Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs Volume II Part 9

When General Grant was before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives during the impeachment investigation, this question was put to him:

"Have you at any time heard the President make any remark in regard to the admission of members of Congress from rebel States in either House?"

"I cannot say positively what I have heard him say. I have heard him say as much in his public speeches as anywhere else. I have heard him say twice in his speeches that if the North carried the election by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, the majority, why should they not be the Congress of the United States? I have heard him say that several times."

That answer was followed by this question:

"When you say the North, you mean the Democratic Party of the North, or, in other words, the party advocating his policy?"

General Grant replied:

"I meant if the North carried enough members in favor of the admission of the South. I did not hear him say that he would recognize them as the Congress, I merely heard him ask the question, 'Why would they not be the Congress?'"

At this point, and without further discussion of the purpose of Mr.

Johnson in regard to the reorganization of the Government, I think it may be stated without injustice to him, that while he was opposed to secession at the time the Confederate Government was organized, and thenceforward and always without change of opinion, yet he was also of opinion that the act of secession by the several States had not disturbed their legal relations to the National Government. Acting upon that opinion, he proceeded to reorganize the State governments, and with the purpose of securing the admission of their Senators and Representatives without seeking or accepting the judgment of Congress upon the questions involved in the proceeding. On one vital point he erred seriously and fundamentally as to the authority of the President in the matter. From the nature of our Government there could be no escape in a legal point of view from the conclusion that, whatever the relations were of the seceding States to the General Government, the method of restoration was to be ascertained and determined by Congress, and not by the President acting as the chief executive authority of the nation. In a legal and const.i.tutional view, that act on his part, although resting upon opinions which he had long entertained, and which were entertained by many others, must be treated as an act of usurpation.

The facts embodied in the charges on which Mr. Johnson was impeached by the House and arraigned before the Senate were not open to doubt, but legal proof was wanting in regard to the exact language of his speeches. The charges were in substance these: That he had attacked the integrity and the lawful authority of the Congress of the United States in public speeches made in the presence of the country. The second charge was that he had attempted the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, and that, without the concurrence of the Senate, he had so removed him, contrary to the act of Congress, known as the Tenure of Office Act. In the first investigation into the conduct of Andrew Johnson, he was described in the resolution as "Vice-President of the United States, discharging at present the duties of President of the United States." The resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives the seventh day of March, 1867. A large amount of testimony was taken, and the report of the committee, in three parts, by the different members, was submitted to the House the fourth day of the following December. The majority of the committee, consisting of George S. Boutwell, Francis Thomas, Thomas Williams, William Lawrence, and John C. Churchill, reported a resolution providing for the impeachment of the President of the United States, in these words: "Resolved, that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors." It will be observed that in the resolution for his impeachment he is described as "President of the United States," while in the resolution authorizing the inquiry into his conduct he is described as "Vice- President, discharging at present the duties of the President of the United States." This question received very careful consideration by the committee, and the conclusion was reached that he was the President of the United States, although he had been elected only to the office of Vice-President. As that question was not raised at the trial by demurrer or motion, it may now be accepted as the established doctrine that the Vice-President, when he enters upon the duties of President, becomes President of the United States. The extended report that was made by the majority of the committee was written by Mr. Williams.

The summary, which was in the nature of charges, was written by myself.

That summary set forth twenty-eight specifications of misconduct on the part of the President, many of which, however, where abandoned when the articles of impeachment were prepared in February, 1868.

In the discussion of the committee there were serious differences of opinion upon provisions of law. The minority of the committee, consisting of James F. Wilson, who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Frederick E. Woodbridge, S. S. Marshall, and Charles R.

