Their Finest Hour Part 21

Prime Minister to First Lord.

18.IX.40.

Surely you can run to a new Admiralty flag. It grieves me to see the present dingy object every morning.

I was relieved by the results produced by the new Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.

21.IX.40.

The figures you gave me of the improvement in operational types between May 10 and August 30 are magnificent. If similar figures could be prepared down to September 30, which is not far off, I should prefer to read them to the Cabinet rather than circulate them. If, however, the September figures cannot be got until late in October, I will read [what I now have] to the Cabinet.The country is your debtor, and of your Ministry.

Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.

25.IX.40.

These wonderful results, achieved under circ.u.mstances of increasing difficulty, make it necessary for me to ask you to convey to your Department the warmest thanks and congratulations from His Majesty's Government.

Throughout the summer and autumn I wished to help the Secretary of State for War in his conflict with War Office and Army prejudices about the commandos, or storm troops.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

25.VIII.40.

I have been thinking over our very informal talk the other night, and am moved to write to you because I hear that the whole position of the commandos is being questioned. They have been told "no more recruiting" and that their future is in the melting-pot. I thought, therefore, I might write to let you know how strongly I feel that the Germans have been right, both in the last war and in this, in the use they have made of storm troops. In 1918, the infiltrations which were so deadly to us were by storm troops, and the final defence of Germany in the last four months of 1918 rested mainly upon brilliantly posted and valiantly fought machine-gun nests. In this war all these factors are multiplied. The defeat of France was accomplished by an incredibly small number of highly equipped elite, while the dull ma.s.s of the German Army came on behind, made good the conquest and occupied it. If we are to have any campaign in 1941, it must be amphibious in its character, and there will certainly be many opportunities for minor operations, all of which will depend on surprise landings of lightly equipped, nimble forces accustomed to work like packs of hounds instead of being moved about in the ponderous manner which is appropriate to the regular formations. These have become so elaborate, so complicated in their equipment, so vast in their transport, that it is very difficult to use them in any operations in which time is vital.For every reason, therefore, we must develop the storm troop or commando idea. I have asked for five thousand parachutists, and we must also have at least ten thousand of these small "bands of brothers" who will be capable of lightning action. In this way alone will those positions be secured which afterwards will give the opportunity for highly trained Regular troops to operate on a larger scale.I hope, therefore, that you will let me have an opportunity of discussing this with you before any action is taken to reverse the policy hitherto adopted or to throw into uncertainty all the volunteers who have been gathered together.

The resistances of the War Office were obstinate, and increased as the professional ladder was descended. The idea that large bands of favoured "irregulars," with their unconventional attire and free-and-easy bearing, should throw an implied slur on the efficiency and courage of the Regular battalions was odious to men who had given all their lives to the organised discipline of permanent units. The colonels of many of our finest regiments were aggrieved. "What is there they can do that my battalion cannot? This plan robs the whole Army of its prestige and of its finest men. We never had it in 1918. Why now?" It was easy to understand these feelings without sharing them. The War Office responded to their complaints. But I pressed hard.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

8.IX.40.

You told me that you were in entire agreement with the views I put forward about the special companies, and ending the uncertainty in which they were placed. Unhappily, nothing has happened so far of which the troops are aware. They do not know they are not under sentence of disbandment. All recruiting has been stopped, although there is a waiting list, and they are not even allowed to call up the men who want to join and have been vetted and approved. Although these companies comprise many of the best and most highly trained of our personnel, they are at present only armed with rifles, which seems a shocking waste should they be thrown into the invasion melee. I hope that you will make sure that when you give an order it is obeyed with promptness. Perhaps you could explain to me what has happened to prevent your decision from being made effective. In my experience of Service Departments, which is a long one, there is always a danger that anything contrary to Service prejudices will be obstructed and delayed by officers of the second grade in the machine. The way to deal with this is to make signal examples of one or two. When this becomes known you get a better service afterwards.Perhaps you will tell me about this if you can dine with me tonight.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War (Mr. Eden).

