The Value of Money Part 19

His products, of course, are composites of gold, labor, and other raw materials, etc., but part of the extra value that comes to his products attaches itself to the gold that is in them. He now has an incentive, which was lacking before, to melt down full weight gold coin in his possession, or to buy gold bars which might otherwise have been coined.

To buy the gold bars, however, probably means that he must have accommodation at the bank. He borrows from the bank the amount he needs, giving a short-time note, since he expects to make up his gold and market it in a fairly short time. The paper of manufacturers of gold will commonly stand well in the "money market," and this is especially true of those in whose hands the gold is not worked up into such specialized forms that the value of the bullion is a minor matter. (I find it necessary to refer frequently to the money market, though a full a.n.a.lysis of money-market phenomena cannot come till after our discussion of credit.) If he must borrow to get the gold, _then the money-rates will come into comparison with the profits he expects to make from working up the gold_. This will usually be true even if he melts down gold coin already in his possession. He might deposit that gold, and so reduce his expenses at the bank, either buying back his own discounted paper, or getting interest on daily checking account. If he has to borrow to get the gold, he may get it either by drawing gold from the bank directly, or by giving a check on the bank to a bullion dealer, which may ultimately lead to a diminution in the bank's supply of gold.

However he gets the gold, there is bound to be some reaction, (1) on the bank's supply of gold, (2) on the supply of loanable funds in the money market, and hence (3) on the money-rates themselves. If he borrows from the money market, he affects the money-rates directly (even though probably, in a given case, not noticeably); if he melts down coin, instead of depositing it (or paying it out to others who may ultimately deposit it) there tends also to be less gold in the bank's vaults; if he buys gold with his own funds in the bullion market, the supply of current bullion for which the banks also compete is reduced. In any of these cases, the banks have less gold than would otherwise be the case.

The relation between gold reserves and the supply of money-funds has been partly discussed already. We have seen that there is no proportional relation, as Fisher, and other quant.i.ty theorists contend.

Loanable funds, on a given gold reserve, are highly elastic. But the elasticity calls for higher money-rates, and higher money-rates tend to reduce the volume of trading, and check the demand. Borrowings from the money market by workers in gold, therefore, are much more significant than borrowings by other manufacturers or merchants, because the latter are content with credit devices, for the most part, while the workers in gold withdraw gold itself from the money market. It is, moreover, harder for the money market to resist extra demand from the jewelers than from many other interests. The a.s.sets of the jewelers, especially from those who do not work the gold up in highly specialized forms, are exceedingly liquid. Their paper, therefore, is exceptionally good in the discount market. Usually, too, the larger jewelry houses have specially good general credit and high reputation. There is, then, less disposition for the market to look askance at an unusual supply of their paper than would be the case with many other sorts of paper. They tend to get about as low rates as anyone else in the market. A money market under centralized control seeking to protect its gold, might tend to raise discount rates on jewelers' paper, but a compet.i.tive money market is very unlikely to do so.

An increase in the value of gold in the arts would, thus, reflect itself pretty quickly in the money market, first in the form of added value for the services of money, and then, secondly, in an increase in the capital value of money. Indeed, an increase in the value of a single rental is an increase in the capital value also, since the value of the single rental is one portion of the capital value. Not only does it mean a higher capital value for gold, but it consequently tends to mean a higher "price." It does mean a higher "price" for present money as compared with future money. It tends, also, to mean a higher "price" of money in terms of other goods. Meeting higher money-rates, all borrowers tend to borrow less, and to buy less, to offer less money for goods. It need not follow, however, that the rising value of gold reduces prices.

The rise in the value of gold in the arts may well be a manifestation of a general rise of values. General prosperity, rather than causes affecting the value of gold in the arts alone, may have occasioned the increasing demand for gold in the arts. This would mean rising values for goods at large. It might well be, therefore, that the rise in the values of goods would offset the rise in the value of money, and that prices of goods would rise at the same time that gold is being withdrawn from the money market to the arts.

Business in general, as well as the jewelers, may be making increased demands on the money market. This would tend still further to raise the money-rates. It would also, however, tend to increase the supply of money-funds. Commercial and industrial paper, in a time of buoyancy and expansion, is particularly acceptable to the banks, and they are likely to expand their loans despite the failure of gold reserves to keep pace.

