The Works of George Berkeley Part 58

_Hyl._ Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

_Phil._ Now let me ask you two questions: _First_, Whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name _Matter_ to an unextended active being? And, _Secondly_, Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?

_Hyl._ Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, but some _Third Nature_ distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

_Phil._ My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit.

Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible. I a.s.sert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful Being(881). I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be a _will_. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of _my_ mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding; there is therefore an _understanding_. But will and understanding const.i.tute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a _Spirit_.

_Hyl._ And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction.

Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in G.o.d?

_Phil._ Without a doubt.

_Hyl._ To suffer pain is an imperfection?

_Phil._ It is.

_Hyl._ Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other Being?

_Phil._ We are.

_Hyl._ And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit G.o.d?

_Phil._ I grant it.

_Hyl._ But you have a.s.serted that whatever ideas we perceive from without are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in G.o.d; or, in other words, G.o.d suffers pain: that is to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction(882).

_Phil._ That G.o.d knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that G.o.d, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy.

But G.o.d, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But G.o.d is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy, or natural ties.

No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to G.o.d, but not the latter. G.o.d knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguis.h.i.+ng, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.

_Hyl._ But, all this while you have not considered that the quant.i.ty of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies(883). And what can withstand demonstration?

_Phil._ Let me see how you demonstrate that point.

_Hyl._ I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quant.i.ties of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and quant.i.ties of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quant.i.ty of Matter in each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to the quant.i.ty of Matter; which was to be demonstrated.

_Phil._ You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quant.i.ty of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and _Matter_ taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of _Matter_ is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?

_Hyl._ In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.

_Phil._ But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that gravity is proportional to _Matter_, in your philosophic sense of the word; except you take it for granted that unknown _substratum_, or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing them, do exist in a _material substratum_; this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.

_Hyl._ I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you shall persuade me the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter(884)?

_Phil._ What mean you, Hylas, by the _phenomena_?

_Hyl._ I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.

_Phil._ And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?

_Hyl._ I have told you so a hundred times.

_Phil._ Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner and(885) order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

_Hyl._ It is.

_Phil._ Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of _Matter_(886), I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly dest.i.tute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas(887), they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

_Hyl._ After all, can it be supposed G.o.d would deceive all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

_Phil._ That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or pa.s.sion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to G.o.d, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by G.o.d, that it is impossible we should withhold our a.s.sent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, _taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses_, is thought to exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose G.o.d has deceived mankind at all.

_Hyl._ But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds, and n.o.body knows where they will end.

_Phil._ Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be a.s.sured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts:-these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarra.s.s the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some _ambages_, and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this:-that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

_Hyl._ As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas?

You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with _scepticism_. This is so plain, there is no denying it.

_Phil._ You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things(888); since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves(889).

_Hyl._ Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

_Phil._ What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition-that Matter(890) is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ-you will have them to be empty appearances, I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.

_Hyl._ You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?

_Phil._ Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel(891); neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye(892). But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to const.i.tute a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circ.u.mstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the gla.s.s being quite different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas(893), the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circ.u.mstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation(894).

_Hyl_. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

_Phil._ It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true _representations_ of those _originals_. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all(895). We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge(896). Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty(897). Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in nature(898). The result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all this scepticism(899)? Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason(900), of the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the _absolute or external existence of unperceiving substances_(901)? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances(902), admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

_Hyl._ For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived by the _senses_ of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my _imagination_. Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

_Phil._ I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination(903). But what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.

_Hyl._ I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?

_Phil._ It is.

_Hyl._ But the _same_ idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing(904)? And is not this highly absurd?

_Phil._ If the term _same_ be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word _same_ where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, _several saw the same thing_, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term _same_ be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of ident.i.ty, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic ident.i.ty consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing(905). But whether philosophers shall think fit to _call_ a thing the _same_ or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the _same_ thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of _different_ things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term _same_ applied to it(906)? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward sh.e.l.l remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the _same_, and I should say it was not the _same_ house:-would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of ident.i.ty, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by the _abstracted idea of ident.i.ty_; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself.--Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about ident.i.ty and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion with you-that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

_Hyl._ [(907)Ay, Philonous,] But they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.