Logic Part 33

If the definition has been correctly abstracted from the particulars, the particulars have the attributes summarised in the definition; and, therefore, they have whatever can be shown to follow from those attributes. But it frequently happens that the argument rests partly on the qualities connoted by the cla.s.s name and partly on many other facts.

In Geometry, the proof of a theorem depends not only upon the definition of the figure or figures directly concerned, but also upon one or more axioms, and upon propria or constructions already established. Thus, in Euclid's fifth Proposition, the proof that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, depends not only on the equality of the opposite sides, but upon this together with the construction that shows how from the greater of two lines a part may be cut off equal to the less, the proof that triangles that can be conceived to coincide are equal, and the axiom that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal. Similarly, in Biology, if colouring favourable to concealment is a proprium of carnivorous animals, it is not deducible merely from their predatory character or any other attribute entering into the definition of any species of them, but from their predatory character together with the causes summarised in the phrase 'Natural Selection'; that is, compet.i.tion for a livelihood, and the destruction of those that labour under any disadvantages, of which conspicuous colouring would be one. The particular coloration of any given species, again, can only be deduced by further considering its habitat (desert, jungle or snowfield): a circ.u.mstance lying wholly outside the definition of the species.

The validity of an argument based partly or wholly on a definition depends, in the first place, on the existence of things corresponding with the definition--that is, having the properties connoted by the name defined. If there are no such things as isosceles triangles, Euclid's fifth Proposition is only formally true, like a theorem concerning the fourth dimension of s.p.a.ce: merely consistent with his other a.s.sumptions.

But if there be any triangles only approximately isosceles, the proof applies to them, making allowance for their concrete imperfection: the nearer their sides approach straightness and equality the more nearly equal will the opposite angles be.

Again, as to the things corresponding with terms defined, according to Dr. Venn, their 'existence' may be understood in several senses: (1) merely for the reason, like the pure genera and species of Porphyry's tree; the sole condition of whose being is logical consistency: or (2) for the imagination, like the giants and magicians of romance, the heroes of tragedy and the fairies of popular superst.i.tion; whose properties may be discussed, and verified by appeal to the right doc.u.ments and authorities (poems and ballads): or (3) for perception, like plants, animals, stones and stars. Only the third cla.s.s exist in the proper sense of the word. But under a convention or hypothesis of existence, we may argue from the definition of a fairy, or a demiG.o.d, or a dragon, and deduce various consequences without absurdity, if we are content with poetic consistency and the authority of myths and romances as the test of truth.

In the region of concrete objects, whose properties are causes, and neither merely fictions nor determinations of s.p.a.ce (as in Geometry), we meet with another condition of the validity of any argument depending on a definition: there must not only be objects corresponding to the definition, but there must be no other causes counteracting those qualities on whose agency our argument relies. Thus, though we may infer from the quality of co-operation connoted by civilisation, that a civilised country will be a wealthy one, this may not be found true of such a country recently devastated by war or other calamity. Nor can co-operation always triumph over disadvantageous circ.u.mstances.

Scandinavia is so poor in the gifts of nature favourable to industry, that it is not wealthy in spite of civilisation: still, it is far wealthier than it would be in the hands of a barbarous people. In short, when arguing from a definition, we can only infer the _tendency_ of any causal characteristics included in it; the unqualified realisation of such a tendency must depend upon the absence of counteracting causes. As soon as we leave the region of pure conceptions and make any attempt to bring our speculations home to the actual phenomena of nature or of human life, the verification of every inference becomes an unremitting obligation.

CHAPTER XXIV

FALLACIES

-- 1. A Fallacy is any failure to fulfil the conditions of proof. If we neglect or mistake the conditions of proof unintentionally, whether in our private meditations or in addressing others, it is a Paralogism: but if we endeavour to pa.s.s off upon others evidence or argument which we know or suspect to be unsound, it is a Sophism.

Fallacies, whether paralogisms or sophisms, may be divided into two cla.s.ses: (a) the Formal, or those that can be shown to conflict with one or more of the truths of Logic, whether Deductive or Inductive; as if we attempt to prove an universal affirmative in the Third Figure; or to argue that, as the average expectation of life for males at the age of 20 is 19-1/2 years, therefore Alcibiades, being 20 years of age, will die when he is 39-1/2; (b) the Material, or those that cannot be clearly exhibited as transgressions of any logical principle, but are due to superficial inquiry or confused reasoning; as in adopting premises on insufficient authority, or without examining the facts; or in mistaking the point to be proved.

-- 2. Formal Fallacies of Deduction and Induction are, all of them, breaches of the rule 'not to go beyond the evidence.' As a detailed account of them would be little else than a repet.i.tion of the foregoing chapters, it may suffice to recall some of the places at which it is easiest to go astray.

(1) It is not uncommon to mistake the Contrary for the Contradictory, as--A is not taller than B, ? he is shorter.

(2) To convert _A._ or _O._ simply, as--

All Money is Wealth ? All Wealth is Money;

or--Some Wealth is not Money ? Some Money is not Wealth.

In both these cases, Wealth, though undistributed in the convertend, is distributed in the converse.

(3) To attempt to syllogise with two premises containing four terms, as

The Papuans are savages; The Javanese are neighbours of the Papuans: ? The Javanese are savages.

Such an argument is excluded by the definition of a Syllogism, and presents no formal evidence whatever. We should naturally a.s.sume that any man who advanced it merely meant to raise some probability that 'neighbourhood is a sign of community of ideas and customs.' But, if so, he should have been more explicit. There would, of course, be the same failure of connection, if a fourth term were introduced into the conclusion, instead of into the premises.