They simply get along with smaller reserves. Higher money-rates in such a case tend to reduce the volume of business, but need not actually reduce it, if there are bigger profits than before antic.i.p.ated in business transactions. Not absolute money-rates, but money-rates in relation to antic.i.p.ated profits from the use of money, are significant.

There is large room here for flexibility, elasticity, etc. There is much slack to be taken up by the money-rates, much slack in the fluid subst.i.tutes for money in various functions, and much slack to be taken up by the volume of trade. But all this will best appear after our discussion of the money market.

I have said enough to indicate the character of the factors immediately determining the equilibrium between gold in the arts and gold in the money employments. In the preceding discussion, also, I have discussed the more fundamental factors governing the value of gold in both employments. The problem of translating the fundamental theory of value into money market terms, and of translating the phenomena of the money market into terms of fundamental values is not easy. Most of our value theory in the past has been concerned with individual psychology, Crusoe economics, trading in small markets with a few buyers, barter transactions, etc. It has been abstract and unrealistic. The practical students of the money market, who are immersed in the facts of modern money, have got little help from it, and have often been scornful of it.

I hope to be able to contribute something to bringing the two methods of approach to common terms. They are correlative aspects of the same problem. Each gives highly important clues to the understanding of the other. Neither can be understood without some understanding of the other. A theory of value which cannot be applied in the money market, the stock exchange, and the great field of modern business generally, has small _raison d'etre_.

In the next chapter I shall take up the problems of credit, and the money market.

CHAPTER XXIII

CREDIT

a.n.a.lysis and description are much more important than definition.

Definition at the beginning of a study is frequently a fetter, rather than an aid to thought. This is especially true in a field where phenomena overlap and interlace, and where the "pure principle,"

"essence" or "_Wesen_" of the thing defined never presents itself, but is only to be reached by violent abstraction. To pick out one element--as "futurity"[503]--as marking off credit from other things would be an ill.u.s.tration of this. Or to take the notion of _promise_, or contract obligation, in connection with futurity, is likewise to limit the field unduly, on the one hand, and to include things which do not belong there on the other. Thus, a contract whereby A is to build a house for B by the end of a year, receiving at that time, or in instalments as the work proceeds, a sum of money, is not a credit transaction. We have, however, promise, futurity, and a future payment of money all called for in the contract. On the other hand, if A sends B a telegraphic order for money, which B receives three minutes after the money is entrusted by A to the telegraph company, we have a credit transaction, with no element of futurity in it. Certainly there is less of futurity there than in the case where a laborer, working all day, is paid only at night for work done in the morning. Futurity enters into the values of all goods which are not destined for immediate consumption--capital values of long-time goods are discounted present worths of _future_ values. Contracts, promises, and beliefs in promises run through the whole range of economic life,--the domestic servant, paid weekly, ill.u.s.trates all three. Yet only a special cla.s.s of these economic activities are commonly counted as credit transactions. Credit is really a part of the system of economic value relations not easily marked off in economic nature from the rest. Its clearest _differentiae_ are juridical rather than economic. It will be the purpose of the present chapter, in part, to blur, rather than to make precise, the line between credit and non-credit in economic phenomena, and to a.s.similate the laws of credit to the general laws of value.

This will involve, however, a careful a.n.a.lysis and precisioning of certain phenomena commonly counted as credit phenomena. Buying and selling on the one hand; borrowing and lending on the other: the distinction seems clear. It is in law. But what is it in economic nature? When a merchant discounts his own note at the bank, it is borrowing. When he discounts the note of another, his debtor, it is selling. If he writes before his endors.e.m.e.nt of the note, "without recourse," (unusual at a bank, but common enough with real estate mortgage-notes) he has made a perfect sale, and is entirely out of the transaction. Is it, however, in economic nature a different transaction from the original one in which he got the note from a borrower? Legally bonds are credit instruments, and stocks are not. Stocks represent _owners.h.i.+p_. But practically, as an economic matter, both represent the alienation of control, on faith, to a small group of men, and practically, too, the difference between preferred stocks and bonds is often very slight. Whatever the legal rights of a bondholder, under the terms of his contract, the legal fact itself often is, under the growing practice of receivers.h.i.+ps, that he cannot exercise his right to foreclose without such difficulty that it doesn't pay to do it. Very frequently indeed the junior bondholder will come out of a reorganization as simply a preferred stockholder--which is what he practically was all the time. He couldn't vote as a bondholder, but his voting rights as a stockholder commonly mean little! As a bondholder, if he held enough bonds, he might even have more influence on the affairs of the corporation than as a stockholder. The market is moved by other forces than the legal distinctions in corporate contracts! And market facts are not necessarily correctly told by the accountant's categories either. I shall trouble myself little, in what follows, with the juridical and accountancy problems of credit, save in so far as these bear directly on the more pertinent economic aspects of the matter. I am interested in the question of credit as a part of the problem of value and prices--and particularly from the standpoint of the problem of the value of money.

