Decision Points Part 16

The safest course was to stick with the plan. But one thought kept recurring: By killing the dictator we might be able to end the war before it began, and spare lives. I felt a responsibility to seize this opportunity. General Myers briefed me that the planes were ga.s.sed up and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles were programmed. I turned to the team gathered in the Oval Office and said, "Let's go." Just after the forty-eight-hour deadline expired, the bombing began.

Condi called early the next morning. A witness had seen a man who resembled Saddam being carried out of the rubble at Dora Farms. But as the days pa.s.sed, the reports changed. The operation was a harbinger of things to come. Our intent was right. The pilots performed bravely. But the intelligence was wrong.

The day after the opening shot at Dora Farms, a flurry of military activity commenced. From Iraq's southern border with Kuwait, the V Corps and First Marine Expeditionary Force started their parallel charge to Baghdad. Meanwhile, our air forces bombarded the capital. In the initial wave of the strike, more than three hundred cruise missiles-followed by stealth bombers-took out most of Saddam's military command and government headquarters. Unlike the firebombing of Dresden, the nuclear strikes on Hiros.h.i.+ma and Nagasaki, or the use of napalm on Vietnam, our attack spared much of Baghdad's civilian population and infrastructure. It was not only shock and awe, but one of the most precise air raids in history.

In southern Iraq, Marines deployed to protect key oil fields. Polish Special Forces and U.S. Navy SEALs secured offsh.o.r.e oil infrastructure. A British armored division liberated the southern city of Basra and the vital port of Umm Qasr. The oil fires and sabotage we feared never materialized, and we had cleared a path for humanitarian aid to flow into Iraq.

In northern Iraq, paratroopers seized key transit points and helped build an air bridge for supplies and humanitarian aid. With support from Kurdish forces, the Zarqawi camp was destroyed. In western Iraq, American, British, and Australian Special Forces patrolled the desert for Scud missiles and made sure Saddam never had the chance to attack Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, or other allies in the region.

By the end of the second week, our troops had reached the outskirts of Baghdad. They had endured blinding sandstorms, searing heat, and heavy hazmat gear to protect against the biological or chemical attack we feared. They faced fierce resistance from Saddam's most loyal forces, who attacked from civilian vehicles and hid behind human s.h.i.+elds. Yet they completed the fastest armored advance in the history of warfare. Along the way, they handed out candy and medicine to children and risked their lives to protect Iraqi civilians.

On April 4, Sergeant Paul Ray Smith and his men were securing a courtyard near the Baghdad airport. Saddam's Republican Guards ambushed them, wounding several of Sergeant Smith's men. Exposed to enemy fire, Sergeant Smith manned a machine gun and kept shooting until he suffered a mortal wound. The Army's after-action report revealed that he had killed fifty enemy soldiers and saved as many as one hundred Americans. For his act of bravery, Paul Ray Smith became the first soldier in the war on terror to earn the Medal of Honor. In April 2005, I presented the medal to his widow, Birgit, and young son at the White House.

The day after Sergeant Smith gave his life to secure the airport, the Third Infantry Division entered Baghdad. The First Marine Division arrived two days later. At the NSC meeting on the morning of April 9, Tommy Franks reported that the Iraqi capital could fall at any moment. My next meeting was with President Rudolf Schuster Rudolf Schuster of Slovakia. His young democracy, one of forty-eight countries that had pledged military or logistical support in Iraq, had deployed a unit trained to manage the impact of a WMD attack. President Schuster had tears in his eyes as he described his nation's pride in helping liberate Iraq. I kept that moment in mind when I heard critics allege that America acted unilaterally. The false charge denigrated our allies and p.i.s.sed me off. of Slovakia. His young democracy, one of forty-eight countries that had pledged military or logistical support in Iraq, had deployed a unit trained to manage the impact of a WMD attack. President Schuster had tears in his eyes as he described his nation's pride in helping liberate Iraq. I kept that moment in mind when I heard critics allege that America acted unilaterally. The false charge denigrated our allies and p.i.s.sed me off.