Eldridge, maintained the doctrine that a civil officer under the Const.i.tution of the United States was not liable to impeachment except for the commission of an indictable offence. This doctrine had very large support in the legal profession, resting on remarks found in Blackstone. On the other hand, Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, had given support to the doctrine that a civil officer was liable to impeachment who misdemeaned himself in office. The provision of the Const.i.tution is in these words:

"The President, Vice-President, and all Civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

The majority of the Judiciary Committee, in the controversy which arose in the committee and in the House of Representatives, maintained that the word "misdemeanors" was used in a political sense, and not in the sense in which it is used in criminal law. In support of this view attention was called to the fact that the party convicted was liable only to removal from office, and therefore that the object of the process of impeachment was the purification and preservation of the civil service. In the opinion of the majority, it was the necessity of the situation that the power of impeachment should extend to acts and offences that were not indictable by statute nor at common law. The report of the Judiciary Committee, made the twenty-fifth day of November, was rejected by the House of Representatives.

The attempt of the President to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War revived the question of impeachment, and on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of February, 1868, the House of Representatives "resolved to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors." The articles of impeachment were acted on by the House of Representatives the second day of March, and on the fourth day of March they were presented to the Senate through Mr. Bingham, chairman of the managers, who was designated for that duty.

The articles were directed to the following points, namely: That the President, by his speeches, had attempted "to set aside the rightful authority and powers of Congress"; that he had attempted "to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States and the several branches thereof"; and "that he had attempted to incite the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by them duly and const.i.tutionally enacted." Further, it was alleged that he had declared in speeches that the "Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Const.i.tution of the United States to exercise legislative power in the same."

A further charge, and on which greater reliance was placed, was set forth in these words: "That he had denied and intended to deny the power of the Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the Const.i.tution of the United States." These articles were in substance the articles that had been rejected by the House of Representatives in 1867. Finally, as the most important averment of all, the President was charged with an "attempt to prevent the execution of the act ent.i.tled 'An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices,'

pa.s.sed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving and attempting to contrive means by which he could prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the function of the office of the Secretary for the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of the said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War." In various forms of language these several charges were set forth in the different articles of impeachment--eleven in all. The eleventh article, which was prepared by Mr. Stevens, embodied the summary of all the charges mentioned. It is to be observed that in the eleventh article there is no allegation that the President had committed an offence that was indictable under any statute of the United States or that would have been indictable at common law. It may be a.s.sumed, I think, that for this country, at least, the question that was raised at the beginning and argued with great force, and by which possibly the House of Representatives may have been influenced in the year 1867, has been settled in accord with the report of the majority of the Judiciary Committee. The House decided that the President was impeachable for misdemeanors in office. With stronger reason it may be said that every other civil officer is bound to behave himself well in his office. He cannot do any act which impairs his standing in the place which he holds, or which may bring discredit upon the public, and especially he may not do any act in disregard of his oath to obey the laws and to support the Const.i.tution of the country. The eleventh article was the chief article that was submitted to a vote in the Senate. The question raised by that article is this in substance: Is the President of the United States guilty in manner and form as set forth in this article? On that question thirty- five Senators voted that he was guilty, and nineteen Senators voted that he was not guilty. Under the Const.i.tution the President was found not guilty of the offences charged, but the majority given may be accepted, and probably will be accepted, as the judgment of the Senate that the President of the United States is liable to impeachment and removal from office for acts and conduct that do not subject him to the process of indictment and trial in the criminal courts. At this point I express the opinion that something has been gained, indeed that much has been gained, by the decision of the House of Representatives, supported by the opinions of a large majority in the Senate.

The answer of the respondent, considered in connection with the arguments that were made by his counsel, sets forth the ground upon which the Republican members of the Senate may have voted that the President was not guilty of the two princ.i.p.al offences charged, viz: that in his speeches he had denounced and brought into contempt, intentionally, the Congress of the United States; and, second, that his attempted removal of Edwin M. Stanton was a violation of the Tenure of Office Act. In the President's answer to article ten, which contained the allegation that in his speech at St. Louis, in the year 1866, he had used certain language in derogation of the authority of the Congress of the United States, it was averred that the extracts did not present his speech or address accurately. Further than that, it was claimed that the allegation under that article was not "cognizable by the court as a high misdemeanor in office." Finally, it was claimed that proof should be made of the "actual" speech and address of the President on that occasion. The managers were not able to meet the demand for proof in a technical sense. The speech was reported in the ordinary way, and the proof was limited to the good faith of the reporters and the general accuracy of the printed report in the newspapers. In this situation as to the charges and the answer, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that members of the Senate had ground for the vote of not guilty upon the several charges in regard to the speeches that were imputed to the President.

Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to the article in which the President was charged with the violation of the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The proviso of the statute was in these words: "Provided that the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal by and with the advice of the Senate." The proviso contained exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate were secure in their places unless the Senate should a.s.sent to their removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor.

The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during his term.

There were incidents in the course of the proceedings that possess historical value. By the Const.i.tution the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is made the presiding officer in the Senate when the President is put upon trial on articles of impeachment. Chief Justice Chase claimed that he was to be addressed as "Chief Justice." That claim was recognized by the counsel for the President and by some members of the Senate. The managers claimed that he was there as the presiding officer, and not in his judiciary capacity. He was addressed by the managers and some of the Senators as "Mr. President."

There was a difference of opinion in the Senate, and a difference between the managers and the counsel for the respondent, as to the right of the presiding officer to rule upon questions of law and evidence arising in the course of the trial. Under the rule of the Senate as adopted, the rulings of the President were to stand unless a Senator should ask for the judgment of the Senate.

Other instances occurred which do not possess historical value, but were incidents unusual in judicial proceedings. When the Judiciary Committee of the House was entering upon the investigation of the conduct of President Johnson, General Butler expressed the opinion that upon the adoption of articles of impeachment by the House the President would be suspended in his office until the verdict of the Senate. As this view was not accepted by the committee, I made these remarks in my opening speech to the House after a review of the arguments for and against the proposition:

"I cannot doubt the soundness of the opinion that the President, even when impeached by the House, is ent.i.tled to his office until he has been convicted by the Senate."

This view was accepted.

At the first meeting of the managers I was elected chairman by the votes of Mr. Stevens, General Logan, and General Butler. Mr. Bingham received the votes of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Williams. Upon the announcement of the vote, Mr. Bingham made remarks indicating serious disappointment and a purpose to retire from the Board of Managers. I accepted the election, and acted as chairman at the meeting. At the next meeting, and without consultation with my a.s.sociates, I resigned the place and nominated Mr. Bingham. The nomination was not objected to, and Mr. Bingham took the chair without comment by himself, nor was there any comment by any other person. The gentlemen who had given me their votes and support criticized my conduct with considerable freedom, and were by no means reconciled by the statement which I made to them. Having reference to the nature of the contest and the condition of public sentiment, I thought it important that the managers should avoid any controversy before the public, especially as to a matter of premiers.h.i.+p in the conduct of the trial. It seemed to be important that the entire force of the House of Representatives should be directed to one object, the conviction of the accused.

Beyond this, Mr. Bingham and Mr. Wilson had been opposed to the impeachment of Mr. Johnson when the attempt was first made in the House of Representatives. I thought it important to combine the strength that they represented in support of the proceeding in which we were then engaged. If Mr. Stevens had been in good health, he would have received my support and the support of General Butler and General Logan. At that time his health was much impaired, but his intellectual faculties were free from any cloud.

Another incident occurred which does not require explanation, and which may not be open to any explanation. After the report of the Judiciary Committee, and its rejection by the House of Representatives, I was surprised to receive an invitation from the President to dine with him at what is known as a State dinner. I a.s.sumed that arrangements had been made for a series of such dinners, and that the invitation had been sent out by a clerk upon a prearranged plan as to the order of invitations. When the matter had pa.s.sed out of my mind, but before the day named for the dinner, I received a call on the floor of the House from Mr. Cooper, son-in-law of the President and secretary in the Executive Mansion. He asked me if I had received an invitation to dine with the President. I said I had. Next he said, "Have you answered it?" I said, "No, I have not." That was followed by the further question, "Will you answer it?" I said, "No, I shall not."

