inventory tracking. The idea was that Ingalls could build the same wars.h.i.+p as any other yard, but with a compet.i.tive price advantage that n.o.body would be able to touch without making the same investment. At the time, their compet.i.tors made fun of the millions of dollars poured into the new facility on the Gulf Coast. But Litton Ingalls stayed the course, and submitted bids for both the LHA and Spruance- Spruance-cla.s.s (DD-963) programs. Incredibly, amid a howl of protests, they won both contracts.
The Tarawa- Tarawa-cla.s.s (LHA-1) a.s.sault s.h.i.+ps were 820 ft/249.9 m long, weighing 39,967 tons (fully loaded), and looked a lot like a straight-decked Ess.e.x Ess.e.x-cla.s.s (CV-9) carrier from World War II. Powered by a pair of large Combustion Engineering boilers feeding twin Westinghouse steam turbines driving two screws with some 70,000 shp, the new s.h.i.+p was capable of a maximum speed of 24 kt/43.9 kph and a sustained speed of 22 kt/40.2 kph. Their broad beam of 106 ft/32.3 m and draft of 26 ft/7.9 m would just fit through the locks of the Panama Ca.n.a.l, so that they could switch between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in a hurry. They were long and slab-sided, their dominant feature a huge island structure along the starboard side amids.h.i.+ps. This island contains command, flag, and navigational bridges, along with planning and command s.p.a.ces for embarked Marine units. The hull of an LHA consists of five zones, each with a different function. They include: * Flight Deck Flight Deck--This runs the full length of the LHA; it has nine helicopter landing spots and two aircraft elevators to the hangar deck. There is access to the interior of the s.h.i.+p through the island structure. While there is no "ski-jump" to a.s.sist in launching V/STOL aircraft like the Harrier (as found on British, Italian, Spanish, and Russian carriers), there is enough length for a normal takeoff run.* Hangar Deck Hangar Deck--Directly below the flight deck in the after half of the s.h.i.+p, this enclosed hangar holds a reinforced squadron of medium lift helicopters. Between the flight deck and the hangar deck, there is room to stow and operate roughly forty-two CH-46-sized aircraft.* Well Deck/Vehicle and Cargo Stowage-- Well Deck/Vehicle and Cargo Stowage--Directly below the hangar deck and extending forward is the well deck for launching and retrieving landing craft, as well as the stowage areas for Marine vehicles, equipment, and supplies. The well deck was originally configured for four LCUs, or seven LCM-8s (described shortly). To operate landing craft, ballast tanks at the aft end of the s.h.i.+p are flooded, giving a slight "tip" to the LHA and creating an artificial "beach" for landing craft. Then the tanks are pumped out, and a large stern gate is raised to protect the landing craft and the well deck from the elements.* Engineering-- Engineering--Located amids.h.i.+ps below the vehicle and cargo stowage is the engineering plant. This area contains boilers, turbines, generators, and heavy equipment--everything from the engines to the air-conditioning and electrical systems. From here, the exhaust from the boilers and other equipment runs through uptakes on the starboard side, where it is vented through the top of the island structure.* Crew/Troop Accommodations-- Crew/Troop Accommodations--Most of the forward half of the s.h.i.+p contains berthing, mess, and other s.p.a.ces for the crew of 925 sailors and 1,713 Marines. Accommodations on the Tarawa Tarawa were considered lavish by contemporary standards, with air-conditioning in all berthing compartments, enlarged bunk and personal stowage s.p.a.ce, and a climate-controlled conditioning room for the embarked Marines (now converted to a gym for the entire s.h.i.+p's company). were considered lavish by contemporary standards, with air-conditioning in all berthing compartments, enlarged bunk and personal stowage s.p.a.ce, and a climate-controlled conditioning room for the embarked Marines (now converted to a gym for the entire s.h.i.+p's company).