When the meeting ended, Dan Bartlett Dan Bartlett told me I ought to take a look at the TV. I didn't keep one in the Oval Office, so I went to the area outside where my personal a.s.sistants sat. I watched as a crowd of Iraqis in Baghdad's Firdos Square cheered while a Marine vehicle dragged down a forty-foot-tall statue of Saddam. told me I ought to take a look at the TV. I didn't keep one in the Oval Office, so I went to the area outside where my personal a.s.sistants sat. I watched as a crowd of Iraqis in Baghdad's Firdos Square cheered while a Marine vehicle dragged down a forty-foot-tall statue of Saddam.

For twenty days I had been filled with anxiety. Now I was overwhelmed with relief and pride. I was also mindful of the challenges ahead. Saddam's forces still controlled parts of northern Iraq, including his hometown of Tikrit. There were pockets of resistance from ruthless Baathist fighters called Fedayeen Saddam. And Saddam and his sons were on the run. As I told Jose Maria Aznar Jose Maria Aznar when I called to share the news, "You won't see us doing any victory dances or anything." when I called to share the news, "You won't see us doing any victory dances or anything."

I should have followed my own advice. Tommy Franks felt it was important to show that a new phase in the war had begun. As a way to do that, I decided to give a speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln, which was returning home after ten months at sea. The five thousand sailors, airmen, and Marines aboard the carrier had supported operations in both the Afghan and Iraqi theaters.

On May 1, 2003, I climbed into the seat of a military jet for the first time in more than thirty years. Navy pilot Scott Zellem Scott Zellem, known by his call sign as Z-Man, briefed us on the safety procedures at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego.*** Commander John "Skip" Lussier, a fine pilot with more than five hundred carrier landings on his resume, got our S-3B Viking off the ground. At one point, he handed the controls to me, and I flew the jet for a few minutes over the Pacific Ocean. I was rusty, but after a few porpoises I steadied out. The commander wisely took over as we approached the carrier. He guided the plane down to the deck and caught the final arresting wire. Commander John "Skip" Lussier, a fine pilot with more than five hundred carrier landings on his resume, got our S-3B Viking off the ground. At one point, he handed the controls to me, and I flew the jet for a few minutes over the Pacific Ocean. I was rusty, but after a few porpoises I steadied out. The commander wisely took over as we approached the carrier. He guided the plane down to the deck and caught the final arresting wire.

Aboard the Lincoln, Lincoln, I visited with the landing crew, marveled at takeoffs and landings in the catapult zone, and ate chow with the sailors and Marines. "My fellow Americans," I said in my speech, "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended....The transition from dictators.h.i.+p to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq." I visited with the landing crew, marveled at takeoffs and landings in the catapult zone, and ate chow with the sailors and Marines. "My fellow Americans," I said in my speech, "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended....The transition from dictators.h.i.+p to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq."

Aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln. White House/Paul Morse White House/Paul Morse I hadn't noticed the large banner my staff had placed on the bridge of the s.h.i.+p, positioned for TV. It read "Mission Accomplished." It was intended as a tribute to the folks aboard the Lincoln Lincoln, which had just completed the longest deployment for an aircraft carrier of its cla.s.s. Instead, it looked like I was doing the victory dance I had warned against. "Mission Accomplished" became a shorthand criticism for all that subsequently went wrong in Iraq. My speech made clear that our work was far from done. But all the explaining in the world could not reverse the perception. Our stagecraft had gone awry. It was a big mistake.

With Saddam gone from power, our central objective became helping the Iraqis develop a democracy that could govern itself, sustain itself, defend itself, and serve as an ally in the war on terror. The objective was ambitious, but I was optimistic. Many of the dire contingencies we had planned for and worried about before the war had not come to pa.s.s. There had been no Fortress Baghdad, no ma.s.sive oil field fires, no widespread starvation, no civilian ma.s.sacre by Saddam, no WMD attack on our troops, and no terrorist attack on America or our allies.

There was one important contingency for which we had not adequately prepared. In the weeks after liberation, Baghdad descended into a state of lawlessness. I was appalled to see looters carrying precious artifacts out of Iraq's national museum and to read reports of kidnapping, murder, and rape. Part of the explanation was that Saddam had released tens of thousands of criminals shortly before the war. But the problem was deeper than that. Saddam had warped the psychology of Iraqis in a way we didn't fully understand. The suspicion and fear that he had cultivated for decades were rising to the surface.

"What the h.e.l.l is happening?" I asked during an NSC meeting in late April. "Why isn't anybody stopping these looters?"

