Philosophy - Who needs it Part 4

While recovering from [an] illness, I had a chance to catch up on some reading I had wanted to do for a long time. Opening one interesting book, I almost leaped out of bed. I read some statements which shocked me much more profoundly than any of today's p.r.o.nouncements in the news magazines or on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times. The New York Times. I had been reporting on some of those journalistic writings occasionally, as a warning against the kinds of intellectual dangers (and b.o.o.by traps) they represented. But they looked like cheap little graffiti compared to the sweep of wholesale destruction presented in a few sentences of that book. I had been reporting on some of those journalistic writings occasionally, as a warning against the kinds of intellectual dangers (and b.o.o.by traps) they represented. But they looked like cheap little graffiti compared to the sweep of wholesale destruction presented in a few sentences of that book.

Just as, at the end of Atlas Shrugged, Atlas Shrugged, Francisco saw a radiant future contained in a few words, so I saw the long, dismal, slithering disintegration of the twentieth century held implicitly in a few sentences. I wanted to scream a warning, but it was too late: that book had been published in 1898. Written by Friedrich Paulsen, it is ent.i.tled Francisco saw a radiant future contained in a few words, so I saw the long, dismal, slithering disintegration of the twentieth century held implicitly in a few sentences. I wanted to scream a warning, but it was too late: that book had been published in 1898. Written by Friedrich Paulsen, it is ent.i.tled Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine. Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine.

Professor Paulsen is a devoted Kantian; but, judging by his style of writing, he is an honest commentator- in the sense that he does not try to disguise what he is saying: "There are three att.i.tudes of the mind towards reality which lay claim to truth-Religion, Philosophy, and Science. . . . In general, philosophy occupies an intermediate place between science and religion. . . . The history of philosophy shows that its task consists simply in mediating between science and religion. It seeks to unite knowledge and faith, and in this way to restore the unity of the mental life. . . . As in the case of the individual, it mediates between the head and the heart, so in society it prevents science and religion from becoming entirely strange and indifferent to each other, and hinders also the mental life of the people from being split up into a faith-hating science and a science-hating faith or superst.i.tion." (New York, Ungar, 1963, pp. 1-2.) This means that science and mystic fantasies are equally valid as methods of gaining knowledge; that reason and feelings-the worst kinds of feelings: fear, cowardice, self-abnegation-have equal value as tools of cognition; and that philosophy, "the love of wisdom," is a contemptible middle-of-the-roader whose task is to seek a compromise-a detente-between truth and falsehood.

Professor Paulsen's statement is an accurate presentation of Kant's att.i.tude, but it is not Kant that shocked me, it is Paulsen. Philosophic system-builders, such as Kant, set the trends of a nation's culture (for good or evil), but it is the average pract.i.tioners who serve as a barometer of a trend's success or failure. What shocked me was the fact that a modest commentator would start his book with a statement of that kind. I thought (no, hoped hoped) that in the nineteenth century a man upholding the cognitive pretensions of religion to an equal footing with science, would have been laughed off any serious lectern. I was mistaken. Here was Professor Paulsen casually proclaiming-in the nineteenth century-that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology.

Existentially (i.e., in regard to conditions of living, scale of achievement, and rapidity of progress), the nineteenth century was the best in Western history. Philosophically, it was one of the worst. People thought they had entered an era of inexhaustible radiance; but it was merely the sunset of Aristotle's influence, which the philosophers were extinguis.h.i.+ng. If you have felt an occasional touch of wistful envy at the thought that there was a time when men went to the opening of a new play, and what they saw was not Hair Hair or or Grease, Grease, but but Cyrano de Bergerac, Cyrano de Bergerac, which opened in 1897-take a wider look. I wish that, borrowing from Victor Hugo's which opened in 1897-take a wider look. I wish that, borrowing from Victor Hugo's Notre Dame de Paris, Notre Dame de Paris, someone had pointed to the Paulsen book, then to the play, and said: " someone had pointed to the Paulsen book, then to the play, and said: "This will kill will kill that. that." But there was no such person.

I do not mean to imply that the Paulsen book had so fateful an influence; I am citing the book as a symptom, not a cause. The cause and the influence were Kant's. Paulsen merely demonstrates how thoroughly that malignancy had spread through Western culture at the dawn of the twentieth century.

The conflict between knowledge and faith, Paulsen explains, "has extended through the entire history of human thought" (p. 4) and Kant's great achievement, he claims, consisted in reconciling them. ". . . the critical [Kantian] philosophy solves the old problem of the relation of knowledge and faith. Kant is convinced that by properly fixing the limits of each he has succeeded in furnis.h.i.+ng a basis for an honorable and enduring peace between them. Indeed, the significance and vitality of his philosophy will rest princ.i.p.ally upon this. . . . it is [his philosophy's] enduring merit to have drawn for the first time, with a firm hand and in clear outline, the dividing line between knowledge and faith. This gives to knowledge what belongs to it-the entire world of phenomena for free investigation; it conserves, on the other hand, to faith its eternal right to the interpretation of life and of the world from the standpoint of value." (P. 6.) This means that the ancient mind-body dichotomy-which the rise of science had been healing slowly, as men were learning how to live on earth-was revived by Kant, and man was split in two, not with old daggers, but with a meat-ax. It means that Kant gave to science the entire material world (which, however, was to be regarded as unreal), and left ("conserved") one thing to faith: morality. morality. If you are not entirely sure of which side would win in a division of that kind, look around you today. If you are not entirely sure of which side would win in a division of that kind, look around you today.