That ended the conversation.

After the decision in the Senate had been made, the managers proceeded under the order of the House to investigate the truthfulness of rumors that were afloat, that money and other valuable considerations had been used to secure the acquittal of the President. That investigation established the fact that money had been in the possession of persons who had been engaged in efforts to secure the acquittal of the President. Those persons, with perhaps a single exception, were persons who had no official connection with the Government, and none of them were connected with the Government at Was.h.i.+ngton. As to most of them, it appeared that they had no reasons, indeed no good cause, why they should have taken part either for the conviction of the President or in behalf of his acquittal. The sources from which funds were obtained did not appear, nor was there evidence indicating the amount that had been used, nor the objects to which the money had been applied. It should be said as to Senators, that there was no evidence implicating them in the receipt of money or other valuable considerations. One very important fact not then known to the managers appeared afterwards in the report of the Treasury Department, showing a very large loss by the Government during the last eighteen months of Mr. Johnson's administration. In that period the total receipts from the duties on spirits amounted to $41,678,684.34. During the first eighteen months of General Grant's administration, when the rates of duties and taxation remained the same, the total receipts of revenue from spirits amounted to $82,417,419.85, showing a difference of $40,738,735.51. It is not easy to explain in full this money loss in one branch of the public service. Something may be attributed to the fact that persons obtained nominations for office by representations to the President that they were his friends and supporters, and would continue to be so, under all circ.u.mstances. When their nominations came to the Senate, they made representations of an opposite character.

When they had received their appointments, they very naturally allied themselves with the President's policy, inasmuch as they could not be easily removed except upon an initiative taken by him. This deficiency occurred in the states and districts in which the money should have been collected and through the agents employed there. It other words, no part of the deficiency ever pa.s.sed into the Treasury of the United States.

It is not improbable that a majority of the people now entertain the opinion that the action of the House of Representatives in the attempt that was made to impeach President Johnson was an error.

It is not for me to engage in a discussion on that point. I end by the expression of the opinion that the vote of the House and the vote of the Senate, by which the doctrine was established that a civil officer is liable to impeachment for misdemeanor in office, is a gain to the public that is full compensation for the undertaking, and that these proceedings against Mr. Johnson were free from any element or quality of injustice.

Johnson's case ought to be borne in mind in all agitation for a longer Presidential term. Whenever the country is engaged in a Presidential contest there are complains by business men accompanied by a demand for an extension of the term of office to six or in some instances to ten years. The disturbance of business is due to the importance of the election, and the importance of an election is due to the amount of power that is to be secured by the successful party. An extension of the term would add to the importance of the election, and a term of six or ten years would intensify the contest and the injury to business would be intensified, proportionately. It is doubtful whether in a period of twenty or fifty years any appreciable relief to business would be furnished by an extension of the term of the Presidential office.

It is by no means certain that the total of business is not as great as it would be in the same four years if the term were ten years instead of four. The total of production and consumption cannot be affected seriously by a political controversy that does not extend usually, over a period of more than three months. If business is diminished during those months there will be a corresponding gain in the months that are to follow.

In a popular government there must be elections, and in all such governments business interests must be subordinated to the general welfare. The changes that have taken place since the Government was organized would justify the shortening rather than the lengthening of the Presidential term. The means of communication are such that two years may give the ma.s.s of the people better means for judging men and measures than could be had in four years at the opening of this century.

