Decision Points Part 15

I told the team I would deliver that message in a speech to the United Nations the following week. I would remind the UN that Saddam's defiance was a threat to the credibility of the inst.i.tution. Either the words of the Security Council would be enforced, or the UN would exist only as a useless international body like the League of Nations.

Tony Blair came to dinner that night at Camp David. He was pleased when I told him I was planning to ask the UN for the resolution. "Many opponents wish we would just be unilateral-then they could complain," he said. "But you are calling their bluff." came to dinner that night at Camp David. He was pleased when I told him I was planning to ask the UN for the resolution. "Many opponents wish we would just be unilateral-then they could complain," he said. "But you are calling their bluff."

We both understood what the decision meant. Once we laid out our position at the UN, we had to be willing to follow through with the consequences. If diplomacy failed, there would be only one option left. "I don't want to go to war," I told Tony, "but I will do it."

Tony agreed. After the meeting, I told Alastair Campbell Alastair Campbell, one of Tony's top aides, "Your man has got cojones cojones." I'm not sure how that translated to the refined ears of 10 Downing Street. But to anyone from Texas, its meaning was clear.

"All the world now faces a test," I told UN delegates on September 12, 2002, "and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"

Delivering the speech was a surreal experience. The delegates sat silent, almost frozen in place. It was like speaking to a wax museum.

Speaking before the UN on Iraq. White House/Paul Morse White House/Paul Morse The response outside the chamber was encouraging. Allies thanked me for respecting the UN and accepting their advice to seek a resolution. Many at home appreciated that I had challenged the UN. An editorial in the Was.h.i.+ngton Post Was.h.i.+ngton Post read: "If the United Nations remains pa.s.sive in the face of this long-standing and flagrant violation of its authority in a matter involving weapons of ma.s.s destruction, it certainly will risk the irrelevance of which Mr. Bush warned." read: "If the United Nations remains pa.s.sive in the face of this long-standing and flagrant violation of its authority in a matter involving weapons of ma.s.s destruction, it certainly will risk the irrelevance of which Mr. Bush warned."

While the UN debate unfolded, we went to work on another resolution, a congressional war authorization congressional war authorization. As part of the debate, leaders on Capitol Hill asked the intelligence community to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate a.n.a.lyzing Saddam's WMD programs. The CIA compiled the NIE using much of the same intelligence it had been showing to me for the past eighteen months. In a summary sentence later decla.s.sified, the NIE concluded, "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade."

The intelligence had an impact on members of Congress. Senator John Kerry said, "When I vote to give the president of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly a.r.s.enal of weapons of ma.s.s destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat."

Senator Jay Rockefeller Jay Rockefeller, a respected Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, followed up: "Saddam's existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose real threats to America today, tomorrow....He could make these weapons available to many terrorist groups, third parties, which have contact with his government. Those groups, in turn, could bring those weapons into the United States and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly."

Senator Chuck Hagel Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican, supported the resolution. He said, "The risks of inaction are too high. We are elected to solve problems, not just debate them. The time has come to chart a new course in Iraq and in the Middle East."

On October 11, 2002, the Senate pa.s.sed the resolution 77 to 23. The House pa.s.sed it 296 to 133. Both margins were larger than those of the votes for the Gulf War. The resolution garnered votes from prominent Democrats, including House Minority Leader d.i.c.k Gephardt d.i.c.k Gephardt, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle Tom Daschle, and Senators Hillary Clinton Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden Joe Biden, John Kerry, John Edwards John Edwards, and Harry Reid Harry Reid.

Some members of Congress would later claim they were not voting to authorize war but only to continue diplomacy. They must not have read the resolution. Its language was unmistakable: "The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."

The decisive vote at the UN came on November 8. Colin had been horse-trading on minor issues, but he stayed tough on the provisions holding Saddam to account. The question was whether the resolution would have the votes. We needed nine of the fifteen Security Council members, without a veto from France, Russia, or China. We had been burning up the phone lines, trying to get everyone on board. Shortly after the Security Council vote, the phone in the Oval Office rang. "Hey, Boss," Colin said. "We got it done."