Material objects as such have neither value nor disvalue; they acquire value-significance only in regard to a living being-particularly, in regard to serving or hindering man's goals. Man's goals and values are determined by his moral code. The Kantian division allows man's reason to conquer the material world, but eliminates reason from the choice of the goals for which material achievements are to be used. Man's goals, actions, choices and values-according to Kant-are to be determined irrationally, i.e., by faith.

In fact, man needs morality in order to discover the right way to live on earth. In Kant's system, morality is severed from any concern with man's existence. In fact, man's every problem, goal or desire involves the material world. In Kant's system, morality has nothing to do with this world, nor with reason, nor with science, but comes-via feelings-from another, unknowable, "noumenal" dimension.

If you share the error prevalent among modern businessmen, and tend to believe that nonsense such as Kant's is merely a verbal pastime for mentally unemployed academicians, that it is too preposterous to be of any practical consequence-look again at the opening quotation from Professor Paulsen's book. Yes, it is nonsense and vicious nonsense-but, by grace of the above att.i.tude, it has conquered the world.

There is more than one way of accepting and spreading a philosophic theory. The guiltiest group, which has contributed the most to the victory of Kantianism, is the group that professes to despise it: the scientists. Adopting one variant or another of Logical Positivism (a Kantian offshoot), they rejected Kant's noumenal dimension, but agreed that the material world is unreal, that reality is unknowable, and that science does not deal with facts, but with constructs. They rejected any concern with morality, agreeing that morality is beyond the power of reason or science and must be surrendered to subjective whims.

Now observe the breach between the physical sciences and the humanities. Although the progress of theoretical science is slowing down (by reason of a flawed epistemology, among other things), the momentum of the Aristotelian past is so great that science is still moving forward, while the humanities are bankrupt. Spatially, science is reaching beyond the solar system-while, temporally, the humanities are sliding back into the primeval ooze. Science is landing men on the moon and monitoring radio emissions from other galaxies-while astrology is the growing fas.h.i.+on here on earth; while courses in astrology and black magic are given in colleges; while horoscopes are sent galloping over the airwaves of a great scientific achievement, television.

Scientists are willing to produce nuclear weapons for the thugs who rule Soviet Russia-just as they were willing to produce military rockets for the thugs who ruled n.a.z.i Germany. There was a story in the press that during the first test of an atom bomb in New Mexico, Robert Oppenheimer, head of the Los Alamos group who had produced the bomb, carried a four-leaf clover in his pocket. More recently, there was the story of Edgar Mitch.e.l.l, an astronaut who conducted ESP experiments on his way to the moon. There was the story of a s.p.a.ce scientist who is a believer in occultism and black magic.

Such is the "honorable and enduring peace" between knowledge and faith, achieved by the Kantian philosophy.

Now what if one of those men gained political power and had to consider the question of whether to unleash a nuclear war? As a Kantian, he would have to make his decision, not on the grounds of reason, knowledge and facts, but on the urgings of faith, i.e., of feelings, i.e., on whim.

There are many examples of Kantianism ravaging the field of today's politics in slower, but equally lethal, ways. Observe the farce of inflation versus "compa.s.sion." The policies of welfare statism have brought this country (and the whole civilized world) to the edge of economic bankruptcy, the forerunner of which is inflation-yet pressure groups are demanding larger and larger handouts to the nonproductive, and screaming that their opponents lack "compa.s.sion." Compa.s.sion as such cannot grow a blade of gra.s.s, let alone of wheat. Of what use is the "compa.s.sion" of a man (or a country) who is broke-i.e., who has consumed his resources, is unable to produce, and has nothing to give away?

If you cannot understand how anyone can evade reality to such an extent, you have not understood Kantianism. "Compa.s.sion" is a moral term, and moral issues-to the thoroughly Kantianized intellectuals-are independent of material reality. The task of morality-they believe-is to make demands, with which the world of material "phenomena" has to comply; and, since that material world is unreal, its problems or shortages cannot affect the success of moral goals, which are dictated by the "noumenal" real reality.

Dear businessmen, why do you worry about a half-percent of interest on a loan or investment-when your your money supports the schools where those notions are taught to your children? money supports the schools where those notions are taught to your children?

No, most people do not know Kant's theories, nor care. What they do know is that their teachers and intellectual leaders have some deep, tricky justification-the trickier, the better-for the net result of all such theories, which the average person welcomes: "Be rational, except when you don't feel like it."

Note the motivation of those who accepted the grotesque irrationality of Kant's system in the first place-as declared by his admirer, Professor Paulsen: "There is indeed no doubt that the great influence which Kant exerted upon his age was due just to the fact that he appeared as a deliverer from unendurable suspense. The old view regarding the claims of the feelings and the understanding on reality had been more and more called in question during the second half of the eighteenth century. . . . Science seemed to demand the renunciation of the old faith. On the other hand, the heart still clung to it On the other hand, the heart still clung to it. . . . Kant showed a way of escape from the dilemma. His philosophy made it possible to be at once a candid thinker and an honest man of faith. For that, thousands of hearts have thanked him with pa.s.sionate devotion." (Pp. 6-7; emphasis added-no other comment is necessary.) Philosophy is a necessity for a rational being: philosophy is the foundation of science, the organizer of man's mind, the integrator of his knowledge, the programmer of his subconscious, the selector of his values. To set philosophy against reason, i.e., against man's power of cognition, to turn philosophy into an apologist for and a protector of superst.i.tion-is such a crime against humanity that no modern atrocities can equal it: it is the cause of modern atrocities.