What difference is made in values and prices by lending and borrowing?

What kinds of lending and borrowing are there? What shall we say of bank-notes, of bank-deposits, of bills of exchange? What difference is made by the money market? Behind the legal forms and the technical methods, what are the psychological forces at work? How are these psychological forces modified by the technical forms and methods? What are the economic differences between long and short time loans? How shall we draw the distinction between the "money-rates" and the long time interest rate on "capital?" Why can some things serve as collateral in the money market when others cannot? What sorts of credit are appropriate to commerce, to manufacturing, to agriculture? Is credit capital? Is an increase in credit an increase in values? The last two of these questions imply that we have a definition of credit. Perhaps the answers to some of the other questions may have given us such a definition. But a.n.a.lysis and description will precede definition.

The etymology of "credit" has sometimes been taken as the clue to the meaning of the word for economics, and the idea of confidence, or belief, has been made the heart of the matter. A man has good credit when others have confidence in his integrity, etc. Men lend to others when they can trust them to repay. Doubtless something of this sort was responsible for the original choice of the word. But when loans are made on good mortgage security, or on collateral security, the personality of the borrower may count for little or nothing. Confidence there is, but not confidence in the intentions of the borrower. The confidence is in the "goodness" (_i. e._, the value and marketability) of the collateral.

The same questions are raised by the lender here which he would raise if he were going to buy the thing, instead of lending with it as security.

None the less, I think that in the etymology of the word we have an important clue. We must generalize the notion, however, beyond the limits of confidence in personal intentions. It involves confidence in the general economic situation, in the future of business, in the permanence of values, in the certainty of future incomes, etc. Thus viewed, the element of confidence, though important in highest degree, is not peculiar to the phenomena which we call credit phenomena in economics. It appears wherever there are values which depend on future events. One does not need much confidence in buying potatoes or apples or meat--though in the case of meat quite a lot of confidence may be involved--and misplaced! But whenever the future is involved, whenever capital values of any kind are involved--lands, stocks, bonds, houses, horses, manufacturing equipment, etc.--the element of belief, confidence, hopeful att.i.tude toward the future, is quite as much present as in the case of a loan. Nor is the element of personal confidence less present, often, in these things than in the case of a loan. Very often the value of a horse may depend in considerable degree on the integrity of the man who offers it for sale; the value of a piece of land may be much enhanced if a trustworthy owner makes certain statements as to the yields he has got from it; the values of stocks (really credit instruments, from the angle of economic a.n.a.lysis) may depend very much on the personality of the organizers and managers of a corporation. Personal prestiges may count for much more in these cases than in the case of a collateral loan.

Further, in connection with the element of belief, or confidence.

Borrowing is expensive, and men do not borrow for amus.e.m.e.nt. That borrowing and lending may increase, it is not enough that lenders have confidence in the ability of borrowers to repay. Borrowers must also have confidence in the future of their businesses, in their ability to make enough out of the loan to pay the expense involved, and have a surplus left over. I abstract here from consumption loans. They play a very minor role.[504] The a.n.a.lysis in an earlier chapter, based on Kinley's figures, showing that retail trade is less than one-eleventh of the total pecuniary transactions in 1909, and that the percentage of credit instruments used in retail trade is much lower than in other transactions, will justify us, when quant.i.tative questions are involved, in abstracting from consumption loans. Since such loans will be chiefly employed in retail buying, and since we know that most retail buying does not result from loans for consumption purposes, we may conclude that modern credit is overwhelmingly of a different sort. Most of it arises from business activities of one kind or another, and rests on expectation of profit and loss.[505] Such loans are not made when borrowers, as well as lenders, have not confidence in the transactions they mean to put through.

