Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism Part 3

[3] _Hyp._ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 8.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 10.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 12.

[7] _Hyp._ I. 14.

[8] _Hyp._ I. 14.

s.e.xtus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by refuting it.[1] The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions.

"We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, meaning by this name the idea of it."[2] Phenomena are the only things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life by them. They are, however, subjective. s.e.xtus distinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena,[3] and that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they const.i.tute the appearances of objects.[4] We see from this that s.e.xtus makes the only reality to consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind.

He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown outside, about which the Sceptic can make no a.s.sertions.

Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they affect life in four different ways. They const.i.tute the guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the arts important.[5] According to the tradition of laws and customs, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itself an abstract good. The Sceptic of s.e.xtus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case with professing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were.

s.e.xtus says, "We are not without energy in the arts which we undertake."[6] This was a positive tendency which no philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy from his theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, and his life was governed by phenomena.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 19.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 19.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 22; Diog. IX. 11, 105.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 22.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 23.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 24.

The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1]

In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and pa.s.sion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under other names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3]

After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from the false[4] during the time of [Greek: epoche], or suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow follows the body.[5]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 25.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 26.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 26.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 107.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 29.

The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He is not wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and so on.[1] He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the dogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they are by nature an evil.[2] To the Sceptic nothing is in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that "he escapes from difficulties easier."[3] For instance, he who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying "No more," is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4] For he who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good.[5] The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor seek anything eagerly.[6]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 30.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 30.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 30; Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[4] _Adv. Math._ XI. 146-160.

[5] _Hyp._ I. 27.

[6] _Hyp._ I. 28.

Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam on a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attempts to do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threw the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it produced a representation of the foam.[1] Thus the Sceptics were never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly between the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came to them of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it.

The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, consists in placing arguments in opposition to each other, both in regard to phenomena, and to things of the intellect. By placing the phenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal, the intellectual to the intellectual, and the phenomenal to the intellectual, and _vice versa_, the present to the present, past, and future, one will find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It is not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, and consequently a state of [Greek: epoche] may always be maintained.[2] Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion, and must be preceded by the intellectual process described above, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or any subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique form of moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itself happiness.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 28, 29.

[2] _Hyp._ I. 32-35.

It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to a.s.sert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and consequently to have the att.i.tude of still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the teachings of s.e.xtus that he affirmed the non-existence of the soul,[1] or the ego, and denied absolute existence altogether.[2] The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.[3]

There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions which control the character of the phenomena.

Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and absolute reality can never be known.

[1] _Adv. Math._ VII. 55; _Hyp._ II. 32.

[2] _Adv. Math._ XI. 140.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

CHAPTER III.

_The Sceptical Tropes_.

The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism const.i.tutes historically and philosophically the most important part of the writings of s.e.xtus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ s.e.xtus gives two cla.s.ses of Tropes, those of [Greek: epoche] and the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus against Aetiology.

The Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are arranged in groups of ten, five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School to which they belong; the first of these groups is historically the most important, or the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche], as these are far more closely connected with the general development of Scepticism, than the later ones. By the name [Greek: tropos] or Trope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form of argument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common in Greek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time of Aristotle.[1] The Stoics, however, used the word with a different meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2]

Stepha.n.u.s and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word _modus_[3] and [Greek: tropos] also is often used interchangeably with the word [Greek: logos] by s.e.xtus, Diogenes Laertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with [Greek: topos],[4] and [Greek: typos] is found in the oldest edition of s.e.xtus.[5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of probabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of doubt.[6] All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of Aenesidemus give the Tropes the princ.i.p.al place in their treatment of the subject. s.e.xtus occupies two thirds of the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ in stating and discussing them; and about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism is devoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these two authors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack on Scepticism.[7] Favorinus wrote a book ent.i.tled _Pyrrhonean Tropes_, and Plutarch one called _The Ten ([Greek: topoi]) Topes of Pyrrho_.[8] Both of these latter works are lost.

[1] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen_, p. 35.

[2] Diog I. 76; _Adv. Math._ VIII. 227.

[3] Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 36.