The Works of George Berkeley Part 44

_Hyl._ I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a _sceptic_?

_Phil._ Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest _sceptic_?

_Hyl._ That is what I desire.

_Phil._ What mean you by Sensible Things?

_Hyl._ Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?

_Phil._ Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be _sensible_ which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

_Hyl._ I do not sufficiently understand you.

_Phil._ In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of G.o.d, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

_Hyl._ No, certainly: it were absurd to think _G.o.d_ or _virtue_ sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.

_Phil._ It seems then, that by _sensible things_ you mean those only which can be perceived _immediately_ by sense?

_Hyl._ Right.

_Phil._ Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?

_Hyl._ It doth.

_Phil._ In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?

_Hyl._ You cannot.

_Phil._ And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

_Hyl._ To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by _sensible things_ I mean those only which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive _immediately_: for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason(789).

_Phil._ This point then is agreed between us-That _sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense_. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures(790); or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

_Hyl._ We do not.

_Phil._ It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

_Hyl._ I grant it.

_Phil._ Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

_Hyl._ Nothing else.

_Phil._ _Heat_ then is a sensible thing?

_Hyl._ Certainly.

_Phil._ Doth the _reality_ of sensible things consist in being perceived?

or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?

_Hyl._ To _exist_ is one thing, and to be _perceived_ is another.

_Phil._ I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

_Hyl._ I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

_Phil._ Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind(791)?

_Hyl._ It must.

_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.

_Hyl._ Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

_Phil._ What! the greatest as well as the least?

_Hyl._ I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree.

_Phil._ But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain?

_Hyl._ No one can deny it.

_Phil._ And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?

_Hyl._ No, certainly.

_Phil._ Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception?

_Hyl._ It is senseless without doubt.

_Phil._ It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

_Hyl._ By no means.

_Phil._ Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

_Hyl._ I grant it.

_Phil._ What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material Substance, or no?

_Hyl._ It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.

_Phil._ How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this point.

_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

_Phil._ Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?