So far the thing has run in terms of individual calculation of profit and loss. But even the most sagacious business men do not play a lone hand. No one is uninfluenced by the expectations and feelings of others.

In general, business confidence is in large degree a matter of social psychology, resting on suggestion, contagion, etc., as well as on cool calculation of profit and loss. Even where men are able in considerable degree to free themselves from the prevailing optimism or pessimism, they must take it into account. The man who extends his business when n.o.body is in the mood to buy, when no one will make contracts with him, runs a very fair chance of bankruptcy, even though there be, in the technical facts of industry, no reason for the prevailing pessimism. A man with large resources, which are not fully employed, seeing that the prevailing "bad business" is "largely psychological" may, indeed, take advantage of the fact, get his labor and raw materials cheaply, and produce some staple in advance of his market. If he can afford to hold his surplus, he may make large profits by so doing. But usually business men will not, in such a situation, have the surplus resources to enable them to put through such an undertaking, and hence, even though they may recognize that the rest of the business world is irrational, they must, perforce, conform to its irrationality, and their sober estimate of the prospects of a given undertaking may be just as much adverse as if they shared the feeling of gloom which all about them feel. They meet it from the banker from whom they wish to borrow. Even if able to borrow, they meet it from the dealers to whom they are accustomed to sell their products. The prevailing gloom is as much a fact with which they must reckon as is the price of their raw materials, or the technical qualities of those raw materials.

Further, business confidence is not a matter in which each man counts one! There are centers of prestige, men and inst.i.tutions whose att.i.tude toward the future counts heavily indeed in determining the att.i.tudes of others. These prestiges may arise from various causes. Recognized wisdom and probity may give a man great prestige in economic matters. There are financial writers and students of the market, not necessarily men of great wealth, whose opinions are exceedingly influential in making business confidence. The wisdom without the probity is not enough. Some men, known to be sagacious students of the market, have been known to succeed in their plans by telling the truth, with the result that everybody else did the wrong thing! They made business confidence, but not the sort that was complimentary to them. Other men have prestige, influence in making business confidence, by virtue of possession of large wealth. They are, first, in position to lend largely. Their decisions count directly for more than the decisions of thousands of other men. The very fact that they have confidence in the future, apart from anything else, means a tremendous increase in _effective_ business confidence--which we are here concerned with. The optimism of a man who can neither buy nor sell nor borrow nor lend, because he himself has no economic resources, and no prestige, is like the desire of a penniless beggar for an economic good--its effect on the market is not great! But further, the fact that a rich man is lending makes possible activities which would not otherwise be possible, and so justifies confidence on the part of those who wish to deal with those to whom he lends. Such a man may, on the other hand, borrow. His borrowing, for business activity, justifies confidence on the part of those who would deal with him. Quite apart, therefore, from any influence on the opinions of others growing out of respect for his judgment, or less rational reaction to him, he can do much to make or unmake business confidence.

But commonly, also, such a man is a center of prestige, as well as a controller of economic power by virtue of his wealth. Men look to him for their cue. If _he_ has confidence enough in the future to risk his great wealth, surely smaller men with smaller interests need not be afraid. Vitally important centres for the making and controlling of business confidence are the banks. Having intimate knowledge of the affairs of many business men, of business men in many different lines, they are in a position to judge wisely of business prospects. Having great power to make or refuse loans, they can encourage or chill the enthusiasm which business men may independently develop. The whispered word of a banker may well count for more than the half-page advertis.e.m.e.nt of a promoter. But the banker is not all powerful. His influence is much greater, often, in restraining than in evoking business confidence. Bankers may during long periods be quite unable to increase their loans, though they tempt borrowing by easy rates.

Business confidence is a fact of social psychology. It is an organic phenomenon, with radiant points of control. It is a matter of inter-mental activity, rather than a thing in which each man makes an independent choice.

But this is to say nothing of credit phenomena that is not true of all value phenomena. All economic values are social values. The values of wheat or sugar or bicycles are social values. There are centers of power and prestige, growing out of the distribution of wealth, or various other social factors, which have a dominating influence on economic values, as a rule. Credit phenomena are merely part and parcel of the general system of economic motivation and control.