The short answer was that there was a manpower shortage manpower shortage in Baghdad. The Iraqi police force had collapsed when the regime fell. The Iraqi army had melted away. Because of Turkey's decision, many of the American troops who liberated Baghdad had been required to continue north to free the rest of the country. The damage done in those early days created problems that would linger for years. The Iraqis were looking for someone to protect them. By failing to secure Baghdad, we missed our first chance to show that we could. in Baghdad. The Iraqi police force had collapsed when the regime fell. The Iraqi army had melted away. Because of Turkey's decision, many of the American troops who liberated Baghdad had been required to continue north to free the rest of the country. The damage done in those early days created problems that would linger for years. The Iraqis were looking for someone to protect them. By failing to secure Baghdad, we missed our first chance to show that we could.

The security vacuum was accompanied by a political vacuum. I decided to name an American administrator to provide order while we worked to develop a legitimate government. The idea grew into the Coalition Provisional Authority Coalition Provisional Authority, authorized by a United Nations resolution and led by a distinguished foreign service officer and counterterrorism expert, Amba.s.sador L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer.

Jerry impressed me from the start. He was an aggressive leader who shared my conviction that the Iraqis were capable of democracy. He knew it would take time for them to write a const.i.tution and prepare for elections. In one of our first meetings, he told me he'd read a study of previous postwar operations and thought we needed more troops in Iraq.

I raised the question of troop levels with Don Rumsfeld and the military leaders.h.i.+p. They a.s.sured me we had enough. They antic.i.p.ated the arrival of more forces from Coalition partners and believed we could train an Iraqi army and police force fairly quickly. They were also concerned about stirring up Iraqi nationalism and inciting violence by appearing to occupy the country.

I accepted Don and the military's judgment. The chaos and violence we witnessed was alarming, but it was still early. The situation reminded me of the difficult first days in Afghanistan. I refused to give up on our plan before it had a chance to work.

Bremer arrived in Iraq on May 12, 2003. One of his first tasks was to a.s.semble an Iraqi Governing Council that would take responsibility for key ministries and prepare for a formal return of sovereignty. Navigating Iraq's tribal, religious, and ethnic politics was highly complicated. But Jerry and his team did a superb job. The Governing Council took office in July, just four months after liberation. It included twenty-five Iraqis from all backgrounds. Iraqis still had a long way to go, but they had taken their first step toward a representative government. arrived in Iraq on May 12, 2003. One of his first tasks was to a.s.semble an Iraqi Governing Council that would take responsibility for key ministries and prepare for a formal return of sovereignty. Navigating Iraq's tribal, religious, and ethnic politics was highly complicated. But Jerry and his team did a superb job. The Governing Council took office in July, just four months after liberation. It included twenty-five Iraqis from all backgrounds. Iraqis still had a long way to go, but they had taken their first step toward a representative government.

Forming the Governing Council was an important way to demonstrate that Saddam's tyranny was gone forever. With that in mind, Jerry issued two orders shortly after his arrival in Baghdad. One declared that certain members of Saddam's Baath Party would not be eligible to serve in the new government of Iraq. The other formally disbanded the Iraqi army, which had largely disappeared on its own.

In some ways, the orders achieved their objectives. Iraq's s.h.i.+a and Kurds-the majority of the population-welcomed the clean break from Saddam. But the orders had a psychological impact I did not foresee. Many Sunnis took them as a signal they would have no place in Iraq's future. This was especially dangerous in the case of the army. Thousands of armed men had just been told they were not wanted. Instead of signing up for the new military, many joined the insurgency insurgency.

In retrospect, I should have insisted on more debate on Jerry's orders, especially on what message disbanding the army would send and how many Sunnis the de-Baathification would affect. Overseen by longtime exile Ahmed Chalabi Ahmed Chalabi, the de-Baathification program turned out to cut much deeper than we expected, including mid-level party members like teachers. It is possible we would have issued the orders anyway. They were tough calls, and any alternative would have created a separate set of problems. Had the s.h.i.+a concluded that we were not serious about ending the era of the Baath Party, they may have turned against the coalition, rejected the goal of a unified Iraqi democracy, and aligned themselves with Iran. There is no way to know for sure what would have happened, but the discussion would have better prepared us for what followed.