The USS Ess.e.x Ess.e.x (LHD-2) is moved from its final a.s.sembly area to a floating barge for launching at the Litton Ingalls production facility at Pascagoula, Miss., on January 4th, 1991. s.h.i.+ps of this cla.s.s are the largest man-made objects to be moved across the earth. (LHD-2) is moved from its final a.s.sembly area to a floating barge for launching at the Litton Ingalls production facility at Pascagoula, Miss., on January 4th, 1991. s.h.i.+ps of this cla.s.s are the largest man-made objects to be moved across the earth.
OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.
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Compared with earlier amphibious s.h.i.+ps, the Tarawas Tarawas were armed to the teeth. In addition to a pair of launchers for the new RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), there were a pair of new lightweight Mk 45 5-in./127mm 54-cal. guns, to provide naval gunfire support, and mounts for six Mk 67 20mm cannons, for protection against enemy patrol boats and other threats. All of this firepower was backed up by a combination of air, surface search, and fire-control radars, as well as by a low-light television camera. were armed to the teeth. In addition to a pair of launchers for the new RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), there were a pair of new lightweight Mk 45 5-in./127mm 54-cal. guns, to provide naval gunfire support, and mounts for six Mk 67 20mm cannons, for protection against enemy patrol boats and other threats. All of this firepower was backed up by a combination of air, surface search, and fire-control radars, as well as by a low-light television camera. Tarawa Tarawa and her sisters were at the time the largest, most powerful amphibious s.h.i.+ps ever built. They combined the best features of an LPH, LKA, LSD, and LPD, all in a single, highly survivable hull. Sailors and Marines lined up to get duty a.s.signments to the new "king of the 'gators." and her sisters were at the time the largest, most powerful amphibious s.h.i.+ps ever built. They combined the best features of an LPH, LKA, LSD, and LPD, all in a single, highly survivable hull. Sailors and Marines lined up to get duty a.s.signments to the new "king of the 'gators."
While the new s.h.i.+ps were everything the Navy and Marines wanted, they came at a high price, and with a lot of teething problems. The fixed-price contracts had a.s.sumed that inflation of construction costs (labor, energy, materials, etc.) would remain stable through the early 1970s. Unfortunately, the 1970s were anything but stable. Several bouts of double-digit inflation, a five-fold increase in the cost of energy, and a huge increase in labor rates caused the construction cost of the LHAs (and everything else!) to skyrocket beyond the expectations of either Litton Ingalls or the Navy. The original plan was that $1.2 billion would buy nine Tarawas. Tarawas. The government wound up paying $1.6 billion for five: The government wound up paying $1.6 billion for five: Tarawa Tarawa (LHA-1), (LHA-1), Saipan Saipan (LHA-2), (LHA-2), Belleau Wood Belleau Wood (LHA-3), (LHA-3), Na.s.sau Na.s.sau (LHA-4), and (LHA-4), and Peleliu Peleliu (LHA-5). n.o.body had seen price inflation like that of the 1970s in over a generation, and it simply was not taken into account when the contracts were written. Since there was no "fault" on the part of either Litton Ingalls or the Navy, the two sides agreed to an additional $400 million for completion of five units. After this forecasting breakdown, Navy contracting was changed forever. Today, contracts have a built-in growth factor to adjust for inflation (determined by the government). This "cost-plus" contract lets the contractor and the government split cost overruns, rea.s.suring contractors who take huge risks on billion-dollar projects that they have a chance to turn a profit someday. (LHA-5). n.o.body had seen price inflation like that of the 1970s in over a generation, and it simply was not taken into account when the contracts were written. Since there was no "fault" on the part of either Litton Ingalls or the Navy, the two sides agreed to an additional $400 million for completion of five units. After this forecasting breakdown, Navy contracting was changed forever. Today, contracts have a built-in growth factor to adjust for inflation (determined by the government). This "cost-plus" contract lets the contractor and the government split cost overruns, rea.s.suring contractors who take huge risks on billion-dollar projects that they have a chance to turn a profit someday.
