Rulers of India: Albuquerque Part 3

Albuquerque goes on to say--

'And so I intend to drive out of Calicut the Moors, who {67} are the people that furnish the Zamorin with all the revenue that he requires for the expenses of war, and after this is over I shall give my attention forthwith to the affairs of Goa, wherein I can help in the war against the King of the Deccan.'

Albuquerque then adds that Ormuz now belongs to the King of Portugal, and that--

'the horses of Ormuz shall not be consigned except to Baticala [Bhatkal] or to any other port he [the Raja of Vijayanagar] pleases to point out where he can have them, and shall not go to the King of the Deccan, who is a Moor and his enemy.'[2]

[Footnote 2: Instructions to Frei Luis; Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. pp. 74-77.]

These instructions make evident the att.i.tude of Albuquerque, his desire to earn the friends.h.i.+p of Hindu rulers and his unrelenting enmity to all Muhammadans. He had not the absurd notion which Almeida attributed to him of desiring to establish a direct Portuguese rule all over India. He wished rather to pose as the destroyer of Muhammadanism and the liberator of the natives. In return for this service Portugal was to control the commerce of India with Europe.

The att.i.tude is not very different from that adopted by the English 300 years later, and it is a remarkable conception for a statesman at the very beginning of the sixteenth century.

Before however Albuquerque was able to combine operations with the Hindu Raja of Narsingha he was forced, against his better judgment, to make an immediate attack unaided upon Calicut. Dom Ferno de {68} Coutinho, the Marshal, insisted on this expedition against the Zamorin, on the ground that the King had ordered him to destroy Calicut before he returned to Portugal. The prudent Albuquerque endeavoured to dissuade the Marshal, but the headstrong young n.o.bleman insisted on having his way. The entire military force of the Portuguese in India sailed for Calicut, and on Jan. 4, 1510, a landing was effected in front of the city. Albuquerque desired that a halt should then be made, as the men were very wearied, and could not bear the weight of their arms by reason of the great heat,--but in vain. He found himself forced to comply with the wishes of his impetuous relative, but he did his best to a.s.sure a safe retreat from the disaster, which he foresaw, by ordering Dom Antonio de Noronha, after burning the s.h.i.+ps in the port, to remain in reserve with 300 men. Albuquerque then proceeded to follow the Marshal, who was rapidly making his way towards the Zamorin's palace. As the Marshal moved forward--

'There came against him twenty or thirty Nairs, armed with swords and s.h.i.+elds, shouting aloud in their accustomed manner. When he caught sight of them coming against him he began to chuckle, and said to Gaspar Pereira, who was close beside him:--"Is this your Calicut that you terrify us all with in Portugal?" Gaspar Pereira replied that he would think differently before long; for he would wager that, if they could that day penetrate to the houses of the Zamorin, those little naked blacks would give them trouble enough.

The Marshal replied:--"This is not the kind of people who will give me any trouble."[3]

[Footnote 3: Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. p. 67.]

{69} The Portuguese vanguard under the Marshal managed to reach the Zamorin's palace, but the men soon scattered to plunder and got into disorder. They burnt the palace, but were hotly attacked by the Nairs when they endeavoured to retreat. More than eighty of the Portuguese were killed as they retired, including the Marshal and ten or twelve of the princ.i.p.al officers. Albuquerque himself was wounded, and all the invaders would probably have been cut to pieces but for the gallant conduct of the reserve under the command of Dom Antonio de Noronha. After this repulse, which was the most serious the Portuguese had sustained in India, Albuquerque returned to Cochin.

It is interesting to compare the account of this attack on Calicut, as given by Sheikh Zin-ud-din in his historical work called the _Tohfut-ul-mujahideen_, which was written in the sixteenth century:--

'Now on Thursday, the 22nd day of the month of Ramzan, in the year of the Hejira 915, the Franks made a descent upon Calicut, committing great devastation and burning the Jama Mosque which was built by Nakuz Miscal; and they attacked also the palace of the Zamorin, hoping to obtain possession of it, as that prince was absent, being engaged in war in a distant part of his dominions.

