The Great War and How It Arose Part 1

The Great War and How It Arose.

by Anonymous.

SERBIA'S POSITION.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archd.u.c.h.ess were a.s.sa.s.sinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these a.s.sa.s.sins had been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial"

investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the Serbians the guilt both of a.s.sisting the a.s.sa.s.sins and of continually conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were the chief terms[2]:--

"The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following declaration:--

"'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and functionaries partic.i.p.ated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."

"The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:

"To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity; ...

"To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

"To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

"To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

"To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto."

In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words, Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6 p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary for pa.s.sing new laws and amending her Const.i.tution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the partic.i.p.ation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Amba.s.sador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general mobilisation.

An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented itself with "pa.s.sing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Amba.s.sador there. The fate of the message so pa.s.sed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Amba.s.sador told the British Amba.s.sador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.

As Sir Edward Grey told the German Amba.s.sador on one occasion "the Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept."[5]

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pa.s.s on" the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of conciliation. Italy a.s.sented, France a.s.sented, Russia declared herself ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired.

The British Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--

"I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Amba.s.sador here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the a.s.sistance on which the Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented with Serbian rule."[6]

So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as 1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest right down to the aegean Sea.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.

[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.

[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--

"Serbia ... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war where they had added l.u.s.tre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant, brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently.

Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?

Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army--and from your Navy--all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another gallant old warrior who would go--Lord Roberts. It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."

[4] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 39.

[5] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 46.

[6] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 82.

RUSSIA'S POSITION.

Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23, 1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the Austrian Amba.s.sador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated, then a.s.suredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade.

GERMANY'S POSITION.

Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:--

"=The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... a.s.sure him (Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike att.i.tude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our ally to take a yielding att.i.tude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our a.s.sistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.=

"=A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing att.i.tude of our Easterly and Westerly neighbours.=

"_=We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia.=_"

Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that the German Government instructed its Amba.s.sador at Petrograd to make the following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:--

"=Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.=

"=But mobilisation means war.=

"=As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....="

Here, then, we have the plain admission:--