Meanwhile, there were problems at the new Litton Ingalls yard with modular construction. Until engineers realized that they had made the tolerances too tight, the pre-a.s.sembled modules wouldn't fit together. They had failed to allow for the normal metal expansion and contraction that might occur between cool Mississippi mornings and the blazing heat of summer afternoons. Simply adding a little extra "meat" to joints between modules and tr.i.m.m.i.n.g it as they were a.s.sembled solved this problem. Another problem developed out of the LHA design itself, which tried to trim top weight by thinning down structural a.s.semblies topside. Unhappily, the strength of the ocean sometimes exceeded the expectations of engineers. The fix for this--structural stiffening--was made when the s.h.i.+ps came back in for refits. But generally, the new concept worked, keeping Litton Ingalls the most profitable and busy s.h.i.+pyard in America. As the U.S. s.h.i.+pbuilding industry has crumbled (in 1996 we're down to just five yards capable of building major combatants), they have remained compet.i.tive, branching out into building railroad cars and oil platforms.
While the Navy and Litton Ingalls were sorting out financial and engineering problems, the five LHAs were making their presence so much felt around the world, that the Navy and Marines soon realized they should have bought more of them, whatever their cost. While the policies of the Carter years prohibited this, the coming of the Reagan Administration changed everything. John Lehman's planned six-hundred-s.h.i.+p Navy included funding for new amphibious vessels and landing craft. First on the wish list was a batch of new big-deck amphibious a.s.sault carriers, based on the LHA design. The new cla.s.s, designated Landing Helicopter Docks.h.i.+ps (LHDs), would consist of five units. By 1996, seven LHDs had been contracted, with possible extra units to replace retiring LPHs. The LHDs would bear the proud names of World War II aircraft carriers. The lead s.h.i.+p was christened USS Wasp (LHD-1) after two carriers (CV-7 and CV-18) that served in World War II and the Cold War. Wasp was a traditional name dating back to the American Revolutionary War.
The LHD is based upon the LHA design, with significant new features. These included: * Standoff Capability Standoff Capability--The ability to support amphibious operations from over the horizon (OTH), utilizing the new LCAC, MV-22B Osprey, CH-53E Super Stallion, and AV-8B Harrier II V/STOL fighter bomber.* Survivability-- Survivability--The capability to fight in environments contaminated by nuclear fallout, chemical agents, or biological weapons. Survivability includes active defense against patrol boats or suicidal small craft, and the ability to avoid, withstand, or repair damage from mines, bombs or cruise missiles.* Sea Control s.h.i.+p Convertibility Sea Control s.h.i.+p Convertibility--During the 1970s, several CNOs, including Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and James Hollaway, tried and failed to build small aircraft carriers, with up to twenty V/STOL fighter/bombers and eight to ten antisubmarine (ASW) helicopters to escort convoys and amphibious forces. These "Sea Control s.h.i.+ps" would resemble the British Invincible cla.s.s. The very successful Spanish light carrier Principe de Asturias Principe de Asturias is based on a U.S. design from this period that never got off the drawing board. By simply embarking with a suitable air group, the LHD could perform Sea Control missions in addition to its amphibious role. is based on a U.S. design from this period that never got off the drawing board. By simply embarking with a suitable air group, the LHD could perform Sea Control missions in addition to its amphibious role.
