Speeches on Questions of Public Policy Part 23

[Mr. Absalom Watkin, of Manchester, having invited Mr. Bright to a meeting about to be held in that city on behalf of the Patriotic Fund, and having stated that in his opinion the present war was justified by the authority of _Vattel_, Mr. Bright replied in the subjoined letter.]

I think, on further consideration, you will perceive that the meeting on Thursday next would be a most improper occasion for a discussion as to the justice of the war. Just or unjust, the war is a fact, and the men whose lives are miserably thrown away in it have clearly a claim upon the country, and especially upon those who, by the expression of opinions favourable to the war, have made themselves responsible for it.

I cannot, therefore, for a moment appear to discourage the liberality of those who believe the war to be just, and whose utmost generosity, in my opinion, will make but a wretched return for the ruin they have brought upon hundreds of families.

With regard to the war itself, I am not surprised at the difference between your opinion and mine, if you decide a question of this nature by an appeal to _Vattel_. The 'law of nations' is not my law, and at best it is a code full of confusion and contradictions, having its foundation on custom, and not on a higher morality; and on custom which has always been determined by the will of the strongest. It may be a question of some interest whether the first crusade was in accordance with the law and principles of _Vattel_; but whether the first crusade was just, and whether the policy of the crusades was a wise policy, is a totally different question. I have no doubt that the American war was a just war according to the principles laid down by writers on the 'law of nations,' and yet no man in his senses in this country will now say that the policy of George III. towards the American colonies was a wise policy, or that war a righteous war. The French war, too, was doubtless just according to the same authorities; for there were fears and antic.i.p.ated dangers to be combatted, and law and order to be sustained in Europe; and yet few intelligent men now believe the French war to have been either necessary or just. You must excuse me if I refuse altogether to pin my faith upon _Vattel_. There have been writers on international law who have attempted to show that private a.s.sa.s.sination and the poisoning of wells were justifiable in war: and perhaps it would be difficult to demonstrate wherein these horrors differ from some of the practices which are now in vogue. I will not ask you to mould your opinion on these points by such writers, nor shall I submit my judgment to that of _Vattel_.

The question of this present war is in two parts--first, was it necessary for us to interfere by arms in a dispute between the Russians and the Turks; and secondly, having determined to interfere, under certain circ.u.mstances, why was not the whole question terminated when Russia accepted the Vienna note? The seat of war is three thousand miles away from us. We had not been attacked--not even insulted in any way.

Two independent Governments had a dispute, and we thrust ourselves into the quarrel. That there was some ground for the dispute is admitted by the four Powers in the proposition of the Vienna note. [Footnote: Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell, March 7, 1853--Blue Book, part i. p.

87. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon., April 9 and May 22, 1853--Ibid, part i. pp. 127 and 235. Lord John Russell to Sir G.

H. Seymour, February 9, 1853--Eastern Papers, part v. p. 8. Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour, April 5, 1853--Ibid, part v. p. 22. Lord Carlisle's Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters, p. 181.] But for the English Minister at Constantinople and the Cabinet at home the dispute would have settled itself, and the last note of Prince Menchikoff would have been accepted, and no human being can point out any material difference between that note and the Vienna note, afterwards agreed upon and recommended by the Governments of England, France, Austria and Prussia. But our Government would not allow the dispute to be settled.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe held private interviews with the Sultan--did his utmost to alarm him--insisted on his rejection of all terms of accommodation with Russia, and promised him the armed a.s.sistance of England if war should arise. [Footnote: Lord Stratford to the Earl of Clarendon, May 19, 1853. See, however, a despatch of May 10--Blue Book, part i. p. 213.]

The Turks rejected the Russian note, and the Russians crossed the Pruth, occupying the Princ.i.p.alities as a 'material guarantee.' I do not defend this act of Russia: it has always appeared to me impolitic and immoral; but I think it likely it could be well defended out of _Vattel_, and it is at least as justifiable as the conduct of Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston in 1850, when they sent ten or twelve s.h.i.+ps of war to the Piraeus, menacing the town with a bombardment if the dishonest pecuniary claims made by Don Pacifico were not at once satisfied.

[Footnote: Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow, February, 1850.]

But the pa.s.sage of the Pruth was declared by England and France and Turkey not to be a _casus belli_. Negotiations were commenced at Vienna, and the celebrated Vienna note was drawn up. This note had its origin in Paris [Footnote: Earl of Westmorland to Lord Clarendon, July 25, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 19.], was agreed to by the Conference at Vienna, ratified and approved by the Cabinets of Paris and London [Footnote: Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, August 2, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 27. Lord Cowley to Lord Clarendon, August 4, 1853--Ibid, part ii. p. 37.], and p.r.o.nounced by all these authorities to be such as would satisfy the honour of Russia, and at the same time be compatible with the 'independence and integrity' of Turkey and the honour of the Sultan. Russia accepted this note at once [Footnote: Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon, August 5, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 43. Count Nesselrode, August 6, 1853--Ibid, part ii. p. 46.],-- accepted it, I believe, by telegraph, even before the precise words of it had been received in St. Petersburgh [Footnote: Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord Clarendon, August 12, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 50. Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, September 7, 1853--Ibid, part ii. p.