21.IX.40.

.I am not happy about the equipment position of the commandos. It is a waste of this fine material to leave them without sufficient equipment for training purposes, much less for operations.Pray let me have a statement showing:1. What equipment has already been issued to the various commandos.2. What is the output scale of equipment which these units are to have.3. What can be issued to them immediately for training purposes.I should like to have a return each week showing the precise position as regards the equipment of the various Commandos.

Prime Minister to C.-in-C. Home Forces. (Sir Alan Brooke).

21.IX.40.

We often hear tales of how the Germans will invade on an enormous front, trying to throw, say, a quarter of a million men ash.o.r.e anyhow, and trusting afterwards to exploit lodgments which are promising. For an attack of this kind our beach defence system seems admirably devised. The difficulty of defending an island against overseas attack has always consisted in the power of the invader to concentrate a very superior force at one point or another. But if he is going to spread himself out very widely, the bulk of his forces, if they reach sh.o.r.e, will come up against equal or superior forces spread along the coast. It will be a case of one thin line against another. Whereas I can readily imagine a concentrated attack pressed forward with tremendous numbers succeeding against our thin line, I find it difficult to see what would be the good of his landing large numbers of small parties, none of which would be strong enough to break our well-organised sh.o.r.e defence. If he is going to lose, say, a hundred thousand in the pa.s.sage, and another hundred and fifty thousand are to be brought up short at the beaches, the actual invasion would be rather an expensive process, and the enemy would have sustained enormous losses before we had even set our reserves in motion. If, therefore, there is anything in this alleged German plan, it seems to me it should give us considerable satisfaction. Far more dangerous would be the ma.s.sed attack on a few particular selected points.Perhaps you will talk to me about this when we next meet.

Our anxieties about the Italian invasion of Egypt were, it now appears, far surpa.s.sed by those of Marshal Graziani, who commanded it. Ciano notes in his diary: August 8, 1940. Graziani has come to see me. He talks about the attack on Egypt as a very serious undertaking, and says that our present preparations are far from perfect. He attacks Badoglio, who does not check the Duce's aggressive spirit a fact which "for a man who knows Africa means that he must suffer from softening of the brain, or, what is worse, from bad faith. The water supply is entirely insufficient. We move toward a defeat which, in the desert, must inevitably develop into a rapid and total disaster." 8, 1940. Graziani has come to see me. He talks about the attack on Egypt as a very serious undertaking, and says that our present preparations are far from perfect. He attacks Badoglio, who does not check the Duce's aggressive spirit a fact which "for a man who knows Africa means that he must suffer from softening of the brain, or, what is worse, from bad faith. The water supply is entirely insufficient. We move toward a defeat which, in the desert, must inevitably develop into a rapid and total disaster."I reported this to the Duce, who was very much upset about it because in his last conversation with Graziani he had received the impression that the offensive would start in a few days. Graziani did not set any date with me. He would rather not attack at all, or, at any rate, not for two or three months. Mussolini concluded that "one should only give jobs to people who are looking for at least one promotion. Graziani's only anxiety is to remain a Marshal." 1 1 A month later, the Commander-in-Chief asked for a further month's postponement. Mussolini, however, replied that if he did not attack on Monday he would be replaced. The Marshal answered that he would obey. "Never," says Ciano, "has a military operation been undertaken so much against the will of the commanders."

On September 13, the main Italian army began its long-expected advance across the Egyptian frontier. Their forces amounted to six infantry divisions and eight battalions of tanks. Our covering troops consisted of three battalions of infantry, one battalion of tanks, three batteries and two squadrons of armoured cars. They were ordered to make a fighting withdrawal, an operation for which their quality and desert-worthiness fitted them. The Italian attack opened with a heavy barrage of our positions near the frontier town of Sollum. When the dust and smoke cleared, the Italian forces were seen ranged in a remarkable order. In front were motor-cyclists in precise formation from flank to flank and front to rear; behind them were light tanks and many rows of mechanical vehicles. In the words of a British colonel, the spectacle resembled "a birthday party in the Long Valley at Aldershot." The 3d Cold-stream Guards, who confronted this imposing array, withdrew slowly, and our artillery took its toll of the generous targets presented to them.

Farther south two large enemy columns moved across the open desert south of the long ridge that runs parallel to the sea and could be crossed only at Halfaya the "h.e.l.lfire Pa.s.s" which played its part in all our later battles. Each Italian column consisted of many hundreds of vehicles, with tanks, anti-tank guns, and artillery in front, and with lorried infantry in the centre. This formation, which was several times adopted, we called the "Hedgehog." Our forces fell back before these great numbers, taking every opportunity to hara.s.s the enemy, whose movements seemed erratic and indecisive. Graziani afterwards explained that at the last moment he decided to change his plan of an enveloping desert movement and "concentrate all my forces on the left to make a lightning movement along the coast to Sidi Barrani." Accordingly the great Italian ma.s.s moved slowly forward along the coast road by two parallel tracks. They attacked in waves of infantry carried in lorries, sent forward in fifties. The Coldstream Guards fell back skilfully at their convenience from Sollum to successive positions for four days, inflicting severe punishment as they went.

On the 17th, the Italian Army reached Sidi Barrani. Our casualties were forty killed and wounded, and the enemy's about five times as many, including a hundred and fifty vehicles destroyed. Here, with their communications lengthened by sixty miles, the Italians settled down to spend the next three months. They were continually hara.s.sed by our small mobile columns, and suffered serious maintenance difficulties. Mussolini at first was "radiant with joy. He has taken the entire responsibility of the offensive on his shoulders," says Ciano, "and is proud that he was right." As the weeks lengthened into months, his satisfaction diminished. It seemed, however, certain to us in London that in two or three months an Italian army far larger than any we could gather would renew the advance to capture the Delta. And then there were always the Germans who might appear! We could not, of course, expect the long halt which followed Graziani's advance. It was reasonable to suppose that a major battle would be fought at Mersa Matruh. The weeks that had already pa.s.sed had enabled our precious armour to come round the Cape without the time-lag so far causing disadvantage. It was now approaching.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

14.IX.40.

I hope the armoured brigade will be in time. I have no doubt it could have been conducted safely through the Mediterranean, and the present danger that it will be too late averted. It must, however, be remembered that General Wavell himself joined in the declaration of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy, Army, and Air, that the situation in Egypt did not warrant the risk. It was this declaration that made it impossible for me to override the Admiralty objections, as I would otherwise have done.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War. (General Ismay to see.) 19.IX.40.

The armoured reinforcements are now in the Gulf of Aden. We have been a.s.sured that, of course, General Wavell has made all arrangements to get them into action as quickly as possible. I hope this is so. I am sorry that someone like Lord Beaverbrook is not waiting on the quay to do the job of pa.s.sing them to the fighting line. We must do the best we can. Has it been considered whether it would be better to carry these vehicles through the Ca.n.a.l to Alexandria and debark them there close to the front, or have special trains and railway cars, cranes, and other facilities been acc.u.mulated at Suez? Let the alternatives be examined here. here. Without waiting for this, let a telegram be drafted inquiring about the alternatives and the arrangements now made by General Wavell. Every day and even every hour counts in this matter. Without waiting for this, let a telegram be drafted inquiring about the alternatives and the arrangements now made by General Wavell. Every day and even every hour counts in this matter.

All the time I had a fear for Malta, which seemed almost defenceless.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.I.G.S.

21.IX.40.

This telegram [from Governor and C.-in-C. Malta] confirms my apprehensions about Malta. Beaches defended on an average battalion front of fifteen miles, and no reserves for counter-attack worth speaking of, leave the island at the mercy of a landing force. You must remember that we do not possess the command of the sea around Malta. The danger, therefore, appears to be extreme. I should have thought four battalions were needed, but, owing to the difficulty of moving transports from the west, we must be content with two for the moment. We must find two good ones. Apparently there is no insuperable difficulty in accommodation.

When I look back on all these worries, I remember the story of the old man who said on his deathbed that he had had a lot of trouble in his life, most of which had never happened. Certainly this is true of my life in September, 1940. The Germans were beaten in the Air Battle of Britain. The overseas invasion of Britain was not attempted. In fact, by this date Hitler had already turned his glare to the East. The Italians did not press their attack upon Egypt. The tank brigade sent all round the Cape arrived in good time, not indeed for a defensive battle of Mersa Matruh in September, but for a later operation incomparably more advantageous. We found means to reinforce Malta before any serious attack from the air was made upon it, and no one dared to try a landing upon the island fortress at any time. Thus September pa.s.sed.

9.

Dakar

Importance of Aiding General de Gaulle - Plan for Liberating Dakar - Need to Support the Free French Forces - My Minute of August 8, 1940 - The War Cabinet Approves "Operation Menace" - Dangers of Delay and Leakage - Message from "Jacques" - Our Second String - The French Cruisers Sighted - A Failure at Whitehall - Too Late - I Advise the War Cabinet to Abandon the Project - Strong Desire of the Commanders to Attack - General de Gaulle's Persistence - The War Cabinet Gives Full Discretion to the Commanders - My Telegram to General s.m.u.ts and President Roosevelt - The Attack on Dakar - s.h.i.+ps Versus Forts - Stubborn Resistance of the Vichy French - We Suffer Appreciable Naval Losses - Cabinet and Commanders Agreed to Break Off - Changes of Role at Home and on the Spot - Justification of the Commanders - Parliament Requires No Explanations.

AT THIS TIME His Majesty's Government attached great importance to aiding General de Gaulle and the Free French to rally the African possessions and colonies of France, especially those upon the Atlantic coast. Our information was that a large portion of the French officers, officials, and traders in all these territories had not despaired. They were stunned by the sudden collapse of their motherland, but being still free from Hitler's force and Petain's fraud were in no mood to surrender. To them General de Gaulle shone as a star in the pitch-black night. Distance gave them time, and time gave them opportunity. His Majesty's Government attached great importance to aiding General de Gaulle and the Free French to rally the African possessions and colonies of France, especially those upon the Atlantic coast. Our information was that a large portion of the French officers, officials, and traders in all these territories had not despaired. They were stunned by the sudden collapse of their motherland, but being still free from Hitler's force and Petain's fraud were in no mood to surrender. To them General de Gaulle shone as a star in the pitch-black night. Distance gave them time, and time gave them opportunity.

Once it was clear that Casablanca was beyond our strength, my mind naturally turned to Dakar. In all this the small handling committee I formed to advise me personally on French affairs was convinced and active. On the evening of August 3, 1940, I sent my general approval from Chequers to a proposal for landing Free French forces in West Africa. General de Gaulle, Major-General Spears, and Major Morton had evolved a plan in outline, of which the object was to raise the Free French flag in West Africa, to occupy Dakar, and thus consolidate the French colonies in West and Equatorial Africa for General de Gaulle, and later to rally the French colonies in North Africa. General Catroux was to come from Indo-China to England and eventually take command of the French North African colonies, should these be liberated later on.

On August 4, the Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the details of this plan, as worked out further by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, and drew up their report for the War Cabinet. The proposals of the Chiefs of Staff were based on the three following a.s.sumptions: first, that the force must be equipped and loaded so that it could land in any French West African port; secondly, that the expedition should consist entirely of Free French troops and have no British elements, except the s.h.i.+ps in which it moved and their naval escort; thirdly, that the matter should be settled as between Frenchmen, so that the expedition would land without effective opposition.

The strength of the Free French force would be about twenty-five hundred men, comprising two battalions, a company of tanks, sections of artillery and engineers, and a bomber and a fighter flight, for which we should supply the Hurricanes. This force could be ready at Aldershot on August 10, and it was estimated that transports and stores.h.i.+ps could sail from Liverpool on August 13 and troops.h.i.+ps between the 19th and 23d, arriving at Dakar on the 28th, or at the other ports, Konakri and Duala, a few days later. The War Cabinet approved these proposals at their meeting on August 5.

It soon became clear that General de Gaulle required more British support than the Chiefs of Staff had contemplated. They represented to me that this would involve commitments larger and more enduring than those which had been foreseen, and also that the expedition was beginning to lose its Free French character. Our resources were at this time so severely strained that this extension could not be lightly accepted. However, on August 6, I conferred with General de Gaulle, and at 11 P P.M. on August 7, I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the project. It was agreed that the best place to land the Free French force was Dakar. I stated that the expedition must be sufficiently backed by British troops to ensure its success, and asked for a larger plan on these lines. The Chiefs of Staff dwelt upon the conflict between a policy of improving our relations with Vichy and our interests in marshalling the French colonies against Germany. They set forth the danger that General de Gaulle's movement might lead to war with Metropolitan France and also with the French Colonies. If, nevertheless, reports from the Free French agents on the spot and from our own representatives in the area were favourable, they recommended that the expedition should go forward. Accordingly, in the early hours of August 8, I issued the following directive: on August 7, I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the project. It was agreed that the best place to land the Free French force was Dakar. I stated that the expedition must be sufficiently backed by British troops to ensure its success, and asked for a larger plan on these lines. The Chiefs of Staff dwelt upon the conflict between a policy of improving our relations with Vichy and our interests in marshalling the French colonies against Germany. They set forth the danger that General de Gaulle's movement might lead to war with Metropolitan France and also with the French Colonies. If, nevertheless, reports from the Free French agents on the spot and from our own representatives in the area were favourable, they recommended that the expedition should go forward. Accordingly, in the early hours of August 8, I issued the following directive:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.

8.VIII.40.

1. The telegram from the Governor of Nigeria shows the danger of German influence spreading quickly through the West African colonies of France with the connivance or aid of the Vichy Government. Unless we act with celerity and vigour, we may find effective U-boat bases, supported by German aviation, all down this coast, and it will become barred to us but available for the Germans in the same way as the western coast of Europe.2. It is now six weeks since the Cabinet was strongly disposed to action at Casablanca, and Mr. Duff Cooper and Lord Gort were despatched. Nothing, however, came of this. The local French were hostile. The Chiefs of the Staff were not able to make any positive proposals, and the situation has markedly deteriorated.3. It would seem extremely important to British interests that General de Gaulle should take Dakar at the earliest moment. If his emissaries report that it can be taken peaceably, so much the better. If their report is adverse, an adequate Polish and British force should be provided and full naval protection given. The operation, once begun, must be carried through. De Gaulle should impart a French character to it, and of course, once successful, his administration will rule. But we must provide the needful balance of force.4. The Chiefs of the Staff should make a plan for achieving the capture of Dakar. For this purpose they should consider available: (a) (a) de Gaulle's force and any French wars.h.i.+ps which can be collected; de Gaulle's force and any French wars.h.i.+ps which can be collected; (b) (b) ample British naval force, both to dominate French wars.h.i.+ps in the neighbourhood and to cover the landing; ample British naval force, both to dominate French wars.h.i.+ps in the neighbourhood and to cover the landing; (c) (c) a brigade of Poles properly equipped; a brigade of Poles properly equipped; (d) (d) the Royal Marine Brigade which was being held available for the Atlantic islands, but might well help to put de Gaulle ash.o.r.e first, or alternatively commandos from Sir R. Keyes's force; the Royal Marine Brigade which was being held available for the Atlantic islands, but might well help to put de Gaulle ash.o.r.e first, or alternatively commandos from Sir R. Keyes's force; (e) (e) proper air support, either by carrier or by machines working from a British West African colony. proper air support, either by carrier or by machines working from a British West African colony.5. Let a plan be prepared forthwith, and let the dates be arranged in relation to the Mediterranean operation.6. It is not intended, after Dakar is taken, that we shall hold it with British forces. General de Gaulle's administration would be set up, and would have to maintain itself, British a.s.sistance being limited to supplies on a moderate scale, and of course preventing any sea-borne expedition from Germanised France. Should de Gaulle be unable to maintain himself permanently against air attack or air-borne troops, we will take him off again after destroying all harbour facilities. We should, of course, in any case take over Richelieu Richelieu under the French flag and have her repaired. The Poles and the Belgians would also have their gold, which was moved before the armistice to Africa by the French Government for safety, recovered for them. under the French flag and have her repaired. The Poles and the Belgians would also have their gold, which was moved before the armistice to Africa by the French Government for safety, recovered for them.7. In working out the above plan, time is vital. We have lost too much already. British s.h.i.+ps are to be used as transports whenever convenient, and merely hoist French colours. No question of Orders in Council or legislation to transfer British transports to the French flag need be considered.8. The risk of a French declaration of war and whether it should be courted is reserved for the Cabinet.

On August 13, I brought the matter before the War Cabinet, explaining that it went farther than the original plan of a purely French expedition. The details of a landing of six different parties at dawn on the beaches near Dakar and thus dispersing the efforts of the defenders, a.s.suming there was opposition, were examined by my colleagues. The War Cabinet approved the plan, subject to consideration by the Foreign Secretary upon the chances of Vichy France declaring war. Measuring the situation as far as I could, I did not believe this would happen. I had now become set upon this venture. I approved the appointment of Vice-Admiral John Cunningham and Major-General Irwin as the commanders of the expedition. They visited me at Chequers on the night of August 12, and we went through all the aspects of this doubtful and complex affair. I drafted their instructions myself.

I thus undertook in an exceptional degree the initiation and advocacy of the Dakar expedition, to which the code name "Menace" was a.s.signed. Of this, although I cannot feel we were well served on all occasions and certainly had bad luck, I never at any time repented. Dakar was a prize; rallying the French colonial empire a greater. There was a fair chance of gaining these results without bloodshed, and I felt in my finger-tips that Vichy France would not declare war. The stubborn resistance of Britain, the stern mood of the United States, had lit new hope in French hearts. If we won, Vichy could shrug its shoulders. If we lost, they could trade off their resistance with their German masters as a virtue. The most serious danger was prolonged fighting. But these were days in which far more serious risks were the commonplaces of our daily life. I conceived that our resources, albeit strained to the last inch and ounce, could just manage it. With invasion looming up ever nearer and more imminent, we had not shrunk from sending half our tanks to Wavell for the defence of Egypt. Compared to that, this was a pup. Our national War Cabinet, Tory, Labour, and Liberal, were hard, resolute men imbued with an increasing sense of playing a winning hand. So all the orders were given, and everything went forward under unchallengeable authority.

Our two dangers were now delay and leakage, and the first aggravated the second. At this time the Free French forces in England were a band of exiled heroes in arms against the reigning Government of their country. They were ready to fire on their own fellow-countrymen, and accept the sinking of French wars.h.i.+ps by British guns. Their leaders lay under sentence of death. Who can wonder at, still less blame them for, a tenseness of emotion or even for indiscretion? The War Cabinet could give orders to our own troops without anyone but the commanders and the Chiefs of Staff circle having to be informed of our intentions. But General de Gaulle had to carry his gallant band of Frenchmen with him. Many got to know. Dakar became common talk among the French troops. At a dinner in a Liverpool restaurant French officers toasted "Dakar!" Our a.s.sault landing craft had to travel on trolleys across England from near Portsmouth to Liverpool, and their escort wore tropical kit. We were all in our wartime infancy. The sealing of the island was not to be compared with what we achieved later in the supreme operations of "Torch" and "Overlord."