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While Wasp would be based on the good basic design of the Tarawa Tarawa cla.s.s LHAs, it would be a greatly improved and more capable vessel. One way to compare the two cla.s.ses is to consider the five critical payload footprints discussed earlier in this chapter: cla.s.s LHAs, it would be a greatly improved and more capable vessel. One way to compare the two cla.s.ses is to consider the five critical payload footprints discussed earlier in this chapter:
LHD vs. LHA/LPH Payload Footprints [image]
As can be clearly seen, with the exception of vehicle s.p.a.ce (Cargo2), the LHD is superior to each of the s.h.i.+ps it replaces. The Navy decided to trade additional Cargo s.p.a.ce for Cargo. Provision of a chemical/biological/nuclear Collective Protection System (CPS) took up a lot of internal volume in the LHD design, but was considered essential to the s.h.i.+p's mission. Like any wars.h.i.+p, the LHD is a set of design compromises. The design of Wasp Wasp has the advantage of a more s.p.a.cious well deck for the new LCACs, plus more room to operate aircraft. has the advantage of a more s.p.a.cious well deck for the new LCACs, plus more room to operate aircraft.
To better understand how these huge s.h.i.+ps are put together, I visited the Litton Ingalls s.h.i.+pbuilding plant in Pascagoula, Mississippi, on the Gulf Coast. Pascagoula is a s.h.i.+pbuilding town, with a bit of roughneck, wildcat spirit still left. Litton Ingalls is the largest employer in the area, which b.u.t.ts up against Mobile, Alabama, and Pensacola, Florida, to the east. The West Bank facility, where they build the LHDs, is a joint venture of Litton Ingalls s.h.i.+pbuilding and the State of Mississippi, which issued state bonds to finance construction of the world's most advanced s.h.i.+pyard. It is the only new s.h.i.+pbuilding yard built in the last thirty years in the U.S. Other yards still build s.h.i.+ps on slipways carved into the banks of rivers. Litton Ingalls builds them in a vast open s.p.a.ce, where s.h.i.+ps move along a production line of mammoth proportions. Over the past few years, Ingalls has built four different cla.s.ses of wars.h.i.+p here, including Ticonderoga Ticonderoga cla.s.s (CG-47) cruisers, cla.s.s (CG-47) cruisers, Arleigh Burke Arleigh Burke cla.s.s (DDG-51) destroyers, cla.s.s (DDG-51) destroyers, Sa'ar V Sa'ar V cla.s.s corvettes for Israel, and cla.s.s corvettes for Israel, and Wasp Wasp-cla.s.s (LHD-1) amphibious carriers.
The best place to get a feel for how Ingalls works is the control tower in the middle of the facility. From over twelve stories up on the observation platform, you can see the work flow around the 611-acre yard, and it is fascinating to watch. From the railroad and truck receiving areas on the north side, raw materials and equipment feed into fabrication shops. From the moment it hits the receiving dock, every metal plate, wire spool, or equipment crate is tagged with a bar code for computerized tracking in nearly real time. This lets Litton Ingalls order materials and equipment for "just in time" delivery, which reduces inventory costs.
a.s.sembly takes place in five work "Bays," which are open areas of concrete pads overlaid with a grid of railroad tracks, surrounded by mobile cranes to lift and position s.h.i.+p modules as they are a.s.sembled. At the time of my visit, the Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s destroyer construction occupied Bays 1 through 3 on the Eastern side of the yard. Litton Ingalls calls them the Barry cla.s.s, after the first unit that they built (DDG-52). Bays 4 and 5 are a.s.signed to work on the LHDs. The ma.s.sive vessels are a.s.sembled much the way that a sandwich shop stacks a "hoagie." Each module is "stuffed" with electrical, water, hydraulic, steam, and cable "runs," reducing the need to work deep inside a dark, partially completed s.h.i.+p. It also means that a s.h.i.+p can be brought to life and powered up much earlier, reducing the time required to make her ready for sea trials. As submodules are a.s.sembled, they move down to the south end of the bay for stacking into one of the five major modules that make up a finished LHD. Each module is stacked and welded into place, and then its lines and connections are fused, just as a surgeon might graft arteries and tendons to rejoin a severed limb. Modules I (the bow) through 4 (the stern and well deck) are stacked together and joined into a single hull at the south edge of the a.s.sembly area. By this time, each module weighs several thousand tons. These huge chunks fit together with tolerances of a few millimeters or less. After the four hull modules are joined, Module 5, the island deckhouse is added. At over 500 tons, this last item is the largest structure ever lifted by a crane. At this point, the pile of rust-colored metal is beginning to look like a s.h.i.