In _Social Value_ (pp. 102-103) I have denied the doctrine of Meinong and Tarde that explicit belief, existential judgments, are essential to the existence of values, taking value in the generic sense, which includes aesthetic value, religious and patriotic value, legal, moral, and other values. I have pointed out that we do, at times, value ideal objects, the creatures of our imaginations. The dead sweetheart, or the Beatrice that never was (or that never was what she was imagined to be) may have tremendous value. Not merely things hoped for, but things hopelessly gone, as "The Lost Cause" to the Southerner, may be objects of value so high that other things, known to be real, may sink into insignificance beside them. Even in these cases, however, there must be a "reality-_feeling_" an unconscious presumption or a.s.sumption that the object valued is real. Indeed, belief, as distinguished from mere ideation, is an emotional "tang," an essentially emotional, rather than intellectual, fact. If it be present, the ideation and explicit judgment may be dispensed with.

It is, however, characteristic of economic values, particularly of the values of instrumental goods and of the goods with which business men make profits, that the tendency to raise the question of reality, to require explicit judgment, is strong. The successful business man is necessarily the man who does this, who does not too highly value the creatures of his imagination, when he imagines a vain thing. One need not, perhaps, seriously raise the question as to the reality of the loaf of bread he buys. Explicit judgment there would be superfluous. But very serious questionings come in whenever lands or houses or securities or bills of exchange come in. One needs to know what the facts are, and to make judgments based upon them. Hence, for all values of capital goods and income-bearers, for the values which pa.s.s in wholesale and speculative trading in general, the matter of _belief_ is vitally important. Here, again, then, we have nothing in the psychological principles underlying credit phenomena to mark them off from the general field of value phenomena.

The general laws of value, then, apply in the case of credit phenomena.

We find nothing unique in essence in them. The juridical relations, also, in so far as they have economic significance, shade into one another. To buy a bond from a bondholder is purchase and sale. To pay a borrower money for his personal note is lending. But from the standpoint of the theory of value and prices this distinction may be ignored. We may extend the idea of buying, selling, and price to cover all contracts where values are balanced against values, and expressed in terms of each other. Future money has its price in present money, just as much as present wheat has its price in present money. Really it is not future money against present money. It is a case of _rights_, which involve the payment of money in the future, sold for money, and priced in money. In general, it is _rights_, rather than _things_, which pa.s.s in economic exchange. Physical delivery does not const.i.tute selling. Delivering a load of wheat to a railroad does not const.i.tute sale of the wheat to the railroad; selling a farm does not involve any physical moving of the farm. Rights, _in personam_ or _in rem_, are objects of economic value, and the exchange of these rights makes up the bulk, if not the whole, of economic exchange. (Exchange may be limited to the transfers of juristic rights, without value being so limited. I have discussed the relations of value and exchange in the chapter on "Value," above.) Property rights are commonly conceived of as the proper objects of buying and sale.

Contracts involving the future services of free men stand legally on a different footing from contracts regarding physical goods. But economic a.n.a.lysis is not greatly concerned with these distinctions, except in so far as they affect the values of the things exchanged, and so the terms of the exchanges. I do not believe that the legal distinctions can be made to run on all fours with any significant economic distinctions, and shall not undertake to make them do so. In the phenomena we have simply cases of buying and selling (in a generalized sense of those terms) of _rights_, at _prices_ (by a very slight extension of the term, price, to which the market is well accustomed). The terms of these exchanges, the prices, are governed by values, social economic values, in no wise different from the values which govern the prices in exchanges which we do not cla.s.s as credit transactions. I say that credit phenomena are exchanges of rights. This is true of all exchanges. We do not exchange rights for money. We exchange rights to other things for rights to money. The mere physical transfer, even of money, does not give rights to the money. I may merely be giving you the money for safe keeping, or for use for my purposes. While the law makes the rights to money that has left the hands of its owner less lasting, as against innocent third parties, than in the case of other objects, and while the right to money is always, or almost always, met by returning other money of equal amount, even in the case of money it is a right, and not a mere physical transfer, that is significant.

