Their Finest Hour Part 20

"Operation Hats" was carried out successfully and without loss between August 30 and September 5. Admiral Cunningham left Alexandria on August 30, and on the evening of the 31st his aircraft reported the approach of an enemy force of two battles.h.i.+ps and seven cruisers. Hopes of an engagement were raised, but evidently the Italians were not seeking trouble and nothing happened. The following evening our aircraft again made contact with the enemy, who were now retiring to Taranto. Thereafter Admiral Cunningham's s.h.i.+ps moved about with complete freedom to the east and south of Malta and were not seriously molested from the air. The convoy reached Malta safely, only one s.h.i.+p being damaged by air attack. Meanwhile the reinforcements, consisting of the Valiant Valiant but not her unreconstructed sister-s.h.i.+p the but not her unreconstructed sister-s.h.i.+p the Barham, Barham, the aircraft-carrier the aircraft-carrier Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious and two anti-aircraft cruisers, accompanied by Admiral Somerville with Force "H," were approaching from Gibraltar. The and two anti-aircraft cruisers, accompanied by Admiral Somerville with Force "H," were approaching from Gibraltar. The Valiant Valiant and the cruisers had no difficulty in landing much-needed guns and ammunition in Malta, and then joined Admiral Cunningham to the eastward on September 3. During the return pa.s.sage to Alexandria the fleet attacked Rhodes and Scarpanto and easily repulsed an E-boat attack. Admiral Somerville's force returned to Gibraltar without being molested in any way. and the cruisers had no difficulty in landing much-needed guns and ammunition in Malta, and then joined Admiral Cunningham to the eastward on September 3. During the return pa.s.sage to Alexandria the fleet attacked Rhodes and Scarpanto and easily repulsed an E-boat attack. Admiral Somerville's force returned to Gibraltar without being molested in any way.

All this convinced me that it would have been a fair risk, especially compared with those we were resolutely running in seriously depleting our armour at home in the teeth of the enemy's invasion preparations, to transport the armoured brigade through the Malta channel, and that it would now be in Egypt, instead of more than three weeks away. No serious disaster did in fact occur in Egypt during those three weeks. Nevertheless, an exaggerated fear of Italian aircraft had been allowed to hamper naval operations. I thought, and think, the event proved my case. Towards the end of November Admiral Somerville with Force "H" did in fact successfully escort a convoy to Malta from the westward, and on the way fought a partial action near Sardinia with that part of the Italian Fleet which had escaped damage at Taranto. One s.h.i.+p of this convoy pa.s.sed on to Alexandria, together with three more store s.h.i.+ps from Malta, escorted by further Fleet reinforcements for the Eastern Mediterranean. This was the first time that a merchant s.h.i.+p made the complete pa.s.sage of the Mediterranean after the Italian entry into the war. The reader will see in the next volume how a still more hazardous exploit was performed by the Navy in sending tanks to Egypt in 1941, when the German Air Force was fully established in Sicily. when the German Air Force was fully established in Sicily.

Prime Minister to First Lord.

7.IX.40.

1. The course of "Operation Hats" makes me quite sure that it was wrong to recede from the idea of pa.s.sing the armoured vehicles through the Mediterranean. If you will read my Minute reciting all the reasons why this course should be adopted you will see that they are reinforced by new facts now....

Prime Minister to First Lord.

7.IX.40.

I should be glad if you would let me have a short resume of the different occasions when I pressed, as First Lord, for the preparation of the Ramillies Ramillies cla.s.s s.h.i.+ps to withstand air bombardment by thick deck armour and larger bulges. If those s.h.i.+ps had been put in hand when I repeatedly pressed for them to be, we should now have the means of attacking the Italian sh.o.r.es, which might be productive of the highest political and military results. Even now there is a disposition to delay taking this most necessary step, and no subst.i.tute is offered. cla.s.s s.h.i.+ps to withstand air bombardment by thick deck armour and larger bulges. If those s.h.i.+ps had been put in hand when I repeatedly pressed for them to be, we should now have the means of attacking the Italian sh.o.r.es, which might be productive of the highest political and military results. Even now there is a disposition to delay taking this most necessary step, and no subst.i.tute is offered.I have not yet heard from you in reply to the Minute I sent you renewing this project of reconstruction in the hope that we may not be equally dest.i.tute of bombarding vessels next year. I shall be glad to have a talk with you on this subject when I have refreshed my mind with the papers.