+p, but it is land-locked like a beached whale. destroyer construction occupied Bays 1 through 3 on the Eastern side of the yard. Litton Ingalls calls them the Barry cla.s.s, after the first unit that they built (DDG-52). Bays 4 and 5 are a.s.signed to work on the LHDs. The ma.s.sive vessels are a.s.sembled much the way that a sandwich shop stacks a "hoagie." Each module is "stuffed" with electrical, water, hydraulic, steam, and cable "runs," reducing the need to work deep inside a dark, partially completed s.h.i.+p. It also means that a s.h.i.+p can be brought to life and powered up much earlier, reducing the time required to make her ready for sea trials. As submodules are a.s.sembled, they move down to the south end of the bay for stacking into one of the five major modules that make up a finished LHD. Each module is stacked and welded into place, and then its lines and connections are fused, just as a surgeon might graft arteries and tendons to rejoin a severed limb. Modules I (the bow) through 4 (the stern and well deck) are stacked together and joined into a single hull at the south edge of the a.s.sembly area. By this time, each module weighs several thousand tons. These huge chunks fit together with tolerances of a few millimeters or less. After the four hull modules are joined, Module 5, the island deckhouse is added. At over 500 tons, this last item is the largest structure ever lifted by a crane. At this point, the pile of rust-colored metal is beginning to look like a s.h.i.+p, but it is land-locked like a beached whale.
Now the s.h.i.+p can be connected to steam and power lines, and lighting and air-conditioning systems are turned on. This makes life more bearable for the workers on muggy Gulf Coast summer days. USS Bataan Bataan (LHD-5), already joined with all major modules in place, was being outfitted prior to the next step. This involves translating the completed hull sideways (at about 16 in./40.6 cm per minute) onto a floating drydock, moving the dock out into the channel of Mississippi Sound, and floating off the new s.h.i.+p. Once launched, the s.h.i.+p is towed to an outfitting berth on the south and east sides of the yard, where they prepare her for sea trials, commissioning, and delivery to the Navy. (LHD-5), already joined with all major modules in place, was being outfitted prior to the next step. This involves translating the completed hull sideways (at about 16 in./40.6 cm per minute) onto a floating drydock, moving the dock out into the channel of Mississippi Sound, and floating off the new s.h.i.+p. Once launched, the s.h.i.+p is towed to an outfitting berth on the south and east sides of the yard, where they prepare her for sea trials, commissioning, and delivery to the Navy.
Let's take a walk though the uncompleted Bataan Bataan to see how things are done. Wearing a hard hat, I joined Steve Davis, the General s.h.i.+p Superintendent for to see how things are done. Wearing a hard hat, I joined Steve Davis, the General s.h.i.+p Superintendent for Wasp Wasp (LHD-1), to tour the interior s.p.a.ces. Each s.h.i.+p is a.s.signed a Superintendent as the chief of construction until she is turned over to the Navy. Steve Davis has decades of s.h.i.+pbuilding experience on nuclear attack submarines, DDGs, and LHDs. After warnings about what not to touch, we entered the ma.s.sive hull. While warm and smelling of burned metal, the interior of the LHD was surprisingly easy to move about in. It was smoky and dirty, but you could clearly see a wars.h.i.+p emerging from the effort of hundreds of workers on board. Ingalls workers are clearly proud of their work, and Steve was anxious to show me how (LHD-1), to tour the interior s.p.a.ces. Each s.h.i.+p is a.s.signed a Superintendent as the chief of construction until she is turned over to the Navy. Steve Davis has decades of s.h.i.+pbuilding experience on nuclear attack submarines, DDGs, and LHDs. After warnings about what not to touch, we entered the ma.s.sive hull. While warm and smelling of burned metal, the interior of the LHD was surprisingly easy to move about in. It was smoky and dirty, but you could clearly see a wars.h.i.+p emerging from the effort of hundreds of workers on board. Ingalls workers are clearly proud of their work, and Steve was anxious to show me how Bataan Bataan had been improved over his first LHD, had been improved over his first LHD, Wasp. Wasp. As we headed back outside, we stopped for a moment on the uncompleted hangar deck to talk with several of the outfitters, including Steve's son. Litton Ingalls is proud to be a family company, and it is not unusual to find two or three generations working at the Pascagoula s.h.i.+pyard. As we headed back outside, we stopped for a moment on the uncompleted hangar deck to talk with several of the outfitters, including Steve's son. Litton Ingalls is proud to be a family company, and it is not unusual to find two or three generations working at the Pascagoula s.h.i.+pyard.