Our problem regarding credit is, then, much simplified. We have simply to pick out certain economic exchanges to which the name of credit transactions has been applied,--a various and heterogeneous set of exchanges, in many ways--and study them, to find their peculiarities.

These peculiarities will not make them exceptions to the general laws of value. They will make them merely special cases. To find essential principles marking off credit transactions, at large, from non-credit transactions is an exceedingly difficult thing. There are more differences among credit transactions themselves, than there are between the genus, credit transactions, and the cla.s.s of things not called by that name.

Thus, monthly payments of rent, of wages, of college professors'

salaries, are not commonly called credit transactions. The monthly payment of grocery bills, or of telephone bills, involves credit. Where is a real difference to be found? On the other hand, between book credit between grocer and patron on the one hand, and a bank-note or deposit credit on the other, the difference is large, in many practically important ways. Between a call loan and a ten year agricultural mortgage-note, the differences are even greater.

One may be disposed to find the differences between credit transactions and non-credit transactions in the fact that the former stipulate a definite sum of money, due at definite times. This would partly differentiate a bond, say, from a stock. The bond not merely calls for stipulated yearly payments, but also calls for a definite payment at the end. This would, however, exclude British Consols from the list of credit instruments! British Consols differ from safe preferred stocks in legal, rather than in economic, ways. Legally they are alike in that no terminal payment is called for. Practically they are alike in that annual regular sums may be expected. It may at least be said of credit transactions that stipulated money payments, either at a different time or a different _place_, are called for. This would include the telegraphic transfers of funds, and would exclude the case where A, a farmer, does a day's work for B, a neighbor, for the promise of a day's work in return at a later season. The latter transaction involves many of the elements that definitions of credit have included, but I think that we may at least limit our conception of credit transactions to transactions within a money economy, where money, as a measure of values, functions in the calculations. Shall we, however, limit credit transactions to cases where a stipulated _amount_ of money is named in the contract, for a stipulated time?

Shall we exclude contracts where the payment of money is made contingent on anything? By contingency here I mean legal contingency. This test would exclude the highest grade preferred stock. It would include the shakiest bonds that contained, in the terms of the contract, no contingency. But where, then, would one place such an instrument as the Seaboard Airline Adjustment 5% Bonds, which may default in a given year half of the interest, if it is not earned,[506] and which yet call for the payment of the princ.i.p.al at a stipulated time?

What shall we say of "borrowing and carrying" transactions on the stock exchange? Is not the loan of stocks a real credit transaction?

Ordinarily, when stocks are put up as collateral, one thinks of the money as being lent, and the stock merely as a pledge. But in the case of borrowing stocks by a bear to deliver next day, the transaction is definitely thought of as a loan of stock. It is sometimes paid for, the bear paying the bull a premium, instead of receiving interest on the money he has turned over to the bull as a "pledge." The more usual thing, is, of course, for the bull to pay the bear interest. But in a contract like this, there are many contingencies. As the stock rises in value, the bear must lend more money to the bull; if the stock falls, the bull must return part of the money to the bear. Both times and amounts are here contingent, even though in the end the amounts lent and repaid balance. Call loans, of course, do not call for payment at a stipulated time, and the same is true of bank-deposits and bank-notes, and of many other forms of credit. Interest on deposits in mutual savings banks is contingent, legally, as to amount. Are insurance policies credit instruments? What of endowment policies?

It is easy to draw legal distinctions in all these cases, but to show that definite and uniform economic consequences flow from these legal distinctions is quite impossible. Rather, it is easily possible to show that uniform or certain economic consequences do not, in general, flow from them.

I shall refrain from the effort to give a general, fundamental definition of credit. I shall rather discuss certain of the more important types of what have been called credit, with a view to seeing what bearing they have on the problems with which this book is concerned; the value of money, and prices. The general cla.s.s of transactions to which the name, credit transactions, has been applied may be roughly designated as transactions in which the consideration on one side, at least, is the a.s.sumption of a debt, running in terms of money (though not necessarily to be paid in actual money), payable either at a future time or at another place. Objections can be found to this definition. It does not meet the fundamental test of a definition that, for the purpose in hand, it should seize upon the essential and unique characteristic of the things marked off. I am not sure that it meets the tests of inclusiveness and exclusiveness even for those transactions which we call credit transactions. Thus, if A and B go to the bank together, and A there buys B's horse, standing in front of the bank, giving B in return a check, which B immediately cashes in the same room where the check is drawn, the idea of different time or different place is not realized in any but a technical sense. A, in drawing the check is, of course, a.s.suming a debt. The check, if repudiated by the bank, becomes a note, which A must pay. A, moreover, is paying B, not with money, but with the transfer of a claim on the bank, and the fact that his check, if unpaid, becomes a note is not the main fact about the check. Understanding our definition of credit to cover this case also, however, and attaching no fundamental importance to the definition save as a means of marking off a cla.s.s of more or less related phenomena which we mean to discuss, the definition will serve.