The vote was unanimous, 15 to 0. Not only had France voted for the resolution, but so had Russia, China, and Syria. The world was now on record: Saddam had a "final opportunity to comply" with his obligation to disclose and disarm. If he did not, he would face "serious consequences."

Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, Iraq had thirty days to submit a "currently accurate, full, and complete declaration" of all WMD-related programs. The resolution made clear the burden of proof rested with Saddam. The inspectors did not have to prove that he had weapons. He had to prove that he did not.

When the deadline arrived on December 7, Saddam submitted his report. I viewed it as a key test. If he came forward with honest admissions, it would send a signal that he understood the message the world was sending. Instead, he submitted reams of irrelevant paperwork clearly designed to deceive. Hans Blix Hans Blix, the mild-mannered Swedish diplomat who led the UN inspections team, later called it "rich in volume but poor in information." Joe Lieberman Joe Lieberman was more succinct. He said the declaration was a "twelve-thousand-page, one-hundred-pound lie." was more succinct. He said the declaration was a "twelve-thousand-page, one-hundred-pound lie."

If Saddam continued his pattern of deception, the only way to keep the pressure on Iraq would be to present some of the evidence ourselves. I asked George Tenet and his capable deputy, John McLaughlin John McLaughlin, to brief me on what intelligence we could decla.s.sify to explain Iraq's WMD programs.

A few days before Christmas, John walked me through their first effort. It was not very convincing. I thought back to CIA briefings I had received, the NIE that concluded Saddam had biological and chemical weapons, and the data the CIA had provided for my UN speech in September. "Surely we can do a better job of explaining the evidence against Saddam," I said. George Tenet agreed.

"It's a slam dunk," he said.

I believed him. I had been receiving intelligence briefings on Iraq for nearly two years. The conclusion that Saddam had WMD was nearly a universal consensus. My predecessor believed it. Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill believed it. Intelligence agencies in Germany, France, Great Britain, Russia, China, and Egypt believed it. As the German amba.s.sador to the United States, not a supporter of war, later put it, "I think all of our governments believe that Iraq has produced weapons of ma.s.s destruction and that we have to a.s.sume that they still have...weapons of ma.s.s destruction." If anything, we worried that the CIA was underestimating Saddam, as it had before the Gulf War.

In retrospect, of course, we all should have pushed harder on the intelligence and revisited our a.s.sumptions. But at the time, the evidence and the logic pointed in the other direction. If Saddam doesn't actually have WMD If Saddam doesn't actually have WMD, I asked myself, why on earth would he subject himself to a war he will almost certainly lose? why on earth would he subject himself to a war he will almost certainly lose?

Every Christmas during my presidency, Laura and I invited our extended family to join us at Camp David. We were happy to continue the tradition started by Mother and Dad. We cherished the opportunity to relax with them, Laura's mom, Barbara Barbara and and Jenna Jenna, and my brothers and sister and their families. We loved to watch the children's pageant at the Camp David chapel and to sing carols with military personnel and their families. One of the highlights was an annual Pink Elephant gift exchange, in which my teenage nieces and nephews were not above pilfering the latest iPod or other coveted item from the president of the United States. In later years, we started a tradition of making donations in another family member's name. Jeb Jeb and and Doro Doro donated books to the library aboard the USS donated books to the library aboard the USS George H.W. Bush George H.W. Bush. Marvin Marvin and his wife, Margaret, donated a communion chalice to the Camp David chapel on behalf of Laura and me. We gave a gift to the Dorothy Walker Bush Pavilion at the Southern Maine Medical Center in Mother and Dad's name. and his wife, Margaret, donated a communion chalice to the Camp David chapel on behalf of Laura and me. We gave a gift to the Dorothy Walker Bush Pavilion at the Southern Maine Medical Center in Mother and Dad's name.