101.]. Everybody thought the question now settled; a Cabinet Minister a.s.sured me we should never hear another word about it; 'the whole thing is at an end,' he said, and so it appeared for a moment. But the Turk refused the note which had been drawn up by his own arbitrators, and which Russia had accepted [Footnote: Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, August 13, 1853--Blue Book, part iv. p. 69. Lord Stratford to the Earl of Clarendon, August 14, 1853--Ibid, part ii. p.

71.]. And what did the Ministers say then, and what did their organ, the _Times_, say? They said it was merely a difference about words; it was a pity the Turk made any difficulty, but it would soon be settled [Footnote: Lord Cowley to Lord Clarendon, from Paris, September 2, 1853-- Blue Book, part iv. p. 87. Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, September 10, 1853--Ibid, part iv. p. 95. The _Times_, September 17, 1853.]. But it was not settled, and why not? It is said that the Russian Government put an improper construction on the Vienna note. But it is unfortunate for those who say this, that the Turk placed precisely the same construction upon it; and further, it is upon record that the French Government advised the Russian Government to accept it, on the ground that 'its general sense differed in nothing from the sense of the proposition of Prince Menchikoff.' [Footnote: Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmoreland, July 25, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 1.

Count Nesselrode's Memorandum of March 2, 1854, in the _Journal des Debats_.] It is, however, easy to see why the Russian Government should, when the Turks refused the award of their own arbitrators, re- state its original claim, that it might not be damaged by whatever concession it had made in accepting the award; and this is evidently the explanation of the doc.u.ment issued by Count Nesselrode, and about which so much has been said. But, after this, the Emperor of Russia spoke to Lord Westmoreland on the subject at Olmutz, and expressed his readiness to accept the Vienna note, with any clause which the Conference might add to it, explaining and restricting its meaning; [Footnote: Lord Westmoreland to Lord Clarendon, September 28, 1853--Blue Book, part ii.

p. 129. Lord Cowley to Lord Clarendon, October 4, 1853--Ibid, part ii.

p. 131. Lord Clarendon to Lord Cowley, October 7, 1853--Ibid, part ii.

p. 140. Lord Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus--Ibid, part ii. p. 132.] and he urged that this should be done at once, as he was anxious that his troops should re-cross the Pruth before winter. [Footnote: Earl of Westmoreland, September 14, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 106.] It was in this very week that the Turks summoned a grand council, and, contrary to the advice of England and France, determined on a declaration of war.

[Footnote: Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, September 26, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. p. 130. M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski, October 4, 1853-- Ibid, part ii. p. 136.]

Now, observe the course taken by our Government. They agreed to the Vienna note; not fewer than five Members of this Cabinet have filled the office of Foreign Secretary, and therefore may be supposed capable of comprehending its meaning: it was a note drawn up by the friends of Turkey, and by arbitrators self-const.i.tuted on behalf of Turkey; they urged its acceptance on the Russian Government, and the Russian Government accepted it; there was then a dispute about its precise meaning, and Russia agreed, and even proposed that the arbitrators at Vienna should amend it, by explaining it, and limiting its meaning, so that no question of its intention should henceforth exist. But, the Turks having rejected it, our Government turned round, and declared the Vienna note, their own note, entirely inadmissible, and defended the conduct of the Turks in having rejected it. The Turks declared war, against the advice of the English and French Governments [Footnote: Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, September 20, 1853--Blue Book, part ii. pp. 149, 151. Lord Clarendon, October 24, 1853--Ibid, part ii. p. 131. Lord Stratford, November 17, 1853--Ibid, part ii. pp. 271, 281. Lord Stratford--Ibid, part ii. p. 288. Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford, November 8, 1853--Ibid, part ii. p. 219.]--so, at least, it appears from the Blue Books; but the moment war was declared by Turkey, our Government openly applauded it. England, then, was committed to the war.

She had promised armed a.s.sistance to Turkey--a country without government [Footnote: Lord Clarendon to Lord Stratford--Blue Book, part i. pp. 81, 82. Lord Stratford to M. E. Pisani, June 22, 1853--Ibid, part i. p. 383. The same to the same, July 4--Ibid, part i. pp. 383, 384.], and whose administration was at the mercy of contending factions; and incapable of fixing a policy for herself, she allowed herself to be dragged on by the current of events at Constantinople. She 'drifted,' as Lord Clarendon said, exactly describing his own position, into the war, apparently without rudder and without compa.s.s.

The whole policy of our Government in this matter is marked with an imbecility perhaps without example. I will not say they intended a war from the first, though there are not wanting many evidences that war was the object of at least a section of the Cabinet. A distinguished Member of the House of Commons said to a friend of mine, immediately after the accession of the present Government to office, 'You have a war Ministry, and you will have a war.' But I leave this question to point out the disgraceful feebleness of the Cabinet, if I am to absolve them from the guilt of having sought occasion for war. They promised the Turk armed a.s.sistance on conditions, or without conditions. They, in concert with France, Austria, and Prussia, took the original dispute out of the hands of Russia and Turkey, and formed themselves into a court of arbitration in the interests of Turkey; they made an award, which they declared to be safe and honourable for both parties; this award was accepted by Russia and rejected by Turkey; and they then turned round upon their own award, declared it to be 'totally inadmissible,' and made war upon the very country whose Government, at their suggestion and urgent recommendation, had frankly accepted it. At this moment England is engaged in a murderous warfare with Russia, although the Russian Government accepted her own terms of peace, and has been willing to accept them in the sense of England's own interpretation of them ever since they were offered; and at the same time England is allied with Turkey, whose Government rejected the award of England, and who entered into the war in opposition to the advice of England. Surely, when the Vienna note was accepted by Russia, the Turks should have been prevented from going to war, or should have been allowed to go to war at their own risk.

I have said nothing here of the fact that all these troubles have sprung out of the demands made by France upon the Turkish Government, and urged in language more insulting than any which has been shown to have been used by Prince Menchikoff [Footnote: Col. Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury, November 20, 1852--Blue Book, part i. p. 49. Lord J. Russell to Lord Cowley, January 28, 1853--Ibid, part i. p. 67.]. I have said nothing of the diplomatic war which has been raging for many years past in Constantinople, and in which England has been behind no other Power in attempting to subject the Porte to foreign influences [Footnote: Blue Book--Correspondence respecting the Condition of Protestants in Turkey, 1841-51, pp. 5-8.] I have said nothing of the abundant evidence there is that we are not only at war with Russia, but with all the Christian population of the Turkish Empire, and that we are building up our Eastern policy on a false foundation--namely, on the perpetual maintenance of the most immoral and filthy of all despotisms over one of the fairest portions of the earth which it has desolated, and over a population it has degraded but has not been able to destroy. I have said nothing of the wretched delusion that we are fighting for civilization in supporting the Turk against the Russian and against the subject Christian population of Turkey. I have said nothing about our pretended sacrifices for freedom in this war, in which our great and now dominant ally is a monarch who, last in Europe, struck down a free const.i.tution, and dispersed by military violence a national Representative a.s.sembly.

My doctrine would have been non-intervention in this case. The danger of the Russian power was a phantom [Footnote: 'There never has been a great State whose power for external aggression has been more overrated than Russia. She may be impregnable within her own boundaries, BUT SHE IS NEARLY POWERLESS FOR ANY PURPOSE OF OFFENCE.'--_Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons_, 1853.]; the necessity of permanently upholding the Mahometan rule in Europe is an absurdity. Our love for civilization, when we subject the Greeks and Christians to the Turks, is a sham; and our sacrifices for freedom, when working out the behests of the Emperor of the French and coaxing Austria to help us, is a pitiful imposture.

The evils of non-intervention were remote and vague, and could neither be weighed nor described in any accurate terms. The good we can judge something of already, by estimating the cost of a contrary policy. And what is that cost? War in the north and south of Europe, threatening to involve every country of Europe. Many, perhaps fifty millions sterling, in the course of expenditure by this country alone, to be raised from the taxes of a people whose extrication from ignorance and poverty can only be hoped for from the continuance of peace. The disturbance of trade throughout the world, the derangement of monetary affairs, and difficulties and ruin to thousands of families. Another year of high prices of food, notwithstanding a full harvest in England, chiefly because war interferes with imports, and we have declared our princ.i.p.al foreign food-growers to be our enemies. The loss of human life to an enormous extent. Many thousands of our own countrymen have already perished of pestilence and in the field; and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of English families will be plunged into sorrow, as a part of the penalty to be paid for the folly of the nation and its rulers.

When the time comes for the 'inquisition for blood,' who shall answer for these things? You have read the tidings from the Crimea; you have, perhaps, shuddered at the slaughter; you remember the terrific picture,-- I speak not of the battle, and the charge, and the tumultuous excitement of the conflict, but of the field after the battle--Russians, in their frenzy or their terror, shooting Englishmen who would have offered them water to quench their agony of thirst; Englishmen, in crowds, rifling the pockets of the men they had slain or wounded, taking their few s.h.i.+llings or roubles, and discovering among the plunder of the stiffening corpses images of the 'Virgin and the Child.' You have read this, and your imagination has followed the fearful details. This is war,--every crime which human nature can commit or imagine, every horror it can perpetrate or suffer; and this it is which our Christian Government recklessly plunges into, and which so many of our countrymen at this moment think it patriotic to applaud! You must excuse me if I cannot go with you. I will have no part in this terrible crime. My hands shall be unstained with the blood which is being shed. The necessity of maintaining themselves in office may influence an administration; delusions may mislead a people; _Vattel_ may afford you a law and a defence; but no respect for men who form a Government, no regard I have for 'going with the stream,' and no fear of being deemed wanting in patriotism, shall influence me in favour of a policy which, in my conscience, I believe to be as criminal before G.o.d as it is destructive of the true interest of my country.

I have only to ask you to forgive me for writing so long a letter. You have forced it from me, and I would not have written it did I not so much appreciate your sincerity and your good intentions towards me.

Believe me to be, very sincerely yours,

JOHN BRIGHT.

October 29.