Once a s.h.i.+p pa.s.ses her builder's trials, she is ready for delivery to the Navy. Many sailors of the first crew, known in Navy tradition as "plank owners," actually join the s.h.i.+p during construction, to a.s.sist in the final fitting out and testing. This includes the final step in the manufacturing process, which they call "the Litton Miracle." Under the meticulous supervision of a lady named Annie Gese, the new wars.h.i.+p is scrubbed spotless from stem to stern--even in corners and dark spots where inspectors would probably never look. Only then is the s.h.i.+p ready for commissioning in the fleet. As we headed back through the summer heat and humidity, Steve showed me partially a.s.sembled modules for USS Bonhomme Richard Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6, named for John Paul Jones's Revolutionary War frigate) being stacked and made ready for mating as soon as (LHD-6, named for John Paul Jones's Revolutionary War frigate) being stacked and made ready for mating as soon as Bataan Bataan was floated in 1996. was floated in 1996.
Litton Ingalls is a busy place, with over a dozen destroyers and LHDs in various stages of a.s.sembly and outfitting. Later, Steve and some of the senior Litton Ingalls executives expressed their hope that the next LHD, an as-yet-unnamed seventh s.h.i.+p, would be funded in the coming fiscal year. Less than a month later, they got their wish when the Congress approved LHD-7 as part of the FY-96 budget. This will guarantee the best possible price for the Navy, keep the work force stable, and keep suppliers healthy for future programs. In fact, when s.h.i.+pbuilding executives from the Far East and Europe want new ideas on how to build s.h.i.+ps better, they come and look at how Litton Ingalls is doing things in the heart of Mississippi!
Even before a s.h.i.+p is delivered, the Navy has selected her first Captain. A good first skipper can make a s.h.i.+p "happy" or "lucky" and set the tone for every skipper and crew for years to come. As the first commanding officer of Wasp, Wasp, the Navy chose Captain Len Picotte, who has become a Rear Admiral. Command of an LHD or one of the LHAs is particularly coveted in the Navy, since it is the largest surface vessel that can be commanded by a nonaviator. Because of the variety of missions that an LHD or LHA might draw, the Navy has decreed that if the captain is a surface line officer, the executive officer must be an aviator. This is reversed if the captain is an aviator, so the positions tend to switch off as officers move up and out. From the day she was laid down (May 30th, 1985), USS the Navy chose Captain Len Picotte, who has become a Rear Admiral. Command of an LHD or one of the LHAs is particularly coveted in the Navy, since it is the largest surface vessel that can be commanded by a nonaviator. Because of the variety of missions that an LHD or LHA might draw, the Navy has decreed that if the captain is a surface line officer, the executive officer must be an aviator. This is reversed if the captain is an aviator, so the positions tend to switch off as officers move up and out. From the day she was laid down (May 30th, 1985), USS Wasp Wasp has been a lucky, happy s.h.i.+p. Unlike the LHAs, very few problems arose during design and construction. By the end of the Summer of 1987, she had been floated off (August 4th) and christened (September 19th). She pa.s.sed her trials and was commissioned on July 29th, 1989. She entered into service with ARGs of the Atlantic fleet, and has been there ever since. In the fall of 1996, she goes into her first major overhaul and upgrade. has been a lucky, happy s.h.i.+p. Unlike the LHAs, very few problems arose during design and construction. By the end of the Summer of 1987, she had been floated off (August 4th) and christened (September 19th). She pa.s.sed her trials and was commissioned on July 29th, 1989. She entered into service with ARGs of the Atlantic fleet, and has been there ever since. In the fall of 1996, she goes into her first major overhaul and upgrade.