If Paulsen is representative of the nineteenth century, the twentieth never had a chance. But if men grasp the source of their destruction-if they dedicate themselves to the greatest of all crusades: a crusade for the absolutism of reason-the twenty-first century will have a chance once more.

9

Kant Versus Sullivan 1970

In the t.i.tle essay of For the New Intellectual, For the New Intellectual, discussing modern philosophy's concerted attack on man's mind, I referred to the philosophers' division into two camps, "those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge of the world by deducing it exclusively from concepts, which come from inside his head and are not derived from the perception of physical facts (the Rationalists)-and those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts (the Empiricists). To put it more simply: those who joined the Witch Doctor, by abandoning reality-and those who clung to reality, by abandoning their mind." discussing modern philosophy's concerted attack on man's mind, I referred to the philosophers' division into two camps, "those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge of the world by deducing it exclusively from concepts, which come from inside his head and are not derived from the perception of physical facts (the Rationalists)-and those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts (the Empiricists). To put it more simply: those who joined the Witch Doctor, by abandoning reality-and those who clung to reality, by abandoning their mind."

For the past several decades, the dominant fas.h.i.+on among academic philosophers was empiricism-a militant kind of empiricism. Its exponents dismissed philosophical problems by declaring that fundamental concepts-such as existence, ent.i.ty, ident.i.ty, reality-are meaningless; they declared that concepts are arbitrary social conventions and that only sense data, "unpro-cessed" by conceptualization, represent a valid or "scientific" form of knowledge; and they debated such issues as whether man may claim with certainty that he perceives a tomato or only a patch of red.

Sooner or later, it had to become apparent that cooks, let alone scientists, do something with that patch of red by some means which is not direct and immediate sensory perception. And-as in any field of activity ruled by fas.h.i.+on, not facts-the philosophical pendulum began to swing to the other side of the same coin.

Accepting the empiricists' basic premise that concepts have no necessary relation to sense data, a new breed of rationalists is floating up to the surface of the academic mainstream, declaring that scientific scientific knowledge does not require any sense data at all (which means: that man does not need his sense organs). knowledge does not require any sense data at all (which means: that man does not need his sense organs).

If the empiricist trend-with its glib, glossy, up-to-the-minute modernism of quasi-technological jargon and pseudo-mathematical equations-may be regarded as the miniskirt period of philosophical fas.h.i.+on, then the rationalist revival brings in the maxiskirt period, an old, bedraggled, pavement-sweeping, unsanitary maxiskirt, as unsuited for climbing into a modern car or airplane (or for any kind of climbing) as its equivalent in the field of ladies' garments.

How low this new fas.h.i.+on can fall and what its hem-line can pick up may be observed in the November 20, 1969 issue of The Journal of Philosophy The Journal of Philosophy-a magazine regarded as the most "prestigious" of the American journals of the philosophic profession, published at Columbia University.

The lead article is ent.i.tled "Science Without Experience" by Paul K. Feyerabend of the University of California and London University. (Remember that what is meant here by "experience" is the evidence of man's senses.) The article declares: "It must be possible to imagine a natural science without sensory elements, and it should perhaps also be possible to indicate how such a science is going to work.

"Now experience is said to enter science at three points: testing; a.s.similation of the results of test; understanding of theories."

Whoever is said to have said this, did not include observation observation among his three points, implying that science begins with "testing." If so, what does one "test"? No answer is given. among his three points, implying that science begins with "testing." If so, what does one "test"? No answer is given.

"It is easily seen that experience is needed at none of the three points just mentioned.

"To start with, it does not need to enter the process of test: test: we can put a theory into a computer, provide the computer with suitable instruments directed by him (her, it) so that relevant measurements are made which return to the computer, leading there to an evaluation of the theory. The computer can give a simple yes-no response from which a scientist may we can put a theory into a computer, provide the computer with suitable instruments directed by him (her, it) so that relevant measurements are made which return to the computer, leading there to an evaluation of the theory. The computer can give a simple yes-no response from which a scientist may learn learn whether or not a theory has been confirmed without having in any way whether or not a theory has been confirmed without having in any way partic.i.p.ated partic.i.p.ated in the test (i.e., without having been subjected to some relevant in the test (i.e., without having been subjected to some relevant experience experience)." (All italics in original.) One might feel, at this point, that one's brain is being paralyzed by too many questions. Just to name a few of them: Who built the computer, and was he able to do it without sensory experience? Who programs the computer and by what means? Who provides the computer with "suitable instruments" and how does he know what is suitable? How does the scientist know that the object he is dealing with is a computer?