The security situation continued to deteriorate over the summer. Iraq was becoming a magnet for extremists-Baathist insurgents, Fedayeen Saddam, foreign terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda, and, later, militant s.h.i.+a and agents of Iran. These groups had different ideologies, but they shared an immediate goal: to drive America out of Iraq. They knew they could never win a direct fight against our troops, so they deployed roadside bombs and attacked nonmilitary targets such as the Jordanian emba.s.sy and the UN complex in Baghdad. Another tactic was to kidnap reconstruction workers and execute them in grisly Internet videos. Their strategy was to present an image of Iraq as hopeless and unwinnable, swinging American public opinion against the war and forcing us to withdraw as we had in Vietnam.

To an extent, they succeeded. It was difficult for the average American to differentiate the twisted terrorists from the millions of ordinary Iraqis who were grateful for liberation. We tried to get the good news out-the relative calm in the Kurdish north and s.h.i.+a south, the rebuilding of schools and hospitals, and the training of a new Iraqi army. But in the eyes of the media-and, therefore, of the public-none of this quiet progress could compete with the bombings and the beheadings.

In early July, a reporter asked me about attacks on our troops. "There are some who feel like that if they attack us that we may decide to leave prematurely," I said. "...My answer is: Bring 'em on."

Anytime I spoke on Iraq, there were multiple audiences listening, each of which had a different perspective. I thought about four in particular.

The first audience was the American people. Their support was essential to funding and fighting the war. I believed that most Americans wanted to win in Iraq. But if the cost seemed too high or victory too distant, they would grow weary. It was important for me to reinforce the importance of the cause and our determination to prevail.

The second audience was our troops. They had volunteered to serve and were risking their lives far from home. They and their families needed to know I believed in them, stood firmly behind their mission, and would not make military decisions based on politics.

The third audience was the Iraqi people. Some wanted us gone, but I was convinced that the vast majority of Iraqis wanted us to stay long enough to help a democratic society emerge. It was important that I communicate my resolve to complete the work we had begun. If Iraqis suspected we were going to abandon them, they would turn to other sources of protection.

The final audience was the enemy. They believed their acts of savagery could affect our decisions. I had to make clear they never would.

My "bring 'em on" comment "bring 'em on" comment was intended to show confidence in our troops and signal that the enemy could never shake our will. But the firestorm of criticism showed that I had left a wrong impression with other audiences. I learned from the experience and paid closer attention to how I communicated with each audience in the years ahead. was intended to show confidence in our troops and signal that the enemy could never shake our will. But the firestorm of criticism showed that I had left a wrong impression with other audiences. I learned from the experience and paid closer attention to how I communicated with each audience in the years ahead.

By the fall of 2003, the international coalition in Iraq was comprised of ground forces from thirty countries, including two multinational divisions led by Great Britain and Poland, and logistical support from many others. Coalition forces had discovered torture chambers, rape rooms, and ma.s.s graves containing thousands of bodies. They found a facility containing state-of-the-art hazmat suits and syringes with the antidote for VX nerve agent. But they had not found the stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons that virtually every major intelligence agency in the world believed Saddam had.

When Saddam didn't use WMD on our troops, I was relieved. When we didn't discover the stockpile soon after the fall of Baghdad, I was surprised. When the whole summer pa.s.sed without finding any, I was alarmed. The press corps constantly raised the question, "Where are the WMD?"

I was asking the same thing. The military and intelligence teams a.s.sured me they were looking constantly. They examined hidden sites Saddam had used during the Gulf War. They collected intelligence and responded to tips. At one point, the CIA heard that large canisters had been spotted from a bridge over the Euphrates River. Navy frogmen deployed to the scene. They found nothing. A high-ranking official from the United Arab Emirates brought drawings of tunnels he believed Saddam had used to hide weapons. We dug up the ground. Nothing materialized.

George Tenet recruited David Kay David Kay, the UN's chief weapons inspector in Iraq in 1991, to lead a new inspections team. Kay conducted a thorough search of Iraq and found irrefutable evidence that Saddam had lied to the world and violated Resolution 1441. "Iraq's WMD programs spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were elaborately s.h.i.+elded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom," he told Congress in October 2003. But there was one thing Kay did not find: the WMD stockpiles everyone expected.