This issue could never at any moment be decided without balancing other bitter needs in new construction. It was on this rock, and not on differences of principle that my wishes finally foundered.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

8.IX.40.

Following for Sir Andrew Cunningham, C.-in-C. Eastern Mediterranean, from Prime Minister and Minister of Defence:I congratulate you on the success of the recent operation in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, and upon the accession to your Fleet of two of our finest units, with other valuable vessels. I am sorry, however, that the armoured brigade which is so necessary to the defence of Egypt and Alexandria is still separated by more than three weeks from its scene of action. I hope you will find it possible to review the naval situation in the light of the experience gained during "Hats" and the arrival of Ill.u.s.trious Ill.u.s.trious and and Valiant. Valiant. Not only the paper strength of the Italian Navy, but also the degree of resistance which they may be inclined to offer, should be measured. It is of high importance to strike at the Italians this autumn, because as time pa.s.ses the Germans will be more likely to lay strong hands upon the Italian war machine, and then the picture will be very different. We intend to strengthen the anti-aircraft defences of Malta by every possible means, and some novel weapons of which I have high hopes will shortly be sent there for experiment. I trust that Malta may become safe for temporary visits of the Fleet at an earlier date than April, 1941. If in the meanwhile you have any proposals for offensive action to make, they should be transmitted to the Admiralty. I shall be glad if you will also concert with the Army and Air Force plans for an operation against the Italian communications in Libya, which at the right time could be used to hamper any large-scale offensive against Egypt. The advantages of gaining the initiative are obviously very great. I hope the Fulmars [the fast fighter planes which had at last reached our aircraft-carriers] have made a good impression. The battle here for air mastery continues to be severe, but firm confidence is felt in its eventual outcome. Not only the paper strength of the Italian Navy, but also the degree of resistance which they may be inclined to offer, should be measured. It is of high importance to strike at the Italians this autumn, because as time pa.s.ses the Germans will be more likely to lay strong hands upon the Italian war machine, and then the picture will be very different. We intend to strengthen the anti-aircraft defences of Malta by every possible means, and some novel weapons of which I have high hopes will shortly be sent there for experiment. I trust that Malta may become safe for temporary visits of the Fleet at an earlier date than April, 1941. If in the meanwhile you have any proposals for offensive action to make, they should be transmitted to the Admiralty. I shall be glad if you will also concert with the Army and Air Force plans for an operation against the Italian communications in Libya, which at the right time could be used to hamper any large-scale offensive against Egypt. The advantages of gaining the initiative are obviously very great. I hope the Fulmars [the fast fighter planes which had at last reached our aircraft-carriers] have made a good impression. The battle here for air mastery continues to be severe, but firm confidence is felt in its eventual outcome.

It is surprising that the violent impact of the air upon our control of the Mediterranean had not been more plainly foreseen by the British Government before the war and by their expert advisers. In any case, however, we had fallen so far behind in the air race with Germany that the defence of Britain made an overwhelming demand on the already outnumbered forces we possessed. Until the Battle of Britain had been decisively won, every reinforcement of aircraft to the Mediterranean and Egypt had been an act of acute responsibility. Even in the winter months, when we felt we were masters of our own daylight air at home, it was very hard under the full fury of the Blitz to send away fighter aircraft either to Malta or to Egypt. It was also most painful to take from bombarded British cities and vital seaports and munitions factories the anti-aircraft guns and sh.e.l.ls sorely needed for their protection, and to send these either all round the Cape to Egypt or at much peril direct to Malta.