But such questions become unnecessary if one remembers two fallacies identified in Objectivist epistemology, which can help, not to elucidate, but to account for that paragraph: the fallacies of context-dropping and of "concept-stealing"-which the article seems to flaunt as valid epistemological methods, proceeding, as it does, from the basic premise that the computers are here.

This still leaves the question: by what means does the scientist learn the computer's verdict? To this one, the article's author provides an answer-which is point 2 of his theory of knowledge.

"Usually such information travels via the senses, giving rise to distinct sensations. But this is not always the case. Subliminal perception [of what?] leads to reactions directly, and without sensory data. Latent learning leads to memory traces [of what?] directly, and without sensory data. Posthypnotic suggestion [by whom and by what means?] leads to (belated) reactions directly, and without sensory data. In addition there is the whole unexplored field of telepathic phenomena." such information travels via the senses, giving rise to distinct sensations. But this is not always the case. Subliminal perception [of what?] leads to reactions directly, and without sensory data. Latent learning leads to memory traces [of what?] directly, and without sensory data. Posthypnotic suggestion [by whom and by what means?] leads to (belated) reactions directly, and without sensory data. In addition there is the whole unexplored field of telepathic phenomena."

Apparently in order not to let this sink in fully, the article's next sentence continues the paragraph uninterrupted. But I have interrupted it precisely to let this sink in fully.

The paragraph's next sentence is: "I am not a.s.serting that the natural sciences as we know them today could be built on these phenomena alone and could be freed from sensations entirely. Considering the peripheral nature of the phenomena and considering also how little attention is given to them in our education (we are not trained to use effectively our ability for latent learning) this would be both unwise and impractical. But the point is made that sensations are not necessary necessary for the business of science and that they occur for practical reasons only." for the business of science and that they occur for practical reasons only."

What would be the meaning or value of an impractical impractical process of consciousness? Since the practice of the faculty of consciousness is to give us information about reality, an impractical process would be one that fails in this function. Yet it is some such process that the author advocates as superior or, at least, as equal to the processes of sensory experience-and urges our educators to develop in us. process of consciousness? Since the practice of the faculty of consciousness is to give us information about reality, an impractical process would be one that fails in this function. Yet it is some such process that the author advocates as superior or, at least, as equal to the processes of sensory experience-and urges our educators to develop in us.

Turning now to point 3 of his theory of knowledge-the relations.h.i.+p of experience to the understanding of theories-the author announces that "experience arises together with together with theoretical a.s.sumptions, theoretical a.s.sumptions, not not before them . . ." He proves it as follows: "eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely disoriented, incapable of carrying out the simplest action." before them . . ." He proves it as follows: "eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely disoriented, incapable of carrying out the simplest action."

A disoriented person is an adult who, losing part of his acquired acquired conceptual knowledge, is unable to function on a purely sensory-perceptual level, i.e., unable to revert to the stage of infancy. Normally developing infants and children are not conceptual knowledge, is unable to function on a purely sensory-perceptual level, i.e., unable to revert to the stage of infancy. Normally developing infants and children are not disoriented. disoriented. It is the It is the abnormal abnormal state of an adult that the article offers as a demonstration of the cognitive impotence of sense data. state of an adult that the article offers as a demonstration of the cognitive impotence of sense data.

Then the article's author plunges rapidly into his his theory of a child's cognitive development, as follows: the development "gets started only because the child reacts correctly toward signals, theory of a child's cognitive development, as follows: the development "gets started only because the child reacts correctly toward signals, interprets them correctly, interprets them correctly, because he possesses means of interpretation even before he has experienced his first clear sensation." because he possesses means of interpretation even before he has experienced his first clear sensation."

The possession of means means and their and their use use are not the same thing: e.g., a child possesses the means of digesting food, but would you accept the notion that he performs the process of digestion are not the same thing: e.g., a child possesses the means of digesting food, but would you accept the notion that he performs the process of digestion before before he has taken in any food? In the same way, a child possesses the means of "interpreting" sense data, i.e., a conceptual faculty, but this faculty cannot interpret anything, let alone interpret it "correctly," before he has experienced his first clear sensation. What would it be interpreting? he has taken in any food? In the same way, a child possesses the means of "interpreting" sense data, i.e., a conceptual faculty, but this faculty cannot interpret anything, let alone interpret it "correctly," before he has experienced his first clear sensation. What would it be interpreting?

"Again we can imagine that this interpretative apparatus acts without being accompanied by sensations (as do all reflexes and all well-learned movements such as typing). The theoretical knowledge it contains certainly can be applied applied correctly, though it is perhaps not correctly, though it is perhaps not understood. understood. But what do sensations contribute to our understanding? Taken by themselves, i.e., taken as they would appear to a completely disoriented person, they are of no use, either for understanding, or for action." But what do sensations contribute to our understanding? Taken by themselves, i.e., taken as they would appear to a completely disoriented person, they are of no use, either for understanding, or for action."

After a few more sentences of the same kind, the paragraph concludes: "Understanding in the sense demanded here thus turns out to be ineffective and superfluous. Result: sensations can be eliminated from the process of understanding also (though they may of course continue to accompany accompany it, just as a headache accompanies deep thought)." it, just as a headache accompanies deep thought)."