(4) To distribute in the conclusion a term that was undistributed in the premises (an error essentially the same as (2) above), i.e., Illicit process of the major or minor term, as--

Every rational agent is accountable; Brutes are not rational agents: ? Brutes are not accountable.

In this example (from Whately), an illegitimate mood of Fig. I., the major term, 'accountable,' has suffered the illicit process; since, in the premise, it is predicate of an affirmative proposition and, therefore, undistributed; but, in the conclusion, it is predicate of a negative proposition and, therefore, distributed. The fact that nearly everybody would accept the conclusion as true, might lead one to overlook the formal inconclusiveness of the proof.

Again,

All men are two-handed; All two-handed animals are cooking animals: ? All cooking animals are men.

Here we have Bramantip concluding in A.; and there is, formally, an illicit process of the minor; though the conclusion is true; and the evidence, such as it is, is materially adequate. ('Two-handed,' being a peculiar differentia, is nugatory as a middle term, and may be cut out of both premises; whilst 'cooking' is a proprium peculiar to the species Man; so that these terms might be related in U., _All men are all cookers_; whence, by conversion, _All cookers are men_.)

(5) To omit to distribute the middle term in one or the other premise, as--

All verbal propositions are self-evident; All axioms are self-evident: ? All axioms are verbal propositions.

This is an illegitimate mood in Fig. II.; in which, to give any conclusion, one premise must be negative. It may serve as a formal ill.u.s.tration of Undistributed Middle; though, as both premises are verbal propositions, it is (materially) not syllogistic at all, but an error of cla.s.sification; a confounding of co-ordinate species by a.s.suming their ident.i.ty because they have the generic attribute in common.

(6) To simply convert an hypothetical proposition, as--

If trade is free, it prospers; ? If trade prospers, it is free.

This is similar to the simple conversion of the categorical A.; since it takes for granted that the antecedent is co-extensive with the consequent, or (in other words) that the freedom of trade is the sole condition of, or (at least) inseparable from, its prosperity.

The same a.s.sumption is made if, in an hypothetical syllogism, we try to ground an inference on the affirmation of the consequent or denial of the antecedent, as--

If trade is free it prospers: It does prosper; ? It is free.

It is not free; ? It does not prosper.

Neither of these arguments is formally good; nor, of course, is either of them materially valid, if it be possible for trade to prosper in spite of protective tariffs.

An important example of this fallacy is the prevalent notion, that if the conclusion of an argument is true the premises must be trustworthy; or, that if the premises are false the conclusion must be erroneous.

For, plainly, that--

If the premises are true, the conclusion is true, is a hypothetical proposition; and we argue justly--

The premises are true; ? The conclusion is true; or, The conclusion is false; ? The premises are false (or one of them is).

This is valid for every argument that is formally correct; but that we cannot trust the premises on the strength of the conclusion, nor reject the conclusion because the premises are absurd, the following example will show:

All who square the circle are great mathematicians; Newton squared the circle: ? Newton was a great mathematician.

The conclusion is true; but the premises are intolerable.

How the taking of Contraries for Contradictories may vitiate Disjunctive Syllogisms and Dilemmas has been sufficiently explained in the twelfth chapter.

-- 3. Formal Fallacies of Induction consist in supposing or inferring Causation without attempting to prove it, or in pretending to prove it without satisfying the Canons of observation and experiment: as--

(1) To a.s.sign the Cause of anything that is not a concrete event: as, e.g., why two circles can touch only in one point. We should give the 'reason'; for this expression includes, besides evidence of causation, the principles of formal deduction, logical and mathematical.

(2) To argue, as if on inductive grounds, concerning the cause of the Universe as a whole. This may be called the fallacy of transcendent inference: since the Canons are only applicable to instances of events that can be compared; they cannot deal with that which is in its nature unique.

(3) To mistake co-existent phenomena for cause and effect: as when a man, wearing an amulet and escaping s.h.i.+pwreck, regards the amulet as the cause of his escape. To prove his point, he must either get again into exactly the same circ.u.mstances without his amulet, and be drowned--according to the method of Difference; or, s.h.i.+rking the only satisfactory test, and putting up with mere Agreement, he must show, (a) that all who are s.h.i.+pwrecked and escape wear amulets, and (b) that their cases agree in nothing else; and (c), by the Joint Method, that all who are s.h.i.+pwrecked without amulets are drowned. And even if his evidence, according to Agreement, seemed satisfactory at all these points, it would still be fallacious to trust to it as proof of direct causation; since we have seen that unaided observation is never sufficient for this: it is only by experiment in prepared circ.u.mstances that we can confidently trace sequence and the transfer of energy.

There is the reverse error of mistaking causal connection for independent co-existence: as if any one regards it as merely a curious coincidence that great rivers generally flow past great towns. In this case, however, the evidence of connection does not depend merely upon direct Induction.

(4) _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc_: to accept the mere sequence of phenomena, even though often repeated, as proving that the phenomena are cause and effect, or connected by causation. This is a very natural error: for although, the antecedents of a phenomenon being numerous, most of them cannot be its cause, yet it is among them that the cause must be sought. Indeed, if there is neither time nor opportunity for a.n.a.lysis, it may seem better to accept any antecedent as a cause (or, at least, as a sign) of an important event than to go without any guide.

And, accordingly, the vast and complicated learning of omens, augury, horoscopy and prophetic dreams, relies upon this maxim; for whatever the origin of such superst.i.tions, a single coincidence in their favour triumphantly confirms them. It is the besetting delusion of everybody who has wishes or prejudices; that is, of all of us at some time or other; for then we are ready to believe without evidence. The fallacy consists in judging off-hand, without any attempt, either by logic or by common sense, to eliminate the irrelevant antecedents; which may include all the most striking and specious.