Thus defined, we have in credit a concept susceptible to quant.i.tative treatment. Debts, in terms of money, can be summed up, and we may have the concept of the "volume of credit" as the sum of such debts at a given time, or through a given period of time, or as an average through a period of time. We may distinguish credit transactions from credit, defining credit as the volume of debts, and credit transactions as transactions in which the debts are pa.s.sed in exchange. This would be to broaden the notion of credit transactions beyond the usual conception, since it would include transactions in which A sells ("without recourse") B's note to C. It would also include cases where bonds are sold. It would exclude cases where stocks are sold, since they are not legally debts. Some would prefer to limit the notion of credit transaction to transactions in which there remains some contingent responsibility on the part of the one who uses the credit instrument, but this would be to deny the name, credit transaction, to cases where bank-notes or government paper are used in payments, as well as to deny it to the case where bonds are sold. It is not important, for my purposes, to draw a sharp line about the concept, credit transaction, however. And about the concept credit itself I have drawn a line resting on a legal, rather than an economic, distinction.

Within the field of credit, thus defined, we may single out for especial consideration certain forms of demand or short time credit, particularly bills of exchange, bank-notes and bank-deposits, and merchants'

book-credit. We shall also have something to say regarding long-time credit, including bonds, and mortgage-notes that have no general market.

All these debts in terms of money, to which, in the aggregate, we have given the name, volume of credit, have grown out of _exchanges_.

Exchange is here used in a wide sense, and is not confined to the case where goods or services are bought and sold. It is an exchange, if a man gives his note to a banker in return for a deposit credit. But, on the a.s.sumption that exchanges are made only when gains are to be realized, it follows that all debts, and so all credit, have been created in view of antic.i.p.ated gains (or to avert antic.i.p.ated losses). In a society where everything is in equilibrium, a "static state," where there are no "transitions" to be effected, where there is no occasion for speculation, and where exchanges of lands, etc., are negligible, the volume of all exchanges, including those where debts are pa.s.sed in exchange, would be small. The occasion for the creation of the debts which make up the volume of credit would not be nearly so numerous as under dynamic conditions. The _volume_ of credit, in other words, is largely a function of dynamic conditions, even though credit would exist in a static condition of economic life. The bulk of credit, as the bulk of exchanging, grows out of dynamic conditions, transitional changes, and the like.

This will be clearer when we raise the question as to _why_ debts are created, as to what function debts perform in economic life. Why should a man borrow? Let us suppose that a farmer has 600 acres of land. He wishes to sell 100 acres, and use the proceeds in buying equipment for his farm. But he finds it difficult to sell the 100 acres. There is no ready market. He can sell it immediately only at a great sacrifice. By waiting, and looking industriously for a customer, or by engaging a real estate dealer to do so, he could finally find a buyer, but the thing is slow and uncertain, and he wishes to get the equipment at once. He borrows, therefore, giving his farm as security, or a part of the farm as security. He exchanges a claim on the future income of the farm for present money, and with this he can buy the equipment he needs. The net result has been that the credit transaction has transformed his unmarketable quantum of value into a marketable form of value. He has been able, by an indirect step, to do what he could not do directly--to trade a part of the farm (which in its economic essence is a prospect of future income) for the equipment. In this ill.u.s.tration, _credit has functioned as a means of increasing the marketability or saleability of non-pecuniary forms of wealth_. Credit is primarily a device for effecting exchanges that could not otherwise be effected, or for effecting exchanges more easily than they could otherwise be effected.