The left trotted out a new mantra: "Bush Lied, People Died." The charge was illogical. If I wanted to mislead the country into war, why would I pick an allegation that was certain to be disproven publicly shortly after we invaded the country? The charge was also dishonest. Members of the previous administration, John Kerry John Kerry, John Edwards John Edwards, and the vast majority of Congress had all read the same intelligence that I had and concluded Iraq had WMD. So had intelligence agencies around the world. n.o.body was lying. We were all wrong. The absence of WMD stockpiles did not change the fact that Saddam was a threat. In January 2004, David Kay said, "It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat....What we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war."

Still, I knew the failure to find WMD would transform public perception of the war. While the world was undoubtedly safer with Saddam gone, the reality was that I had sent American troops into combat based in large part on intelligence that proved false. That was a ma.s.sive blow to our credibility-my credibility-that would shake the confidence of the American people.

No one was more shocked or angry than I was when we didn't find the weapons. I had a sickening feeling every time I thought about it. I still do.

While the fight in Iraq was more difficult than I expected, I remained optimistic. I was inspired by the courage of the one hundred thousand Iraqis who volunteered to join their security forces, by leaders who stepped forward to replace members of the Governing Council who had been a.s.sa.s.sinated, and by ordinary people who longed for freedom.

Nothing gave me more confidence than our troops. Thanks to them, most of the senior members of Saddam's regime had been captured or killed by the end of 2003. In July, we got an intelligence tip that Saddam's two sons were in the Mosul area of northern Iraq. Joined by Special Forces, troops from the 101st Airborne under the command of General David Petraeus laid siege to the building where Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay, were hiding. After a six-hour firefight, both were dead. We later received intelligence that Saddam had ordered the killing of Barbara Barbara and and Jenna Jenna in return for the death of his sons. in return for the death of his sons.

Two days after the fall of Baghdad, Laura Laura and I visited Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Was.h.i.+ngton and the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. We met with almost a hundred wounded service members and their families. Some were from Afghanistan; many were from Iraq. It was a heart-wrenching experience to look into a hospital bed and see the consequences of sending Americans into combat. One comfort was that I knew they would receive superb medical care from the skilled and compa.s.sionate professionals of the military health-care system. and I visited Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Was.h.i.+ngton and the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. We met with almost a hundred wounded service members and their families. Some were from Afghanistan; many were from Iraq. It was a heart-wrenching experience to look into a hospital bed and see the consequences of sending Americans into combat. One comfort was that I knew they would receive superb medical care from the skilled and compa.s.sionate professionals of the military health-care system.

Visiting the wounded was both the toughest and most inspiring part of my job. Here, with Sergeant Patrick Hagood at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. White House/Paul Morse White House/Paul Morse At Walter Reed, I met a member of the Delta Team, one of our elite Special Forces units. For cla.s.sification reasons, I cannot give his name. He had lost the lower half of his leg. "I appreciate your service," I said as I shook his hand. "I'm sorry you got hurt."

"Don't feel sorry for me, Mr. President," he replied. "Just get me another leg so I can go back in."

At the National Naval Medical Center, I met forty-two-year-old Marine Master Gunnery Sergeant Guadalupe Denogean. He had been wounded a few weeks earlier, when a rocket-propelled grenade struck his vehicle. The explosion blew off part of his skull and his right hand; shrapnel penetrated his upper back and legs, and his eardrums burst.

When asked if he had any requests, Guadalupe said he had two. He asked for a promotion for the corporal who had saved his life. And he wanted to become an American citizen. After 9/11, I had issued an executive order making all foreign nationals serving in the military eligible for immediate citizens.h.i.+p.

Guadalupe had come to the United States from Mexico as a boy. He picked fruit to help his family make a living until he joined the Marines at age seventeen. After serving for twenty-five years-and deploying for two wars with Iraq-he wanted the flag on his uniform to be his own. That day in the hospital, Laura Laura and I attended his naturalization ceremony, conducted by Director and I attended his naturalization ceremony, conducted by Director Eduardo Aguirre Eduardo Aguirre of the Bureau of Citizens.h.i.+p and Immigration Services. Guadalupe raised his right hand, covered in bandages, and swore the oath of citizens.h.i.+p. of the Bureau of Citizens.h.i.+p and Immigration Services. Guadalupe raised his right hand, covered in bandages, and swore the oath of citizens.h.i.+p.