The Christmas pageant at Camp David's Evergreen Chapel, one of our favorite holiday traditions. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper Amid the Christmas celebrations in 2002, Dad and I talked about Iraq. For the most part, I didn't seek Dad's advice on major issues. He and I both understood that I had access to more and better information than he did. Most of our conversations were for me to rea.s.sure him that I was doing fine and for him to express his confidence and love.

Iraq was one issue where I wanted to know what he thought. I told Dad I was praying we could deal with Saddam peacefully but was preparing for the alternative. I walked him through the diplomatic strategy-the solidsupport from Blair, Howard, and Aznar;theuncertainty with Chirac and Schroeder; and my efforts to rally the Saudis,Jordanians,Turks, and others in the Middle East.

Heshared my hope that diplomacy would succeed. "You know how tough war is, son, and you've got to try everything you can to avoid war," he said. "But if the man won't comply, you don't have any other choice."

I sought Dad's advice on Iraq. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper Shortly after New Year's, I sent Barbara Barbara and Jenna a letter at college. "I am working hard to keep the peace and avoid a war," I wrote. "I pray that the man in Iraq will disarm in a peaceful way. We are putting pressure on him to do just that and much of the world is with us." and Jenna a letter at college. "I am working hard to keep the peace and avoid a war," I wrote. "I pray that the man in Iraq will disarm in a peaceful way. We are putting pressure on him to do just that and much of the world is with us."

As 2003 began, it became increasingly clear that my prayer would not be answered. On January 27, Hans Blix Hans Blix gave a formal report to the United Nations. His inspections team had discovered warheads that Saddam had failed to declare or destroy, indications of the highly toxic VX nerve agent, and precursor chemicals for mustard gas. In addition, the Iraqi government was defying the inspections process. The regime had violated Resolution 1441 by blocking U-2 flights and hiding three thousand doc.u.ments in the home of an Iraqi nuclear official. "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it," Blix said. gave a formal report to the United Nations. His inspections team had discovered warheads that Saddam had failed to declare or destroy, indications of the highly toxic VX nerve agent, and precursor chemicals for mustard gas. In addition, the Iraqi government was defying the inspections process. The regime had violated Resolution 1441 by blocking U-2 flights and hiding three thousand doc.u.ments in the home of an Iraqi nuclear official. "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it," Blix said.

I could see what was happening: Saddam was trying to s.h.i.+ft the burden of proof from himself to us. I reminded our partners that the UN resolution clearly stated that it was Saddam's responsibility to comply. As Mohamed ElBaradei Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, explained in late January, "The ball is entirely in Iraq's court....Iraq now has to prove that it is innocent....They need to go out of their way to prove through whatever possible means that they have no weapons of ma.s.s destruction."

In late January, Tony Blair Tony Blair came to Was.h.i.+ngton for a strategy session. We agreed that Saddam had violated UN Security Council Resolution 1441 by submitting a false declaration. We had ample justification to enforce the "serious consequences." But Tony wanted to go back to the UN for a second resolution clarifying that Iraq had "failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it." came to Was.h.i.+ngton for a strategy session. We agreed that Saddam had violated UN Security Council Resolution 1441 by submitting a false declaration. We had ample justification to enforce the "serious consequences." But Tony wanted to go back to the UN for a second resolution clarifying that Iraq had "failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it."

"It's not that we need it," Tony said. "A second resolution gives us military and political protection."

I dreaded the thought of plunging back into the UN. d.i.c.k, Don, and Condi were opposed. Colin told me that we didn't need another resolution and probably couldn't get one. But if Tony wanted a second resolution, we would try. "As I see it, the issue of the second resolution is how best to help our friends," I said.

The best way to get a second resolution was to lay out the evidence against Saddam. I asked Colin to make the presentation to the UN. He had credibility as a highly respected diplomat known to be reluctant about the possibility of war. I knew he would do a thorough, careful job. In early February, Colin spent four days and four nights at the CIA personally reviewing the intelligence to ensure he was comfortable with every word in his speech. On February 5, he took the microphone at the Security Council.

"The facts on Iraq's behavior," he said, "demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort-no effort-to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of ma.s.s destruction."