Then there were delays. We had hoped to strike on September 8, but now it appeared that the main force must first go to Freetown to refuel and make their final poise. The plan was based upon the French troops.h.i.+ps reaching Dakar in sixteen days at twelve knots. It was found, however, that the s.h.i.+ps carrying the mechanical transport could only make eight to nine knots, and this discovery was reported only at a stage of loading when the time lost in re reloading into faster s.h.i.+ps offered no gain. In all ten days' delay from the original date became inevitable: five days for the miscalculation of the speed of the s.h.i.+ps, three days for unforeseen loading troubles, two days for the refuelling at Freetown. We must now be content with September 18.

I presided over a meeting of the Chiefs of the Staff and General de Gaulle on August 20 at 10.30 P.M P.M., and am on record as summing up the plan as follows: The Anglo-French Armada would arrive at Dakar at dawn, aircraft would drop streamers and leaflets over the town, the British squadron would remain on the horizon, and French s.h.i.+ps would come towards the port. An emissary, in a picket boat flying the Tricolour and a white flag, would go into the harbour with a letter to the Governor saying that General de Gaulle and his Free French troops had arrived. General de Gaulle would stress in the letter that he had come to free Dakar from the danger of imminent German aggression and was bringing food and succour to the garrison and inhabitants. If the Governor was amenable, all would be well; if not, and the coast defences opened fire, the British squadrons would close in. If the opposition continued, the British wars.h.i.+ps would open fire on the French gun positions, but with the utmost restraint. If determined opposition was met with, the British forces would use all means to break down resistance. It was essential that the operation should be completed, and General de Gaulle master of Dakar, by nightfall.General de Gaulle expressed his agreement.

On the 22d we met again, and a letter was read from the Foreign Secretary to me disclosing a leakage of information. Exactly what this leakage amounted to, no one could tell. The advantage of sea-power used offensively is that when a fleet sails no one can be sure where it is going to strike. The seas are broad and the oceans broader. Tropical kit was a clue no more definite than the Continent of Africa. The wife of a Frenchman in Liverpool, who was suspected of Vichy contacts, was known to be convinced that the Mediterranean was the destination of the troops.h.i.+ps which were gathering in the Mersey. Even the word "Dakar," if bruited carelessly, might be a blind. Such forms of "cover" were carried to remarkable refinements as we became more experienced and wily. I was worried by the delays and beat against them. As to the leakage, none could tell. At any rate, on August 27 the Cabinet gave their final general approval for going ahead. Our target date was then September 19.

At 6.24 P.M P.M. on September 9, the British Consul-General at Tangier cabled to Admiral North, commanding the Atlantic station, "a sh.o.r.e appointment at Gibraltar," and repeated to the Foreign Office: Following received from "Jacques." French squadron may try to pa.s.s the Straits proceeding westward for unknown destination. This attempt may be timed to take place within the next seventy-two hours.

The Admiral was not not in the Dakar circle, and took no special action. The telegram was repeated from Tangier simultaneously to the Foreign Office and received at 7.50 in the Dakar circle, and took no special action. The telegram was repeated from Tangier simultaneously to the Foreign Office and received at 7.50 A.M. A.M. on the 10th. At this time we were under almost continuous bombardment in London. Owing to the recurrent stoppages of work through the air raids, arrears had acc.u.mulated in the cipher branch. The message was not marked "Important," and was deciphered only in its turn. It was not ready for distribution until September 14, when at last it reached the Admiralty. on the 10th. At this time we were under almost continuous bombardment in London. Owing to the recurrent stoppages of work through the air raids, arrears had acc.u.mulated in the cipher branch. The message was not marked "Important," and was deciphered only in its turn. It was not ready for distribution until September 14, when at last it reached the Admiralty.