There is no form of education that more fully justifies its cost than the education that is gained in a Presidential canva.s.s. The newspapers, the magazines, and more than all the speakers--"stump orators" as they are called--communicate information and stimulate thought. The voters are converted into a great jury, and after full allowance is made for weakness, corruption and coercion, they are advanced at each quadrennial contest in their knowledge of men, in their ability to deal with measures of policy, and in comprehension of the principles of government. If the losses in business were as great as is ever represented, the educational advantages of a Presidential canva.s.s are an adequate set-off. The people have an opportunity to see and hear the men who are engaged in public affairs and questions are discussed upon their intrinsic merits. In the sixty years of my experience there has been a great advance in the quality of the speeches to which the people have listened. The speeches of 1840 would not be tolerated in 1900.

When great questions are under debate appeals are made to the principles of government and proportionately the education of the people is of a higher grade.

A serious objection to a long term in the Presidential office is the fact that a spirit of discontent, that always exists, will develop into insubordination or even revolution. We have an example in the history of the Republic of Hayti. The term is seven years and in many cases the President has been superseded by the leader of a revolutionary party. The most recent instance was the overthrow of President Legitime and the instalment of Hyppolite. The peace and prosperity of Hayti would be promoted by reducing the term of the Presidential office to two years. The contests that are sure to arise among a mercurial people would thus be transferred from the battle-field to the ballot- box. Who could have answered for the peace of the United States in 1868 if President Johnson's term had been six years instead of eight months?

[* This was a race riot, which occurred July 30, 1866, and in which many negroes were killed.--EDITOR.]

x.x.xIII THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT IN 1869

In March, 1869, I was appointed Secretary of the Treasury by President Grant. Soon after my appointment Mr. McCulloch, the retiring Secretary, said to me that I should find the department in excellent order, and that in his opinion the financial difficulties of the Government had been overcome. The first of these statements was true in part, and in part it was very erroneous.

The accounting branch of the service was properly administered practically, but there were about one hundred persons on the pay rolls who had no desks in the department, and who performed but little work at their homes, where some of them ostensibly were employed in copying.

Several heads of bureaus were notoriously intemperate. This condition of things was due in part to the war and to the exigencies of the department consequent upon the war; and in part it was due to the const.i.tutional infirmities of Mr. Chase and Mr. McCulloch. In some respects they resembled each other. They were phlegmatic in temperament, lacking in versatility, and lacking in facility for labor and business.

Mr. McCulloch was diligent, industrious and conscientiously devoted to his duties. He had been crippled in his administration by the conflict between Congress and the President. The head of the Treasury needs the confidence of the President, and the confidence and the support of Congress. The latter Mr. McCulloch did not enjoy, and there were indications that in some respects he differed with the President. He was hampered by the fact that any change in the personnel of his department would be followed by inquiries from one party or the other, coupled oftentimes with complaints and criticisms.

Great evils existed in the revenue system. The controversy between Congress and the President led to many removals of collectors of customs and of internal revenue. Their places were supplied by persons who could accommodate themselves to both parties. The President was made to believe that the applicants were his friends, but that their relations with Republican Senators were such that they could secure confirmation. When nominated these men represented themselves as good Republicans and friendly to the Congressional policy. From such persons an honest performance of duty could not have been expected.

Hence gross frauds upon the revenue were perpetrated and in most instances by the connivance of those in office.

The returns for the last year of Johnson's administration, and the first years of Grant's administration, showed that the loss on whisky in the first named period was not less than thirty million dollars.

That there were other great losses was proved by the facts that the payments on the public debt were less than thirty million dollars during the last year of Johnson's administration and that the payments were one hundred million dollars during the first year of Grant's administration, and that without any additional sources of revenue.

If Mr. McCulloch's first statement had been true in the most important particulars, his second claim would not have been open to debate. It was true that the department had pa.s.sed the point where there was any exigency for money. The Government was no longer a borrower. Payments on the public debt had been made, but otherwise nothing had been done to relieve the country of the interest account, nor was the credit of the Government such that any practicable movement in that direction could have been made.

The six per cent bonds were worth only 83 or 84, and no step had been taken to redeem the pledge of the Government in regard to the Sinking Fund made in the act of February 25, 1862. The interest account exceeded two hundred and thirty-three million dollars.