Witnessing Master Gunnery Sergeant Guadalupe Denogean become an an American citizen. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper A few moments later, he was followed by Marine Lance Corporal O.J. Santamaria, a native of the Philippines. He was twenty-one years old and had suffered a serious wound in Iraq. He was hooked up to an intravenous blood transfusion. About halfway through the ceremony, he broke down in tears. He powered through to the end of the oath. I was proud to respond, "My fellow American."

In the fall of 2003, Andy Card Andy Card came to me with an idea. Was I interested in making a trip to Iraq to thank the troops? You bet I was. came to me with an idea. Was I interested in making a trip to Iraq to thank the troops? You bet I was.

The risk was high. But Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin Joe Hagin, working with the Secret Service and White House Military Office, came up with a way to pull it off. The week of Thanksgiving, I would travel to Crawford and tell the press I was staying for the full holiday. Then, on Wednesday night, I would slip out of the ranch and fly to Baghdad.

I told Laura several weeks ahead of the trip. She was rea.s.sured when I told her we would abort the trip if news of it leaked. I told Barbara Barbara and and Jenna Jenna about thirty minutes before I left. "I'm scared, Dad," Barbara said. "Be safe. Come home." about thirty minutes before I left. "I'm scared, Dad," Barbara said. "Be safe. Come home."

Condi and I climbed into an unmarked Suburban, our baseball caps pulled low, and headed for the airport. To maintain secrecy, there was no motorcade. I had nearly forgotten what a traffic jam felt like, but riding on I-35 the day before Thanksgiving brought the memories back. We crept along, pa.s.sing an occasional car full of countera.s.sault agents, and made it to Air Force One on schedule. Timeliness was important. We needed to land as the sun was setting in Baghdad.

We flew from Texas to Andrews Air Force Base, where we switched to the twin version of Air Force One and took off for Iraq. The plane carried a skeleton crew of staff, military and Secret Service personnel, and a press contingent sworn to secrecy. I slept little on the ten-and-a-half-hour flight. As we neared Baghdad, I showered, shaved, and headed to the c.o.c.kpit to watch the landing. Colonel Mark Tillman manned the controls. I trusted him completely. As Laura Laura always put it, "That Mark can sure land this plane." always put it, "That Mark can sure land this plane."

Sitting in the c.o.c.kpit of Air Force One on the approach to Baghdad. White House/Tina Hager White House/Tina Hager With the sun dropping on the horizon, I could make out the minarets of the Baghdad skyline. The city seemed so serene from above. But we were concerned about surface-to-air missiles on the ground. While Joe Hagin Joe Hagin a.s.sured us the military had cleared a wide perimeter around Baghdad International Airport, the mood aboard the plane was anxious. As we descended in a corkscrew pattern with the shades drawn, some staffers joined together in a prayer session. At the last moment, Colonel Tillman leveled out the plane and kissed the runway, no sweat. a.s.sured us the military had cleared a wide perimeter around Baghdad International Airport, the mood aboard the plane was anxious. As we descended in a corkscrew pattern with the shades drawn, some staffers joined together in a prayer session. At the last moment, Colonel Tillman leveled out the plane and kissed the runway, no sweat.

Waiting for me at the airport were Jerry Bremer and General Ricardo Sanchez, the senior ground commander in Iraq. "Welcome to a free Iraq," Jerry said.

We went to the mess hall, where six hundred troops had gathered for a Thanksgiving meal. Jerry was supposed to be the guest of honor. He told the troops he had a holiday message from the president. "Let's see if we've got anybody more senior here...," he said.

That was my cue. I walked out from behind a curtain and onto the stage of the packed hall. Many of the stunned troops hesitated for a split second, then let out deafening whoops and hooahs. Some had tears running down their faces. I was swept up by the emotion. These were the souls who just eight months earlier had liberated Iraq on my orders. Many had seen combat. Some had seen friends perish. I took a deep breath and said, "I bring a message on behalf of America. We thank you for your service, we're proud of you, and America stands solidly behind you."

After the speech, I had dinner with the troops and moved to a side room to meet with four members of the Governing Council, the mayor of Baghdad, and members of the city council. One woman, the director of a maternity hospital, told me how women had more opportunities now than they had ever dreamed about under Saddam. I knew Iraq still faced big problems, but the trip reinforced my faith that they could be overcome.

