The Battle of New Orleans Part 6

THE COVERT RETREAT OF THE BRITISH.

The battles of the eighth were decisive of the campaign, and of the War of 1812-15, so far as military operations were concerned. The British had been beaten in generals.h.i.+p and beaten upon the field of battle, until they were made to feel and to confess to defeat so crus.h.i.+ng as to leave no hope of retrieving disaster. Within fifteen days after landing, they had sustained losses equal to one third of their entire army of invasion. With prestige gone and spirit broken, and their ranks shattered, there was but one thing left to do. To cover their retreat and get safely back to their s.h.i.+ps before the broken remnants of their army were made to capitulate by surrender became a matter of gravest concern. The situation is set forth in the following official letter to the Secretary of War:

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 19, 1815.

_Sir_: Last night, at 12 o'clock, the enemy precipitately decamped and returned to his boats, leaving behind him, under medical attendance, eighty of his wounded, fourteen pieces of heavy artillery, and a quant.i.ty of ammunition. Such was the situation of the ground he abandoned, and that through which he retired, protected by ca.n.a.ls, redoubts, intrenchments, and swamps on his right and the river on his left, that I could not, without great risk, which true policy did not seem to require, much annoy him on his retreat.

Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to renew his efforts at some other point, or not, I can not certainly determine. In my own mind, however, there is little doubt that his last exertions have been made in this quarter, at least for the present season. In this belief I am strengthened by the prodigious losses he has sustained at the position he has just quitted, and by the failure of his fleet to pa.s.s Fort St. Philip. His loss on this ground, since the debarkation of his troops, as stated by the last prisoners and deserters, and as confirmed by many additional circ.u.mstances, must have exceeded four thousand men. We succeeded on the 8th, in getting from the enemy about one thousand stand of arms of various kinds.

Since the action of the 8th, the enemy have been allowed but very little respite, my artillery from both sides of the river being constantly employed until the hour of their departure, in annoying them. They were permitted to find no rest.

I am advised by Major Overton, who commands at Fort St. Philip, in a letter of the 18th, that the enemy having bombarded his fort for nine days, with thirteen-inch mortars, without effect, had on the morning of that day retired. I have little doubt that he would have sunk their vessels had they attempted to run by.

Do not think me too sanguine in the belief that Louisiana is now clear of the enemy. I need not a.s.sure you, however, that wherever I command, such a belief shall never occasion any relaxation in the measures for resistance. I am but too sensible that while the enemy is opposing us, is not the most proper time to provide for them. On the 18th, our prisoners on sh.o.r.e were delivered to us, an exchange having been agreed to. I shall have on hand an excess of several hundred.

I have the honor to be, &c., ANDREW JACKSON, _Commander-in-Chief_.

The losses to the American army, in the five battles fought from the twenty-third of December to the eighth of January, inclusive, are summarized in the report of the Adjutant-general, which we give:

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, Jan'y 16, 1815.

Sir: I enclose for the information of the War Department, a report of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under Major-general Jackson, in the different actions with the enemy since their landing.

ROB'T BUTLER, _Adjutant-General_.

BATTLE. KILLED. WOUNDED. MISSING.

December 23d 24 115 74 December 28th 9 8 None.

January 1st 11 23 None.

January 8th 13 39 19 ----- ------ ----- 57 185 93

A total of three hundred and thirty-five men. This includes the killed, wounded, and missing in the two battles on the eighth.

Our English authorities are so marked with exaggerations and discrepancies as to numbers in either army, and also as to losses and casualties, that they are unreliable. There is with nearly all their writers, and in the reports of their officers, a disposition to minimize numbers on their own side, and to overstate those on the side of the Americans. This was no doubt due to a sense of mortified pride and deep chagrin over their repeated defeats and final expulsion from the country, under humiliations such as English armies and navies had rarely before known in history. General Jackson was not far wrong in estimating the entire losses of the British, during the two weeks of invasion, at more than four thousand men. If the large number who deserted from their ranks after the battles of the eighth of January be included, the excess would doubtless swell the numbers much above four thousand. Their killed, wounded, and missing on the eighth approximated three thousand.

So decimated and broken up were their columns that they dared not risk another battle.

REPULSE OF THE BRITISH FLEET BEFORE FORT ST. PHILIP.

On the first of January, Major W.H. Overton, in command of Fort St.

Philip, which guards the pa.s.sage of the Mississippi River from its mouth for the protection of New Orleans, received information that the enemy intended to capture or pa.s.s the fort, to cooperate with their land forces threatening the city. On the seventh, a fleet of two bomb-vessels, one sloop, one brig, and one schooner appeared and anch.o.r.ed below the fortification and began an attack. For nine days they continued a heavy bombardment from four large sea-mortars and other ordnance, but without the effect they desired. Making but little impression toward destroying the fort, and fearing to risk an attempt finally to pa.s.s our batteries, the fleet withdrew on the morning of the eighteenth, and pa.s.sed again into the Gulf. Our loss in this affair was but two killed and seven wounded. During the nine days of attack the enemy threw more than one thousand bombs from four ten-and thirteen-inch mortars, besides many sh.e.l.ls and round shot from howitzers and cannon.

AN ENGLISH SOLDIER'S VIEW OF DEFEAT.

A graphic pen-picture of the chaotic and wretched condition of the English army after the crus.h.i.+ng defeat of the eighth, and until its final return to the fleet, is given by Gleig in his "Narrative of the Campaigns." It will be read with all the more interest because it is the frank admission of a brave though prejudiced officer, giving an enemy's view of the great disaster that befell the British arms, in which he fully shared:

General Lambert prudently determined not to risk the safety of his army by another attempt upon works evidently so much beyond our strength. He considered that his chances of success were in every respect lessened by the late repulse. An extraordinary degree of confidence was given to the enemy, while our forces were greatly diminished in numbers. If again defeated, nothing could save our army from destruction; it could only now retreat in force. A retreat, therefore, was resolved upon while the measure appeared practicable, and toward that end all our future operations were directed.

One great obstacle existed; by what road were the troops to travel to regain the fleet? On landing, we had taken advantage of the bayou, and thus come within two miles of the cultivated country, in our barges. To return by the same route was impossible. In spite of our losses there were not enough boats to transport above one half of the army at one time. If we separated, the chances were that both divisions would be destroyed; for those embarked might be intercepted, and those left behind might be attacked by the whole American army. To obviate the difficulty, it required that we should build a pa.s.sable road through the swamp, to Lake Borgne, some twenty miles away. The task was burthened with innumerable difficulties.

There was no firm foundation on which to work, and no trees to a.s.sist in forming hurdles. All we could do was to bind together large quant.i.ties of swamp weeds and lay them across the quagmire. It was but the semblance of a road, without firmness and solidity.

To complete this road, bad as it was, occupied nine days, during which our army lay in camp, making no attempt to molest the enemy.

The Americans, however, were not so inactive. A battery of six guns, mounted on the opposite bank, kept up a continued fire upon our men.

The same mode of proceeding was adopted in front, and thus, night and day we were hara.s.sed by danger, against which there was no fortifying ourselves. Of the extreme unpleasantness of our situation, it is hardly possible to convey an adequate conception. We never closed our eyes in peace, for we were sure to be awaked before the lapse of many minutes, by the splash of a roundshot or sh.e.l.l in the mud beside us.

Tents we had none, but lay some in open air, and some in huts of boards, or any material we could procure. From the moment of our landing, December 23d, not a man had undressed, except to bathe; many had worn the same s.h.i.+rt for weeks. Heavy rains now set in, with violent storms of thunder and lightning, and keen frosts at night.

Thus we were wet all day, and nearly frozen at night. With our outposts there was constant skirmis.h.i.+ng. Every day they were attacked by the Americans, and compelled to maintain their ground by dint of hard fighting. No one but those who belonged to this army can form a notion of the hards.h.i.+ps it endured, and the fatigue it underwent.

Nor were these the only evils which tended to lessen our numbers. To our soldiers every inducement was held out by the enemy to desert.

Printed papers, offering lands and money as the price of desertion, were thrown into the pickets, while individuals would persuade our sentinels to quit their stations. It could not be expected that bribes so tempting would always be refused. Many desertions began daily to take place, and ere long became so frequent, that the evil rose to be of a serious nature. In the course of a week, many men quitted their colors, and fled to the enemy.

Meanwhile, the wounded, except such as were too severely hurt to be removed, were embarked in the boats and sent off to the fleet. Next followed the baggage and stores, with the civil officers, commissaries, and purveyors; and last of all such of the light artillery as could be drawn without risk of discovery. But of the heavy artillery, no account was taken. It was determined to leave them behind, retaining their stations. By the 17th, no part of the forces was left in camp but the infantry. On the evening of the 18th, it also began the retreat. Tr.i.m.m.i.n.g the fires, and arranging all in the order as if no change were to take place, regiment after regiment stole away, as soon as darkness concealed their motions, leaving the pickets to follow as a rear guard, with injunctions not to retire till daylight appeared. Profound silence was maintained; not a man opened his mouth, except to issue necessary orders in a whisper. Not a cough or any other noise was to be heard from the head to the rear of the column. Even the steps of the soldiers were planted with care, to prevent the slightest echo. Nor was this precaution unnecessary.

In spite of every endeavor to the contrary, a rumor of our intention had reached the Americans; for we found them of late very watchful and prying.

While our route lay alongside the river, the march was agreeable enough, but as soon as we entered the marsh, all comfort was at an end. Our roadway, constructed of materials so slight, and resting on a foundation so infirm, was trodden to pieces by the first corps.

Those who followed were compelled to flounder on the best way they could. By the time the rear of the column gained the mora.s.s, all trace of a way had disappeared. Not only were the reeds torn asunder and sunk by the pressure of those in front, but the bog itself was trodden into the consistency of mud. Every step sunk us to the knees, and sometimes higher. Near the ditches, we had the utmost difficulty in crossing at all. There being no light, except what the stars supplied, it was difficult to select our steps, or follow those who called to us that they were safe on the other side. At one of those ditches, I myself beheld an unfortunate wretch gradually sink until he totally disappeared. I saw him flounder, heard his cry for help, and ran forward with the intention of saving him; but before I had taken a second step, I myself sunk to my breast in the mire. How I kept from smothering is more than I can tell, for I felt no solid bottom under me, and sank slowly deeper and deeper, till the mud reached my arms. Instead of rescuing the poor soldier, I was forced to beg a.s.sistance for myself. A leathern canteen strap being thrown to me, I laid hold of it, and was dragged out, just as my fellow-sufferer was buried alive, and seen no more.

All night we continued our journey, toiling and struggling through this terrible quagmire; and in the morning reached the Fishermen's Huts, mentioned before as standing on the brink of Bayou Bienvenue, near Lake Borgne. The site is as complete a desert as the eye of man was ever pained by beholding. Not a tree or a bush grew near. As far as the eye could reach, an ocean of weeds covering and partially hiding the swamp presented itself, except on the side where a view of the Lake changed, without fertilizing, the prospect. Here we were ordered to halt; and perhaps I never rejoiced more sincerely at any order than at this. Wearied with my exertions, and oppressed with want of sleep, I threw myself on the chilly ground, without so much as pulling off my muddy garments; in an instant all my cares and troubles were forgotten. After many hours, I awoke from that sleep, cold and stiff, and creeping beside a miserable fire of weeds, devoured the last morsal of salt pork my wallet contained.

The whole army having come up, formed along the brink of the Lake; a line of outposts was planted, and the soldiers commanded to make themselves as comfortable as possible. But there was little comfort.

Without tents or shelter of any kind, our bed was the mora.s.s, and our sole covering the clothes which had not quitted our backs for a month. Our fires, so necessary to a soldier's happiness, were composed solely of weeds, which blazed up and burned out like straw, imparting but little warmth. Above all, our provisions were expended, with no way to replenish in reach. Our sole dependence was the fleet, nearly one hundred miles away, at anchor. It was necessary to wait until our barges could make the trip there, and return. For two entire days, the only provisions issued to the troops were some crumbs of biscuit and a small allowance of rum. As for myself, being fond of hunting, I determined to fare better. I took a fire-lock and went in pursuit of wild ducks, of which there seemed plenty in the bog. I was fortunate enough to kill several, but they fell in the water, about twenty yards out. There was no other alternative.

Pulling off my clothes, and breaking the thin ice, I waded out and got my game, and returned to sh.o.r.e, s.h.i.+vering like an aspen. As I neared the sh.o.r.e, my leg stuck fast in the mire, and in pulling it out my stocking came off, a loss that gave me great discomfort, until we went aboard the fleet. I request that I may not be sneered at when I record this loss of my stocking as one of the disastrous consequences of this ill-fated expedition.

As the boats returned, regiment after regiment set sail for the fleet. But, the wind being foul, many days elapsed before all could be got off. By the end of January, we were all once more on board our former s.h.i.+ps. But our return was far from triumphant. We, who only seven weeks ago had set out in the surest confidence of glory, and I may add, of emolument, were brought back dispirited and dejected. Our ranks were woefully thinned, our chiefs slain, our clothing tattered and filthy, and our discipline in some degree injured. A gloomy silence reigned throughout the armament, except when it was broken by the voice of lamentation over fallen friends. The interior of each s.h.i.+p presented a scene well calculated to prove the misadventures of human hope and human prudence. On reaching the fleet, we found that a splendid regiment, the 40th Foot, of one thousand men, had just arrived to reinforce us, ignorant of the fatal issue of our attack.

But the coming of thrice their number could not recover what was lost, or recall the fateful past. There was no welcome, nor rejoicing; so great was the despondency that no attention was given to the event. A sullen indifference as to what might happen next seemed to have succeeded all our wonted curiosity, and confidence of success in every undertaking.

On the 4th of February, the fleet weighed anchor and set sail, though detained by adverse winds near the sh.o.r.e of Cat Island until the 7th, when it put to sea. Our course, towards the east, led to the conjecture that we were steering towards Mobile. Nor was it long before we came in sight of the bay which bears that name.

SECOND ATTACK ON FORT BOWYER, MOBILE BAY.

So great and so repeated had been the reverses of the British arms, that an opportunity to retrieve lost prestige, even in a small degree, could not well be permitted to pa.s.s unimproved. The great flotilla of sixty vessels, with the fragments of the shattered army, which set sail with flags and pennants gayly flying in the breeze from Negril Bay, Jamaica, but a little over two months ago, was still a power upon the sea, at a safe distance from Jackson's triumphant army. The little outpost of a fort that guarded Mobile Bay, which had inflicted a heavy loss on, and beaten off, a squadron of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps a few months before, lay in their path homeward, and it was determined to invest it, and to overwhelm it with numbers. On the sixth of February, the great armament appeared in sight of Dauphin Island. On the seventh, twenty-five s.h.i.+ps anch.o.r.ed in a crescent position extending from the island toward Mobile Point, where stood the fort. On the morning of the eighth, the enemy landed five thousand troops opposite the line of s.h.i.+ps at anchor, investing the fort by sea and land. The fortification was erected for defense mainly on the sea side, to render it formidable to s.h.i.+ps attempting to enter the pa.s.s into Mobile Bay. On the land side was a sandy plain, rendering it incapable of defense against a superior force protected by extensive siege works. The enemy mounted a number of batteries behind parapets and epaulements, which directed their fire upon the weakest parts of the defense. The fort was gallantly defended by a garrison of three hundred and fifty men, under command of Colonel William Lawrence. Some losses were inflicted on the besiegers as they continued to push their works to within short musket-range of the fort.

But the heavy cannonading and fire from small-arms encircled the besieged from every direction, and further defense became hopeless.

Terms of surrender were agreed to on the eleventh, and on the twelfth the garrison marched out with the honors of war, yielding possession to the enemy.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE CONCLUDED ON THE 24TH OF DECEMBER, 1814.

The small victory at Mobile Bay was barren of any gain to the British cause; for, on the fourteenth, two days after the surrender, intelligence came from England to General Lambert that articles of peace had been signed by the plenipotentiaries of the belligerent nations, in session at Ghent. Gleig remarks, in his "Narrative": "With the reduction of this trifling work ended all hostilities in this quarter of America; for the army had scarcely rea.s.sembled, when intelligence arrived from England of peace. The news reached us on the fourteenth, and I shall not deny that it was received with much satisfaction."

On the nineteenth, General Jackson issued an address from headquarters, from which we reproduce as follows: "The flag-vessel, which was sent to the enemy's fleet at Mobile, has returned, and brings with it intelligence, extracted from a London paper, that on the twenty-fourth of December articles of peace were signed by the commissioners of the two nations."

Thus, on the day after the first landing of the British army on Louisiana soil, and after the first battle was fought at night, terms of peace were agreed on. It was fifteen days after that auspicious event until the battles on the eighth occurred, causing such disaster and loss of valuable lives to the English army and nation; and fifty-two days from the signing of articles until a message of the good news was received by the commander-in-chief of the British forces. There was no alternative but to await the slow pa.s.sage of the s.h.i.+p across the wide Atlantic, with sails set to breeze and calm, and sometimes tossed and delayed by adverse storm. To-day, the news of such an event would be flashed over the great cables under the sea and the network of electric wires throughout the land, in the twinkling of an eye after its occurrence. Such an advantage at the time would have been worth to England the entire cost of the telegraph system of the world.

LEGISLATURE SUPPRESSED UNDER MARTIAL LAW--CHARGES OF TREASONABLE UTTERANCES.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth of December, just as the British began their attack on the American line, General Jackson issued an order forcibly forbidding the meeting of the Legislature in session, and for taking possession of the legislative halls. The proceeding created great excitement in the civil and military circles of the city, especially among the members of the body and their immediate friends. The author is indebted to Mr. William Beer, of the Howard Library of New Orleans, for the loan of a copy of a rare little book ent.i.tled "Report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Military Measures Employed Against the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, the 28th of December, 1814." In the full report of the testimony taken by the committee, we have a history of the causes which led to this open rupture between the commander-in-chief and the General a.s.sembly of Louisiana, and of its incidents and issues.