This means that credit transactions are a part of the productive process, and that they increase values. It is the function of credit to universalize the characteristic of money, high saleability. It is the function of credit to "coin," so to speak, rights to goods on shelves, lands, etc., etc., into liquid rights, bearing the dollar mark, which are much more highly saleable than the rights in their original form were, and which often become as saleable as money itself, functioning perfectly as money.

Credit thus tends to universalize that characteristic which Menger[507]

considers the unique characteristic of money. By means of credit transactions, a man borrows up to 50% of the value of the farm, makes his farm in effect, 50% saleable or fluid. The man who owns livestock may not be able, on a given day, to market them without loss, but he can use their value in the market, up, say, to 75%, by a loan. The man who owns a hundred shares of United States Steel may not be able, at a given time, to market them to his satisfaction--though in the case of articles and stocks dealt in the speculative markets saleability is very high indeed, and in the case of United States Steel, in particular, the "spread" between "buying price" and "selling price" is very narrow--but he can borrow, with the stock as security, up to 80% of its value. On a bond of the United States government, he may borrow up to 100%.[508] The process of creating credit is a process of transforming rights from unsaleable to saleable form. Often this means the subdivision of rights, preferential rights to a _portion_ of the value of a piece of wealth being more saleable, because of greater certainty, than the total right to the whole. Another reason why partial rights may be more saleable is that the value represented by each partial right is smaller. It is easier to market things worth a thousand dollars than things worth fifty thousand, as a rule. In any case, a chief economic function of credit is,--_the_ chief function for our purposes--to make fluid and saleable articles of wealth other than money; to universalize the quality of saleability.

This justifies us in our contention made before that _all_ corporate securities, whether stocks or bonds,[509] are, in economic nature, alike. Driven to a legal concept for a definition of credit, we were obliged to exclude stocks from our rough definition. But corporate organization does precisely what the various other transactions that we have called credit transactions do. Lands and buildings and machinery, or the roadbed and rolling stock of a railroad, are highly specialized, often unfit for use in any form other than that in which they now appear. As concrete instruments of production, they would be highly unsaleable. In their totality, as a going concern, they are highly unsaleable, because in the aggregate so very valuable. Grouped together, however, but still subdivided, the objects of many thousands of partial rights, represented by stocks and bonds, they become saleable in high degree.

As objects other than money gain in saleability, they tend to gain in value, also. This is not necessarily true, always. If wealth is already in the best place, at the proper time, and in the proper hands, no point is involved in further exchanges. Additional saleability--or an increase in the qualities that make for saleability--could make no difference.

But when objects could be employed to greater advantage if in different hands, if, in other words, there is occasion for exchange, then whatever adds to the saleability of a good adds to its value. What would otherwise have gone into the trouble and expense of marketing now is saved. In general, items of wealth tend to gain in value as they gain in saleability--though not in any definite proportion.

Further, as objects of value other than money gain in saleability, money tends to lose its _differential advantage_ in this respect, and so tends to lose that part of its value which comes from the money-uses. If all things, including gold, were equally saleable, there would be no _raison d'etre_ for money, and gold would have only the value that comes from its commodity functions. In so far as credit-arrangements give to partial rights to wealth the capacity to serve as a medium of exchange or for other money purposes--and this is true to a high degree of bank-credit--this tends to cut under the sources of value of money.

Credit thus, from two angles, tends to raise prices; it raises the values of goods; and it tends to lower the value of money. The limits on this, however, are reached when gold ceases entirely to function as money, and when all items of value are perfectly saleable. Then credit has done its perfect work for prices, and can do no more. No incentive remains for further borrowing, if all items of value that need to be exchanged are perfectly saleable.

These theses will meet objection, particularly from those who are accustomed to quant.i.ty theory reasoning, and who look upon the volume of credit as something independent of the volume of trade. On the logic of the quant.i.ty theory there is no reason why prices might not mount indefinitely, if only credit could increase indefinitely. The causes controlling the volume of credit are, on this view, quite independent of the volume of trade. I have given this line of thought sufficient criticism, perhaps, in Part II, but shall find occasion to recur to it at a later point in this chapter. However, writers not bound by quant.i.ty theory ideas, may still find reason to question these theses, and it is necessary that I should take account of various complications, and make what may well be called substantial qualifications and modifications, before the theses are acceptable.