The most dangerous part left was the takeoff from Baghdad. We were told to keep all lights out and maintain total telephone silence until we hit ten thousand feet. I was still on an emotional high. But the exhilaration of the moment was replaced by an eerie feeling of uncertainty as we blasted off the ground and climbed silently through the night.

After a few tense minutes, we reached a safe alt.i.tude. I called one of the operators on the plane and asked him to connect me with Laura Laura. "Where are you?" she asked. "I am on the way home," I said. "Tell the girls all is well."

She sounded relieved. It turns out she'd had a little mix-up with the timing. She couldn't remember whether I said I would be in the air at 10:00 a.m. or noon. At 10:15, she had called a Secret Service agent at the ranch and asked if he had heard from President Bush. "Let me check," the agent said.

A few seconds pa.s.sed. "Yes, ma'am," he replied. "They are ninety minutes away."

She realized he was talking about Mother and Dad, who were on their way to spend Thanksgiving with us. "No, I mean my George," she said. The agent paused. "Well, ma'am," he said, "we show he is in the ranch house."

Secrecy was so tight that the agents on the ranch were still unaware that I had slipped away for the most thrilling trip of my presidency.

On Sat.u.r.day, December 13, Don Rumsfeld called. He had just spoken to General John Abizaid General John Abizaid, who had replaced Tommy Franks after his retirement in July. John was a cerebral, Lebanese American general who spoke Arabic and understood the Middle East. John believed we had captured Saddam Hussein. Before we announced it to the world, we had to be 100 percent sure.

The next morning, Condi called back to confirm the report. It was Saddam. His tattoos-three blue dots near his wrist, a symbol of his tribe-provided the telltale evidence. I was elated. Getting Saddam would be a big lift for our troops and for the American people. It would also make a psychological difference for the Iraqis, many of whom feared he would return. Now it was clear: The era of the dictator was over forever.

Several months later, four men came to see me at the White House. They were members of the Delta Team that had captured Saddam. They told me the story of the hunt. Intelligence pointed them to a farm near Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. As the soldiers combed the grounds, one discovered a hole. He climbed in and pulled out a disheveled, angry man.

"My name is Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein," the man said. "I am the president of Iraq and I want to negotiate."

"Regards from President Bush," the soldier replied.

Saddam had three weapons with him, including a pistol that the men presented to me in a gla.s.s box. I told them I would display the gift in the private study off the Oval Office and one day in my presidential library. The pistol always reminded me that a brutal dictator, responsible for so much death and suffering, had surrendered to our troops while cowering in a hole.

The pistol Saddam Hussein had with him when he was captured. George W. Bush Presidential Library George W. Bush Presidential Library

As I record these thoughts more than seven years after American troops liberated Iraq, I strongly believe that removing Saddam from power was the right decision. For all the difficulties that followed, America is safer without a homicidal dictator pursuing WMD and supporting terror at the heart of the Middle East. The region is more hopeful with a young democracy setting an example for others to follow. And the Iraqi people are better off with a government that answers to them instead of torturing and murdering them.

As we hoped, the liberation of Iraq had an impact beyond its borders. Six days after Saddam's capture, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi Muammar Qaddafi of Libya-a longtime enemy of America and state sponsor of terror-publicly confessed that he had been developing chemical and nuclear weapons. He pledged to dismantle his WMD programs, along with related missiles, under a system of strict international verification. It's possible the timing was a coincidence. But I don't think so. of Libya-a longtime enemy of America and state sponsor of terror-publicly confessed that he had been developing chemical and nuclear weapons. He pledged to dismantle his WMD programs, along with related missiles, under a system of strict international verification. It's possible the timing was a coincidence. But I don't think so.

The war also led to consequences we did not intend. Over the years, I've spent a great deal of time thinking about what went wrong in Iraq and why. I have concluded that we made two errors that account for many of the setbacks we faced.

The first is that we did not respond more quickly or aggressively when the security situation started to deteriorate after Saddam's regime fell. In the ten months following the invasion, we cut troop levels from 192,000 to 109,000. Many of the remaining troops focused on training the Iraqi army and police, not protecting the Iraqi people. We worried we would create resentment by looking like occupiers. We believed we could train Iraqi security forces to lead the fight. And we thought progress toward a representative democracy, giving Iraqis of all backgrounds a stake in their country, was the best path to lasting security.

