Arguments before the Committee on Patents of the House of Representatives Part 41

Section 35, line 8, the word "full" should be canceled; and in line 9, after "allowed," there should be inserted "according to the practice of law and equity."

In many cases it might be inequitable to allow costs, and the court should be left free to exercise its legal discretion.

Section 36, line 11, the word "common" should be inserted before the word "law." This section should be compared with section 2, and they should be consolidated, or preferably they should both be omitted as unnecessary and as being outside of the purview of this act.

Section 38, line 23, there should be inserted after the word "musical" the word "-dramatic."

Line 25, the word "make" should be canceled and there should be inserted the words "produce by."

It is evident that the right to make belongs to the patentee of the device.

Page 30, line 1, the words "ninety days" should be changed to "three months" as more convenient and as excluding any contention whether or not Sundays and holidays are included in the ninety days. The similar provision of the patent law reads "three months."

Section 44 should be amended by inserting after "a.s.signment", in line 12, the words: "and index the same under the name of the person by whom the original entry of copyright was made."

Section 45 should be amended so that lines 21 to 23 shall read as follows: "signee shall in all cases give in the statutory notice of copyright prescribed by this act the name of the person by whom the original entry of the copyright was made."

Without this provision the public will be put to great inconvenience in finding the original entry on which the copyright depends. The copyright notice should be of a clear and specific character so as to cause the public as little inconvenience and uncertainty as possible.

Paragraph 52 should be amended by striking out "provided" and all thereafter to the end of the paragraph in lines 2 and 3 of page 33. This provision is altogether too broad and the courts should be left free to determine what are conditions precedent to a valid copyright and whether there has been any breach of them.

Section 54 should be amended by striking out the words "the date of the" and inserting "that the affidavit states the dates of;"

and in line 20 cancel the words "as stated in the said affidavit,"

and insert the words "which dates shall be given in the certificate."

Section 55 provides for the destruction of card catalogues. The wisdom of this provision is very doubtful. A single card catalogue for each cla.s.s of copyright work would save an immense amount of time and error to the public, and to the Librarian in making searches. Instead of periodically destroying card catalogues, they should be added to and preserved. As soon as they are destroyed, instead of being able to make one examination of one part of the card catalogue, the public will be compelled to examine a great number of periodically made printed indexes. I therefore suggest that the words "and thereupon", to and including the word "intervals," lines 9 to 12 of page 34, be canceled.

As to the destruction of articles provided for in section 59, I suggest that the section be amended by inserting in line 10 of page 36, after the word "provided," the words "and with the authorization of the Committees on Patents of the Senate and of the House of Representatives."

Section 63 should be amended by striking out the words "sold or placed on" in line 7, and by inserting "made public, or sold publicly or privately, or placed on public."

As to section 64, I have to suggest that the present bill is supposed to be what may be termed a codification of the copyright law; if so, section 4966 of the Revised Statutes has no proper place outside of this bill. If there is anything desirable in the section it should be embodied in the bill at the proper place, and in doing so it should be made plain that the word "musical" where it first occurs in section 4966 means "musical-dramatic," meaning thereby a composition which is dependent upon representation or performance in the dramatic sense.

I do not believe that the people of this country are aware of what the musical composers and publishers are attempting to do in the way of securing monopolies.

If the public were aware that these persons, after having secured copyrights giving them the exclusive right of copying and publis.h.i.+ng music for sale, and after having sold the copies of such music are attempting to secure laws by which they may impose further taxes upon the public for the use of such music by singing or playing, and are seeking to provide fines and terms of imprisonment for those members of the public who do not pay the additional tax, there will be such a storm of protests before your committees as could not be disregarded.

Section 4966 of the Revised Statutes should be repealed altogether, and so far as its provisions appear in this bill they should be limited to musical-dramatic compositions, and the provisions for damages other than actual damages and for imprisonment should be absolutely eliminated.

Very respectfully,

H. N. LOW.

The ACTING CHAIRMAN. Now we will hear the gentleman who represents the talking machines.

STATEMENT OF S. T. CAMERON, ESQ., REPRESENTING THE AMERICAN GRAPHOPHONE COMPANY, OF NEW YORK CITY.

Mr. CAMERON. Gentlemen, the first objection we have to the bill is, in our mind, the most serious one, and one which has been several times touched upon heretofore, so that I shall not attempt to go into any very great detail in discussing it here, but shall simply call attention to the fact that we object to it, and point out to you why, in connection with our particular business, it is especially important.

If you will turn to section 4 you will find that it reads:

That the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall include all the works of an author.

Our position is that this is in direct contravention of the Const.i.tution. If you will subst.i.tute in that clause the word used by the Const.i.tution, and say that the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall include all the "writings" of an author, then we do not object to that section.

Now, if you will take certain other sections of this bill, with that change made in section 4, and attempt to read them, particularly where the word "reproduce" occurs, or the word "reproductions" occurs, you will see the importance of it to us.

Take, for example, section 3, immediately above:

That the copyright provided by this act shall extend to and protect all the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, any and all reproductions or copies thereof.

If you read that word "reproductions" with the word "works" in section 4 changed to "writings," reproduction means a very different thing.

If you will turn to section 18, on page 14, subclause b, you will find this language:

Any arrangement or reproduction in some new form of a musical composition.

Mr. CHANEY. What do you understand the word "works" to mean in section 4?

Mr. CAMERON. It may mean anything that is reduced to writing, or that is not reduced to writing. It may be an oral speech that is absolutely wafted upon the winds of the air and never gets into permanent form.

In proof of that we go to section 5, line 20: "Oral lectures, sermons, addresses."

The talking-machine art stands in a somewhat different position from that of the perforated music roll. You take a sheet of music and you have Sousa's or any other band play that music into the horn of an instrument, a patented apparatus. That machine engraves lines corresponding to what? To the sound waves produced by the band or the voice of the performer on the wax or other tablet.

Now, if you make that word "works" read "writings," as I understand, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the word "writings," it means this, in its broadest signification: That the idea of the author has been recorded in some tangible form, in such a way that another, through the eye, may have the idea of the author impressed upon his brain. That may be a painting; it may be the work of an artist. I think the Supreme Court has included a painting under that term because of that very fact, that the idea of the artist was recorded in some tangible form and, through the eye of the beholder, the idea of the artist was conveyed to the brain of the beholder. That is what a writing is, as I understand it, within the meaning of the Const.i.tution.

Mr. CHANEY. The effect of your argument is, then, to limit the word to something that can be read by anybody?

Mr. CAMERON. Not necessarily by anybody.

Mr. CURRIER. But by somebody?

Mr. CAMERON. Yes. I can not read Sanskrit.

Mr. CHANEY. I mean to say, that can be read by persons understanding the same language?

Mr. CAMERON. Yes; something that is capable of conveying to the reader, if you may call him such, the idea of the author.

Mr. CHANEY. And in that respect it would cut out the music-roll proposition altogether?

Mr. CAMERON. As my predecessor has told you, there is a dispute in regard to that, and I am not qualified to state. As far as I have been able to a.n.a.lyze the evidence, the preponderance is against the idea that the music roll can be read. But I do know this: There is a graphophone record of the disk form [exhibiting record to the committee]. There is a graphophone record of the cylinder form [exhibiting record]. I defy anyone--I defy Mr. Sousa to read that and tell whether it is one of his marches or whether it is a speech of a Member of Congress. [Laughter.]

Mr. CHANEY. They are often very much alike. [Laughter.]

Mr. CAMERON. They are both musical. [Laughter.]

Mr. MCGAVIN. They are alike in volume of sound. [Laughter.]