Colin's presentation was exhaustive, eloquent, and persuasive. Coming against the backdrop of Saddam's defiance of the weapons inspectors, it had a profound impact on the public debate. Later, many of the a.s.sertions in Colin's speech would prove inaccurate. But at the time, his words reflected the considered judgment of intelligence agencies at home and around the world.

"We are both moral men," Jacques Chirac Jacques Chirac told me after Colin's speech. "But in this case, we see morality differently." I replied politely, but I thought to myself: told me after Colin's speech. "But in this case, we see morality differently." I replied politely, but I thought to myself: If a dictator who tortures and ga.s.ses his people is not immoral, then who is? If a dictator who tortures and ga.s.ses his people is not immoral, then who is?

Three days later, Chirac stepped in front of the cameras and said, "Nothing today justifies war." He, Gerhard Schroeder Gerhard Schroeder, and Vladimir Putin Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement of opposition. All three of them sat on the Security Council. The odds of a second resolution looked bleak. issued a joint statement of opposition. All three of them sat on the Security Council. The odds of a second resolution looked bleak.

Tony urged that we forge ahead. "The stakes are now much higher," he wrote to me on February 19. "It is apparent to me from the EU summit that France wants to make this a crucial test: Is Europe America's partner or compet.i.tor?" He reminded me we had support from a strong European coalition, including Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and all of Eastern Europe. In a recent NATO vote, fifteen members of the alliance had supported military action in Iraq, with only Belgium and Luxembourg standing with Germany and France. Portuguese Prime Minister urged that we forge ahead. "The stakes are now much higher," he wrote to me on February 19. "It is apparent to me from the EU summit that France wants to make this a crucial test: Is Europe America's partner or compet.i.tor?" He reminded me we had support from a strong European coalition, including Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and all of Eastern Europe. In a recent NATO vote, fifteen members of the alliance had supported military action in Iraq, with only Belgium and Luxembourg standing with Germany and France. Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Barroso Jose Barroso spoke for many European leaders when he asked, incredulously, "We are faced with the choice of America or Iraq, and we're going to pick Iraq?" spoke for many European leaders when he asked, incredulously, "We are faced with the choice of America or Iraq, and we're going to pick Iraq?"

Tony and I agreed on a strategy: We would introduce the second resolution at the UN, joined by the visionary leader of Spain, Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar Jose Maria Aznar. If we lined up enough yes votes, we might be able to persuade France and Russia to abstain rather than veto. If not, we would pull down the resolution, and it would be clear they had blocked the final diplomatic effort.

The second resolution, which we introduced on February 24, 2003, was important for another reason. Tony was facing intense internal pressure on the issue of Iraq, and it was important for him to show that he had exhausted every possible alternative to military force. Factions of the Labour Party had revolted against him. By early March, it wasn't clear if his government could survive.

I called Tony and expressed my concern. I told him I'd rather have him drop out of the coalition and keep his government than try to stay in and lose it.

"I said I'm with you," Tony answered.

I pressed my point again.

"I understand that, and that's good of you to say," he replied. "I absolutely believe in this. I will take it up to the very last."

I heard an echo of Winston Churchill in my friend's voice. It was a moment of courage that will stay with me forever.

At Tony's request, I made one last effort to persuade Mexico and Chile, two wavering Security Council members, to support the second resolution. My first call was to my friend President Vicente Fox Vicente Fox. The conversation got off to an inauspicious start. When I told Vicente I was calling about the UN resolution, he asked which one I meant. "If I can give you some advice," I said, "you should not be seen teaming up with the French." He said he would think about it and get back to me. An hour pa.s.sed. Then Condi heard from the emba.s.sy. Vicente had checked into the hospital for back surgery. I never did hear from him on the issue.

My conversation with President Ricardo Lagos Ricardo Lagos of Chile did not go much better. He was a distinguished, scholarly man and an effective leader. We had negotiated a free trade agreement that I hoped Congress would approve soon. But public opinion in Chile ran against a potential war, and Ricardo was reluctant to support the resolution. He talked about giving Saddam an additional two or three weeks. I told him a few more weeks would make no difference. Saddam had already had years to comply. "It is sad it has come down to this," I said. I asked one last time how he planned to vote. He said no. of Chile did not go much better. He was a distinguished, scholarly man and an effective leader. We had negotiated a free trade agreement that I hoped Congress would approve soon. But public opinion in Chile ran against a potential war, and Ricardo was reluctant to support the resolution. He talked about giving Saddam an additional two or three weeks. I told him a few more weeks would make no difference. Saddam had already had years to comply. "It is sad it has come down to this," I said. I asked one last time how he planned to vote. He said no.

As the diplomatic process drifted along, the pressure for action had been mounting. In early 2003, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan Alan Greenspan told me the uncertainty was hurting the economy. told me the uncertainty was hurting the economy. Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia, the kingdom's longtime amba.s.sador to Was.h.i.+ngton and a friend of mine since Dad's presidency, came to the Oval Office and told me our allies in the Middle East wanted a decision.

Whenever I heard someone claim that we had rushed to war, I thought back to this period. It had been more than a decade since the Gulf War resolutions had demanded that Saddam disarm, over four years since he had kicked out the weapons inspectors, six months since I had issued my ultimatum at the UN, four months since Resolution 1441 had given Saddam his "final opportunity," and three months past the deadline to fully disclose his WMD. Diplomacy did not feel rushed. It felt like it was taking forever.

Meanwhile, the threats continued. President Hosni Mubarak Hosni Mubarak of Egypt had told Tommy Franks that Iraq had biological weapons and was certain to use them on our troops. He refused to make the allegation in public for fear of inciting the Arab Street. But the intelligence from a Middle Eastern leader who knew Saddam well had an impact on my thinking. Just as there were risks to action, there were risks to inaction as well: Saddam with a biological weapon was a serious threat to us all. of Egypt had told Tommy Franks that Iraq had biological weapons and was certain to use them on our troops. He refused to make the allegation in public for fear of inciting the Arab Street. But the intelligence from a Middle Eastern leader who knew Saddam well had an impact on my thinking. Just as there were risks to action, there were risks to inaction as well: Saddam with a biological weapon was a serious threat to us all.

In the winter of 2003, I sought opinions on Iraq from a variety of sources. I asked for advice from scholars, Iraqi dissidents in exile, and others outside the administration. One of the most fascinating people I met with was Elie Wiesel Elie Wiesel, the author, Holocaust survivor, and deserving n.o.bel Peace Prize recipient. Elie is a sober and gentle man. But there was pa.s.sion in his seventy-four-year-old eyes when he compared Saddam Hussein's brutality to the n.a.z.i genocide. "Mr. President," he said, "you have a moral obligation to act against evil." The force of his conviction affected me deeply. Here was a man who had devoted his life to peace urging me to intervene in Iraq. As he later explained in an op-ed: "Though I oppose war, I am in favor of intervention when, as in this case because of Hussein's equivocations and procrastinations, no other option remains."

With Elie Wiesel. White House/Paul Draper White House/Paul Draper I've always wondered why many critics of the war did not acknowledge the moral argument made by people like Elie Wiesel. Many of those who demonstrated against military action in Iraq were devoted advocates of human rights. Yet they condemned me for using force to remove the man who had ga.s.sed the Kurds, mowed down the s.h.i.+a by helicopter guns.h.i.+p, ma.s.sacred the Marsh Arabs, and sent tens of thousands to ma.s.s graves. I understood why people might disagree on the threat Saddam Hussein posed to the United States. But I didn't see how anyone could deny that liberating Iraq advanced the cause of human rights.

With diplomacy faltering, our military planning sessions had increasingly focused on what would happen after the removal of Saddam. In later years, some critics would charge that we failed to prepare for the postwar period. That sure isn't how I remember it.

Starting in the fall of 2002, a group led by Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley Steve Hadley produced in-depth plans for post-Saddam Iraq. Two of our biggest concerns were starvation and refugees. Sixty percent of Iraqis were dependent on the government as a source of food. An estimated two million Iraqis could be displaced from their homes during war. produced in-depth plans for post-Saddam Iraq. Two of our biggest concerns were starvation and refugees. Sixty percent of Iraqis were dependent on the government as a source of food. An estimated two million Iraqis could be displaced from their homes during war.

On January 15, Elliott Abrams Elliott Abrams, a senior NSC staffer, delivered a detailed briefing on our preparations. We planned to prestation food, blankets, medicine, tents, and other relief supplies. We produced maps of where refugees could be sheltered. We deployed experienced humanitarian relief experts to enter Iraq alongside our troops. We had pinpointed the locations of most of Iraq's fifty-five thousand food distribution points and made arrangements with international organizations-including the World Food Programme-to make sure plenty of food was available.

We also developed plans for long-term reconstruction. We focused on ten areas: education, health, water and sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, governance and rule of law, agriculture, communications, and economic policy. For each, we gathered data, formulated a strategy, and set precise goals. For example, USAID determined that Iraq had 250 nonmilitary general hospitals, 20 military hospitals, 5 medical college hospitals, and 995 civilian medical care centers. Our plan called for surging medical supplies into the country, working to recruit Iraqi doctors and nurses living abroad to return home, training new medical personnel, and, ultimately, handing control to a new Iraqi health ministry.

One of the toughest questions was how to plan for a post-Saddam political system. Some in the administration suggested that we turn over power immediately to a group of Iraqi exiles. I didn't like the idea. While the exiles had close connections in Was.h.i.+ngton, I felt strongly that the Iraqis' first leader should be someone they selected. I was mindful of the British experience in Iraq in the 1920s. Great Britain had installed a non-Iraqi king, Faisal, who was viewed as illegitimate and whose appointment stoked resentment and instability. We were not going to repeat that mistake.

The other major challenge was how to provide security after Saddam. Some intelligence reports predicted that most of Saddam's army and police would switch sides once the regime was gone. The top commanders-those with innocent blood on their hands-would not be invited to rejoin. But we would draw on the rest of the Saddam-era forces to form the foundation of the new Iraqi military and police.

In January 2003, I issued a presidential directive, NSPD 24, creating a new Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian a.s.sistance. ORHA was charged with turning our conceptual plans into concrete action. We based the office in the Pentagon, so that our civilian efforts in Iraq would run through the same chain of command as our military operations. To lead the office, Don Rumsfeld tapped Jay Garner Jay Garner, a retired general who had coordinated the military's relief effort in northern Iraq in 1991. He recruited a cadre of civilian experts from across the government who would stand by to deploy to Baghdad.

By having our plans and personnel ready before the war, I felt we were well prepared. Yet we were aware of our limitations. Our nation building capabilities were limited, and no one knew for sure what needs would arise. The military had an old adage: "No battle plan battle plan survives first contact with the enemy." As we would learn in Iraq, that was doubly true of a plan for the postwar environment. survives first contact with the enemy." As we would learn in Iraq, that was doubly true of a plan for the postwar environment.

By March 2003, the battle plan was ready. After more than a year of probing and questioning, Tommy Franks and his team had developed an operation that I was confident would overthrow Saddam Hussein swiftly and decisively, while minimizing the loss of American and Iraqi life. The one remaining uncertainty was the role of Turkey Turkey. For months, we had been pressing the Turks to give us access to their territory so that we could send fifteen thousand troops from the Fourth Infantry Division to enter Iraq from the north. We promised to provide economic and military aid, help Turkey access key programs from the International Monetary Fund, and maintain our strong support for Turkey's admission to the European Union.

At one point, it looked like we would get permission. Prime Minister Abdullah Gul Abdullah Gul's cabinet approved our request. But when the Turkish parliament held a final vote on March 1, it came up just short of pa.s.sage. I was frustrated and disappointed. On one of the most important requests we had ever made, Turkey, our NATO ally, had let America down.

Don and Tommy held the Fourth Infantry Division in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, where it could deploy through Turkey if the government changed its mind or, otherwise, join the invasion from Kuwait. We also planned to deploy a thousand paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne to the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. This wasn't our first choice, but at least we would have a foothold for a northern front.

In the south, we had more than 150,000 American troops on Iraq's border, with some 90,000 more stationed in the Gulf region. I had made it abundantly clear that we would use them if necessary. Coercive diplomacy Coercive diplomacy had brought us to our maximum point of leverage. The military and diplomatic tracks had fully converged. The choice between war and peace belonged to Saddam Hussein alone. had brought us to our maximum point of leverage. The military and diplomatic tracks had fully converged. The choice between war and peace belonged to Saddam Hussein alone.

For months, the National Security Council had been meeting almost daily to discuss Iraq. I knew where all my advisers stood. d.i.c.k Cheney was concerned about the slow diplomatic process. He warned that Saddam Hussein could be using the time to produce weapons, hide weapons, or plot an attack. At one of our weekly lunches that winter, d.i.c.k asked me directly, "Are you going to take care of this guy, or not?" That was his way of saying he thought we had given diplomacy enough time. I appreciated d.i.c.k's blunt advice. I told him I wasn't ready to move yet. "Okay, Mr. President, it's your call," he said. Then he deployed one of his favorite lines. "That's why they pay you the big bucks," he said with a gentle smile.

Don Rumsfeld was not as definitive. He a.s.sured me the military would be ready if I gave the order. He also warned that we couldn't leave 150,000 troops sitting on Iraq's border forever. The logistical strain of supporting that many forces was immense. At some point, the buildup would lose its coercive value because Saddam would conclude we weren't serious about sending the troops in.

Condi was careful to stay neutral at the NSC meetings, but she gave me her opinion in private. She had been a strong supporter of inspections. But after meeting with Blix Blix and his team, she was convinced Saddam would do nothing but stall. She reluctantly concluded that the only way to enforce the UN resolution would be to use the military option. and his team, she was convinced Saddam would do nothing but stall. She reluctantly concluded that the only way to enforce the UN resolution would be to use the military option.

Colin had the deepest reservations. In a one-on-one meeting in early 2003, he had told me he believed we could manage the threat of Iraq diplomatically. He also told me he was not fully comfortable with the war plans. That did not surprise me. The operation Tommy Franks had conceived would use about a third as many troops as we had in the Gulf War. It marked a stark departure from the belief that America could win wars only by deploying ma.s.sive, decisive force-commonly known as the Powell Doctrine.

I was pleased when Colin told me he had shared his concerns about the plan with Tommy. Colin had been chairman of the Joint Chiefs during Desert Storm, and I was confident Tommy would take his input seriously. While I was still hopeful diplomacy would work, I told Colin it was possible that we would reach the point where war was the only option left. Neither of us wanted war, but I asked if he would support military action as a last resort. "If this is what you have to do," he said, "I'm with you, Mr. President."

On Sunday morning, March 16, I boarded Air Force One and winged my way to the Azores Islands, a Portuguese territory about two thirds of the way from Was.h.i.+ngton to Lisbon. I was headed to a last-minute summit on diplomatic strategy with Tony Blair Tony Blair, Jose Maria Aznar Jose Maria Aznar, and Prime Minister Jose Barroso Jose Barroso of Portugal. With the French, Germans, and Russians opposed to the second UN resolution, and the Mexicans and Chileans unwilling to provide their votes, we all agreed the diplomatic track had reached its end. We planned to withdraw the second UN resolution Monday morning. That evening, I would give of Portugal. With the French, Germans, and Russians opposed to the second UN resolution, and the Mexicans and Chileans unwilling to provide their votes, we all agreed the diplomatic track had reached its end. We planned to withdraw the second UN resolution Monday morning. That evening, I would give Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein and his sons forty-eight hours to leave the country, a final opportunity to avoid war. and his sons forty-eight hours to leave the country, a final opportunity to avoid war.

With three steadfast European allies at the Azores Islands, (from left) Jose Barroso, Tony Blair, and Jose Maria Aznar. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper Tony's critical vote in parliament would come Tuesday. He told me he would resign if the vote failed, meaning that Great Britain would withdraw from the military coalition. I never imagined I would be following a British parliamentary vote so closely, let alone pulling for the Labour Party prime minister. I shook hands with my friend and his team as we left the Azores. "I hope that's not the last time we ever see them," Condi said on the walk to Air Force One.

The flight home was long and quiet. After so much planning and waiting, the moment had arrived. Unless Saddam fled the country, we would be at war in three days. I was deeply disappointed that diplomacy had failed. But I had promised the American people, our allies, and the world that we would enforce the UN resolutions UN resolutions. I was not going to break my word.

For months I had solicited advice, listened to a variety of opinions, and considered the counterarguments. Some believed we could contain Saddam by keeping the inspectors in Iraq. But I didn't see how. If we were to tell Saddam he had another chance-after declaring this was his last chance-we would shatter our credibility and embolden him.

Others suggested that the threat wasn't as serious as we thought. That was easy for them to say. They weren't responsible for protecting the country. I remembered the shattering pain of 9/11, a surprise attack for which we had received no warning. This time we had a warning like a blaring siren. Years of intelligence pointed overwhelmingly to the conclusion that Saddam had WMD. He had used them in the past. He had not met his responsibility to prove their destruction. He had refused to cooperate with the inspectors, even with the threat of an invasion on his doorstep. The only logical conclusion was that he was hiding WMD. And given his support of terror and his sworn hatred of America, there was no way to know where those weapons would end up.

Others alleged that America's real intent was to control Iraq's oil or satisfy Israel. Those theories were false. I was sending our troops into combat to protect the American people.

I knew the cost would be high. But inaction had a cost, too. Given everything we knew, allowing Saddam to stay in power would have amounted to an enormous gamble. I would have had to bet that either every major intelligence agency was wrong or that Saddam would have a change of heart. After seeing the horror of 9/11, that was not a chance I was willing to take. Military action was my last resort. But I believed it was necessary.

The next day, Monday, March 17, 2003, Amba.s.sador John Negroponte John Negroponte withdrew the second resolution at the UN. That night, I addressed the nation from the Cross Hall of the White House. "The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours," I said, "...Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing." withdrew the second resolution at the UN. That night, I addressed the nation from the Cross Hall of the White House. "The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours," I said, "...Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing."

The next two days felt like a week. We did get some good news on Tuesday: Tony Blair Tony Blair had won his vote in parliament by a solid margin. Great Britain would be at our side. had won his vote in parliament by a solid margin. Great Britain would be at our side.

George Tenet and Colin Powell kept me updated on the latest developments with Iraq. Our last-ditch hope was that Saddam would agree to go into exile. At one point, an offer from a Middle Eastern government to send Saddam to Belarus with $1 to $2 billion looked like it might gain traction. Instead, in one of his last acts, Saddam ordered the tongue of a dissident slashed out and left the man to bleed to death. The dictator of Iraq had made his decision. He chose war.

On Wednesday morning, I convened the entire National Security Council in the Situation Room, where I gave the order to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom. Six hours later, I got an unexpected call from Don Rumsfeld. He said that he had something major to discuss. He and George Tenet were on their way to the Oval Office.

"What's going on?" I asked when they arrived.

"Mr. President," George said, "we think we have a chance to kill Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein."

What followed was one of the most extraordinary meetings of my presidency. With the full national security team gathered in the Oval Office, advisers scrambled in and out providing the latest updates from the field. A network of intelligence sources in Iraq reported that Saddam and some of his family were likely to spend the night at a complex outside Baghdad called Dora Farms. If we bombed the site, we might be able to decapitate the regime.

I was skeptical. If I ordered the airstrike, we would be departing from our well-conceived plan, which called for two days of covert operations before the air war commenced. I pictured all that could go wrong. Two F-117 bombers would have to fly unescorted over a heavily fortified city. My biggest concern was that the intelligence was a trap. What if it was not Saddam headed to Dora Farms, but a busload of kids? The first images of the war would show us killing innocent Iraqi children.