Let me now summarize the preceding, i.e., that article's theory of man and of knowledge: a zombie whose mental apparatus produces theoretical knowledge which he does not understand, but which "interprets" signals "correctly" and enables him to "apply" it correctly, i.e., to act without any understanding-directed by his ultimate cognitive authority, the scientist, a blind-deaf-mute who engages in mental telepathy with a computer.

Now for the article's payoff or cas.h.i.+ng-in: "Why is it preferable to interpret theories on the basis of an observational observational language rather than on the basis of a language of intuitively evident statements (as was done only a few centuries ago and as must be done anyway, for observation does not help a disoriented person), or on the basis of a language containing short sentences (as is done in every elementary physics course)? . . . Knowledge can language rather than on the basis of a language of intuitively evident statements (as was done only a few centuries ago and as must be done anyway, for observation does not help a disoriented person), or on the basis of a language containing short sentences (as is done in every elementary physics course)? . . . Knowledge can enter enter our brain without touching our senses. And some knowledge our brain without touching our senses. And some knowledge resides resides in the individual brain without ever having entered it. Nor is observational knowledge the most reliable knowledge we possess. Science took a big step forward when the Aristotelian idea of the reliability of our everyday experience was given up and was replaced by an empiricism of a more subtle kind. . . . Empiricism . . . is therefore an unreasonable doctrine, not in agreement with scientific practice." in the individual brain without ever having entered it. Nor is observational knowledge the most reliable knowledge we possess. Science took a big step forward when the Aristotelian idea of the reliability of our everyday experience was given up and was replaced by an empiricism of a more subtle kind. . . . Empiricism . . . is therefore an unreasonable doctrine, not in agreement with scientific practice."

Summing up his procedure, the article's author concludes with: "Proceeding in this way of course means leaving the confines of empiricism and moving on to a more comprehensive and more satisfactory kind of philosophy." The "confines of empiricism," in this context, means: the confines of reality.

Before we return to the morgue for the task of dissection, let us pause for a breath of fresh air-for a moment's tribute to the lonely giant whom, two thousand three hundred years after his death, the enemies of man's mind still have to try to attack before they can destroy the rest of us.

A graphic description of what a non-observational, non-Aristotelian language would be like is given in an academically less prestigious journal-Look magazine, January 13, 1970. An article ent.i.tled "Growl to Me Softly and I'll Understand" declares: "On a personal level, there'll be no need to cling to formal grammar to convey meaning. Speech doesn't have to be linear; it can come out as a compressed overlay of facts and sensations and moods and ideas and images. Words can serve as signals, and others will understand. The way a man feels can be unashamedly expressed in sheer sound, such as a low, glottal hum, like the purring of a cat, to indicate contentment. . . . Feelings have meaning. Sounds have meaning. Open language can be a joy-a language we can grow with, growl with. Words can cramp your style." magazine, January 13, 1970. An article ent.i.tled "Growl to Me Softly and I'll Understand" declares: "On a personal level, there'll be no need to cling to formal grammar to convey meaning. Speech doesn't have to be linear; it can come out as a compressed overlay of facts and sensations and moods and ideas and images. Words can serve as signals, and others will understand. The way a man feels can be unashamedly expressed in sheer sound, such as a low, glottal hum, like the purring of a cat, to indicate contentment. . . . Feelings have meaning. Sounds have meaning. Open language can be a joy-a language we can grow with, growl with. Words can cramp your style."

Suppose that you are on trial for a crime you did not commit; you need the clearest focus, the fullest concentration on facts, the strictest justice in the minds of those you face, in order to prove your innocence; but what "comes out" of the judge and jury is "a compressed overlay of facts and sensations and moods and ideas and images."

Suppose that the government issues a decree which expropriates everything you own, sends your children to a concentration camp, your wife to a firing squad, yourself to forced labor, and your country into a nuclear war; you struggle frantically to understand why; but what "comes out" of your country's leaders is "a compressed overlay of facts and sensations and moods and ideas and images."

These examples are not exaggerations; they are precisely what the two articles quoted mean, and the only only things they can mean-in that factual, existential reality where your sole tool of protection and survival is things they can mean-in that factual, existential reality where your sole tool of protection and survival is concepts, concepts, i.e., language. i.e., language.

The Look Look article wears a thin fig leaf, in the form of restricting the growls to the "personal level" (which cannot be done, since the human mind is unable to carry for long that kind of double psycho-epistemology). But article wears a thin fig leaf, in the form of restricting the growls to the "personal level" (which cannot be done, since the human mind is unable to carry for long that kind of double psycho-epistemology). But The Journal of Philosophy The Journal of Philosophy article advocates the method of the "compressed overlay"-a non-observational language-for the mental activities of scientists. article advocates the method of the "compressed overlay"-a non-observational language-for the mental activities of scientists.

"Science Without Experience" heralds the retrogression of philosophy to the primordial, pre-philosophical rationalism of the jungle ("as was done only a few centuries ago," states the author, in support of a non-observational language). But what is innocent and explicable in an infant or a savage becomes senile corruption when the snake oil, totem poles and magic potions are replaced by a computer. This is the sort of rationalism that Plato, Descartes and all the others of that school would be ashamed of; but not Kant. This is his his baby and baby and his his ultimate triumph, since he is the most fertile father of the doctrine equating the ultimate triumph, since he is the most fertile father of the doctrine equating the means means of consciousness with its of consciousness with its content content-I refer you to his notion that the machinery of consciousness produces its own (categorial) content.

"Science Without Experience" is an article without significance and would not be worth considering or discussing if it were not for the shocking fact that it was published in the leading American journal of the philosophic profession. If this this is the view of man, of reason, of knowledge, of science, of existence sanctioned and propagated by the philosophic authorities of our time, can you blame the hippies and yippies who are their products? Can you blame an average youth who is thrown out into the world with is the view of man, of reason, of knowledge, of science, of existence sanctioned and propagated by the philosophic authorities of our time, can you blame the hippies and yippies who are their products? Can you blame an average youth who is thrown out into the world with this this kind of mental equipment? Do you need any committees, commissions or multi-million-dollar studies to tell you the causes of campus violence and drug addiction? kind of mental equipment? Do you need any committees, commissions or multi-million-dollar studies to tell you the causes of campus violence and drug addiction?

A brilliant young professor of philosophy gave me the following explanation of the appearance of that article: "They [the academic philosophers] would enjoy it because it attacks philosophy, in a hooligan manner, including some of their own most cherished beliefs, such as empiricism. They get a kick out of it. They will read and publish anything, so long as it does not imply or advocate a broad, consistent, integrated system system of ideas." of ideas."

For a long time, the academic philosophers have been able to do nothing but attack and refute one another (which is not difficult) without being able to offer any theory of a constructive or positive nature. Every new attack confirms their notion that nothing else is possible to their profession and nothing else can be demanded of them. If the style of the attack is hooligan, it rea.s.sures them: they don't have to take it (or philosophy) seriously. They will tolerate anything, so long as it does not require that they check the validity of their own premises-i.e., so long as it does not threaten the belief that one set of (arbitrary) a.s.sumptions is as good as another.

In For the New Intellectual, For the New Intellectual, I mentioned the central cause of the post-Renaissance philosophy's disaster, the issue that brought its eventual collapse. "They [the philosophers] were unable to offer a solution to the 'problem of universals,' that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relations.h.i.+p of concepts to perceptual data-and to prove the validity of scientific induction. . . . [They] were unable to refute the Witch Doctor's claim that their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and that their scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity than his revelations." I mentioned the central cause of the post-Renaissance philosophy's disaster, the issue that brought its eventual collapse. "They [the philosophers] were unable to offer a solution to the 'problem of universals,' that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relations.h.i.+p of concepts to perceptual data-and to prove the validity of scientific induction. . . . [They] were unable to refute the Witch Doctor's claim that their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and that their scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity than his revelations."

(Observe that the demands for this sort of epistemological equality is still the irrationalists' policy, strategy and goal. "Why is it preferable to interpret theories on the basis of an observational observational language rather than on the basis of a language of intuitively evident statements . . . ?" asks the author of "Science Without Experience." This is the perverse form in which mystics are compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of reason and to confess their motive, their envy and their fear; an advocate of reason does not ask that his knowledge be granted equality with the intuitions and revelations of mystics.) language rather than on the basis of a language of intuitively evident statements . . . ?" asks the author of "Science Without Experience." This is the perverse form in which mystics are compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of reason and to confess their motive, their envy and their fear; an advocate of reason does not ask that his knowledge be granted equality with the intuitions and revelations of mystics.) Concepts are the products of a mental process that integrates and organizes the evidence provided by man's senses. (See my Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. ) Man's senses are his only direct cognitive contact with reality and, therefore, his only ) Man's senses are his only direct cognitive contact with reality and, therefore, his only source source of information. Without sensory evidence, there can be no concepts; without concepts, there can be no language; without language, there can be no knowledge and no science. of information. Without sensory evidence, there can be no concepts; without concepts, there can be no language; without language, there can be no knowledge and no science.

The answer to the question of the relations.h.i.+p of concepts to perceptual data determines man's evaluation of the cognitive efficacy of his mind; it determines the course of every individual life and the fate of nations, of empires, of science, of art, of civilization. There are not many men who would die for the sake of protecting the right answer to that question, yet countless millions have died because of the wrong answers.

Through all the ages, a major attack on man's conceptual faculty was directed at its foundation, i.e., at his senses-in the form of the allegation that man's senses are "unreliable." It remained for the brazen-ness of the twentieth century to declare that man's senses are superfluous.

If you want to grasp fully the abysmal nature of that claim and, simultaneously, to grasp the origin of concepts and their dependence on sensory evidence, I will refer you to a famous play. One might think that such a subject cannot be dramatized, but it has been-simply, eloquently, heartbreakingly-and it is not a work of fiction, but a dramatization of historical facts. It is The Miracle Worker The Miracle Worker by William Gibson and it tells the story of how Annie Sullivan brought Helen Keller to grasp the nature of by William Gibson and it tells the story of how Annie Sullivan brought Helen Keller to grasp the nature of language. language.

If you have seen the superlative performance of Patty Duke in the role of Helen Keller, in the stage or screen version of the play, you have seen the image of man projected by "Science Without Experience"-or as near to it as a living human being can come. Helen Keller was not that article's ideal-a creature devoid of all sensory contact with reality-but she came close to it: blind and deaf since infancy, i.e., deprived of sight and hearing, she was left with nothing but the sense of touch to guide her (she retained also the senses of smell and taste, which are not of great cognitive value to a human being).

Try to remember the incommunicable horror of that child's state, communicated by Patty Duke: a creature who is neither human nor animal, with all the power of a human potential, but reduced to a sub-animal helplessness; a savage, violent, hostile creature fighting desperately for self-preservation in an unknowable world, fighting to live somehow with a chronic state of terror and hopeless bewilderment; a human mind (proved later to be an unusually intelligent mind) struggling frantically, in total darkness and silence, to perceive, to grasp, to understand, understand, but unable to understand its own need, goal or struggle. but unable to understand its own need, goal or struggle.

"Without being accompanied by sensations," her "interpretative apparatus" did not act; it did not act "as do all reflexes"; it did not produce any knowledge at all, let alone any "theoretical knowledge." "Knowledge," that article declares, "can enter enter our brain without touching our senses." None entered hers. Would she have been able to operate a computer? She was not able to learn to use a fork or to fold her napkin. our brain without touching our senses." None entered hers. Would she have been able to operate a computer? She was not able to learn to use a fork or to fold her napkin.

Annie Sullivan, her young teacher (superlatively portrayed by Anne Bancroft), is fiercely determined to transform this creature into a human being, and she knows the only means that can do it: language, language, i.e., the development of the conceptual faculty. But how does one communicate the nature and function of language to a blind-deaf-mute? The entire action of the play is concerned with this single central issue: Annie's struggle to make Helen's mind grasp a i.e., the development of the conceptual faculty. But how does one communicate the nature and function of language to a blind-deaf-mute? The entire action of the play is concerned with this single central issue: Annie's struggle to make Helen's mind grasp a word word-not a signal, but a word.

The form of the language is a code of tactile symbols, a touch alphabet by means of which Annie keeps spelling words into Helen's palm, always making her other hand touch the objects involved. Helen catches on, in part, very rapidly: she learns to repeat the signals into Annie's palm, but but with no relation to the objects, she learns to spell many words, with no relation to the objects, she learns to spell many words, but but she does not grasp the connection of the signals to their she does not grasp the connection of the signals to their referents, referents, she thinks it is a game, she is merely mimicking motions at random, without any understanding. (At this stage, she is learning "language" as most of today's college students are taught to use it-as a totally she thinks it is a game, she is merely mimicking motions at random, without any understanding. (At this stage, she is learning "language" as most of today's college students are taught to use it-as a totally non-observational non-observational set of motions denoting nothing.) set of motions denoting nothing.) When Helen's father compliments Annie on the fact that she has taught Helen the rudiments of discipline, Annie, discouraged, answers: ". . . to do nothing but obey is-no gift, obedience without understanding is a-blindness, too."

Annie's determination leads her through as heroic a struggle as has ever been portrayed on the stage. She has to fight the doubts, the weary resignation, of Helen's parents; she has to fight their love and pity for the child, their accusations that she is treating Helen too severely; she has to fight Helen's stubborn resistance and uncomprehending fear, which grows into obvious hatred for the teacher; she has to fight her own doubts, the moments of discouragement when she wonders whether the achievement of the goal she has set herself is possible: she does not know what to do, in the face of one disappointment after another, she does not know whether an arrested human mind can be reached and awakened-it has never been done before. Her only weapon is to go on, hour after hour, day after day, endlessly pulling Helen's hand to touch the objects they encounter (to gain sensory sensory evidence) and spelling into her palm "C-A-K-E . . . M-I-L-K . . . W-A-T-E-R . . ." over and over again, without any results. evidence) and spelling into her palm "C-A-K-E . . . M-I-L-K . . . W-A-T-E-R . . ." over and over again, without any results.

Helen's older half-brother, James, skeptical of Annie's efforts, remarks that Helen might not want to learn, that maybe "there's such a thing as-dullness of heart. Acceptance. And letting go. Sooner or later we all give up, don't we?

"Annie. Maybe you all do. It's my idea of the original sin.

"James. What is?"

"Annie. Giving up.

"James. You won't open her. Why can't you let her be? Have some-pity on her, for being what she is- "Annie. If I'd ever once thought like that, I'd be dead!"

In today's world, many physically healthy but intellectually crippled people (particularly college students) need Annie Sullivan's help, which they can use if they have retained the capacity to grasp (not merely look at and repeat, but grasp grasp) the full meaning of two statements of Annie Sullivan: Addressed to Helen's father: ". . . words can be her eyes, eyes, to everything in the world outside her, and inside too, what is she without words? With them she can think, have ideas, be reached, there's not a thought or fact in the world that can't be hers. . . . And she has them already . . . eighteen nouns and three verbs, they're in her fingers now, I need only time to push to everything in the world outside her, and inside too, what is she without words? With them she can think, have ideas, be reached, there's not a thought or fact in the world that can't be hers. . . . And she has them already . . . eighteen nouns and three verbs, they're in her fingers now, I need only time to push one one of them into her mind! One, and everything under the sun will follow." of them into her mind! One, and everything under the sun will follow."

Addressed to Helen, who cannot hear her: "I wanted to teach you-oh, everything the earth is full of, Helen, everything on it that's ours for a wink and it's gone, and what we are on it, the-light we bring to it and leave behind in-words, why, you can see five thousand years back in a light of words everything we feel, think, know-and share, in words, so not a soul is in darkness, or done with, even in the grave. And I know, I know, know, one word and I can-put the world in your hand-and whatever it is to me, I won't take less!" one word and I can-put the world in your hand-and whatever it is to me, I won't take less!"

("Words can cramp your style," answers Look Look magazine.) magazine.) To my knowledge, The Miracle Worker The Miracle Worker is the only is the only epistemological epistemological play ever written. It holds the viewer in tensely mounting suspense, not over a chase or a bank robbery, but over the question of whether a human mind will come to life. Its climax is magnificent: after Annie's crus.h.i.+ng disappointment at Helen's seeming retrogression, water from a pump spills over Helen's hand, while Annie is automatically spelling "W-A-T-E-R" into her palm, and suddenly Helen play ever written. It holds the viewer in tensely mounting suspense, not over a chase or a bank robbery, but over the question of whether a human mind will come to life. Its climax is magnificent: after Annie's crus.h.i.+ng disappointment at Helen's seeming retrogression, water from a pump spills over Helen's hand, while Annie is automatically spelling "W-A-T-E-R" into her palm, and suddenly Helen understands. understands. The two great moments of that climax are incommunicable except through the art of acting: one is the look on Patty Duke's face when she grasps that the signals mean the liquid-the other is the sound of Anne Bancroft's voice when she calls Helen's mother and cries: "She The two great moments of that climax are incommunicable except through the art of acting: one is the look on Patty Duke's face when she grasps that the signals mean the liquid-the other is the sound of Anne Bancroft's voice when she calls Helen's mother and cries: "She knows knows!"

The quietly sublime intensity of that word-with everything it involves, connotes and makes possible-is what modern philosophy is out to destroy.

I suggest that you read The Miracle Worker The Miracle Worker and study its implications. I am not acquainted with William Gibson's other works; I believe that I would disagree with many aspects of his philosophy (as I disagree with much of Helen Keller's adult philosophy), but this particular play is an invaluable lesson in the fundamentals of a rational epistemology. and study its implications. I am not acquainted with William Gibson's other works; I believe that I would disagree with many aspects of his philosophy (as I disagree with much of Helen Keller's adult philosophy), but this particular play is an invaluable lesson in the fundamentals of a rational epistemology.

I suggest that you consider Annie Sullivan's t.i.tanic struggle to arouse a child's conceptual faculty by means of a single sense, the sense of touch, then evaluate the meaning, motive and moral status of the notion that man's conceptual faculty does not require any sensory experience.

I suggest that you consider what an enormous intellectual feat Helen Keller had to perform in order to develop a full conceptual range (including a college education, which required more in her day than it does now), then judge those normal people who learn their first, perceptual-level abstractions without any difficulty and freeze on that level, and keep the higher ranges of their conceptual development in a chaotic fog of swimming, indeterminate approximations, playing a game of signals without referents, as Helen Keller did at first, but without her excuse. Then check on whether you you respect and how carefully respect and how carefully you you employ your priceless possession: language. employ your priceless possession: language.

And, lastly, I suggest that you try to project what would have happened if, instead of Annie Sullivan, a s.a.d.i.s.t had taken charge of Helen Keller's education. A s.a.d.i.s.t would spell "water" into Helen's palm, while making her touch water, stones, flowers and dogs interchangeably; he would teach her that water is called "water" today, but "milk" tomorrow; he would endeavor to convey to her that there is no necessary connection between names and things, that the signals in her palm are a game of arbitrary conventions and that she'd better obey him without trying to understand.

If this projection is too monstrous to hold in one's mind for long, remember that this this is what today's academic philosophers are doing to the young-to minds as confused, as plastic and almost as helpless (on the higher conceptual levels) as Helen Keller's mind was at her start. is what today's academic philosophers are doing to the young-to minds as confused, as plastic and almost as helpless (on the higher conceptual levels) as Helen Keller's mind was at her start.

10

Causality Versus Duty 1974

One of the most destructive anti-concepts in the history of moral philosophy is the term "duty."

An anti-concept is an artificial, unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept. The term "duty" obliterates more than single concepts; it is a metaphysical and psychological killer: it negates all the essentials of a rational view of life and makes them inapplicable to man's actions.

The legitimate concept nearest in meaning to the word "duty" is "obligation." The two are often used interchangeably, but there is a profound difference between them which people sense, yet seldom identify.

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged Edition, 1966) describes the difference as follows: " (Unabridged Edition, 1966) describes the difference as follows: "Duty, obligation refer to what one feels bound to do. refer to what one feels bound to do. Duty Duty is what one performs, or avoids doing, in fulfillment of the permanent dictates of conscience, piety, right, or law: is what one performs, or avoids doing, in fulfillment of the permanent dictates of conscience, piety, right, or law: duty to one's country; one's duty to tell the truth, to raise children properly. An obligation duty to one's country; one's duty to tell the truth, to raise children properly. An obligation is what one is bound to do to fulfill the dictates of usage, custom, or propriety, and to carry out a particular, specific, and often personal promise or agreement: is what one is bound to do to fulfill the dictates of usage, custom, or propriety, and to carry out a particular, specific, and often personal promise or agreement: financial or social obligations. financial or social obligations."