The reinforcement of Malta's. .h.i.therto neglected air defences was pressed forward in spite of losses and disappointments. Among the tasks of Admiral Somerville's force at Gibraltar was the convoying of fighter aircraft in a carrier to within flying distance of Malta. The first of these efforts was made in the beginning of August, when twelve Hurricanes were flown into the island from the aircraft-carrier Argus. Argus. Until their arrival the air defence of Malta consisted of three Gladiators, known locally by the affectionate names of "Faith," "Hope," and "Charity." We made a second attempt in November; but there was a tragedy. Nine aircraft out of fourteen, which had been launched from the Until their arrival the air defence of Malta consisted of three Gladiators, known locally by the affectionate names of "Faith," "Hope," and "Charity." We made a second attempt in November; but there was a tragedy. Nine aircraft out of fourteen, which had been launched from the Argus, Argus, four hundred miles to the westward of the island, ran out of fuel on the way through a change of wind, and perished at sea with their devoted pilots. Never again were the margins cut so fine, and though many similar operations took place in the future never did such a catastrophe recur. four hundred miles to the westward of the island, ran out of fuel on the way through a change of wind, and perished at sea with their devoted pilots. Never again were the margins cut so fine, and though many similar operations took place in the future never did such a catastrophe recur.

It had also become necessary to find a way of sending aircraft to the Middle East which would avoid both the dangers of the Mediterranean and the fearful delay around the Cape. An overland route from West Africa would save many vital days and some s.h.i.+pping. The machines had either to be flown ash.o.r.e from an aircraft-carrier, or dismantled and crated for the voyage and then rea.s.sembled at some port for their flight. The choice lay between Lagos and Takoradi.

After careful examination Takoradi was chosen, and as early as August 21,1940, an operating party arrived. The course lay by Kano to Khartoum and eventually to Cairo, a total distance of 3700 miles. Considerable workshops and accommodation had to be built at Takoradi, and various refuelling and rest stations provided along the route. A dozen crated Hurricanes and Blenheims arrived by sea on September 5, followed next day by thirty Hurricanes landed from the carrier Argus. Argus. The first delivery flight left Takoradi on September 20 and arrived at Khartoum four days later. By the end of the year a trickle of a hundred and seven planes had reached Egypt in this way. The first delivery flight left Takoradi on September 20 and arrived at Khartoum four days later. By the end of the year a trickle of a hundred and seven planes had reached Egypt in this way.

Although a quick start had been made, many months' work were needed before the route was organised. The climate at Takoradi and the local malaria hara.s.sed the men erecting the crated aircraft. The use of the carriers was limited by other clamant needs. Weather hampered the air convoys. The number of aircraft unserviceable awaiting spares along the route piled up. The heavy wear on engines in their flight over vast barren sandy s.p.a.ces reduced their fighting life. Terrible teething trouble had to be overcome. None of this aircraft supply was effective in 1940. But if we had not begun in good time the Army of the Nile and all its ventures could not have lived through the tragic events of 1941.

By the close of 1940, the British Navy had once more firmly established itself in the Mediterranean. The defences of Malta had been considerably strengthened by Admiral Somerville's excursions to carry in A.A. and other equipment. Admiral Cunningham's offensive policy in the Eastern Basin had also yielded excellent results. Everywhere, despite the Italian air strength, we held the initiative, and Malta remained in the foreground of events as an advanced base for offensive operations against the Italian communications with their forces in Africa.

8.

September Tensions

Climax of the Air Battle - Intense Strain upon the Fighter Pilots - Evidences of the Impending Invasion - Disappointing Bombing on Concentrations of Barges - Britain Braced - Munitions Policy - My General Directive - A Survey of 1941 Requirements in Material - An Eight Months' Programme - My October Note on Priorities - Laggards - Climax at Home and in Egypt - The Perils of Fog - Need for De Wilde Ammunition - Achievements of the Ministry of Aircraft Production - Policy of Creating Commandos Enforced - Advance of Marshal Graziani's Army, September 13 - Their Halt at Sidi Barrani - Arrival of the Armoured Brigade in Egypt - Parlous Conditions at Malta - Troubles that Never Happened.

SEPTEMBER, like June, was a month of extreme opposing stresses for those who bore the responsibility for British war direction. The air battle, already described, on which all depended, raged with its greatest fury and rose steadily to its climax. The victory of the Royal Air Force on September 15 is seen now in retrospect to have marked its decisive turning-point. But this was not apparent at the time, nor could we tell whether even heavier attacks were not to be expected or how long they would go on. The fine weather facilitated daylight fighting on the largest scale. Hitherto we had welcomed this, but when I visited Air Vice-Marshal Park at Number 11 Group in the third week of September I noticed a slight but definite change in outlook. I asked about the weather, and was told it was set fair for some days to come. This, however, did not seem to be as popular a prospect as it had been at the beginning of the month. I had the distinct feeling that a break in the weather would no longer be regarded as a misfortune.

It happened while I was there in Park's room with several officers that an officer brought in a notification from the Air Ministry that all supplies of De Wilde ammunition were exhausted. This was the favourite of the fighter pilots. The factory on which it depended had been bombed. I saw that this. .h.i.t Park hard; but after a gulp and a pause he replied magnificently: "We fought them without it before, and we can fight them without it again."

In my talks with Air Marshal Dowding, who usually motored over from Uxbridge to Chequers during the week-ends, the sense of Fighter Command being at its utmost strain was evident. The weekly figures over which I pored showed we had adequate numbers, provided the weight of the hostile attack did not increase. But the physical and mental stresses upon the pilots were not reflected on the paper charts. For all their sublime devotion, often facing odds of five and six to one, for all the sense of superiority which their continued success and the enemy's heavy losses created, there are limits to human endurance. There is such a thing as sheer exhaustion, both of the spirit and the animal. I thought of Wellington's mood in the afternoon of the Battle of Waterloo: "Would G.o.d that night or Bluecher would come." This time we did not want Bluecher.

Meanwhile, all the evidences of impending German invasion multiplied. Upwards of three thousand self-propelled barges were counted on our air photographs in the Dutch, Belgian, and French ports and river mouths. We could not tell exactly what reserves of larger vessels might not be gathered in the Rhine estuary, or in the Baltic, from which the Kiel Ca.n.a.l was still open. In my examination of the invasion problem I have set forth the reasoning on which I based my confidence that we should beat them if they came, and consequently that they would not come, and continued to contemplate the issue with a steady gaze. All the same it was impossible to watch these growing preparations, week after week, in the photographs and reports of agents, without a sense of awe. A thing like this gets hold of you bit by bit. The terrible enemy would not come unless he had solid a.s.surance of victory and plans made with German thoroughness. Might there not also be surprises? Might there be tank-landing craft or some clever improvisation of them? What else might there not be? All our night-bombing was concentrated on the invasion ports, where every night German rehearsal exercises of marching on and off the barges and other vessels seemed to be taking place. The results of our bombing of the ma.s.ses of barges which crowded the basins or lay along the quays, judged by the photographs, had several times disappointed me.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.

23.IX.40.

What struck me about these photographs was the apparent inability of the bombers to hit these very large ma.s.ses of barges. I should have thought that sticks of explosive bombs thrown along these oblongs would have wrought havoc, and it is very disappointing to see that they all remained intact and in order, with just a few apparently damaged at the entrance.Can nothing be done to improve matters?

As already mentioned, the Chiefs of Staff were on the whole of the opinion that invasion was imminent, while I was sceptical and expressed a contrary view. Nevertheless, it was impossible to quell that inward excitement which comes from the prolonged balancing of terrible things. Certainly we strained every nerve to be ready. Nothing was neglected that could be achieved by the care and ingenuity of our commanders, the vigilance of our now large and formidable armies, and the unquenchable and fearless spirit of our whole people.

The whole of our war production and its priorities now required to be reviewed in the light of our exclusion from the Continent. In this I worked in consultation with the Minister of Supply and others concerned. At the beginning of this month, after much labour in my small circle, and careful checking, I prepared for the Cabinet a general directive upon munitions, which was intended to govern our affairs in 1941.

THE M MUNITIONS S SITUATIONMEMORANDUM BY THE PRIME MINISTERSeptember 3, 1940. 3, 1940.1. The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore, our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery in the air. The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. We must, therefore, develop the power to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosives to Germany, so as to pulverise the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depend, while holding him at arm's length from our island. In no other way at present visible can we hope to overcome the immense military power of Germany, and to nullify the further German victories which may be apprehended as the weight of their force is brought to bear upon African or Oriental theatres. The Air Force and its action on the largest scale must, therefore, subject to what is said later, claim the first place over the Navy or the Army.2. The weapon of blockade has become blunted, and rendered, as far as Germany is concerned, less effectual, on account of their land conquests and power to rob captive or intimidated peoples for their own benefit. There remain no very important special commodities the denial of which will hamper their war effort. The Navy is at present somewhat pressed in its task of keeping open the communications, but as this condition is removed by new Admiralty measures, by the arrival of the American destroyers, and by the increasing output of anti-U-boat craft from our own yards, we may expect a marked improvement. It is of the utmost importance that the Admiralty should direct their attention to aggressive schemes of war, and to the bombardment of enemy or enemy-held coasts, particularly in the Mediterranean. The production of anti-U-boat craft must proceed at the maximum until further orders, each slip being filled as it is vacated. The Naval Programme does not impinge markedly upon the Air, and should cede some of its armour-plate to tank production.3. The decision to raise the Army to a strength of fifty-five divisions as rapidly as possible does not seem to require any reconsideration. Within this, we should aim at ten armoured divisions, five by the spring, seven by the summer, and ten by the end of 1941. The execution of these programmes of armament supply will tax our munitions factories to the full. I agree in principle with the proposals of the Minister of Supply [Mr. Herbert Morrison] for handling the ammunition supply problem, and also that firings on the 1917/18 scale are not to be expected in the present war.4. Intense efforts must be made to complete the equipment of our Army at home and of our Army in the Middle East. The most serious weak points are tanks and small-arms ammunition, particularly the special types; anti-tank guns and rifles, and even more their ammunition; trench mortars, and still more their ammunition; and rifles. We hope to obtain an additional two hundred and fifty thousand rifles from the United States, but it is lamentable that we should be told that no more than half a million additional rifles can be manufactured here before the end of 1941. Surely, as large numbers of our Regular Army proceed abroad, the need of the Home Guard and of garrison troops for home defence on a far larger scale than at present will be felt. A substantial increase in rifle-making capacity is necessary.5. The danger of invasion will not disappear with the coming of winter, and may confront us with novel possibilities in the coming year. The enemy's need to strike down this country will naturally increase as the war progresses, and all kinds of appliances for crossing the seas that do not now exist may be devised. Actual invasion must be regarded as perpetually threatened, but unlikely to materialise as long as strong forces stand in this island. Apart from this, the only major theatre of war which can be foreseen in 1940/41 is the Middle East. Here we must endeavour to bring into action British, Australasian, and Indian forces, on a scale which should only be limited by sea transport and local maintenance. We must expect to fight in Egypt and the Soudan, in Turkey, Syria, or Palestine, and possibly in Iraq and Persia. Fifteen British divisions, six Australasian, and at least six Indian divisions should be prepared for these theatres, these forces not being, however, additional to the fifty-five divisions which have been mentioned. One would not imagine that the ammunition expenditure would approach the last-war scale. Air power and mechanised troops will be the dominant factors.6 There remain the possibilities of amphibious aggressive warfare against the enemy or enemy-held territory in Europe or North Africa. But the needs of such operations will be provided by the arms and supplies already mentioned in general terms.7. Our task, as the Minister of Supply rightly reminds us, is indeed formidable when the gigantic scale of German military and aviation equipment is considered. This war is not, however, a war of ma.s.ses of men hurling ma.s.ses of sh.e.l.ls at each other. It is by devising new weapons, and above all by scientific leaders.h.i.+p, that we shall best cope with the enemy's superior strength. If, for instance, the series of inventions now being developed to find and hit enemy aircraft, both from the air and from the ground, irrespective of visibility, realise what is hoped from them, not only the strategic but the munitions situation would be profoundly altered. And if the U.P. [unrotated projectiles] weapon can be provided with ammunition, predictors, and other aids which realise an accuracy of hitting three or four times as great as that which now exists, the ground will have taken a long step towards the re-conquest of the air. The Navy will regain much of its old freedom of movement and power to take offensive action. And the Army will be able to land at many points without the risk of being "Namsossed." 1 1 We must, therefore, regard the whole sphere of R.D.F. [Radar], with its many refinements and measureless possibilities, as ranking in priority with the Air Force, of which it is in fact an essential part. The multiplication of the high-cla.s.s scientific personnel, as well as the training of those who will handle the new weapons and research work connected with them, should be the very spearpoint of our thought and effort. Very great reliefs may be expected in anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, although it is at present too soon to alter present plans. We must, therefore, regard the whole sphere of R.D.F. [Radar], with its many refinements and measureless possibilities, as ranking in priority with the Air Force, of which it is in fact an essential part. The multiplication of the high-cla.s.s scientific personnel, as well as the training of those who will handle the new weapons and research work connected with them, should be the very spearpoint of our thought and effort. Very great reliefs may be expected in anti-aircraft guns and ammunition, although it is at present too soon to alter present plans.8. Apart from a large-scale invasion, which is unlikely, there is no prospect of any large expenditure or wastage of military munitions before the spring of 1941. Although heavy and decisive fighting may develop at any time in the Middle East, the difficulties of transport, both of reinforcements and of supplies, will restrict numbers and expenditure. We have, therefore, before us, if not interrupted, a period of eight months in which to make an enormous improvement in our output of warlike equipment, and in which steady and rapid acc.u.mulations may be hoped for. It is upon this purpose that all our resources of credit, materials, and above all of skilled labour, must be bent.