But the Nairs that had been left behind at Calicut, having united against these invaders, made an a.s.sault upon them, and succeeded in ejecting them from the palace, killing at the same time nearly 500 of their party; a great number also were drowned, and the few that escaped were saved by flying on board their vessels; having been entirely defeated in their designs by the permission of G.o.d Most High. Now, both {70} before this time and after it, they made various descents upon the dominions of the Zamorin, burning in these attacks in all nearly fifty vessels that were lying near his sh.o.r.es, and conferring martyrdom upon upwards of seventy of the faithful.'[4]

[Footnote 4: _Tohfut-ul-mujahideen_, translated by Lieut. M. J.

Rowlandson for the Oriental Translation Fund, 1833; pp. 97-99.]

After this serious disaster, which seemed an evil omen for Albuquerque's governors.h.i.+p, the great captain returned to Cochin to be healed of his wounds. Sickness however could not repress his energies, and he soon equipped his fleet afresh and took on board 1000 Portuguese soldiers. With this fleet he intended to sail to the Red Sea. Duarte de Lemos, who had succeeded him as Captain of the Ethiopian and Arabian Seas, earnestly implored the Governor to bring him help at once, alleging that his s.h.i.+ps were rotten and unable to defend the island and fortress of Socotra. Albuquerque was well acquainted with King Emmanuel's desire to put an end to the Muhammadan commerce by way of the Red Sea. It was the notion which he had himself advocated to the King, and its execution was one of the princ.i.p.al aims of his policy. He desired also to return to Ormuz in order to punish the Minister, Cogeatar, and firmly establish Portuguese influence in the Persian Gulf. He therefore left Cochin with twenty-three s.h.i.+ps on Feb. 10, 1510, and on his way to the island of Anchediva [Anjidiv], whence he intended to start for Arabia, he anch.o.r.ed off the port of Mergeu [Mirjan]. {71} He there considered an alternative scheme of campaign, namely, to attack Goa, for it was suggested to him by a native pirate or corsair captain, named Timoja or Timmaya, that it was a particularly suitable time for a sudden attack upon that central port.

This man played a most important part in the history of Portuguese conquest in India. He is reported to have been a Muhammadan by Correa, and, more correctly, a Hindu in the _Commentaries_ of Albuquerque. The first Portuguese captain who had relations with this pirate was Dom Vasco da Gama during his second voyage to India in 1502. Correa says that certain s.h.i.+ps--

'were _fustas_ of thieves, which, with oars and sails, got into a river called Onor (Honawar), where there was a Moor who equipped them, named Timoja.... This Moor committed great robberies at sea upon all that he fell in with, and this Moor was a foreigner and paid part of the plunder to the King of Gersoppa, who was ruler of the country.'[5]

[Footnote 5: _The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama_, translated from Correa's _Lendas da India_: Hakluyt Soc. 1869, p. 309.]

Vasco da Gama had on this information burnt various s.h.i.+ps belonging to Timoja. But the native chieftain seems to have borne the Portuguese no ill feeling for this, and entered into very friendly relations with Dom Francisco de Almeida, the Viceroy. He had written to Albuquerque before the ill-fated attack upon Calicut, begging the Governor to direct his fleet against Goa, and while Albuquerque was on his way on this occasion to the Red Sea, Timoja arrived to parley with him at Mergeu.

{72} 'This man,' it is said in the _Commentaries_ of Albuquerque, 'was a Hindu by birth, very obedient to the interests of the King of Portugal; and being a man of low origin had, as a corsair, raised himself to a position of great honour.'[6]

[Footnote 6: Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. p. 81.]

He informed Albuquerque that the Lord of Goa was dead, and that great dissensions had arisen among his n.o.bles, which left a very favourable opportunity for an attack on the city. The Governor called a council of his captains, and after considering Timoja's arguments it was unanimously resolved to put off the expedition to the Red Sea and to attack Goa.

The capture of Goa is perhaps the most important event of Albuquerque's administration, and the reasons which led to it deserve special consideration. The island of Goa was situated upon the Malabar coast about half way between Bombay and Cape Comorin. It was formed by the mouths of two rivers and was thus easily fitted for defence. At the time of its capture there was a bar at the mouth of the harbour, allowing in full flood s.h.i.+ps drawing three fathoms of water to enter, and the anchorage inside was absolutely safe. It had always been the centre of an important trade, and was visited by merchants of many nationalities. By some authorities its trade is represented as larger than that of Calicut, and at any rate it was but slightly inferior. From its situation, and the ease with which it could be fortified, it was well fitted to become the capital of the Portuguese in India.

Albuquerque's ideas, as has already been said, differed {73} from those of Almeida in one important particular. Albuquerque wished to establish a real Portuguese empire, which should rest upon the possession of Portuguese colonies owning the direct sway of the King of Portugal. Almeida thought it sufficient to command the sea, and that the only land stations should be a few factories in commercial cities, defended by fortifications against all a.s.saults. Almeida therefore was quite satisfied that the fortresses he had built at Cannanore, Cochin, and Quilon were all that was needed; but Albuquerque considered it derogatory for the Portuguese to have their headquarters on sufferance in the capitals of native rulers. He felt it would be impolitic to attack the Rajas who had been friendly with the Portuguese, and he therefore resolved to establish a Portuguese capital in another part of the Malabar coast quite independent of the existing factories. Geographically also he considered Cochin as too far south for the effective maintenance of the Portuguese power in India, and he therefore looked out for a more central situation. Goa seemed to offer just what he wanted, a good harbour and a central situation, while its capture would not offend any of the native allies of the Portuguese.

There was another political consideration which also weighed with Albuquerque. Hitherto the chief enemies of the Portuguese had been Muhammadan merchants, who had, in the instance of Calicut, induced the Hindu ruler to take the offensive. But Goa was the actual possession of a Muhammadan ruler, {74} and its conquest would strike a direct blow at the growing Muhammadan power in India.

Goa belonged to various Hindu dynasties until the early part of the fourteenth century, when it was conquered by the Muhammadan Nawab of Honawar. In 1367, however, the Hindu minister of Harihara, Raja of Vijayanagar, reconquered the city, and it remained a part of the great Hindu kingdom of Southern India for more than seventy years. In 1440 the inhabitants of the old city of Goa attained their independence, and soon after founded the new city of Goa in another part of the island. Its trade, especially in horses, imported from Ormuz, grew rapidly, and in 1470 it was conquered by the Muhammadan King of the Deccan, Muhammad Shah II. So great was the monarch's joy at the conquest, that it is stated in Ferishta that he ordered 'the march of triumph to be beaten for seven days.'

In 1472 the Hindu Raja of Belgaum, and in 1481 the Raja of Vijayanagar made unsuccessful attacks upon Goa. Amid the later troubles of the great Bahmani kingdom of the Deccan, which occurred on the death of Muhammad Shah II, Goa fell to the lot of the Muhammadan kingdom of Bij.a.pur. The founder of this kingdom was Yusaf Adil Shah, a son of Amurad II, Sultan of the Ottoman Turks. That prince had a most romantic history. He was rescued by his mother from being put to death with his brothers on the accession to the throne of Muhammad II. He was secretly delivered over to a merchant of Sava in {75} Persia who educated him. He took the name of Savai from the place of his education, and is always called by the Portuguese historians the Sabaio or cabaio, or the Hidalco, a version of Adil Khan. He came to India as a slave, but he rose rapidly from a simple soldier to the command of the royal body-guard of the Bahmani kings, and was eventually made Governor of Bij.a.pur. In 1489 he was crowned King of Bij.a.pur, and under his rule Goa, which formed part of his dominions, greatly increased in wealth.

Yusaf Adil Shah erected many fine buildings, including a magnificent palace at Goa. He even thought, it is said, of making it his capital, and there can be no doubt that he vastly augmented its prosperity.

But his government was oppressive to the Hindu population; he doubled the taxes, and by favouring his own creed made himself hated by all his Hindu subjects. When Timoja pressed Albuquerque to attack Goa, the Muhammadan Governor, whose name, Malik Yusaf Gurgi, is rendered by the Portuguese Melique cufegurgij, had made himself especially obnoxious from the cruelties wreaked by his Turkish garrison on the citizens. Yusaf Adil Shah was not dead, as Timoja told Albuquerque, but was absent in the interior, and the time was really favourable for a sudden a.s.sault. A Jogi or Hindu ascetic had prophesied that a foreign people coming from a distant land would conquer Goa, and the inhabitants were therefore ready to surrender the city without much opposition to the Portuguese.

{76} Influenced by these considerations, and the arguments of Timoja, Albuquerque altered the direction of his armament and cast anchor off Goa harbour. On March 1, 1510, Dom Antonio de Noronha, Albuquerque's gallant nephew, crossed the bar with the s.h.i.+ps' boats of the Portuguese fleet, two galleys commanded by Diogo Fernandes de Beja and Simo de Andrade, and the _fustas_ or native boats of Timoja, and stormed the fortress of Panjim, which is situated at the entrance to the harbour. The s.h.i.+ps then entered, and on the 3rd of March the city of Goa surrendered without making any defence.[7] The Governor for the Muhammadan King and his soldiers had fled with such haste that many fugitives were drowned in crossing the rivers. Albuquerque entered the city in triumph, and proceeded to the palace of Yusaf Adil Shah, where his first measure was to appoint Dom Antonio de Noronha to be Captain of the city. He was hailed with shouts of welcome by the people, who showered on him flowers made of gold and silver. The Governor at once prepared to strengthen the defences of the city; the s.h.i.+ps' crews were brought ash.o.r.e, and both Portuguese and natives were set to work to build a strong wall round the city, and a citadel.

[Footnote 7: The dates of the first capture of Goa are given differently. The _Commentaries_ of Albuquerque gives March 3, vol.

ii. pp. 88-92; Correa, _Lendas da India_, vol. ii p. 59, says March 1. Barros, Decade II, Book V, chapter 3, ed. of 1777, pp. 464, 465; Castanheda, vol. iii. ed. of 1833, p. 30; and Faria e Sousa, _Asia Portugueza_, ed. of 1666, vol. i. p. 137, all fix February 17.]

Albuquerque was well aware of the effect his {77} conquest would have upon the minds of other native sovereigns. He received amba.s.sadors from the Raja of Vijayanagar, who plainly hinted that their master expected Goa would be made over to him. He also received amba.s.sadors from the King of Ormuz and from Shah Ismail of Persia. These Muhammadan potentates had despatched their amba.s.sadors to the King of Bij.a.pur to incite him to join in a general war against the Portuguese. But when they found Albuquerque in possession of the city of Goa, they adroitly changed the purpose of their missions, and made overtures to him instead. Albuquerque received them with fair words.

He had not abandoned his schemes against Ormuz, but he desired to stand well with Ismail Shah. He thoroughly understood the exact position of Ismail, the greatest of the Sufi Shahs of Persia, whom the Portuguese always called the Sophy, and that Ismail belonged to the s.h.i.+ah sect of Muhammadans, and as such was the enemy of the Turks, who were orthodox Muhammadans.

Albuquerque nominated Ruy Gomes as amba.s.sador to Ismail Shah, and the instructions which he took with him are very significant of Albuquerque's wide range of policy. Ruy Gomes never reached the Persian Court, being poisoned upon the way at Ormuz, but part of his instructions deserve quotation:

'You shall tell Shah Ismail how my Lord the King will be pleased to come to an understanding and alliance with him, and will a.s.sist him in his war against the Sultan; and that I, in his name and on his behalf, offer him the fleet and {78} army and artillery which I have with me, and the fortresses, towns, and lords.h.i.+ps, which the King of Portugal holds in India, and I will give him all this same help against the Turk.'[8]

[Footnote 8: Instructions to Ruy Gomes; Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. pp. 114-118.]

In his letter to the Shah, Albuquerque lays weight also upon the advantages which might be derived from an alliance with the Portuguese:

'I believe that with small trouble,' he says, 'you must gain the Lords.h.i.+p of the city of Cairo, and all his kingdom and dependencies.... If G.o.d grant that this intercourse and alliance be ratified, come you with all your power against the city of Cairo and the lands of the Grand Sultan which are on the borders of your own, and the King my Lord shall pa.s.s over to Jerusalem and gain from him all the land on that side.'[9]

[Footnote 9: Letter to Shah Ismail; Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. pp. 111-114.]

These ideas deserve notice both as ill.u.s.trating the grandiose conceptions of Albuquerque, and his skill in taking advantage of dissensions among the foes of the Christian religion. To him doubtless it mattered not whether the Muhammadans he attacked were s.h.i.+ahs or Sunis--all alike were infidels; but he was perfectly ready to make use of the one sect against the other. He calmly put on one side the demand of the Persian amba.s.sador that the s.h.i.+ah form of Muhammadanism should be proclaimed in Goa, and that Ismail Shah's money should pa.s.s current, but he nevertheless dismissed the amba.s.sador with fair words.

Albuquerque was soon distracted from questions of general policy by the advance of the King of Bij.a.pur upon the island of Goa with 60,000 men. As had {79} happened at Ormuz, his captains did not share his views. They declared it to be impossible to defend Goa, and strongly resented being engaged in the hard work of building walls instead of in the more lucrative business of collecting cargoes for Portugal.

The news of the advance of Yusaf Adil Shah increased the reluctance of the captains to remain, but Albuquerque nevertheless refused to evacuate Goa. The Muhammadan king made overtures to him and promised to cede to the Portuguese any other port in his dominions except Goa, and it was even hinted that Goa itself would be given up, if Albuquerque would surrender Timoja, who was looked on as a traitor to his country. This proposition it need hardly be said was rejected with scorn. Eventually, whether from the unwillingness of the Portuguese captains or from sheer impossibility of defence, Yusaf Adil Shah's army made its way into the island of Goa on May 17, 1510.

The Portuguese at first hoped to hold the citadel of Goa; but finding the position untenable, Albuquerque withdrew his men to their s.h.i.+ps, after setting fire to the a.r.s.enal and beheading 150 of the princ.i.p.al Muhammadan prisoners whom he had in his possession.

He then dropped down the river with his fleet, but was unable to cross the bar owing to the state of the weather. For nearly three months the Portuguese fleet remained at anchor at the mouth of the harbour of Goa. It was one of the most critical periods in Albuquerque's life, and during it he exhibited the {80} highest qualities of a commander. At their anchorage, the Portuguese found themselves exposed to the fire of the King of Bij.a.pur's artillery, mounted in the castle of Panjim, which had been abandoned after the capture of Goa. Albuquerque therefore decided to make a night attack upon this position. The fight was a fierce one. Several of the Portuguese were killed, and it was with difficulty that the garrison was expelled on June 14, 1510.

This successful expedition was followed by another, marred only by the death of the young hero of the fleet, Dom Antonio de Noronha.

News had reached Albuquerque that Yusaf Adil Shah had prepared a number of fire-s.h.i.+ps, which he intended to send down the river to set fire to the Portuguese fleet. He therefore sent his boats to reconnoitre. They reached the dockyard, but in endeavouring to cut out one of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps, which was still on the stocks, Dom Antonio de Noronha was mortally wounded. He died on July 8, and, in the words of the _Commentaries_,

'There was not a single person in the whole of the fleet who was not deeply affected, but especially his uncle, in that he had been deprived of him at a season when he most needed his personal a.s.sistance, his advice, and his knightly example.... He was a very brave cavalier, and never found himself placed in any position which caused him any fear. He was very virtuous, very G.o.dfearing, and very truthful. He was found side by side with Affonso de Albuquerque in every one of the troubles which up to the hour of his death had come upon him. He died at the age of twenty-four {81} years, four having elapsed since he set out from Portugal with his uncle in the fleet of Tristo da Cunha.'[10]

[Footnote 10: Albuquerque's _Commentaries_, vol. ii. pp. 180, 181.]

At no time indeed was Albuquerque more in need of help and advice; his fleet was blockaded in the harbour and stricken with famine; his men deserted in numbers and became renegades; and his captains were in almost open mutiny. It was at this time that he ordered the execution of one of his soldiers, a young Portuguese fidalgo named Ruy Dias, which is treated by the poet Camoens as the chief blot upon the great commander's fame. It was reported to Albuquerque that Ruy Dias had been in the habit of visiting the Muhammadan women whom he had brought with him as hostages from Goa. There is no doubt that through these women information was conveyed to the enemy of the state of affairs in the Portuguese fleet, and Albuquerque therefore directed Pedro de Alpoem, the _Ouvidor_--that is, the Auditor of Portuguese India, who performed the duties of Chief Magistrate--to try Ruy Dias, and he was condemned to be hanged. While the execution was being carried out, certain of the captains rowed up and down among the s.h.i.+ps crying 'Murder,' and one of them, Francisco de Sa, went so far as to cut through the rope with which Ruy Dias was being hanged, with his sword. Albuquerque at once determined to maintain discipline. The execution of Ruy Dias was completed, and Francisco de Sa, with three captains, Jorge Fogaca, Ferno Peres de Andrade and Simo de Andrade, were put in irons.

{82} The extent of the suffering from sickness and starvation in the fleet was made known to Yusaf Adil Shah by deserters, and that monarch, with true chivalry, offered to send provisions to the Portuguese, stating that he wished to conquer them not by starvation but by the sword. Albuquerque resolved to receive no such a.s.sistance from his enemies. He collected on board his own s.h.i.+p all the wine and food that was left, which was being kept for the use of the sick, and displayed it to the messengers of the King of Bij.a.pur. Throughout this difficult period the two generals vied with each other in generosity. One fact is particularly worthy of notice. Yusaf Adil Shah at the request of Albuquerque refused to allow the Portuguese deserters, who had joined him, to continue going down to the banks of the harbour to incite other soldiers and sailors to desert. At last in August, 1510, the weather changed; it became once more possible to cross the bar, and the Portuguese fleet sailed away from Goa. But Albuquerque was not a man to be depressed by one failure. He had resolved that Goa should be the capital of Portuguese India, and he never rested until he had attained his end.

It was on August 15 that Albuquerque sailed out of Goa harbour, and to his great joy the first sight he saw was a Portuguese squadron of four s.h.i.+ps which had just arrived from Portugal under the command of Diogo Mendes de Vasconcellos. The Governor stopped for a time at the anchorage of Anchediva Island, and then proceeded to Honawar (Onor), where he had an {83} interview with Timoja, who had been able to leave Goa harbour with his light native galleys before the larger Portuguese s.h.i.+ps. Timoja gave him information that Yusaf Adil Shah had left Goa for Bij.a.pur three days after the departure of the Portuguese fleet, and also that directly the main Muhammadan army had gone the people in the neighbourhood of Goa had risen in insurrection. Timoja therefore pressed Albuquerque to make a second attack on Goa as soon as possible, which was exactly what the Portuguese commander had determined to do. Albuquerque then sailed south to Cannanore, where he was met by Duarte de Lemos, who had succeeded him as Captain of the Arabian Seas.