While there was logic behind these a.s.sumptions, the Iraqi people's desire for security trumped their aversion to occupation. One of the ironies of the war is that we were criticized harshly by the left and some in the international community for wanting to build an empire in Iraq. We never sought that. In fact, we were so averse to anything that looked like an empire that we made our job far more difficult. By reducing our troop presence and focusing on training Iraqis, we inadvertently allowed the insurgency insurgency to gain momentum. Then to gain momentum. Then al Qaeda al Qaeda fighters flocked to Iraq seeking a new safe haven, which made our mission both more difficult and more important. fighters flocked to Iraq seeking a new safe haven, which made our mission both more difficult and more important.

Cutting troop levels too quickly was the most important failure of execution in the war. Ultimately, we adapted our strategy and fixed the problems, despite almost universal pressure to abandon Iraq. It took four painful, costly years to do so. At the time, progress felt excruciatingly slow. But history's perspective is broader. If Iraq is a functioning democracy fifty years from now, those four hard years might look a lot different.

The other error was the intelligence failure on Iraq's WMD. Almost a decade later, it is hard to describe how widespread an a.s.sumption it was that Saddam had WMD. Supporters of the war believed it; opponents of the war believed it; even members of Saddam's own regime believed it. We all knew that intelligence is never 100 percent certain; that's the nature of the business. But I believed that the intelligence on Iraq's WMD was solid. If Saddam didn't have WMD, why wouldn't he just prove it to the inspectors? Every psychological profile I had read told me Saddam was a survivor. If he cared so much about staying in power, why would he gamble his regime by pretending to have WMD?

Part of the explanation came after Saddam's capture, when he was debriefed by the FBI. He told agents that he was more worried about looking weak to Iran than being removed by the coalition. He never thought the United States would follow through on our promises to disarm him by force. I'm not sure what more I could have done to show Saddam I meant what I said. I named him part of an axis of evil in my State of the Union address. I spoke to a packed chamber of the United Nations and promised to disarm him by force if diplomacy failed. We presented him with a unanimous Security Council resolution. We sought and received strong bipartisan backing from the U.S. Congress. We deployed 150,000 troops to his border. I gave him a final forty-eight-hours' notice that we were about to invade his country. How much clearer could I have been?

It's true that Saddam was getting mixed signals from France, Germany, and Russia-and from antiwar demonstrators around the world. That didn't help. But the war is not their fault. There was one person with the power to avoid war, and he chose not to use it. For all his deception of the world, the person Saddam ultimately deceived the most was himself.

I decided early on that I would not criticize the hardworking patriots at the CIA for the faulty intelligence on Iraq. I did not want to repeat the nasty finger-pointing investigations that devastated the morale of the intelligence community in the 1970s. But I did want to know why the information I received was wrong and how we could prevent a similar mistake in the future. I appointed a nonpartisan commission co-chaired by Judge Larry Silberman Larry Silberman and former Democratic Senator and former Democratic Senator Chuck Robb Chuck Robb to study the question. Their investigation produced valuable recommendations-such as increasing coordination between agencies and publis.h.i.+ng more dissenting opinions-that will make intelligence more reliable for future presidents, without undermining our intelligence community's ability to do its job. to study the question. Their investigation produced valuable recommendations-such as increasing coordination between agencies and publis.h.i.+ng more dissenting opinions-that will make intelligence more reliable for future presidents, without undermining our intelligence community's ability to do its job.

The nature of history is that we know the consequences only of the action we took. But inaction would have had consequences, too. Imagine what the world would look like today with Saddam Hussein still ruling Iraq. He would still be threatening his neighbors, sponsoring terror, and piling bodies into ma.s.s graves. The rising price of oil-which jumped from just over $30 a barrel in 2003 to almost $140 five years later-would have left Saddam awash in wealth. The sanctions, already falling apart, almost certainly would have crumbled. Saddam still had the infrastructure and know-how to make WMD. And as the final weapons inspections report by Charles Duelfer Charles Duelfer concluded, "Saddam wanted to re-create Iraq's WMD capability...after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized." concluded, "Saddam wanted to re-create Iraq's WMD capability...after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized."