Historic Highways of America Volume V Part 1

Historic Highways of America.

Vol. 5.

by Archer Butler Hulbert.

PREFACE

When General Edward Braddock landed in Virginia in 1755, one of his first acts in his campaign upon the Ohio was to urge Governor Morris to have a road opened westward through Pennsylvania. His reason for wis.h.i.+ng another road, parallel to the one his own army was to cut, was that there might be a shorter route than his own to the northern colonies, over which his expresses might pa.s.s speedily, and over which wagons might come more quickly from Pennsylvania--then the "granary of America."

It was inevitable that the shortest route from the center of the colonies to the Ohio would become the most important. The road Braddock asked Morris to open was completed only three miles beyond the present town of Bedford, Pennsylvania, when the road choppers hurried home on receipt of the news of Braddock's defeat.

Braddock made a death-bed prophecy; it was that the British would do better next time. In 1758 Pitt placed Braddock's unfulfilled task on the shoulders of Brigadier-general John Forbes, who marched to Bedford on the new road opened by Morris; thence he opened, along the general alignment of the prehistoric "Trading Path," a new road to the Ohio. It was a desperate undertaking; but Forbes completed his campaign in November, 1758 triumphantly--at the price of his life.

This road, fortified at Carlisle, s.h.i.+ppensburg, Chambersburg, Loudon, Littleton, Bedford, Ligonier, and Pittsburg became the great military route from the Atlantic seaboard to the trans-Allegheny empire. By it Fort Pitt was relieved during Pontiac's rebellion and the Ohio Indians were brought to terms. Throughout the Revolutionary War this road was the main thoroughfare over which the western forts received ammunition and supplies. In the dark days of the last decade of the eighteenth century, when the Kentucky and Ohio pioneers were fighting for the foothold they had obtained in the West, this road played a vital part.

When the need for it pa.s.sed, Forbes's Road, too, pa.s.sed away. Two great railways, on either side, run westward following waterways which the old road a.s.siduously avoided--keeping to the high ground between them.

Between these new and fast courses of human traffic the old Glade Road lies along the hills, and, in the dust or in the snow, marks the course of armies which won a way through the mountains and made possible our westward expansion.

The "Old Glade Road," the old-time name of the Youghiogheny division (Burd's or the "Turkey Foot" Road) of this thoroughfare, has been selected as the t.i.tle of this volume, as more distinctive than the "Pennsylvania Road," which would apply to numerous highways.

A. B. H.

MARIETTA, OHIO, December 30, 1902.

The Old Glade (Forbes's) Road

CHAPTER I

THE OLD TRADING PATH

When, in the middle of the eighteenth century, intelligent white men were beginning to cross the Allegheny Mountains and enter the Ohio basin, one of the most practicable routes was found to be an old trading path which ran almost directly west from Philadelphia to the present site of Pittsburg. According to the Indians it was the easiest route from the Atlantic slope through the dense laurel wildernesses to the Ohio.[1] The course of this path is best described by the route of the old state road of Pennsylvania to Pittsburg built in the first half-decade succeeding the Revolutionary War. This road pa.s.sed through s.h.i.+ppensburg, Carlisle, Bedford, Ligonier, and Greensburg; the Old Trading Path pa.s.sed, in general, through the same points. Comparing this path, which became Forbes's Road, with Nemacolin's path which ran parallel with it, converging on the same point on the Ohio, one might say that the former was the overland path, and the latter, strictly speaking, a portage path. The Old Trading Path offered no portage between streams, as Nemacolin's path did between the Potomac and Monongahela. It kept on higher, dryer ground and crossed no river of importance. This made it the easiest and surest course; in the wintry season, when the Youghiogheny and Monongahela and their tributaries were out of banks, the Old Trading Path must have been by far the safest route to the Ohio; it kept to the high ground between the Monongahela and Allegheny. It was the high ground over which this path ran that the unfortunate Braddock attempted to reach after crossing the Youghiogheny at Stewart's Crossing. The deep ravines drove him back. There is little doubt he would have been successful had he reached this watershed and proceeded to Fort Duquesne upon the Old Trading Path.

As is true of so many great western routes, so of this path--the bold Christopher Gist was the first white man of importance to leave reliable record of it. In 1750 he was employed to go westward for the Ohio Company. His outward route, only, is of importance here.[2] On Wednesday, October 31, he departed from Colonel Cresap's near c.u.mberland, Maryland and proceeded "along an old old Indian Path N 30 E about 11 Miles."[3] This led him along the foot of the Great Warrior Mountain, through the Flintstone district of Allegheny County, Maryland.

The path ran onward into Bedford County, Pennsylvania, and through Warrior's Gap to the Juniata River. Here, near the old settlement b.l.o.o.d.y Run, now Everett, the path joined the well-worn thoroughfare running westward familiarly known as the "Old Trading Path." Eight miles westward of this junction, near the present site of Bedford, a well-known trail to the Allegheny valley left the Old Trading Path and pa.s.sed through the Indian Frank's Town and northwest to the French Venango--Franklin, Pennsylvania. Leaving this on his right, Gist pushed on west over the Old Trading Path. "Snow and such bad Weather" made his progress slow; from the fifth to the ninth he spent between what are now Everett in Bedford County and Stoyestown in Somerset County.[4] On the eleventh he crossed the north and east Forks of Quemahoning--often called "Cowamahony" in early records.[5] On the twelfth he "crossed a great Laurel Mountain"--Laurel Hill. On the fourteenth he "set out N 45 W 6 M to Loylhannan an old Indian Town on a Creek of Ohio called Kiscominatis, then N 1 M NW 1 M to an Indian's Camp on the said Creek."[6] The present town of Ligonier, Westmoreland County, occupies the site of this Indian settlement. "Laurel-hanne, signifying the middle stream in the Delaware tongue. The stream here is half way between the Juniata at Bedford and the Ohio [Pittsburg]."[7] Between here and the Ohio, Gist mentions no proper names. The path ran northwest from the present site of Ligonier, through Chestnut Ridge "at the Miller's Run Gap, and reached the creek again at the Big Bottom below the present town of Latrobe on the Pennsylvania Central Railway; there the trail forked ... the main trail [traveled by Gist], led directly westward to Shannopin's Town, by a course parallel with and a few miles north of the Pennsylvania Railway."[8]

The following table of distances from Carlisle to Pittsburg was presented to the Pennsylvania Council March 2, 1754:

MILES From Carlisle to Major Montour's 10 From Montour's to Jacob Pyatt's 25 From Pyatt's to George Croghan's at Aucquick Old Town[9] 15 From Croghan's to the Three Springs 10 From the Three Springs to Sideling Hill 7 From Sideling Hill to Contz's Harbour 8 From Contz's Harbour to the top of Ray's Hill 1 From Ray's Hill to the 1 crossing of Juniata[10] 10 From 1 crossing of Juniata to Allaquapy's Gap[11] 6 From Allaquapy's Gap to Ray's town[12] 5 From Ray's town to the Shawonese Cabbin[13] 8 From Shawonese Cabbins to the Top of Allegheny Mountain 8 From Allegheny Mountain to Edmund's Swamp[14] 8 From Edmund's Swamp to Cowamahony Creek[15] 6 From Cowamahony to Kackanapaulins 5 From Kackanapaulins To Loyal Hanin[16] foot Ray's Hill 18 From Loyal Hanin to Shanoppin's Town[17] 50

By this early measurement the total distance between Carlisle to Pittsburg by the Indian path was one hundred and ninety miles; ninety-seven miles from Carlisle to Raystown and ninety-three miles from Raystown to Pittsburg.[18] When it is remembered that this was the original Indian track totally uninfluenced by the white man's attention it is interesting to note that the great state road of Pennsylvania from Carlisle to Pittsburg, laid out in 1785, so nearly followed the Indian route that its length between those points (in 1819) was just one hundred and ninety-seven miles--seven miles longer[19] than that of the prehistoric trace of Indian and buffalo. Perhaps there is no more significant instance of the practicability of Indian routes in the United States than this. The very fact that the Indian path was not very much shorter than the first state road shows that it was distinctively a utilitarian course. One interested in this significant comparison will be glad to compare the courses of the old path and that of the state road as given by the compa.s.s.[20]

Other references to the Old Trading Path are made by such traders as George Croghan and John Harris. Croghan wrote to Richard Peters, March 23, 1754: "The road we now travel ... from Laurel Hill to Shanopens (near the forks of the Ohio), is but 46 miles, as the road now goes, which I suppose may be 30 odd miles on a straight line."[21] In an "Account of the Road to Loggs Town on Allegheny River, taken by John Harris, 1754" this itinerary is given:

"From Ray's Town to the Shawana Cabbins 8 M To Edmund's Swamp 8 M To Stoney Creek 6 M To Kickener Paulin's House, (Indian) 6 M To the Clear Fields 7 M To the other side of the Laurel Hill 5 M To Loyal Haning 6 M To the Big Bottom 8 M To the Chestnut Ridge 8 M To the parting of the Road[22] 4 M Thence one Road leads to Shannopin's Town the other to Kisscomenettes, old Town."[23]

So much for the Old Trading Path before the memorable year of 1755. It is significant that the route had already been "surveyed"; Pennsylvania herself desired a share of the Indian trade which Virginia hoped to monopolize through her Ohio Company, which already had storehouses built at Wills Creek on the c.u.mberland and at Redstone Old Fort on the Monongahela. But with the beginning of hostilities with the French, precipitated by Was.h.i.+ngton and his Virginians in 1754, the Indian trade was now completely at a standstill.

General Braddock and his army which was destined to march westward and capture Fort Duquesne arrived at Alexandria, Virginia, February 20, 1755. Already Braddock's deputy quartermaster-general, Sir John St.

Clair, had pa.s.sed through Maryland and Virginia and had decided upon the route of the army to Fort c.u.mberland, the point of rendezvous. Four days after Braddock reached Alexandria, Governor Morris of Pennsylvania received a letter from St. Clair asking him to "open a road toward the head of Youghheagang or any other way that is nearer the French forts,"

in order that the stores to be supplied by the northern colonies might take a shorter course than by way of the roads then being opened through Maryland and Virginia.[24] Morris immediately replied "... there is no Waggon Road from Carlisle West through the Mountains but only a Horse Path, by which the Indian Traders used to carry their Goods and Skins to and from the Ohio while that Trade remained open."[25] Though Morris usually made requests of the a.s.sembly in vain, the request concerning this road was granted, and Morris was empowered, in the middle of March, to open a road "through Carlisle and s.h.i.+ppensburg to the Yoijogain, and to the camp at Will Creek."[26] He immediately appointed George Croghan, John Armstrong, James Burd, William Buchannan, and Adam Hoops to find a road to the three forks of the Youghiogheny--or "Turkey Foot" as the spot was familiarly known on the frontier. On April 29 Burd reported as follows to Morris: "... We have viewed and layed out the Roads leading from hence to the Yohiogain and the camp at Will's Creek, and enclosed You have the Draughts thereof.... We have dispersed our Advertis.e.m.e.nts through the Counties of Lancaster, York, and c.u.mberland, to encourage Labourers to come to Work, and We intend to set off to begin to clear up on Monday first."[27] Thus, slowly, the Old Trading Path was widened into a rough roadway westward from Carlisle. On May 26, John Armstrong wrote Governor Morris that there were over a hundred choppers at work.[28] Five days later Burd wrote Richard Peters that there were one hundred and fifty at work; but he adds, ominously: "The People are all anxious to have arms, and if You can procure me arms I would not trouble the General for a cover; but if you can't they will not be willing to go past Ray's Town without a guard."[29] Little wonder: the van of Braddock's army had struck westward into the Alleghenies the day before this was written, and already the woods were full of spies sent out by the French, and many ma.s.sacres had been reported. The horses and wagons which Franklin had secured for Braddock comprised almost his whole equipment. These had gone to Fort c.u.mberland by the old "Monocasy Road"

and Watkins Ferry.[30]

On the twelfth of June Allison and Maxwell wrote Richard Peters that "Sideling Hill," sixty-seven miles west of Carlisle, and thirty miles east of Raystown, "is cut very artificially, nay more so than We ever saw any; the first waggon that carried a Load up it took fifteen Hundred without ever stopping;" there were, however, many discouragements--"for four Days the Labourers had not one Gla.s.s of Liquor!"[31] On June 15 William Buchannan reported that the road was cleared to Raystown.[32]

But some of the wagons were "pretty much d.a.m.nified." On the seventeenth Edward s.h.i.+ppen wrote Morris from Lancaster: "I understand Mr. Burd has cut the Road 5 Miles beyond Ray's Town, which is 90 Miles from s.h.i.+ppensburg."[33] On the twenty-first General Braddock wrote as follows to Governor Morris from Bear Camp (seven miles west of Little Crossings): "As it is perfectly understood here in what Part the Road making in your Province is to communicate w^{th} that thro' w^{ch} I am now proceeding to Fort Du Quesne, I must beg that you and Mr Peters will immediately settle it, and send an express on Purpose after me with the most exact Description of it, that there may be no Mistake in a Matter of so much Importance."[34] On July 3 Morris wrote Burd, who was in command of the working party, concerning this request of Braddock's. He takes it "for granted ... that the Road must pa.s.s the Turkey Foot ...

and that there cou'd be no Road got to the Northward." Under such circ.u.mstances he affirmed that the nearest course to Braddock's Road would be a straight line from Turkey Foot (Confluence, Pennsylvania) to the Great Crossings of the Youghiogheny (Smithfield, Pennsylvania). He asked Burd to settle this point and send his decision immediately to Braddock.[35]

[Ill.u.s.tration: s.h.i.+PPEN'S DRAUGHT OF THE MONONGAHELA AND YOUGHIOGHENY RIVERS AND BRADDOCK'S ROAD (1759) (_Great Crossings was the intended junction of Paddock's Road and Burd's_)

(_From the original in possession of Pennsylvania Historical Society_)]

The working party on the Pennsylvania road was attacked early in July and needed every one of the five score men whom Braddock had been able to spare for their protection.[36]

Burd replied[37] from the "Top of the Alleghanies" on July 17, while still in ignorance of Braddock's utter rout: "At present I can't form any Judgment where I shall cut the General's Road, further than I know our Course leads us to the Turkey Foot, By the Information of Mr.

Croghan when we run the Road first. Mr. Croghan a.s.sured me he wou'd be on the Road with me in order to pilott from the Place where we left off blaizeing. Instead of that he has never been here, nor is there one Man in my Company that ever was out this Way to the Turkey Foot, But the Party I send will discover the Place where we shall cut the Road and inform the General, and upon their return I will order 'em to blaize back to me."

The news of Braddock's defeat came slowly to the cutters of this historic roadway from central Pennsylvania to the Youghiogheny. On Tuesday night, July 15, a messenger was sent to them from Fort c.u.mberland, who arrived the night of the day the above letter was written.[38] Dunbar wrote Morris from "near ye great Crossings" on the sixteenth: "I have sent an Express to Captain Hogg, who is covering the People cutting Your New Road, as I can't think his advancing that Way safe, to retire immediately."[39] Burd reported to Morris from s.h.i.+ppensburg July 25, that his party had retreated to Fort c.u.mberland from the top of Allegheny Mountain July 17; "St Clair told Me," he added, tentatively, "that I had done my Duty." He had left before Dunbar's messenger had arrived.[40]

Such is the first chapter of the story of the white man's occupation of the Old Trading Path and the Old Glade Road--the name commonly applied to the portion which Burd opened from the main path from where it diverged four miles west of Bedford to the summit of Allegheny Mountain.

This branch was also known as the "Turkey Foot Road."[41] The Old Trading Path was now a white man's road from Carlisle to Bedford and four miles beyond. But the tide of war now set over the mountains after Braddock's defeat, putting an end to any improvement of the new rough road that was opened. Yet not all the ground gained was to be lost.

Governor s.h.i.+rley, now in command, wildly ordered Dunbar to move westward again to retrieve Braddock's mistakes, but sanely added, that, in the case of defeat "You are to make the most proper Disposition of his Majesties' Forces to cover the Frontiers of the Provinces, particularly at the Towns of s.h.i.+ppensburg and Carlisle, and at or near a place called McDowell's Mill, where the New Road to the Allegheny Mountains begins in Pennsylvania, from the Incursions of the Enemy until you shall receive further orders."[42]

Was this a hint that Braddock had been sent by a wrong route and that his successor would march to Fort Duquesne over the Old Trading Path?

CHAPTER II

A BLOOD-RED FRONTIER

There is no truer picture of the dark days of 1755-56 along the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia than that presented in the correspondence of Was.h.i.+ngton at this time. A great burden fell upon his young shoulders with the failure of the campaigns of 1755. Though far from being at fault, he suffered greatly through the faults and failures of others. The British army had come and had been routed. Now, after such a victory as the Indians had never dreamed possible, the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontiers, five hundred miles in length, lay helpless before the bands of bold marauders drunk with the blood of Braddock's slain.

The young colonel of the remnant of the Virginia Regiment took up the difficult task of defending the southern frontier as readily as though a quiet, happy life on his rich farms was an alternative as impossible as alluring. But perhaps a bleeding border-land never in the world needed a twenty-three year old lad more than Virginia now needed her young son. A flood-tide of murder and pillage swept over the Alleghenies. The raids of the savages brought the people to their senses, as the most terrible of tales came in from the frontier. But soon the question arose, "Where is the frontier?" The great track Braddock had opened for the conquest of the Ohio valley became the pathway of his conquerors, and soon Fort c.u.mberland, the frontier post, was far in the enemies' country. The Indians soon found Burd's road on the summit of the Alleghenies and poured over it by Raystown toward Carlisle and s.h.i.+ppensburg. Each day brought the line of settlements nearer and nearer the populous portions of Virginia and Pennsylvania, until Winchester became an endangered outpost and fears were entertained for Lancaster and York. Hundreds now who had refused the despairing Braddock horses and wagons saw their wives and children murdered and their homesteads burned to the ground.

Whether Dunbar did right or wrong in hurrying back to Virginia, it was a bitter day for Virginia and Pennsylvania. When his army hastened from the frontier, it became the prey of the foes whose appet.i.te that army had whetted. Yet s.h.i.+rley, reconsidering his former scheme, ordered Dunbar to New York. After drawing the full fire of the French and Indians upon Virginia and Pennsylvania, this army was sent to New York.

Looking backward, with the stern years 1775-82 in mind, it is easy to see that then, in 1755, Pennsylvania and Virginia were to be put through a hard school for a glorious purpose. They were to be trained in the art of war. Of it they had known practically nothing. They had no effective militia. Of military ethics they had no dream. They knew not what obedience meant and could not understand delegated authority. Their liberty was license or nothing. Of the power of organization, concentration, discipline, routine, and method they were almost as ignorant as their redskinned enemies. Although the men of New England had not been given such great obstacles to overcome, it is undoubtedly true that their militia was far more adequate than anything of which Pennsylvania or Virginia knew, at least until 1758.[43] And yet Braddock died cursing his regulars and extolling the colonials!

Was.h.i.+ngton was elected commander-in-chief in Virginia on his own dignified terms; the army was increased to sixteen companies and 40,000 were voted for general defense. By October the young commander was at Winchester, where he faced a situation desperate and appalling. The country-side was terror-stricken, and few could be found even for defense; many chose "to die with their wives and families." The few score men who attempted to stem the tide of retreat were almost powerless. "No orders are obeyed," Was.h.i.+ngton wrote Dinwiddie, "but such as a party of soldiers, or my own drawn sword enforces." Such was the frenzy of the retreat of the frontier population that threats were made "to blow out the brains" of all in authority who opposed them. But the young commander continued undaunted. He impressed men and horses and wagons, and sent them hurrying for flour and musket-b.a.l.l.s and flints; he compelled men to erect little fortresses to which the people might flee.