The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis Part 2

[Sidenote: _The Consular Committee of 1902._]

In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to inst.i.tute an examination as to how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present joint diplomatic representatives.

The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the arrangement, or of the political importance that might be a.s.signed to the same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain circ.u.mstances and nothing more.

The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Const.i.tution; a corps acting for the most part under authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be an anomaly. The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the Norwegian interpretation of the Const.i.tution; they do not approve of it, nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration of the Minister for Foreign affairs.

The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian Consular Service would duly value the importance of a loyal co-operation.

It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the Committee itself having s.h.i.+rked the most salient points, namely those of a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish side for the solution of the question[22:1].

[Sidenote: _Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian delegates._]

Mr. BOSTRoM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well known so-called Communique[23:1].

[Sidenote: _The Communique._]

This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.

Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of Foreign administration, in other words, _they plainly offered a general agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign affairs_, but that the Norwegian negotiators _refused_ this offer. On the Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were evidently determined not to give up their claim--so unreasonable from a Union point of view--to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.

With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be not impossible that under certain circ.u.mstances a system with different Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the most important advantage of the political agreement between the two countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the question on the following basis:

1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.

2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Emba.s.sies shall be regulated by laws of the same wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authorities of both Kingdoms.

It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Amba.s.sadors should remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other.

The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1].

When the Communique was issued, it was received with very great diversity of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held, contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give some enlightenment on the point.

In the first part of the Communique, which decribes the offer of the Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be _altered_ or _abolished_ without the consent of the Government powers of both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws which cannot be altered by one of the parties, the word 'abolish' does not occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTRoM, in the Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word 'alter', must necessarily include the conception of the word 'abolish'. It was afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been significant only through the connection which may be found to exist between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the extent to which the laws were to be changeable.

The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was ent.i.tled to appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her a.s.sumed rights in the matter.

In other words, was it the intention of the Communique to force Norway to a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?

In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP, and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all negotiations.

Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communique? It is evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of the Communique must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of authority.

On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be a.s.sumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really, among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of foreign administration into her own hands_. The great fear of such a contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communique by the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2], without an agreement with Sweden.

How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing could interpret the Communique as it did?

As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it is impossible to make any definite a.s.sertions.

The Norwegian government may possibly have felt a.s.sured that the Communique did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its a.s.sumed legal right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and pa.s.sed over the Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to the wording of the Communique on that point, and the Norwegian governments att.i.tude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange, especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the Communique_.

Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact remains clear, _that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the Norwegian interpretation of the Communique_. This must be kept strictly in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to be obtained.

FOOTNOTES:

[19:1] It is undoubtedly Russia's proceedings in Finland which have especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of BJoRNSON.

[21:1] The most effective power in the Committee was D:r SIGURD IBSEN, who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the Committee's debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Amba.s.sador BILDT at the Court of St James, the Consul General AMeEN in Barcelona, and the Consul General CHRISTOPHERSEN in Antwerp.

[21:2] The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.

[22:1] NANSEN evidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64): No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore, follows that even the _Swedish Commissioners_ did not think it incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate Consuls. And, of course, he mentions, the _unanimous conclusion_ of the committee of experts from _both_ countries (p. 72).

[23:1] N:o 3.

[23:2] The Swedish members were, the Premier, BOSTRoM, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. LAGERHEIM, and State Secretary HUSBERG. The Norwegian members were, Prime Ministers BLEHR and QVAM, and State Secretaries KNUDSEN and IBSEN

[24:1] N:o 3 These latter decisions in the Communique, which are conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish government, are, of course, omitted by NANSEN.

[25:1] The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have been proposed at more recent dates.

[26:1] It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained, especially the Radicals, of that Ma.s.sive instrument.

[27:1] In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr CARL BERNER said he had heard that Mr BLEHR'S explanation in the Storthing respecting; the Communique before its publication was made known to the Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on, had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary MICHELSEN sharply replied, that Mr BLEHR'S explanation was only the explanation of the Norwegian government on the subject of the Communique.

[27:2] Further affirmation is given by Mr IBSEN'S declaration in the Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr BOSTRoM'S opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in the Communique it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be valid only so long as the present system of foreign administration existed. When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition, it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all intents unacceptable.

IV.

[Sidenote: _The reception of the Communique in Sweden and Norway._]

Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was supposed to characterise the Communique, its general contents roused no unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate, serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home) was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless referred to the resolution of 1893.

Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs.

Meanwhile after the publication of the Communique, the Norwegian Radicals immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.

However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards negotiating, and even BJoRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable, impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then became Prime Minister at Christiania in companions.h.i.+p with D:r IBSEN as Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the leaders.h.i.+p, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious att.i.tude, a powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in no favourable direction.

[Sidenote: _Negotiations on the basis of the Communique._]

In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the basis of the Communique. They were carried on slowly during the Spring 1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.

[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign affairs to the Consular service._]

It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development, from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration within the Union.