Let's go aboard the Wasp Wasp and get to know her a bit better. We'll enter through the landing craft well deck. As you move into position aft of the and get to know her a bit better. We'll enter through the landing craft well deck. As you move into position aft of the Wasp, Wasp, a couple of things strike you almost immediately. How can anything so big move across the ocean? Then, as a helicopter comes in to land a few yards/meters above your head, you wonder how can anyone land on something so small. As the landing craft comes in to dock, you notice the slight downward tilt to the stern of the s.h.i.+p. This is because the stern gate has been lowered and the aft ballast tanks have been flooded down to provide the smoothly sloping artificial "beach" for the landing craft. If you're standing on the navigation bridge of an LCU, be sure to watch your head if you are over 6 ft/2 m tall. Lined with Douglas fir, the well deck is vast (322 ft/98.1 m long, 50 ft/15.25 m wide, and 28 ft/8.5 m high), but it seems crowded when a pair af LCUs or three LCACs are docked inside. Once the landing craft is beached and the bow ramp is lowered, you walk up a steep non-skid ramp, and you are on the vehicle deck. Following Navy etiquette, we "request permission to come aboard" from the senior officer present. a couple of things strike you almost immediately. How can anything so big move across the ocean? Then, as a helicopter comes in to land a few yards/meters above your head, you wonder how can anyone land on something so small. As the landing craft comes in to dock, you notice the slight downward tilt to the stern of the s.h.i.+p. This is because the stern gate has been lowered and the aft ballast tanks have been flooded down to provide the smoothly sloping artificial "beach" for the landing craft. If you're standing on the navigation bridge of an LCU, be sure to watch your head if you are over 6 ft/2 m tall. Lined with Douglas fir, the well deck is vast (322 ft/98.1 m long, 50 ft/15.25 m wide, and 28 ft/8.5 m high), but it seems crowded when a pair af LCUs or three LCACs are docked inside. Once the landing craft is beached and the bow ramp is lowered, you walk up a steep non-skid ramp, and you are on the vehicle deck. Following Navy etiquette, we "request permission to come aboard" from the senior officer present.
Walking forward, you enter a stowage area for vehicles of the embarked MEU (SOC). On this deck and the one below are HMMWVs, 5-ton trucks, M 198 155mm field howitzers, and trailers. Though the decks are stressed for armored vehicles as heavy as M1A1 Abrams tanks, AAV-7 amphibious tractors, and wheeled LAVs, you usually find these beasts over on the LSDs or LPDs of an ARG. On the "big deck" a.s.sault s.h.i.+p, planners prefer to keep only vehicles that can be lifted by the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter. Like a parking garage, the vehicle decks are linked by drive-up ramps. You can drive from the lower vehicle deck all the way up to the hangar and flight decks. Despite the vast stowage s.p.a.ce, vehicles, cargo and equipment are packed together with only inches/centimeters of clearance. Even a s.h.i.+p as big as Wasp Wasp never has enough room for everything a MEU (SOC) commander wants. So the rule is to leave just enough room for a Marine to climb through a vehicle's window, door, or hatch, so that it can be driven out of its parking spot when a s.p.a.ce develops. Shuffling vehicles and cargo around the stowage s.p.a.ce of an amphibious s.h.i.+p is like that children's puzzle with movable tiles and one empty s.p.a.ce. You have to move the tiles around incessantly to reach what's needed. The MEU (SOC) logistics (S-4) staff spends hours on their computers arranging load plans to maximize stowage. But with only 20,900 ft never has enough room for everything a MEU (SOC) commander wants. So the rule is to leave just enough room for a Marine to climb through a vehicle's window, door, or hatch, so that it can be driven out of its parking spot when a s.p.a.ce develops. Shuffling vehicles and cargo around the stowage s.p.a.ce of an amphibious s.h.i.