This policy was generally accepted by my colleagues, and the action of all Departments conformed to it.

I found it necessary in October to add a further note about Priorities, which were a source of fierce contention between the different Departments, each striving to do its utmost.

PRIORITIESNOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTEROctober 15, 1940. 15, 1940.The very highest priority in personnel and material should be a.s.signed to what may be called the Radio sphere. This demands scientists, wireless experts, and many cla.s.ses of highly skilled labour and high-grade material. On the progress made, much of the winning of the war and our future strategy, especially Naval, depends. We must impart a far greater accuracy to the A.A. guns, and a far better protection to our wars.h.i.+ps and harbours. Not only research and experiments, but production, must be pushed hopefully forward from many directions, and after repeated disappointments we shall achieve success.2. The IA priority must remain with aircraft production, for the purpose of executing approved target programmes. It must be an obligation upon them to contrive by every conceivable means not to let this priority be abused and needlessly hamper other vital departments. For this purpose they should specify their requirements in labour and material beforehand quarter by quarter, or, if practicable, month by month, and make all surplus available for others immediately. The priority is not to be exercised in the sense that aircraft production is completely to monopolise the supplies of any limited commodity. Where the condition prevails that the approved M.A.P. demands absorb the total supply, a special allocation must be made, even at prejudice to aircraft production, to provide the minimum essential needs of other departments or branches. This allocation, if not agreed, will be decided on the Cabinet level.3. At present we are aiming at five armoured divisions, and armoured brigades equivalent to three more. This is not enough. We cannot hope to compete with the enemy in numbers of men, and must therefore rely upon an exceptional proportion of armoured fighting vehicles. Ten armoured divisions is the target to aim for to the end of 1941. For this purpose the Army must searchingly review their demands for mechanised transport, and large purchases of M.T. must be made in the United States. The home Army, working in this small island with highly developed communications of all kinds, cannot enjoy the same scale of transport which divisions on foreign service require. Improvisation and makes.h.i.+ft must be their guides. A staff officer renders no service to the country who aims at ideal standards, and thereafter simply adds and multiplies until impossible totals are reached. A report should be furnished of mechanical transport, first, second, and third line of British divisions (1) For foreign service,(2) For home service,(3) For troops on the beaches.

Any attempt to make heavy weather out of this problem is a failure to aid us in our need.Wherever possible in England, horse transport should be used to supplement M.T. We improvidently sold a great many of our horses to the Germans, but there are still a good many in Ireland.4. Special aid and occasional temporary priorities must be given to the laggard elements. Among these stand out the following: (1) Rifles.(2) Small-arms ammunition above all the special types.

Intense efforts must be made to bring the new factories into production. The fact that scarcely any improvement is now expected until the end of the year i.e., sixteen months after the outbreak of war is grave. Twelve months should suffice for a cartridge factory. We have been mercifully spared from the worst consequences of this failure through the armies not being in action as was antic.i.p.ated.Trench mortar ammunition and A. T. gun ammunition are also in a shocking plight, and must be helped.All these laggards must be the subject of weekly reports to the Production Council and to me.5. The Navy must exercise its existing priorities in respect of small craft and anti-U-boat building. This applies also to merchant s.h.i.+pbuilding, and to craft for landing operations. Delay must be accepted upon all larger vessels that cannot finish in 1941. Plans must be made to go forward with all processes and parts which do not clash with prior needs. The utmost possible steel and armour-plate must be ordered in America.

By the middle of September the invasion menace seemed sufficiently glaring to arrest further movement of vital units to the East, especially as they had to go round the Cape. After a visit to the Dover sector, where the electric atmosphere was compulsive, I suspended for a few weeks the despatch of the New Zealanders and the remaining two tank battalions to the Middle East. At the same time I kept our three fast transports, "the Glen [Line] s.h.i.+ps" as they were called, in hand for an emergency dash through the Mediterranean.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

17.IX.40.

In all the circ.u.mstances it would be impossible to withdraw the New Zealand Brigade from their forward position on the Dover promontory. The two cruiser-tank battalions cannot go. Would it not be better to keep the Australians back and delay the whole convoy until the third week in October? After all, none of these forces going round the Cape can possibly arrive in time to influence the impending battle in Egypt. But they may play a big part here. Perhaps by the third week in October the Admiralty will be prepared to run greater risks. Anyhow, we cannot afford to make sure that the New Zealanders and the tank battalions are out of action throughout October in either theatre.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

19.IX.40.

Be careful that the Glen s.h.i.+ps are not got out of the way so that it will be impossible to take the armoured reinforcements through the Mediterranean if the need is sufficient to justify the risk. I don't want to be told there are no suitable vessels available.Let me know what other s.h.i.+ps would be available if we should decide to run a convoy from west to east through the Mediterranean about the third week in October.

Although it was a fine September, I was frightened of fog.

Prime Minister to Colonel Jacob.

16.IX.40.

Pray send a copy of this report by First Sea Lord [about invasion in fog] to the Chiefs of the Staff for C.-in-C. Home Forces, adding: "I consider that fog is the gravest danger, as it throws both air forces out of action, baffles our artillery, prevents organised naval attack, and specially favours the infiltration tactics by which the enemy will most probably seek to secure his lodgments. Should conditions of fog prevail, the strongest possible air barrage must be put down upon the invasion ports during the night and early morning. I should be glad to be advised of the proposed naval action by our flotillas, both in darkness and at dawn: (a) (a) if the fog lies more on the English than the French side of the Channel; if the fog lies more on the English than the French side of the Channel; (b) (b) if it is uniform on both sides. if it is uniform on both sides."Are we proposing to use radio aids to navigation?"Prolonged conditions of stand-by under frequent air bombardment will be exhausting to the enemy. Nonetheless, fog is our foe."

In spite of all the danger it was important not to wear the men out.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

18.IX.40.

Inquire from the C.O.S. Committee whether in view of the rough weather Alert Number 1 might not be discreetly relaxed to the next grade.Report to me.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

18.IX.40.

Make inquiries whether there is no way in which a sheet of flaming oil can be spread over one or more of the invasion harbours. This is no more than the old fire-s.h.i.+p story, with modern improvements, that was tried at Dunkirk in the days of the Armada. The Admiralty can surely think of something.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

18.IX.40.

The De Wilde ammunition is of extreme importance. At Number 11 Group the bombing of its factory was evidently considered a great blow. I can quite understand the output dropping to 38,000 rounds in the week while you are moving from Woolwich and getting reinstated, but I trust it will revive again. Pray let me know your future forecast for the next four weeks. If there is revival in prospect, we might perhaps draw a little upon our reserve.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

25.IX.40.

I must show you the comments made upon the latest returns of small-arms ammunition by my Statistical Department. They cause me the greatest anxiety. In particular the De Wilde ammunition, which is the most valuable, is the most smitten. It seems to me that a most tremendous effort must be made, not only on the whole field of Marks 7 and 8, but on De Wilde and armour-piercing. I am well aware of your difficulties. Will you let me know if there is any way in which I can help you to overcome them?

The reader must pardon this next Minute.