+p is like that children's puzzle with movable tiles and one empty s.p.a.ce. You have to move the tiles around incessantly to reach what's needed. The MEU (SOC) logistics (S-4) staff spends hours on their computers arranging load plans to maximize stowage. But with only 20,900 ft2/1,941.7m2 of vehicle stowage s.p.a.ce and 125,000 ft of vehicle stowage s.p.a.ce and 125,000 ft3/ 3,539.3 m3 of cargo s.p.a.ce, you need the mind of an accountant with the imagination of an artist to figure it all out. A conveyer system on an overhead monorail with five hoists helps s.h.i.+ft cargo pallets around the various bays. In addition, of cargo s.p.a.ce, you need the mind of an accountant with the imagination of an artist to figure it all out. A conveyer system on an overhead monorail with five hoists helps s.h.i.+ft cargo pallets around the various bays. In addition, Wasp Wasp is equipped with fourteen electric two-ton forklifts, twenty-five three-ton diesel forklifts, two five-ton rough terrain forklifts, two pallet conveyers, five aircraft tow tractors, and four spotting dollies. There are also six six-ton cargo elevators to move things from the well deck and vehicle/cargo areas to the hangar and flight decks. is equipped with fourteen electric two-ton forklifts, twenty-five three-ton diesel forklifts, two five-ton rough terrain forklifts, two pallet conveyers, five aircraft tow tractors, and four spotting dollies. There are also six six-ton cargo elevators to move things from the well deck and vehicle/cargo areas to the hangar and flight decks.
Walking up the vehicle ramp to the hangar deck, you emerge into a vast s.p.a.ce which takes up almost a third of the Wasp's Wasp's length. Two full deck levels high, the hangar deck is the aircraft maintenance and stowage area. A typical air group includes a dozen or so CH-46 Sea Knights, four big CH-53E Sea Stallions, four AH-1W Cobras, and four UH-1N Iroquois. A half-dozen AV-8B Harrier II fighter/bombers are usually stowed up on the flight deck or "roof" as the crew members call it. This is because Harriers are designed to be weatherproof. While it is theoretically possible for length. Two full deck levels high, the hangar deck is the aircraft maintenance and stowage area. A typical air group includes a dozen or so CH-46 Sea Knights, four big CH-53E Sea Stallions, four AH-1W Cobras, and four UH-1N Iroquois. A half-dozen AV-8B Harrier II fighter/bombers are usually stowed up on the flight deck or "roof" as the crew members call it. This is because Harriers are designed to be weatherproof. While it is theoretically possible for Wasp Wasp to operate up to forty-five CH-46E-sized aircraft, you usually find some of them up on deck, leaving some room to work down in the hangar. The deck and hangar are linked by two deck edge elevators, each capable of lifting up to 75,000 lb/34,090 kg. This is a change from the LHA, which had one elevator on the fantail. In addition to maintenance and stowage, the hangar deck is used by the embarked Marines for fitness and proficiency training (rappelling and other skills). It serves as a staging area for mission teams as they prepare for action. In the rafters are small office and control s.p.a.ces for the air and maintenance departments, with windows for monitoring the activities below. Walking forward along the starboard side, you come to the flight deck ramp tunnel. This allows vehicles to drive up to the flight deck through the island structure without having to use the aircraft elevators. This usually is the way that the Marines march up to the flight deck to board helicopters. When the LHD was designed back in the early 1980s, the standard utility vehicle for the Mar